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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
1. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. *Nonunion Employee's Right to Representation at Investigatory Interview as Protected
Concerted Activity Under the National Labor Relations Act: Slaughter v. National Labor
Relations Board'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) guarantees employees the right
"to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." 2 Section 7's safeguards extend to concerted activities of both
union members and unorganized ernployees. 5 Protected concerted activities include the
employees' attempts to protest employment conditions so long as the activities are not
unlawful,4 in breach of contracts or violent.6
In defining the parameters of section 7's protection, the United States Supreme
Court in its 1979 decision of N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc.' affirmed the National Labor
Relations Board's (the Board) finding that section 7 of the Act guarantees union em-
ployees the right to refuse to submit to an investigatory interview absent a union rep-
_ resentative when the employee reasonably believes that the interview may result in
disciplinary action. 8 Three years after Weingarten, the Board in Materials Research Corp.
extended the section 7 right to have a representative present during investigatory inter-
views to nonunion employees.'' The Board, however, subsequently overruled its extension
of Weingarten to nonunion workers in the 1985 decision of Sears, Roebuck and Co.'° In
Sears, the Board held that nonunion employees do not possess the right, under section
7, to have a fellow employee present at an investigatory interview.['
During the Survey year, in Slaughter v. National Labor Relations Board,' 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Board's Sears decision, holding
* By Richard Gemma, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120, 122, 122 L.R.R.M. 2867, 2869 (3rd Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 states in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...." Id.
5 N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17, 50 L.R.R.M. 2235, 2238 (1962) (section
7 concerted activities include a walk out by nonunion employees in protest of extremely cold air
temperature in shop),
4 Id. at 17, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2239.
3 ld. See Fournelle v. N.L.R,B,, 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. 2441 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (employers
may discipline employees who engage in strikes in breach of contract).
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 17, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2239. See N.L.R.B, v, City Disposal
Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 115 L.R.R.M, 3193 (1984) (employee may engage in concerted activity
in such abusive manner that employee sacrifices section 7 protection).
7 420 U.S. 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1979) (union employee requested presence of union rep-
resentative at disciplinary hearing).
8 Id. at 260, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2692.
9 262 N.L.R.B, 1010, 1015, 110 L.R.R.M, 1401, 1406 (1982) (nonunion employee attended
disciplinary hearing while his request for representation was denied).
10 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55 at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329 (1985) (nonunion employee requested the
presence of a fellow employee at the interview).
"Id. at 3 n.5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329 n.5.
12 794 F.2d 120, 122, 122 L.R.R.M. 2867, 2869 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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that an employee's right to demand a union representative's presence at an investigatory
interview may be a protected concerted activity under section 7." In this regard, the
court found that there were two permissible interpretations of section 7: first, that the
section 7 right to a representative at investigatory interviews only applied to union
employees; and, second, that section 7's right to have a representative present at an
investigatory interview applied to both union and nonunion employees." Because the
Sears Board never considered the possibility that nonunion employees possessed a section
7 right to demand the presence of a fellow employee at an investigatory interview, the
court remanded the case to the Board to consider which permissible interpretation to
adopt."
In Slaughter, a nonunion employee, Slaughter, filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer, E.1. DuPont de Nemours and Co. (DuPont), claiming that DuPont
improperly discharged him because he refused to submit to an investigatory interview
without a fellow employee present.' 6 Specifically, DuPont demanded on at least four
occasions that Slaughter attend a meeting concerning Slaughter's posting of a notice of
employee rights on a bulletin board. 17 Slaughter told DuPont that he would discuss the
incident only in the presence of a fellow employee." On two occasions, DuPont ordered
the co-worker attending the meeting with Slaughter to return to work and suspended
Slaughter because he refused to attend the meeting alone.' 9 DuPont continually pres-
sured Slaughter until he attended an investigatory meeting alone and DuPont subse-
quently discharged Slaughter for his previous failure to attend the meetings alone."
Following his discharge, Slaughter filed a charge with the Board alleging that DuPont
violated his section 7 right to have a fellow employee present at the investigatory inter-
vieW. 2 ' The Board held that section 7 guaranteed Slaughter, a nonunion employee, the
right to demand the presence of a fellow employee at an investigatory interview. 22 The
Board stated that by discharging Slaughter for exercising that right, DuPont commited
an unfair labor practice and ordered Slaughter's reinstatement.23 DuPont appealed the
Board's ruling.
In the 1982 decision of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. (Chestnut Run) v. N.L.R.B., 24
(DuPont I) the Third Circuit affirmed the Board's interpretation that section 7 guaranteed
nonunion employees the right to have fellow employees present at investigatory inter-
" Id. at 126, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2872,
" Id. at 128, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
ls Id. In remanding the case back to the Board, the court noted its duty to establish the
boundaries for permissible interpretations of section 7 protection. Id.
16 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 724 F.2d 1061, 1064, 115 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155
(3rd Cir. 1983) (the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Slaughter had a
right to insist upon the presence of a fellow employee).
" Id. at 1063-64, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2154-55.
" Id.
Lo Id. at 1064, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2155.
20 Id.
" E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1029, 110 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1418 (1982).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1028, 110 L.R.R.M, at 1418. The Board held that DuPont violated section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Id. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), establishes unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title ...."
" 724 F.2d 1061, 115 L.R.R.M. 2153.
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views. 25 While DuPont's petition for rehearing was pending, however, the court vacated
its opinion and remanded the case to the Board because the Board wished to reconsider
Slaughter's claim in conjunction with the Sears case.26
On remand, the Board, reversing its original decision, ruled that Slaughter's refusal
to attend an investigatory meeting albne was not protected concerted activity." The
Board, citing the Sears holding that section 7 did not guarantee nonunion employees
the right to have a representative present, dismissed the complaint." The Board held
that because Sears established that the Act's language "compelled" the conclusion that
nonunion employees must attend investigatory interviews, to give such employees the
right to have fellow employees present at such interviews was erroneous. 29 Slaughter
petitioned for review."
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Slaughter Board adopted the
Sears holding that the Act "compels" the conclusion that nonunion employees do not
enjoy the right to representation previously granted to union employees in Weingarten."
Affirmance of the Slaughter Board's decision, the court observed, thus would preclude
any other interpretation of the Act.32 The Third Circuit, reasoning that its decision to
extend the section 7 right of representation to nonunion employees was a permissible
interpretation of the Act, reinstated Slaughter's claim."
To justify its view that a permissible interpretation of the Act would allow extension
of investigatory interview representation rights to nonunion employees, the Third Circuit
first reviewed Weingarten." In Weingarten, the Third Circuit noted, the Supreme Court
held that an employee seeking representation at an investigatory interview constitutes
"concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection" under section 7 because the repre-
sentation ensured fair and uniform disciplinary practices." The Weingarten Court rec-
ognized, the Third Circuit further stated, that such representation effectuates the Act's
purpose of protecting the workers' full freedom of association and of equalizing the
bargaining power between employees and employers. 36
The Third Circuit next examined the Materials Research Board's original rationale
for extending the investigatory interview right to nonunion employees." Specifically, the
court noted that although the Materials Research Board used the term "union represen-
tative" in its decision, it did so merely to depict the particular fact pattern and did not
intend to limit the representation right to union employees." Thus, the court noted, the
25 Id. at 1064, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2155.
26 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 733 F.2d 296, 297-98, 116 L.R.R.M. 2343,
2343-44 (3rd Cir. 1984). In vacating its decision, the Third Circuit noted the special deference
granted to the Board's expertise in interpreting the Act. Id.
27 E.I. DuPont, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 176 at 3-4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
28 Id.
29 Id.
"Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 121, 122 L.R.R.M, at 2869.
31 /d. at 122, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2869.
32 Id.
53 Id .
54 Id.
55 Id. at 123, 122 L,R.R.M. at 2869.
66 Id.
37 Id. at 123, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
33 Id.
72	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 29:67
Board's previous decisions contained no particular reason for refusing to extend the
representation rights to nonunion employees. 3°
The Third Circuit also considered whether the employee's right to investigatory
interview representation flows from section 7's protection of concerted activity or whether
such representation arises from the union's exclusive representation of employees in
collective bargaining under section 9 of the Act. 4° Specifically, the court distinguished
the employees' right to representation from the union's right to represent exclusively by
observing that the employer is not obligated to bargain with the investigatory interview
representative who merely assists in clarifying facts." Moreover, the court found that
the union's status as a collective bargaining representative is irrelevant where the em-
ployer's act implicates the section 7 rights of nonunion employees„P Indeed, the court
noted the Material Research Board's original rationale that nonunion employees may, due
to the lack of safeguards against an employer's arbitrary conduct in an unorganized
plant, require the presence of an investigatory interview representative even more than
union employees. 4 °
The court then considered whether the right to representation arose under section
8(a)(5) of the Act, which provides that where a collective bargaining agreement is present
an employee must deal with the employer through his or her representative instead of
individually." The court found that section 8(a)(5) did not apply. 40 The Board, the court
stated, erroneously believed that the representation right's extension to nonunion em-
ployees was illogical because nonunion employees do not enjoy the right to representation
in other employer-employee conflicts 46 In particular, the court distinguished disciplinary
meetings, which implicate a right to union representation, from investigatory interviews,
which involve potential employer action. 47 Unlike disciplinary meetings, the court noted,
the employer is not required to bargain at the interview and may even bypass the
interview entirely. 4° Thus, the court concluded, the right to investigatory interview
representation does not stem from section 8(a)(5)'s right to bargain collectively but from
section 7's protection of concerted activity. 49
The Third Circuit found that guaranteeing both union members and nonunion
employees the right to representation at an investigatory interview is a permissible
interpretation of the Acts° The court overruled, therefore, the Sears Board's view that
the Act "compelled" the finding that nonunion employees possessed no right to repre-
39
 Id.
40 Id. Section 9(a) states in relevant part: "Representatives designed or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees ...." 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
4 ' Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 123, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
42 Id. at 124, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
49 Id. at 124, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2870. The co-worker can assist in identifying and in describing
the incident, in providing moral support for a fearful employee and in helping to diminish unjust
disciplinary action. Id.
44 Id. at 126, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2871. Section 8(a) states in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful
for an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (8)(a)(5).
4' Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 126, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2872.
46 Id. at 126, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2871-72.
47
 Id.
" Id.
49 Id. at 126, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2872.
50 Id. at 128, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
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sentation and remanded the case to the Board." The court noted, however, that the
Board could limit the right. to representation to union employees by altering the Sears
decision's language, replacing the term "compelling interpretation" with the term "per-
missible interpretation." 52 The court justified its reversal on the grounds that the ruling
effectuates "the proper execution of the legislative will" and thus establishes the correct
path for development of labor law. 53
In Slaughter, the court correctly found that section 7 protected both union and
nonunion employees' rights to have a representative at investigatory interviews." The
court properly relied on the Supreme Court's clear emphasis on section 7's protection
of concerted activity as forming the basis of the right to representation." The court
further relied on the Supreme Court's theoretical differentiation between the represen-
tative's rote at an investigatory interview and his or her role as a collective bargaining
representative," arid the need of fair and uniform disciplinary practices for nonunion
eniployees. 57 Thus, with a sound basis for a permissible interpretation of the Act, the
court correctly overruled the Board's interpretation that the Act compelled the finding
that nonunion employees do not enjoy the right to representation.
Because of the Board's special expertise in labor matters, the courts owe special
deference to the Board's interpretation of the Act. 58 The appeals court retains, however,
the authority to identify the boundaries for permissible interpretations." In Slaughter,
the Board failed to consider all permissable interpretations because it believed erro-
neously that the Act's language compelled a finding that section 7 did not protect the
nonunion employees' investigatory interview representation rights. Thus, the court cor-
rectly fulfilled its responsibility to establish the parameters of permissible interpretations
of the Act.
Although the Board in the future may adopt the "permissible interpretation" that
section 7 protects nonunion employees' investigatory interview representation rights and
not the "compelling view" that the Act does not extend the Weingarten right to nonunion
employees," the Third Circuit guided the legislature's intended path of labor law de-
velopment by allowing the Board more flexibility in altering the future scope of section
7 rights. 81 The personnel and philosophies of the Board are subject to constant change, 82
51 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
54 See id. at 123, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2869.
55 See id.
"See id,
" See id, at 123-24, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2870,
"Id, at 124, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2871. See Pattern Maker's League v. N.L.R.B., 473 U.S. 95, 119
L.R.R.M. 2928 (1985) (Board has primary responsibility in interpreting provisions of the Act).
"Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 125, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2870. See Prill v. N.L.R.B., 755 F.2d 941, 118
L.R.R.M. 2649 (D.C. Cir. 1985), ceri. denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v. Frill, 474 U.S. 946, 120
L.R.R.M. 3392 (1985) (the appropriate role of the judiciary is to establish the parameters for
permissible interpretation of the Act). In the 1943 decision of SEC v. Chenery Corp, the Supreme
Court established the judicial duty to declare an agency regulation invalid when based on a misin-
terpretation of congressional intent, or a misconception of the laW. 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943).
6° Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 128, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
61 Id. See Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders,
197 DUKE'. L.J. 215, 222 (1969) (one should judge the effectiveness of judicial supervision by its
effect on the development of law in the long run. and not solely in terms of the case in which the
correction was administered).
62	v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1228, 87 L.R.R.M. 2545, 2550 (5th Cir. 1974).
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and the existence of a "permissible interpretation" allows future Boards to alter their
views according to the needs of employer-employee relations while ensuring consistent
interpretations of the Act. In contrast, a "compelling interpretation" that indicates only
one possible interpretation circumscribes the Board's flexibility and forecasts inconsistent
interpretations of the Act when change is necessary." Thus, the Third Circuit's Slaughter
decision ensures consistent labor law development that permits the Board to adapt section
7 rights to employment needs.64
In sum, the Third Circuit in Slaughter v. N.L.R.B. held that an employee's right to
demand a union representative's presence is protected concerted activity under section
7." The court further held that a permissible, although not required, interpretation of
section 7 would extend the right to have a representative present at an investigatory
interview to nonunion employees also." The Third Circuit's Slaughter decision provides
the Board with the flexibility to alter the interpretation of section 7 rights, which alter-
ations may result in the determination that section 7 does not guarantee nonunion
employees the right to representation at investigatory interviews." Thus, until the Board
considers the question on remand, the rights of nonunion employees to representation
in investigatory interviews under section 7 and the corresponding limitations on em-
ployers in conducting investigatory interviews is unsettled.
B. *Defining Protected Concerted Activity Under the National Labor Relations Act: Meyers
Industries,  Inc.'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), grants employees the right
to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. 2 To this end, section 8(a)(1)
of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees engaging in such protected concerted activity.' The Act, however, does
not specify whether the activity, to be concerted, must involve the joint action of more
than one employee."
63 See Sears, 274 N.L,R.B. No. 55 at 3 n.5, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329 n.5. The Sears majority
recognized the distinction between the term "permissible interpretation" and "compelling interpre-
tation." Id.
64 But see Deaton, 502 F.2d at 1228, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2550 (a court should decline to interfere
with the consistency of the Board's decisions when interference defeats the essential policy of the
Act).
65 Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 126, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2872.
66 Id. at 128, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2873.	 .
67 Id.
* By Mark J. Shaffer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1986) [Meyers	 supple-
menting 268 NLRB 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984) [Meyers I].
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides, in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . ..." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 8(a)(1) states, in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of [their section 7] rights ..." Id.
4 See generally Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493-94; 115 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1025-
26 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting) [Meyers 1].
December 1987]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 75
From 1951 until 1975, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) defined
protected concerted activity as an activity engaged in, or authorized by, more than one
employee in pursuit of a common, work-related goal.' In 1975, however, the Board in
Alleluia Cushion Co. (Alleluia) focused its analysis of concerted activity on the activity's
purpose rather than the number of employees participating in it. The Alleluia Board
held that a single employee engaged in protected concerted activity when the other
employees ought to have had a group concern about the interest asserted by the indi-
vidual employee.s In 1984, the Board in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I) overruled Alleluia
Cushion and reverted to its former position that a single employee engages in concerted
activity only when he or she acts with the express consent of at least one other employee.?
Immediately following Meyers I, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems held
that a single union employee that seeks to enforce a right rooted in a collective bargaining
agreement engages in protected concerted activity, even if the employee does not obtain
any other employee's express consent. 8
During the Survey year, the Board in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II) reconsidered
its definition of protected concerted activity in light of City Disposal. 9 The Meyers II Board
reaffirmed its holding that one, non-union employee does not engage in protected
concerted activity if he or she fails to obtain any other employee's authorization, not-
withstanding the nature of the employee's concern.'° The Meyers II Board found its
Meyers I decision to be consistent with City Disposal, reasoning that the union employee's
assertion of contract rights "is a continuation of an ongoing process of concerted activ-
ity."" In contrast, a non-union employee, the Board stated, engages in concerted activity
only when the evidence shows that the employee acted as "a representative of at least
one other employee." 12 Meyers II thus demonstrates that the definition of a protected
concerted activity applies differently to union and non-union employees.
In Meyers II the employee, Kenneth Prill, was hired as a skilled driver on April 24,
1979, by Meyers Industries (Meyers), a Michigan company engaged in the manufacture,
sale and distribution of aluminum boats and related products.' 3 Meyers assigned Prill a
company truck and its trailer to haul boats from Michigan to various dealers throughout
5 See, e.g., Traylor-Pamco, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 380, 388, 59 L.R.R.M. 1756, 1756 (1965) ("There
is no evidence [in this case] that there was any consultation between the two [employees] in the
matter ..."); Continental Mfg., 155 N.L.R.B, 255, 257, 60 L.R.R.M. 1290, 1290 (1965) ("[The
acting employee] did not consult with ... any other employee, or the Union about the grievances
.."); Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314, 27 L.R.R.M. 1235, 1235 (1951) (" ... the guar-
antees of Section 7 of the Act extend to concerted activity which in its inception involves only a
speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indispensable preliminary step to employee self-
organization").
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1133 (1975). See also Meyers
I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
7 Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
8 465 U.S. 822, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
9 Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 at 7, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1140 (1986) [Meyers
Ill, supplementing 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
10
 Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 at 4-7, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1138-39.
11 Id. at 19, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1143.
12 1d, at 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141.
15 Prill v. N.L.R.B., 755 F.2d 941, 943, 118 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2650 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 313, 120 L.R.R.M. 3392 (1985).
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the country, 14
 This truck, however, had serious mechanical problems, especially with the
braking mechanism. 15 As a result, Prill complained several times to his employer upon
return from trips on which the truck's brakes had malfunctioned."
During a two week period in 1979, Ben Cove, another employee, drove the truck
assigned to Prill. 17
 Cove also experienced mechanical problems with the company truck."
At the same time Gove reported the truck's deficiencies to his supervisor, Prill was in
the office to receive his next assignment. 's Gove described the truck's problems to his
supervisor and stated, in Prill's presence, that he would not drive the truck until Meyers
repaired it."
Shortly after Cove's experiences with Prill's truck, Prill had an accident in Tennessee
in which the same truck jack-knifed because the brakes malfunctioned. 21 Prill then
decided to contact the Tennessee Public Service Commission to arrange for an official
inspection of the vehicle.22 As a result, the Department of Transportation cited Meyers
for operating an unsafe vehicle. 23 After Meyers learned of the accident and the citation,
it decided that the truck was not worth repairing and should be sold for scrap." Meyers
also decided to discharge Prill because it didn't like his "calling the cops like this all the
time."23
On the basis of these facts, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that
Meyers discharged Prill because he made safety complaints and refused to drive an
unsafe vehicle in Tennessee.26 The AL.', relying on Alleluia Cushion Co., held that Prill
engaged in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the Act. 27
14 1d.
15 Id. Prill's vehicle was equipped with braking systems on both the truck and the trailer
components. These systems, although they can be operated independently, ordinarily would func-
tion together when the brake pedal is depressed. On the truck assigned to Prill, however, the brakes
on the trailer essentially were inoperative. 1d. at 943 n.8, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.8.
16 Id. at 943, 118 L.R.R,M. at 2651.
17 Id.
le Id.
13 Id.
20 1d.
2 ' Id.
22 1d. at 944, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2651.
23 Id. See 49 C.F.R. § 396.4 (1978), the regulation that provides in relevant part:
Unsafe operations forbidden
No motor carrier shall permit or require a driver to drive any motor vehicle
revealed by inspection or operation to be in such condition that its operation would
be hazardous or likely to result in a breakdown of the vehicle .... If while any motor
vehicle is being operated on a highway, it is discovered to be in such unsafe condition,
it shall be continued in operation only to the nearest place where repairs can safely
be effected, and even such operations shall be conducted only if it be less hazardous
to the public than permitting the vehicle to remain on the highway.
" Frill, 755 F.2d at 944, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
25 Id. at 944-45, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2652. On an earlier trip to Ohio, Frill stopped at a roadside
inspection conducted by the Ohio State Highway Patrol. After the inspection, Ohio issued the truck
a citation for a number of defects including the brakes. When Prill returned to his employer in
Michigan, he showed the citation to his employer and submitted it together with his paperwork. Id.
at 943, 118 L.R.R,M. at 2651.
26 1d. at 945, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
R7 Id.
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Thus, the Aq found, Meyers had committed an unfair labor practice by discharging
Prill
The Board in Meyers 1 disagreed with the ALJ's decision and dismissed the corn-
plaint.29 Overruling Alleluia, the Board stated that activity could be concerted only if it
involved group action." The Board also criticized Alleluia as inconsistent with the Act
because it allowed group support of an action to be presumed rather than proven.."
Returning to the pre-Alleluia standard, the Board defined a protected concerted activity
as an activity engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by
or on behalf of the acting employee." Thus, the Board stated that before it would find
an 8(a)(1) violation four elements must be present: the activity was concerted; the
employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's activity; the concerted activity
was of a type protected by the Act; and the adverse employment action at issue, such as
the discharge, was motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity."
Applying this standard, the Board held that Frill had acted alone and on his own
behalf when he refused to drive the truck and contacted the Tennessee Public Service
Commission." The Board determined that Gove did not join in Frill's complaints before
the accident, but that Frill merely overheard Grove's complaint while in the office." The
greatest inference from this incident, the Board found, was that another employee
individually was concerned about the truck's condition." Taken by itself, the Board
stated, individual employee concern, even if openly displayed by several employees on
an individual basis, is not sufficient evidence to prove the existence of concerted activity."
Although the Board disapproved of the employer's attempt to get as much use as possible
from old machinery at the expense of Prill's safety, it concluded that section 7, framed
to legitimize and protect group action for mutual aid and protection, was not intended
to encompass this type of individual activity." Therefore, Prill's discharge, according to
the Board, did not violate his rights under section 7 of the Act."
Prill petitioned for review of the Board's decision with the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." The appeals court remanded Meyers to
the NLRB on the grounds that the Board erroneously assumed that the Act mandated
23 Id. The ALJ reasoned that Prill's refusal to drive the vehicle was mandated by Department
of Transportation regulations that reflected a concern for the safety of particular drivers as well as
for that of the public, and that an employee who complains about the safety of a particular truck
speaks for the safety of any employee who may drive that truck. Id. at 946, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
The Al ..J also determined that Prill's complaints before the accident were concerted activity because
they were joined by Gove, who had made similar complaints to his employer in Prill's presence. Id.
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
" Id. at 493-94, 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026, 1028-29.
" Id. at 495-96, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027-28.
"Id. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 498, 115 L.R,R,M. at 1030.
33 Id.
" Id.
37 Id.
" Id. at 499, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1031.
33 Id. One member of the Board dissented, arguing that the Board's use of the concept of
concerted activity to cut off protection for the individual employee who asserts collective rights
violates the history and spirit of Federal labor laws. Id. (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
43 hill v. N.L.R.B., 755 F.2(1 941, 118 L.R.R.M, 2649 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313,
120 L.R.R.M. 3392 (1985).
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the Board's interpretation of what constituted concerted activities. 4 ' The court deter-
mined that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in NLRB v. City Disposal
Systetns42 established that the Board was not required to give a literal, narrow, interpre-
tation to the term "concerted activity," but had substantial authority to define the scope
of section 7. 43
In City Disposal, the appeals court noted, the Supreme Court addressed whether an
individual employee who invoked a collective bargaining right engaged in concerted
activity within the meaning of section 7. 44 The Court, the appeals court found, affirmed
the Board's decision that an individual employee's reasonable and honest invocation of
a collective bargaining right amounted to concerted activity for two reasons: first, the
assertion of a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement is an extension of the
concerted action that produced the agreement; and, second, the assertion of such a right
affects the rights of all employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. 45
Thus, the D.C. Circuit remanded Meyers I to the Board to reconsider the issues in light
of City Disposal's
On reconsideration, the Board in Meyers II reaffirmed Meyers I, holding that a single
employee engages in concerted activity only where he or she acts with the express consent
of at least one other employee. 4' At the outset of its decision in Meyers II, the Board
recognized that it has a wide latitude in interpreting section 7 of the Act. 45 The Act,
noted the Board, emphasizes collective, rather than purely individual activity. 49 The
Board stated that the Act's purpose is to encourage the practice of collective bargaining
and to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization
and the designation of representatives of their own choosing. 513 The Board thus deter-
mined that it is proper to concentrate on joint employee action as the touchstone for an
analysis of which activities are within the scope of section 7. 31 The Board found that its
definition of concerted activity proceeded logically from such an analysis, because its
definition required a linkage to group action for the conduct to be deemed protected
concerted activity. 52
The Board also determined that its Meyers I decision was consistent with the recent
Supreme Court City Disposal decision.53 The Board noted that the City Disposal Court's
analysis focused on the precise manner in which the particular actions of an individual
4 ' Id. at 942, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2650. The court also remanded hill for what it called a lack of
rationale for a new definition. Id. The court did not, however, express an opinion as to the correct
test of concerted activity or whether the Board's standard of concerted activity resulted in a
reasonable interpretation of § 7 of the Act. See id. at 948 n.46, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2655 n.46.
42 465 U.S. 822, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
• Prill, 755 F.2d at 952, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
44 Id. at 949, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2656.
45 Id. at 952, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
4B at 957, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
" Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 at 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141,
SS Id. at 4, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
49 Id. at 4-5, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1139.
50 Id. at 5, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1139.
St Id. at 6-7, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1139.
32 Id. at 7, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1139.
SS Id.
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employee were linked to the actions of fellow employees." The Board reasoned that in
City Disposal the individual employee's assertion of a collective bargaining right was an
integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement and was, therefore, concerted
activity. 55 The Board stated that the Meyers claimant, unlike the City Disposal claimant,
did not invoke a right within any collective bargaining agreement."
The Board found, however, that its definition of concerted activity does not mean
that conduct engaged in by a single employee will never constitute concerted activity
under section 7. 57 The Board stressed that, to the contrary, the definition attempts to
define when an act of any employee is or is not concerted." The definition recognizes
that whether an employee has engaged in concerted activity is a factual question based
on the totality of the available evidence.59 Accordingly, when the evidence demonstrates
group activities, whether specifically authorized by other employees or otherwise, con-
certed activity will be found. 6°
In addition, the Meyers II Board noted that the definition of protected concerted
activity encompasses those circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or
induce group action as well as where individual employees bring group complaints to
the attention of management. 6 ' Furthermore, the Board stated, it is not questioned that
a conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker
and a listener." To qualify as concerted activity, however, the Board stated that the
conversation must appear at the very least to have occurred with the object of initiating
or inducing group action, or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of
the employees. 63 The Board concluded that the definition formulated is not exhaustive,
and any number of situations may arise calling for a careful scrutiny of the record on a
case by case basis."
Finally, the Board rejected the argument that an individual employee's safety com-
plaints in accordance with a state statute, or overall public policy considerations, require
the Board to protect purely individual activity.65 The Board determined that labor's
cause is often advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settle-
ment within the immediate employment context.66 Indeed, the Board stated, employees
may resort to administrative and judicial forums, and to legislators to protect their
interests as etnployees.67 The Board thus determined that an employee who asserts
54 Id. at 9, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1140.
55 1d. (citing City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 832, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3198).
5' Id. at 10 n.30, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1140 n.30. The court reasoned that it is collective activity
which lies at the core of $ 7 of the Act. Id, at 11, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141.
5, Id.
58 Id.
58 1d. at 13, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1141.
5° Id.
6 ' Id. at 15, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
62 Id. at 16, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
68 Id. (quoting Vought Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1294 (1984), enforced, 788 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir.
1986)).
6, Id.
66 Id. at 17, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142-43.
" 1d. at 17, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1 143 (quoting Eastex Inc. v. N,L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565-66, 98
L.R.R.M. 2717, 2720 (1978)).
67 Id. (quoting Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565-66, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2720).
80
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:67
contract rights engages in a protected continuation of the ongoing process of employee
concerted activity, whereas an individual employee who asserts statutory rights is not
similarly protected."
The Board's ruling in Meyers II allows employers lawfully to discharge employees
for filing safety cornplaints. 69 The Meyers II Board found that the Act did not protect
Prill because no other employee expressly joined him in lodging his complaints." Despite
the apparently inequitable result of the decision, the Board, consistent with section 7 of
the Act, correctly defined protected concerted activity and properly excluded from this
definition an employee who acted solely on his own behalf." Accordingly, under Meyers
II, an employee's actions will amount to concerted activity if the action is undertaken
with, or on the authority of, other employees, and not solely by or on behalf of the
acting employee." The effect of drawing such a narrow definition will be to reduce
instances where a single, non-union, employee complains about workplace conditions
and threatens the employer that he or she will report the purported violation to "higher
authorities." In addition, the Meyers II standard suggests that even if an employee's
actions are found to be concerted, the employer's discharge of these employees will be
lawful where the employer did not know that the activity was concerted and was not
motivated to act in response to the employee's concerted activity."
Moreover, the Meyers II decision creates a dual analysis of concerted activity that
depends on whether the acting employee is union or non-union. If the employee is
union, the Board presumes the activity is "concerted." If the acting employee is non-
union, the activity is concerted only if the employee acted with the express consent of
at least one other employee. The Meyers II Board correctly balanced the employee's right
to engage in collective activity against the employer's right to discipline an individual
employee who acts solely on his or her own behalf.
Meyers II also provides employers with greater predictability in dealing with their
employees. While employers must ensure that employees' working conditions are rea-
sonably safe, employers also may be free from individual employees' threats. At the same
time, employees must learn that their actions to obtain better working conditions will be
protected if they act in concert. It is through the strength of employees working together
toward a common goal that the inequalities in bargaining power between employers and
employees will be overcome. 74
In sum, during the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board in Meyers
Industries, Inc. affirmed its earlier decision overruling Alleluia Cushion Co. and developed
a more literal definition of concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.
In Meyers II, the Board defined concerted activity by considering whether an individual
employee acted with the consent of at least one other employee for mutual aid or
protection. Furthermore, according to Meyers II, even if the employee engaged in con-
certed activity, the employer has committed an unfair labor practice only if the employer
knew of the concerted nature of the activity, the activity was of a type protected by the
" Id. at 19,123 L.R.R.M. at 1143.
69 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
7' See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
" See generally supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Act, and the employer's adverse employment action was motivated by the employee's
protected concerted activity.
C. *Intent to Evade Union Obligations as a Factor in Alter Ego Analysis: NLRB v. Allcoast
Transfer, Inc.'
Under sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 2 it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement
entered into with the employee unions When an employer changes its corporate form
by selling its assets or discontinuing its operations, it is well established that a collective
bargaining agreement, entered into by a previous employer, does not bind a successor
employer. 4 Courts, however, agree that if the existing, non-union employer is an "alter
ego" of a previous employer with whom the union had a collective bargaining agreement,
the "alter ego" employer must comply with the terms of the agreement. 5 The present
employer is the alter ego of the former employer where they are substantially the same
entity, and therefore the present employer must honor the collective bargaining agree-
ment of the former. 6 Accordingly, an "alter ego" employer who repudiates the collective
bargaining agreement of its predecessor violates sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Act.
To determine whether an existing employer is an alter ego of the previous employer,
courts focus on the circumstances surrounding the change of corporate form. Specifically,
the courts seek to establish whether the change of corporate form results in a bona fide
change of ownership or merely a disguised continuation of the previous employer.?
Accordingly, courts examine whether the two corporate entities are "substantially iden-
tical" in terms of "management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers,
supervision and ownership. "5 In addition, courts consider relevant evidence of the em-
ployer's intent to avoid compliance with the collective bargaining agreement or anti-
union animus.g There is uncertainty, however, concerning whether an existing employer
* By Brian A. Berube, Staff Member, Bos -roN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 780 F.2d 576, 121 L.R.R.M. 2393 (6th Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1982). 'rhe statute provides in relevant part that,
(a) [i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this tide;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Id.
'NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
4 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 735 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
5 Id.
6 Id.
'Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 414 (1942).
8 E.g., Nelson Elec. v, NLRB, 638 F.2d 965, 968, 106 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2394-95 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N,L.R,B. 1144, 1144, 94 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1394 (1976)) (new
electrical contracting business was bound by the collective bargaining agreement of a prior business
where the two businesses were found to be alter egos).
E.g., Goodman Piping Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 12, 117 L.R.R.M. 2143, 2144 (2d
Cir. 1984) (employer was found to he an alter ego of an employer which had ceased operations
and was therefore bound by the prior employer's collective bargaining agreement).
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can be found to be an alter ego of a predecessor employer absent a finding of such
intent or anti-union animus.°
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc. examined whether an existing employer must exhibit anti-
union animus or a specific intent to evade labor obligations before the court may find it
to be an alter ego of the predecessor employer." The Allcoast court held that a finding
of such intent is not a prerequisite to a finding of alter ego status, but rather one of
many factors to be considered." This finding implies that, in the Sixth Circuit, a change
of corporate form motivated by legitimate factors, having no grounds in anti-union
animus, may still subject the "new" employer to alter ego status, and therefore, require
the new employer to recognize the union and honor the existing collective bargaining
agreement.
In Allcoast, Robert G. Harris (Harris) was chief operating officer as well as the owner
of over ninety percent of a moving and storage company, A. E. Ward (Ward)." Ward
transported goods intrastate under a state license, and interstate under its own Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) license." In addition, Ward transported goods interstate
as an agent of Atlas Van Lines, Inc. (Atlas), under an ICC license issued to Atlas." Local
392 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, and
Helpers of America (Union) represented all truck drivers employed by A.E. Ward.°
In February, 1982, Atlas implemented a policy that disallowed its agents, such as
Ward, from operating under independent ICC licenses." The Atlas policy, however,
permitted its agents to transfer their independent operating authority to a separate
corporation as long as that corporation did not associate its business and equipment with
Atlas."
Responding to Atlas' new policy, Harris formed a new corporation, Ward Moving
and Storage Inc. (Ward Moving), and transferred the Atlas agency relationship to the
new corporation.° Harris was the sole shareholder and officer of Ward Moving." A.E.
Ward then changed its name to Allcoast Transfer, Inc. (Allcoast), 21 and retained its
independent authority for interstate and intrastate transportation. 22 Thus, Harris owned
and was CEO of two corporations: Ward Moving, an Atlas agent; and, Allcoast Transfer,
an independent trucking company. Allcoast maintained a separate headquarters in a
facility close to Ward Moving. 23 The new facility maintained both Allcoast and Ward
1° Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 579, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
" Id. at 579, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395-96.
12 Id. at 581, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
15 Id. at 577, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2394.
' 1 Id.
15 Id.
18 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 577-78, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2394.
18 Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2394. Ward Moving & Storage Inc. was the trade name previously
used by A.E. Ward. Id.
xv Id.
21 Id. A.E. Ward's corporate name was changed to Allcoast Transfer in compliance with an
Atlas policy against the name of the corporation not acting as an agent having a similar name to
the Atlas agent. Id.
n Id.
25 Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2394-95. Harris indicated at trial that Allcoast had a separate
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Moving trucks." Also, Allcoast repainted its equipment so as not to be associated with
Atlas. 25 After ten months, however, Allcoast and Ward Moving operations reconsolidated
at the original site. 2 °
Following the reorganization, Harris informed the A.E. Ward employees that they
could choose to work for either Ward Moving or Allcoast. 27 The Union informed Harris
that it considered both companies, Allcoast and Ward Moving, bound by the collective
bargaining agreement between A.E. Ward" and the Union. 25 Harris informed the Union
that only Allcoast, formerly A.E. Ward, would comply with the bargaining agreement."
He stated that Ward Moving was a separate corporation from A.E. Ward/Allcoast."
The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Ward Moving and Allcoast,"
contending that Ward Moving, as A.E. Ward's alter ego, unlawfully repudiated the
collective bargaining agreement. The administrative law judge (ALD found that Allcoast
and Ward Moving were alter egos, and that, therefore, Ward Moving's repudiation of
the collective bargaining agreement violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act." The
National Labor Relations Board (Board) affirmed the AU 's finding and ordered Ward
Moving and Allcoast to cease and desist their unfair labor practices and to compensate
Ward Moving employees for losses resulting from the company's failure to recognize
the collective bargaining agreement." The Board sought enforcement of its order in the
United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."
In NLRB v Allcoast Transfer, Inc., the Sixth Circuit, agreeing with the Board's con-
clusion that Ward Moving and Allcoast were alter egos, enforced the Board's order."
The court thus found that both corporations were obligated to honor the collective
bargaining agreement." The court noted that the alter ego doctrine's purpose is to
prevent employers from evading. union obligations, such as collective bargaining agree-
ments, by changing their corporate form." The court then stated that the alter ego test,
as adopted by the Supreme Court in Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, focuses on whether
the change of form was a bona fide change of employers or merely a continuation of
the previous employer." Further, the court identified factual criteria used by courts in
location to "'prove a point' that Allcoast and Ward Moving were two separate, distinct businesses."
Id. at 578 n.2, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395 n.2.
24 Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
23 Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2394-95.
" Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395. Harris explained at the administrative hearing that the two
businesses were reconsolidated in the same facility because he did not "receive the business he had
hoped for," and that it was not worth losing money to make the point that the two businesses, Ward
Moving and Allcoast, were separate companies. Id. at 578 n.2, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395 n.2.
27 Id. at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
28 Allcoast formerly was known as A.E. Ward.
" Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 578, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
3° Id.
sl id.
52 Id.
59 Id .
33 Id.
" Id. at 579, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
"Id. at 583, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
37 See id.
"Id, at 579, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2395.
" Id. (quoting Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106, 9 L.R.R.M. at 414, where court upheld the
Board's order to cease and desist unfair labor practices, reinstate employees with back pay and post
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determining whether corporations are alter egos, such as whether the two businesses are
similar in terms of "management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers,
supervision and ownership."40 Next, the court addressed whether a finding of anti-union
animus or an intent to evade union obligations was a prerequisite to the imposition of
alter ego status:"
The Allcoast court first surveyed the decisions of other circuit courts that have
addressed the necessity of a finding of intent:1 2
 in particular, the court noted that, in
the First and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal, intent is a "critical inquiry" for determin-
ing alter ego status." The First Circuit in Penntech Papers Inc. v. NLRB," and the Eighth
Circuit in Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB 4s identified a major conceptual distinc-
tion between the single employer doctrine, where two existing business entities are
treated as one," and the alter ego doctrine, which focuses on a successor employer. 47
Unlike the single employer doctrine, the alter ego determination, the courts noted,
focuses on a "disguised continuance" of the former entity, and therefore, intent is a
"critical inquiry."" The Allcoast court interpreted these cases as requiring the Board to
notices at the plant despite employer's claim that the company's assets had been transferred to
another corporation and that the employer had dissolved).
.ff) Id. These factors had been enumerated by previous courts such as Nelson Electric, 638 F.2d
at 968, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2394-95.
4 ' Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 579, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
42 The Allcoast court noted that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit had
addressed the intent issue, the court was not bound by precedent. Id.
45 Id. at 579-80, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396 (quoting Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739
F.2d 1305, 1311, 116 L.R.R.M. 3224, 3228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088, 117 L.R.R.M. 3232
(1984); Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24, 113 L.R.R.M. 2219, 2223 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 892, 114 L.R.R.M. 2648 (1983)). Both Penntech and Iowa Express found support for
this proposition in Note, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
624, 638-39 (1979). Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3228; Penntech, 706 F.2d at 24,
113 L.R.R.M. at 2223.
" 706 F.2d 18, 113 L.R.R.M. 2219 (court upheld a Board determination that the parent
employer and its subsidiary were a "single employer" for purposes of an unfair labor practice
proceeding).
" 739 F.2d 1305, 116 L.R.R.M. 3224 (court upheld the Board's denial of attorney's fees where
it found the NLRB General Counsel was justified in bringing an unfair labor practice case against
the employer and alleging that the employer was an alter ego of, or single employer with, another
company).
46 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 1441. "The 'single employer' concept reflects
a judgment that two or more business entities may properly be considered as one for various
statutory purposes." Id. Four factors are considered in determining single employer status: "(1)
interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and
(4) common ownership or financial control." Id. at 1442. Unlike the alter ego analysis which Focuses
on a former and present employer, the single employer analysis focuses on two existing employers,
and whether they should be treated as a "single employer" for statutory purposes. See id. at 1441.
41 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 735. The alter ego doctrine examines
successor employers to determine if the former and successor employers are substantially the same
entity, and thereby bound by the labor contract of the predecessor. Id.
48
 Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1310-11, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3228; Penntech, 706 F.2d at 24, 113
L.R.R.M. at 2223. The Penntech and Iowa Express courts relied on NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636
F.2d 266, 270, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir. 1980) and Note, supra note 43, at 638-39, for
their reasoning. Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1310-11, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3228; Penntech, 706 F.2d at 24,
113 L.R.R.M. at 2223. The Allcoast court noted, however, that the Eighth Circuit, in NLRB v.
Campbell—Harris Elec., Inc., listed factors to be considered for alter ego purposes without ever
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find "intentional employer evasion" of union obligations before imposing alter ego
status."
Next, the Allcoast court, considering the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions
in NLRB v. Scott Printing Co/p." and NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc.," expressed doubt as to
whether the Third Circuit requires a finding of intent prior to imposing alter ego status."
In Scott Printing, the Third Circuit assumed, without deciding whether it must be proven,
that the employer evaded its bargaining duties intentionally." The dissenting opinion in
Scott Printing argued that a finding of alter ego status was improper because there was
no evidence of anti-union animus." Four years later, in NLRB v. Al Bryant, the Third
Circuit enumerated factors to consider in an alter ego analysis and did not include
among its list the employer's intent to evade its union obligations." Thus, based upon
Al Bryant and the dissenting opinion in Scott, the Sixth Circuit expressed doubt that the
Third Circuit regarded intent as a necessary element.
In contrast, the Allcoast court found that the Second Circuit rejects the argument
that a finding of "intent to evade" is a prerequisite for finding alter ego status." In
Goodman Piping Products, Inc. v. NLRB, the Second Circuit ruled that intent was not a
prerequisite to imposing alter ego status, although it may be "germane" to the issue or
mentioning an intent element. Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 580, l21 L.R.R.M. at 2396 (citing Campbell—
Harris, 719 F.2d 292, 295, 114 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883 (8th Cir. 1983)). Furthermore, the Campbell—
Harris court noted that the alter ego test is a "flexible test." Campbell—Harris, 719 F.2d at 296, 114
L.R.R.M. at 2883.
In addition, the only language of either Penntech or Iowa Express which explicitly states that
intent must be found is derived from a law review article. Note, .supra note 43, at 638-42. Iowa
Express cited to the language in the Note that an alter ego finding requires that "the employer must
act from anti-union animus." 739 F.2d at 1311, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3228 (quoting Note, supra note 43,
at .639). Penntech cited to slightly different language: "while a single employer examination is
essentially objective, the employer's motivation for the business change is an important element of
the alter ego analysis." 706 F.2d at 24, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2'223 (quoting Note, supra note 43, at 638).
In support of these propositions, the article cites NLRB v. Herman Bros, Pet Supply, Inc., 325
F.2d 68, 70-71, 54 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2684-85 (6th Cir. 1963). In Herman Brothers., however, alter ego
status was imposed because the court found that the sale of the business in question "was a fictitious
transaction to avoid dealing with the union." 325 F.2d at 70, 54 L.R.R.M. at 2684-85. Although
the case establishes intent as a factor or reason for imposing alter ego status, no language in Herman
Brothers indicates that intent is a prerequisite. Accordingly, it is questionable whether this citation is
appropriate and should have been relied upon by these courts.
49 Allcoast, 780 17.2d at 580, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
50 612 F.2d 783, 103 L.R.R.M. 2153 (3d Cir. 1979).
5 J 711 F.2d 593, 113 L,R.R.M. 3690 (3d Cir. 1983).
52 Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 580, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396-97.
55 Id. (quoting Scott Printing, 612 F.2d at 787, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2156).
51
 Id. (citing Scott Printing, 612 F.2d at 789, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2158 (Sloviter, j., dissenting)). The
Scott Printing dissent further noted that intent is a necessary element in determining alter ego status.
612 F.2d at 790, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2158 (Sloviter, j., dissenting).
Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 580, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396-97 (citing Al Bryant, 711 F.2d at 553-54, 113
L.R.R.M. at 3699). in Al Bryant, the court determined that the defendant's company was an alter
ego of its other company. 711 F.2d at 554, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3699. The factors examined were,
"substantial identity of management,•business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervi-
sion and ownership between the old and new corporations." Id. at 553-54, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3699.
The Al Bryant court specifically cited to the criteria set forth in Scott Printing. Id. at 554, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 3699.
56 Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 580, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
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"even a sufficient basis" to prove alter ego status." The court instead found alter ego
status based upon an examination of "management, business purpose, operation, equip-
ment, customers, supervision,, and ownership." 58 Thus, the Second Circuit explicitly has
held that a finding of intent is not required to find the new employer an alter ego:
Finally, the Allcoast court found that some circuits give "substantial weight" to intent
but do not make it a prerequisite to alter ego status.59 In NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc.,
the Tenth Circuit, finding that there is no hard and fast rule for determining alter ego
status," held that anti-union animus either before or after the corporate change is
"germane" to the alter ego inquiry.61 The Tricor court noted that when intent is absent
and legitimate business reasons cause the employer to change its corporate form it is
less likely that the second employer will be an alter ego. 62 Similarly, in Fugazy Continental
Corp. v. NLRB," the D.C. Circuit indicated that a finding of intent may be significant
but is not dispositive. 64 The Fugazy court listed the traditional factors for determining
alter ego status and also noted that substantial weight should be given to evidence
indicating an intent to evade labor obligations. 65
 Accordingly, the Allcoast court inter-
preted the Tenth and D.C. Circuit opinions as placing an emphasis on intent, but not
requiring a finding of intent as a prerequisite to alter ego status.
Having surveyed the various approaches, the Allcoast court concluded that intent is
not a prerequisite to a determination of alter ego status." The Allcoast court, drawing
upon the language used by the Supreme Court in Southport Petroleum, examined whether
there was a "disguised continuance of the old employer." 67 The Sixth Circuit reasoned
57 Id, (quoting Goodman Piping, 74! F.2d at 12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2144).
68
 Goodman Piping, 741 F.2d at 11-12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2144.
Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 581, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
60 1d. (quoting Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3273). The court also enumerated the
traditional elements of alter ego status that are examined. Id. (citing Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270, 105
L.R.R.M, at 3273).
61 Id. (quoting Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270, 105 L.R.R.1%.1. at 3273, where the court enforced a Board
order that a subsequent employer adhere to a collective bargaining agreement of a previous
employer, where it was determined that the two were alter egos).
62 Id, (citing Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3273). The Allcoast court noted that both
Penniech and Iowa Express interpreted Tricor as requiring an intent finding. Allcoast, however, inter-
preted Tricor as holding that intent is important but is not necessary. Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 581 n.6,
121 L.R.R.M. at 2397 n.6.
65
 725 F.2d 1416, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court upheld a Board order that the
employer was an alter ego of a previous employer and was therefore obligated to recognize and
bargain with the union).
64 Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 581, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
65 Id. (citing Fugazy, 725 F.2d at 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2573). The Fugazy court stated that
substantial evidence should be given to "evidence that the motive for the transaction was to evade
statutory and contractual duties under the NLRA or to escape the reach of the Board's remedies."
Fugazy, 725 F.2d at 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2573. The traditional factors enumerated include
"substantial identity of management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervi-
sion and ownership between the old entity and its successor." Id. In Fugazy, alter ego status was
established in part due to a finding of anti-union animus. Id. at 1420, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2574. The
court noted that there was "overwhelming evidence of anti-union animus and ... extremely sus-
picious timing and informality" in the transaction. Id.
" Allcoast, 780 F.2d at 581, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
67 Id. (quoting Southport Petrolvim, 315 U.S. at 106, 9 L.R.R.M. at 414). The court phrased the
question as "whether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership .-.. or
merely a disguised continuance of the old employer." Id. (quoting Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at
106, 9 L.R.R.M. at 414).
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that the inquiry employed by the Supreme Court required an examination of the totality
of the circumstances in each case." Because the Allcoast court decided that a flexible
alter ego analysis is appropriate, the court ruled that no particular element is a prereq-
uisite to a finding of alter ego status. 69 Rather, all factors should be considered together."
The Allcoast court noted that a rule that does not require a specific finding of anti-
union animus furthers the purpose of the alter ego doctrine. 7 ' If intent were a prereq-
uisite, the court reasoned, employers attempting to avoid union obligations might mask
their avoidance in a changed corporate structure based upon seemingly legitimate busi-
ness reasons, thereby escaping their obligations while still maintaining essentially the
same business." Such attempts would not be encouraged under the Allcoast court's
approach, because there would not be a prerequisite finding of intent." Thus, the Allcoast
court reasoned, its approach best advances the purpose of the doctrine.
Applying its holding to the facts, the court found that Ward Moving was the alter
ego of Allcoast/A.E. Ward." The court noted that the two enterprises had substantially
identical management, supervision, labor relations policy, business purpose, operations,
equipment and employees. 75 Thus, the court found adequate support for the Board's
finding of alter ego status without a finding of anti-union animus." The court stated,
however, that while inquiry into Ward's intent iit dividing its operations was not necessary
given the surrounding circumstances, such an inquiry may be required in other situa-
tions." Accordingly, the court granted the Board's petition for enforcement."
The Allcoast court's holding, that intent is not a prerequisite to alter ego status, is
appropriate in light of the case law in other jurisdictions and national labor policy. The
Sixth Circuit's holding is persuasive because none of the cited jurisdictions has stated
explicitly that intent is a prerequisite to alter ego status. Moreover, although the Allcoast
court interprets the First and Eighth Circuit decisions as requiring an intent finding
prior to establishing alter ego status, 79 the language of those cases may not necessarily
require such a finding. In fact, the strongest language used by the First and Eighth
Circuit courts was that "motive or intent are critical inquiries."" Neither circuit court
says that motive or intent are essential findings.
Furthermore, the cases from these circuits, Penntech and Iowa Express, emphasized
the intent element in a different context. The courts used intent as a means of distin-
guishing alter ego analysis from single employer analysis.'" Because the single employer
68 Id. at 581, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
99 Id. at 581-82, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
Id.
71 Id. at 582, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
72 ird.
79 Id.
71 Id .
75 Id. at 582-83, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
' 76 1d. at 583, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
77 Id.
78 hi.
79 Id. at 579-80, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
'° Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311, 116 L.R.R.M, at 3228; Penntech, 706 F.2d at 24, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 2223,
81 Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1310, 116 L.R.R.M. at 3228; Penntech, 706 F.2d at 24, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 2223.
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analysis does not consider intent, while alter ego analysis may, the First and Eighth
Circuits necessarily placed great emphasis on the intent factor.
In addition, none of the cases cited by the Sixth Circuit have held that the employer was
not an alter ego because intent to avoid union obligations was lacking. Accordingly, the
cases cited, while providing helpful insight into the understanding of other jurisdictions,
are inapposite on the issue of whether, absent a specific finding of employer's intent,
alter ego status becomes impossible.
Indeed, most circuits that have considered the question have determined that an
intent finding is not a necessary prerequisite to alter ego status. Under the Sixth Circuit's
survey and interpretation of the relevant cases, only the First and Eighth Circuits are
interpreted as requiring a finding of intent. Whereas the Second, Third, Tenth and D.C.
Circuits are interpreted as finding that intent is an important element, however, it is not
a necessary element. Thus the majority of the surveyed circuits have found that intent
to avoid union obligations is merely one of several elements in an alter ego analysis.
Public policy lends further support to the Sixth Circuit's holding that intent is only
one factor to be considered in an alter ego analysis. Public policy considerations of
industrial peace favor private ordering through collective bargaining agreements." The
approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit will uphold this private ordering because it will
prevent employers from undercutting collective bargaining agreements by cloaking anti-
union animus behind supposedly legitimate business reasons for which the employer
would not be required to recognize the collective bargaining agreement. Although the
Alkoast court's decision risks imposing alter ego status on an employer with legitimate
business reasons for the corporate change, public policy in favor of industrial stabilization
through collective bargaining agreements outweighs this risk. Thus, the approach
adopted by the Sixth Circuit is appropriate and well reasoned.
The Allcoast court's holding implies that, in the Sixth Circuit, an employer may be
considered an alter ego and be bound by a previous collective bargaining agreement,
even if intent to evade collective bargaining or anti-union animus is not established,
when other factors indicating alter ego status are present. The Allcoast case should not
be seen as a radical change in the role of intent as a key factor in determining alter ego
status. Rather, Allcoast indicates that when all other factors are present, such as similar
management, customers, supervision and ownership, an intent inquiry may be unnec-
essary. When all other factors are not present, however, intent will become a "germane"
or "crucial inquiry." Thus, Allcoast designs a flexible test to determine alter ego status,
which test considers intent as a key factor, but not a determinative element.
In sum, during the Survey year, the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Alkoast, held that a
finding of the employer's anti-union animus or intent to evade collective bargaining
obligations is not a prerequisite to a finding of alter ego status. Rather, intent to avoid
union obligations is one element to be considered along with other factors, such as
similarity of management, business purpose, operations, equipment, customers, super-
vision and ownership. This flexible test is appropriate in light of the Act's goal of fostering
collective bargaining as a means of promoting industrial peace. The flexible test dis-
courages employers from using seemingly legitimate business reasons to mask an attempt
to evade collective bargaining. Accordingly, in the Sixth Circuit, employers may be bound
82 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 563 U.S. 574,578,46 L.R.R.M.
2416,2417-18 (1960).
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by a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement with the union, even if the employer's
• change of form was not motivated by anti-labor animus.
D. *Permissible Employer Response to Employee Refusal to Cross Stranger Picket Line:
Business Services by Manpower, Inc.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) guarantees employees' rights
to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection ... ."2 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain. or coerce employees exercising any of' these
section 7 rights." Thus, an employer who discharges an employee for engaging in conduct
protected by section 7 violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act."
An employee's right to honor a legal picket line established on the premises of his
or her own employer is protected concerted activity under section 7 of the Act, even if
he or she is not a member of the same union as the picketers." Similarly, the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) and most of the federal appellate courts that have
considered the issue agree that workers who honor legal picket lines at employers other
than their own, so-called "stranger picket lines," also engage in protected concerted
activity." The Board and the courts disagree, however, on whether an employer may
either discharge or permanently replace an employee who refuses to cross a stranger
picket line.? Employees that are permanently replaced have full reinstatement rights,
while employees that are discharged may not."
* By Constance J. MacDonald, Staff Member, BOSTON Cota.EGE Law REVIEW.
' 784 F.2d 442, 121 L.R.R.M. 2827 (2d Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to
... assist labor organizations, .. . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... ." Id.
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8 provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 ... ."
4 See R, GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 349
(1976).
NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301, 74 L.R.R.M. 2080, 2082 (5th Cir.
1970). See R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 322.
° NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chem. Serv., Inc., 700 F.2d 385, 387, 112 L.R.R.M. 2882,
2884 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364, 107 L.R.R.M.
2667, 2673-74 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163, 105 L.R.R.M. 2788, 2790
(10th Cir. 1980) (dictum); NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032, 1036, 74 L.R.R.M. 2742,
2744 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021, 76 L.R.R.M. 2272 (1971); Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen Helpers and Food Processors, Local Union 657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 204, 205, 75
L.R.R.M. 2480, 2480 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
Except for a period during the Eisenhower Administration, the Board has held that the
honoring of a stranger picket line is protected activity. Business Services by Manpower v. NLRB,
784 F.2d 442, 447, 121 L.R.R.M. 2827, 2831 (2d Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d I, 98 L.R.R.M. 2848 (1st Cir. 1978)
(refusing to enforce Board's order reinstating employee, and holding that employer that demon-
strated legitimate business reason and showed no antiunion animus legally discharged employee
who, without prior notice to employer, refused to cross stranger picket line).
°See infra note 9 for a discussion of the difference between discharging and permanently
replacing an employee.
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The Board adopts the per se rule that employees refusing to cross a stranger picket
line may not be discharged because their conduct is protected under section 7. 9
 If the
employer evidences no antiunion animus and can show a legitimate and substantial
business justification for hiring a new employee to do the refusing employee's job, then
the employer may replace permanently the refusing employee."' The replaced employee,
if he or she makes an unconditional offer to return to work, retains the right to
reinstatement when a comparable position becomes available." By refusing to cross the
stranger picket line, the employee is in effect joining the strike and thus contributing to
a stronger labor movement by promoting solidarity.' 5
In contrast, some appellate courts adopt a balancing approach, and hold that where
an employer's business justification outweighs the employee's interest in protected con-
certed activity, the employer may discharge the employee.' 3 Specifically, these courts find
that where the employee's interest in the protected concerted activity is so attenuated
that the impact of the employer's action on the protected conduct is "comparatively
9 See Torrington Constr. Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1540, 1540-41, 98 L.R.R.M. 1135, 1135-36 (1978)
(sympathy strikers, like economic strikers, may not be discharged; operator of a concrete mix
manufacturing plant improperly discharged truck driver employees who refused to cross a picket
line to deliver concrete at a shopping mall construction site); Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B.
1121, 1137-38, 26 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1950) (analogy to economic striker; brokerage house improperly
discharged employee who refused to cross a picket line at the Stock Exchange).
The Board reasons that employees honoring stranger picket lines are treated like "economic
strikers." "Economic strikers" are employees engaged in a work stoppage in support of bargaining
demands concerning wages or working conditions, or requests that the employer recognize the
union. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 339. Unfair labor practice strikers, in contrast, are employees
protesting employer conduct that violates the Act. Id. Neither type of striker may be discharged.
Id. at 341. If an unfair labor practice striker makes an unconditional offer to return to his job, the
employer must oust any replacement hired and give the employee his job back. Id. An employer,
however, has the right to replace an economic striker permanently. Id. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347, 2 L.R.R.M. 610, 615 (1938). Still, if the replaced employee makes
an unconditional offer to return to work, the employer must give him preferential reinstatement
status. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 343. See NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 681 F.2d 130, 145,
110 L.R.R.M. 2995, 3006 (2d Cir. 1982).
Because the right to strike is seriously discouraged by the employer's right to replace an
economic striker permanently, the Board and the courts have reduced the impact of permanent
replacement by expanding an economic striker's reinstatement rights. It. GORMAN, supra note 4, at
342-43. Upon unconditional application to return to work, an economic striker now has a right to
preferential reinstatement status even if his position is no longer vacant when he applies. Id. at 343.
As soon as his former position or another one for which he is qualified becomes available, the
employer must reinstate the economic striker/employee with full vested employment benefits,
including seniority, unless the employee has already secured equivalent employment elsewhere or
the employer has a legitimate and substantial reason for not reinstating him, such as a change in
business operations or the employee's lack of necessary skills. Id. at 344-45; Koenig Iron Works, 681
F.2d at 145, 110 L.R.R.M. at 3006. Thus, because of the reinstatement rights of economic strikers,
the discharge-replacement distinction makes a difference to the employee. See R. GORMAN, supra
note 4, at 343-45.
'° See Koenig Iron Works, 681 F.2d at 145, 110 L.R.R.M. at 3006; Torrington Constr., 235 N.L.R.B.
at 1541, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1135-36.
" See Koenig Iron Works, 681 F.2d at 145, 110 L.R.R.M. at 3006; Torrington Constr., 235 N.L.R.B.
at 1541, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1135-36.
11 Southern Calif. Edison, 646 F.2d at 1363-64, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2673.
" See, e.g., Manpower, 784 F.2d at 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835. For a detailed description of the
approaches used in stranger picket line cases since 1950 by the Board and the various courts of
appeals, see id. at 446-53, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2830-35.
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slight,"" the employer can discharge the employee without violating the Act, if the
employer can demonstrate a "legitimate and substantial" business reason for the
dismissal's and there is no proof of antiunion animus. 16 An employer's business interest
is "legitimate and substantial" if it outweighs the harm to the employee's interest in the
protected concerted activity of honoring stranger picket lines."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
applied the balancing approach in Business Services by Manpower, Inc. v. NLRB.'" The
court balanced what it found to be the employees' extremely attenuated right to refuse
to cross an informational stranger picket line at the location of their temporary work
assignment against the strong interest of the employer, a temporary employment agency,
in enforcing a neutral rule requiring advance notice of an employee's inability or un-
willingness to fulfill a work assignment.' 9 The court held that because there was no
evidence that the employer acted out of antiunion animus and the employer's business
justification outweighed the employees' section 7 interests in honoring this stranger picket
line, the discharge of these two employees was not an unfair labor practice in violation
of section 8(a)(1)."
In Manpower, the employer, Business Services by Manpower, Inc. (Manpower) was
an employment agency supplying temporary help to business firms." On May 20, 1981,
Manpower service representative Esther Nui called employee Craig Monroe and offered
34 Employee interests in the concerted activity may be so attenuated in a particular case that
they will not fall within the "mutual aid or protection" clause, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556,
567-68, 98 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2721 (1978).
I., R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 338. See, e.g., Carroll, 578 F.2d at 5, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2850-51 (no
violation of the Act where the employer had a legitimate business reason for firing the employee
who refused to cross the stranger picket line and there was no evidence of antiunion animus);
NLRB v. L.G. Everist, 334 F.2d 312, 317-18, 56 L.R.R.M. 2866, 2870-71 (8th Cir. 1964) (the court
rejected the analogy to economic strikers and held that the employer had a legitimate business
reason for discharging and not reinstating four drivers who refused to cross a picket line against a
third employer, not even their employer's customer). But see Browning-Ferris, 700 F.2d at 389, 112
L.R.R.M. at 2885-86 (although no violation of the Act was found because the employees had failed
to make an unconditional offer to return to work, the court followed the per se rule that the
employees could only be replaced but not discharged).
'" R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 338. An employer's antiunion animus, however, can tip the
balance away from the employer's alleged business necessity in favor of the employees' protected
section 7 activity of honoring stranger picket lines. See, e.g., Teamsters, Local 657, 429 F.2d at 205,
75 L.R.R.M. at 2480 (employer violated the Act; discharge of an employee who refused to cross a
stranger picket line was motivated by a desire to punish the employee and was not in an effort to
continue the efficient operation of the business); Truck Drivers and Helpers Local No. 728 v. NLRB
(Overrate Transportation 1), 364 F.2d 682, 683-84, 62 L.R.R.M. 2502, 2503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per
curiam) (employer violated the Act; given the employer's other antiunion actions — interrogating
employees about their union sympathies — and the weakness of the alleged business justification,
it is likely the employer's decision to discharge the employee was influenced by his showing of
sympathy for the union in honoring the stranger picket line).
" R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 338. See, e.g., Alamo Express, 430 F.2d at 1036, 74 L.R.R.M. at
2744-45 (the employer violated the Act by discharging employees who had refused to cross a
stranger picket line, finding that the employer's failure to replace the discharged employees was
evidence of a lack of business necessity for their discharge and no antiunion animus).
'" 784 F.2d at 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-37.
Id.
2° See id. at 443, 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827, 2835-37.
23 Id. at 443, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827.
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both him and employee Richard Cordes a two-day assignment beginning on May 21, at
9 p.m. at the Spaulding Bakery in Conklin, New York." Monroe accepted for both of
them.23 Monroe and Cordes arrived together at Spaulding about 8:30 p.m. and saw five
or six picketers with signs there. 24 The picketers were members of the Bakery and
Confectionary Workers Union employed by Spaulding at its plant in Hazelton, Pennsyl-
vania. 23 The union claimed that because they were on strike in Hazelton, Spaulding had
moved some of the work previously performed in Hazelton to the Conklin plant. 26
Neither the picketers nor their signs requested that others not cross the picket line and
the picketers did not attempt to prevent cars from entering the plant."
After speaking with the picketers, the two Manpower employees decided not
to cross the picket line to report to work. 28 They immediately left and Cordes
called Manpower's answering service, leaving a message at 8:55 p.m. 29 Cordes
claimed he told the answering service that he and Monroe were not going to work
at Spaulding because of a picket line there but that they were were available
to work elsewhere." Both employees knew that Manpower considered any employee
who did not report to work and who did not give Manpower advance
notice of his or her inability or unwillingness to work as having resigned. 31
22 Id. at 443, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
22 Id. Cordes and Monroe requested work together because they lived in the same rooming
house and could drive to work together. Id.
24 Id, Before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Manpower produced some circumstantial
evidence to show that there was no picket line at Spaulding at 8:30 p.m. on May 21, including
testimony from witnesses with no stake in the outcome of this case. Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 833,
117 L.R.R.M. 1345. Taylor testified she spent a lot of time at Spaulding and never saw pickets after
3 p.m. Id. The ALJ, however, found the testimony not to be in direct conflict with the employees'
claim and that Monroe and Cordes were not willfully irresponsible. Id. Because the record did not
justify a conclusion that they had deliberately lied, the ALJ said, he found that there were pickets
there at that time and that that was the reason Monroe and Cordes had refused to report to work.
Id. Although Manpower excepted to some of the ALys credibility findings, the Board found no
basis for reversing the findings. Id. at 827 n.1, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1395 n.l. The Board will not
overrule such findings unless a clear preponderance of the evidence convinces the Board that the
findings were incorrect. Id: Manpower did not raise that exception before the court of appeals.
Manpower, 784 F.2d at 443 n.1, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828 n. 1.
25 Manpower, 784 F.2d at 443-44, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 493, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
28 Id. at 443-44, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
29 Id. at 444, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828. Between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., employees who called the
Manpower office would speak with a secretary, a service representative or the person in charge of
the office. Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 832, 117 L.R.R.M. 1345. Between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m., however,
employees could only reach an answering service. Id.
3G Manpower, 784 F.2d at 444, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828. Kathy Taylor, a Manpower manager,
testified that the message she received from the answering service made no mention of the picket
line, merely stating: —5120Isic]l81, 8:55 P.M. Rick Cordes with a phone number, available the next
few days. — Id.
I See id. at 443-44, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827-28. Taylor testified to the particular importance of
employee punctuality and dependability for an employer running a temporary employment agency.
Id. at 443, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827, If clients cannot depend on the agency to supply the help needed
as requested, they will take their business elsewhere. Id. The company's position in this matter is
emphasized to new employees during their initial interviews and, once they enlist with the agency,
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Accordingly, Manpower removed Monroe and Cordes from its referral
list."
A complaint that Manpower's discharge of Monroe and Cordes violated section
8(a)(1) of the Act was brought before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who held
that Manpower had violated the Act because honoring a picket line "at one's place of
employment" is clearly section 7 protected activity for which an employee cannot be
discharged." In a split decision, the majority of a three-member panel of the Board,
applying the per se rule, agreed with the ALJ that Manpower had violated the Act by
removing Monroe and Cordes from its referral list and ordered their reinstatement and
back pay from May 22, 1981, their date of termination." The majority pointed out that
the Board has held consistently that employees have a right, protected by the Act, to
honor a union's picket line and that under section 7 there should be no distinction made
between stranger picket lines and those at the premises of the employees' own employer. 35
Thus, the majority stated, Manpower should not have discharged Monroe and Cordes.
Rather, Manpower could have replaced Monroe and Cordes permanently, if Manpower,
to protect its business interests, was required to hire two new employees to complete the
refusing employees' assignments." The majority pointed out that Manpower could have
protected its business interests by assigning Monroe and Cordes only to companies not
involved in labor disputes." The dissenting member of the panel, Chairman Dotson,
applied a balancing test and found no violation of the Act because Manpower's need to
employees are given a two-page policy statement including the following instruction and warning
(quoted by the court):
CALL IF YOU CANT REPORT OR IF YOU WILL BE LATE
If you can't report for work, you MUST phone us early. This is very importantill
As your employer, it is necessary that you keep us informed ....
IMPORTANT
IF YOU DO NOT REPORT AS SCHEDULED AND HAVE NOT CALLED OUR
MANPOWER OFFICE, YOU HAVE RESIGNED.
Id. at 443, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827-28.
32 See id. at 444, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828. After having phoned Manpower in the evening several
times subsequently to confirm their availability and still receiving no assignments, Monroe and
Cordes spoke with Esther Nui finally on June 10 and II, respectively, and she informed them they
had been dismissed. Id. at 444, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828-29.
"Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 832-34, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1345. The ALA did not consider this
case as one where employees had honored a stranger picket line. See id. at 833, 117 L.R.R.M. 1345.
The AU ordered Manpower to reinstate Monroe and Cordes and to pay them any back wages
they might have lost since their termination on May 22,1981. Id. at 834, 117 L.R.R.M. 1345.
34 See id. at 827-28, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1345-46.
33 Id. (quoting Eastex, 437 U.S. at 564-65, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2719-20; Browning-Ferris, 700 F.2d
at 387, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2883; Southern Calif. Edison, 646 F.2d at 1363-64, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2673-
74).
To date, only the Board's decision in Manpower has been cited in another case — once, by the
Board, In Caitiff Business Products, Inc. and RBC Corp., employees had been discharged for failing
to cross a picket line established on their employer's premises by fellow employees allegedly laid
off for their union activities, 276 N.L.R.B. No. 60 at 3-4, 22-23, 120 L.R.R.M. 1262 (1985).
Manpower is cited for the proposition that the Board has held consistently that honoring a picket
line is an activity protected by the Act and has even extended those rights to include stranger picket
lines not established at the employee's own employer's premises. Id. at 46, 120 L.R.R.M. 1262 (citing
Manpower, 272 N,L.R.B. at 827, 117 L.R.R.M. 1345).
3° See Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 828, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346. Accord Torrington Constr., 235
N.L.R.B. at 1541, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1135-26.
"Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 828, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
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enforce its advance notice rule, vital to its business of furnishing temporary help, out-
weighed the employees' attenuated interest of honoring the stranger picket line at the
site of their temporary work assignment."
On review, the Second Circuit rejected the Board's per se approach and denied
enforcement of the Board's order, adopting instead a balancing test similar to the one
used by other circuit courts and advocated by Chairman Dotson." The court reasoned
that as to stranger picket lines a case-by-case balancing of the employer's and employees'
interests would be a better approach than rigidly applying the rules regarding strikes
on the employer's own premises, because an employee's section 7 interests are not
identical in the two situations."
The court first considered the employees' interest in the protected concerted activity.
The court pointed out that the employees' section 7 interest in refusing to cross the
picket line at Spaulding was particularly weak because it was purely informational pick-
eting by workers not employed at the plant and who were not even requesting that
people not enter the plant.' The court found it difficult to imagine how the Manpower
employees' refusal to cross the picket line really promoted worker solidarity." Thus,
although the court agreed that, ordinarily, refusing to cross a stranger picket line clearly
is protected concerted activity under section 7, the court found the rationales of union
solidarity and future support of the refusing employees by the picketing employees to
be strained in this case."
The court next turned to what it found to be the employer's compelling business
interest in enforcing a rule requiring advance notice of an employee's inability or un-
willingness to report for an assignment.'" The court reasoned that because Monroe and
Cordes had refused to cross the stranger picket line and failed to report for work at
Spaulding, Manpower not only lost forever one night's profits on those two assignments
but also risked losing its reputation for dependability with its clients." Thus, the court
found that only the discharge of Monroe and Cordes, by removing their names from its
referral list, could adequately protect Manpower's business interest because these em-
ployees could refuse to report to an assignment any time they unexpectedly encountered
a picket line."
Finally, the court found no evidence of antiunion animus.'" Manpower was not even
aware that Monroe and Cordes had refused to cross the Spaulding picket line, the court
stated, until about three weeks after Manpower removed their names from the referral
list for failing to report to work." Also, the court pointed to the uncontradicted testimony
of a Manpower manager who said that one employee who objected in advance to working
at Spaulding due to the picketing was offered and accepted other assignments." The
5e
	
at 829-31, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346-49 (Member Dotson, dissenting).
" See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 442-43, 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827, 2835-37.
4° Id. at 451, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2834.
41 Id. at 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-36.
42 See id.
4' Id.
44
 Id. at 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836.
45 Id. at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836.
46 See id. at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836-37.
47 Id. at 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836.
" See id.
49 Id.
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court found that "Whe refusal to cross the picket line thus was simply a but-for cause
of the termination, not a motivating one." 5u The Second Circuit therefore held that
Manpower did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged Monroe and
Cordes, because the employer's business interest in this case outweighed the employees'
attenuated interest in honoring the stranger picket line and there was no evidence of
antiunion animus."
The court conceded that the Board's per se approach might not be unacceptable in
all cases.52 In this case, however, the court criticized the Board's use of the per se rule
because the Board, given this case's unusual facts and Manpower's compelling business
interest in enforcing its adequate notice rule, should have balanced the employer's and
the employees' interests to determine whether Manpower had lawfully discharged Mon-
roe and Cordes. 53 Under the balancing approach, the court held, Manpower properly
discharged the employees. 54
The Board's per se rule is better than the case-by-case balancing approach adopted
by the Manpower court because the per se rule protects the employees' section 7 interest
in honoring a stranger picket line to promote union solidarity while also accommodating
the employer's interest in continuing his business operations. 55 The employee's interests
are protected because he or she may only be replaced, not discharged, if the employer
shows that the replacement is necessary to carry on employer's business. 56 Moreover, the
employer must reinstate the replaced employee as soon as an appropriate position
becomes available, if the employee makes an unconditional offer to return to work. 57
The employer's business interest also is protected because employer is allowed to hire a
permanent replacement if necessary for the continued operation of the business.55
In contrast, under the court's balancing test the employer may discharge an em-
ployee who refuses to cross a stranger picket line because the employee's refusal affects
the employer's ability to carry on his business smoothly. 59 As the Manpower Board pointed
out, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts that would lead to a favorable result for the
employee if the court applies a balancing test. 60 Therefore, employees are likely to be
discouraged from honoring stranger picket lines out of fear of discharge, because that
activity no longer appears to be protected."
Applying the per se rule to the facts in Manpower, the employer was not justified in
discharging Monroe and Cordes. Manpower made no claim that it had no other em-
ployees who could do Monroe's and Cordes's assigned jobs at Spaulding. 62 Furthermore,
Monroe and Cordes removed themselves from the payroll by not reporting for work at
5' Id.
51 See id. at 443, 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827, 2835-37.
" Id. at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2837.
53 Id.
54 Id.
" See Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 828, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
53 See id.
" See id.
See id.
59 See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-37.
°Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 828, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
ül See Kocol, Remarks on Recent Developments in NLRB Case Law, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 52,
at E-1 (Mar. 18, 1985) (LEXIS, Labor library, BNALAB file).
62 See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836-37.
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Spaulding, so Manpower could not claim that it was paying the employees while they
refused to do the assigned work. 63 Also, Spaulding was not Manpower's only client, so
Manpower could have assigned Monroe and Cordes to jobs with other customers not
having labor difficulties."
Furthermore, if the court had applied a true balancing of employer-employee
interests in the Manpower case, the court, instead of viewing Manpower's advance notice
requirement as a compelling, overriding business justification for discharging Monthe
and Cordes, would have found that Manpower violated section 8(a)(1). 63 The court
criticized the employees' section 7 interest in refusing to cross the picket line at Spaulding
as very weak, because, among other things, the picketing employees were not even
employed at the Spaulding plant in Conklin, New York, where the Manpower employees
were assigned to work. 66 The picketers, however, were employed by and on strike against
Spaulding at its Hazelton, Pennsylvania plant." Thus, the concept of mutual aid and
protection is not as attenuated as the court implied. 68
The court spent much time analyzing the particular business necessities of a tem-
porary employment agency69 but failed to explore the unusual status that the employees
of such an agency have. Although paid by Manpower," Monroe and Cordes would be
working on the Spaulding premises with Spaulding employees and probably would be
supervised by other Spaulding employees. The court pointed out that Manpower's
compelling interest in this case was that Spaulding was one of its largest customers. 7 ' To
the contrary, the court minimized any stake Monroe and Cordes might have in a labor
dispute by pointing out that the employees had only a two-night assignment at Spauld-
ing." The court failed to recognize that if Spaulding were indeed one of Manpower's
largest customers, it is quite possible that Monroe, Cordes and other Manpower em-
ployees might spend a considerable amount of time over the course of a year working
"for Spaulding." Thus, the employees' interest in working conditions at Spaulding was
not as attenuated as the court claimed."
63 See Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 830, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1347. Manpower argued that the refusal
to cross the stranger picket line was analogous to an intermittent work stoppage and thus cause for
discharge. See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2837; R. GORMAN, SUPTa note 4, at 318-
19. The courts and the Board have held quite consistently that such a work stoppage, when used
to extract concessions from the employer, is unprotected activity because employees cannot pick
and choose the work they will do while remaining on the payroll. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 318—
19.
" Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 828-29, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
65 See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 443, 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827, 2835-37.
66 Id. at 443, 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828, 2836.
67 Id. at 443-44, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-36.
° See id. at 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-36.
" See id. at 443, 453-54, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2827-28, 2835-37.
70 See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 443, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828; Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 830, 117
L.R.R.M. at 1347.
7 ' 784 F.2d at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 453, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2835-36. In a case involving a temporary employment agency
and one of its customers, a court even held them to be joint employers, for matters of union
representation. Manpower, Inc., of Shelby County, 164 N.L.R.B. 287, 287-88, 65 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1060
(1967). Although the employees were paid by the temporary agency, they also had significant ties
to the client company because several had worked there nearly a year. Id.
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Moreover, Manpower, apart from establishing the rule requiring advance notice of
an employee's inability or unwillingness to report for an assignment, did little to protect
its assertedly compelling interest in such notice." From 5 p.m. to 8 a.m., employees were
able to reach only an answering service that had no authority to find emergency replace-
ments for employees unable or unwilling to report for their work assignments." Fur-
thermore, Manpower did not require its clients to notify it of any labor disputes and
Manpower did not inform its employees of any such disputes when offering them work
assignments. Such a policy would protect the interests of both the employer and the
employee. If an employee were to accept an assignment, agreeing to cross a stranger
picket line, and then refused to do so at the last minute, the Board could rule that the
employee had waived his right to engage in that protected activity." Thus, his refusal
to cross the stranger picket line would be unprotected activity for which he could be
discharged."
Finally, the court criticized the Board's decision because it would force Manpower
to accept for its referral list two employees who might run into an unexpected picket
line at any time and walk off the job again."' The Board considers this concern im-
proper." The Board holds that employers may riot discharge employees merely to obtain
a work force that is less likely to engage in protected concerted activities. 80 The Board
reasons that such discharges would have the practical effect of abolishing sympathy
actions because employees would be reluctant to engage in such protected activity where
an employer could lawfully discharge the , employees merely by establishing a need to
complete a job within a certain time frame."
In sum, the Second Circuit, in Business Services by Manpower, Inc. v. NLRB, applying
a balancing test, determined that the employer properly discharged, rather than per-
manently replaced, employees who refused to cross a stranger picket line. The court
found that the employer's need to know in advance whether employees would show up
at assigned temporary workplaces outweighed the employees' right to engage in pro-
tected concerted activity. Whether the Board will shift from its per se approach to the
balancing test applied by the Manpower court is unclear because Chairman Dotson's
74 See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
"Manpower, 784 F.2d at 444, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2828; Manpower, 272 N.L.R.B. at 832, 117
L.R.R.M. at 1345. Indeed, Manpower was not aware of evening picketing at Spaulding and thus
never mentioned picketing to Monroe and Cordes when it offered them work, 272 N.L.R.B. at
833, 117 L.R.R.M. 1345.
76 See Carroll, 578 F.2d 1, 98 L.R.R.M. 2848. In Carroll, a bus driver accepted an assignment,
agreeing to cross a stranger picket line. Id. at 2, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2848. At the last minute he refused
to do so, causing chaos at the site of the picket line and ultimately necessitating the formation of a
police cordon to enable the passengers to disetribark. Id. at 2, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2848-49.
" See R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 324-25.
78 See Manpower, 784 F.2d at 454, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2836-37.
79 In 1976 in Newbery Energy Corp., the Board found that an electrical subcontractor had violated
the Act by discharging five employees for refusing to cross a stranger picket line involving a labor
dispute with a separate contractor at the mine where they had been sent to work. 227 N.L.R.B.
436, 436, 94 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1307-08 (1976). The employer hired replacements because the timely
completion of the project was jeopardized by those employees who were engaging in a sympathy
strike. Id. at 437, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1308-09. The Board held that the employer's business necessity
did not justify the discharge of the five employees who refused to cross the picket line. Id. at 437,
94 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
Bo Id, at 437, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
"I Id.
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strong dissent advocates the balancing approach and Member Zimmerman, who had
favored the per se approach, has since left the Board." The Board and the courts should
consider the practical effect of allowing an employer's business justification to override
an employee's section 7 "protected" rights, and restrict the court's holding in Manpower
to the special facts of that case. Otherwise, employees will be reluctant to honor stranger
picket lines and engage in sympathy strikes for fear of being discharged, and thus .a
valuable instrument of labor solidarity and support will be lost.
IL SECONDARY Borcorrs
A. *Excluding Secondary Party Hand billing From the Reach of Section 8(b)(4): Florida Gulf
• Coast Building & Construction Trades v. NLRB'
Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) proscribes union
activities intended to "threaten, coerce, or restrain" a person with whom the union has
no dispute from doing business with an employer with whom the union does have a
dispute. 2
 Through Section 8(b)(4), the Act attempts to protect neutral employers, em-
ployees and consumers from coercive union tactics that force these neutral parties to
become part of the union dispute.' Protecting neutral parties from coercive union
A2 See Kocol, Remarks on Recent Developments in NLRB Case Law, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 52,
at E-1 (Mar. 18, 1985) (LEXIS, Labor library, BNALAB file).
* By Chris Dillon, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 796 F.2d 1328, 123 L.R.R.M. 2001 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). This section of the Act states in relevant part:
(b) It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
(4)
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is —
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as a representative
of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative
of such employees under the provision of § 159 of this title; Provided, that nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
Id. This is the so-called "secondary boycott" prohibition. It is important to note that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
does not proscribe labor activity directed toward the primary employer or a party closely related
to the primary employer.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,.692, 28 L.R.R.M. 2108, 2115
(1951) (the United States Supreme Court described the underlying intent of § 8(b)(4) as "shielding
unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own").
Neutral parties may be classified as "secondary" parties in the dispute. Secondary parties are
uninvolved in the dispute between the union and the "primary" employer. Secondary parties,
however, may be the target of union activities designed to force the secondary party to influence
the position of the primary party in the dispute. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 240–
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behavior, however, must be delicately balanced with the union's right to free speech.'
Restrictive prohibitions against all behavior related to secondary parties, such as hand-
billing or leafletting of consumers, may unnecessarily infringe upon the union's freedom
to express its views. 5 Thus, the Act makes clear in a publicity proviso that the Act's
restriction on a union's coercion of neutral parties does not reach non picketing activity.°
Defining the parameters of union activities prohibited under the Act necessarily
involves both statutory construction and first amendment interpretation.? Contested
union activities first must be analyzed to determine whether they are prohibited under
the Act.° If the statute encompasses the activity, the court must evaluate whether the
statute prohibits behavior that is otherwise protected under the Constitution.° Cases
involving picketing of secondary sites clearly have illustrated the tension between the
statutory goal of protecting secondary parties and the union's right to express its views.i°
44 (1976). See also Goldman, The First Amendment and Non Picketing Labor Publicity tinder Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 36 VAND, L. REV. 1469 (1983). The author distin-
guishes secondary union activities from primary activities:
A secondary boycott is the application of economic pressure by a union upon a
person with whom the union does not have a dispute (the secondary or neutral party),
in order to induce that person to apply pressure upon a person with whom the union
does have a dispute (the primary or nonneutral party). Economic pressure in the form
of appeals to consumers to withhold patronage is a secondary .consumer boycott; union
appeals directed to the secondary employees seeking a work stoppage is a secondary
employee boycott.
Id. at 1470 n.2.
4 See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 617-18, 104
L.R.R.M. 2567, 2571 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
Id, (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
6 See Goldman, sukra note 3, at 1472.
Union activities such as secondary picketing create particularly troublesome constitutional
issues. The right to express views, even when designed to coerce or embarass a party, must be
considered in light of the nonspeech elements of picketing. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910-12 (1982) (picketing as communication includes elements which make it
more than pure speech and, as a result, is entitled to less stringent protection than pure speech);
Safeco, 497 U.S. at 617-18, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2571 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (when union
activities include none of the nonspeech elements such as patrolling which result in limited protec-
tion of the right to free speech, restrictions of such activity violate the union's first amendment
rights); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971) (communication
intended to influence others, when peaceful, is fully protected under the first amendment). See
Goldman, supra note 3, at 1482-87 for a discussion of the differences under a first amendment
analysis between picketing and nonlabor picketing publicity.
8 Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500, 100 L.R.R.M. 2913, 2917 (1979).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. 607, 104 L.R.R.M. 2567 (1982); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1969).
Picketing, in the labor context, contains two elements. First, there is the element of patrolling,
i.e., marching back and forth, Second, there is the element of speech, usually placed on a placard,
intended to influence others to favor the union's position. Id, at 77, 55 L.R.R.M, at 2969 (Black, J.,
concurring). Patrolling is the nonspeech element that prevents a union from enjoying the full
protection of the first amendment. Patrolling necessarily involves a physical presence that may
induce action on the part of another. Handbilling, however, does not have the nonspeech element
of patrolling. Handbilling, when properly conducted, depends solely on the content of the message
to influence the reader. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618-19, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part).
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Prior to 1986, however, courts had not yet resolved this tension in the context of labor
activites that involved peaceful distribution of a message in the absence of picketing.
During the Survey year, in Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades v. NLRB
(Florida Gulf ), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that peaceful distribution of
handbills by union members at secondary sites is not proscribed by the Act." Conse-
quently, the court of appeals did not have to reach the constitutionality of the statute."
After Florida Gulf, peaceful nonpicketing union activities designed to publicize the union's
position may be viewed as free from any prohibition based on the Act.
In Florida Gulf, the union's secondary activities were prompted by the union's dispute
with the H.J. High Construction Company (High). 13 High was the general contractor
engaged by the Wilson Company (Wilson) to build a department store.' 4 Wilson was
then a tenant, along with eighty-five co-tenants, in a mall owned and operated by the
Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo). 15
 The union, contending that High paid
substandard wages to its employees, distributed handbills at four mall entrances urging
consumers not to patronize any of the stores in the mall. 16
The union's handbilling occurred over a three week period during the department
store's construction." The union distributed handbills peacefully and did not picket or
patrol.'s DeBartolo requested the union to amend its handbills to clarify to readers that
the labor dispute did not involve DeBartolo or any of the current tenants of the mall
other than Wilson. 19
 Additionally, DeBartolo asked the union to restrict its handbilling
to the immediate vicinity of Wilson's."
The union's refusal to comply with DeBartolo's request prompted DeBartolo to file
a trespass action in state court and an unfair labor practice charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 21
 The NLRB's General Counsel issued a complaint
alleging that the union activities violated the Act's secondary boycott provisions because
neither DeBartolo nor any tenant of the mall was involved in a labor dispute with the
union." The NLRB considered the complaint and concluded that the union's activities
were exempt from the Act by the publicity proviso of the Act." As a result, the Board
" Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. NLRB (Florida Gulf), 796 F.2d 1328, 1346,
123 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2015 (11th Cir. 1986).
12 Id.
12 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 148, 113 L.R.R.M. 2953 (1983).
"Id. at 149, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2954.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 150, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2954. The union, through its handbills, asked consumers not to
patronize any of the mall's stores until "DeBartolo publicly promised that construction at the Mall
would be done by contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits." Id.
L7 Id.
' 8 Id. at 151, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2954.
12 Id,
2° Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
22 Id. at 152,- 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956. The "publicity proviso" is discussed extensively in Florida
Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1341-46, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2010-14. Congress added the publicity proviso to the
1959 amendment to the Act to clarify the prohibition against union activities. The proviso was
intended to make clear that the prohibitory language did not reach primary picketing or nonpick-
eting publicity. Id. at 1343, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2012-13. The publicity proviso states:
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dismissed the complaint." The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this broad
interpretation of the publicity proviso and held that the union's activities were exempted
from the Act. 25
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the NLRB and the
circuit court and held that the handbilling activities of the union did not fall within the
publicity provision of Section 8(b)(4).26 The Court concluded that the expansive reading
of the publicity proviso by the NLRB and the court of appeals was unwarranted." The
Court remanded the case to the NLRB for a determination of whether the Act, apart
from the publicity proviso, proscribes the union's handbilling."
On remand, the NLRB found that the union's distribution of handbills was intended
to "coerce the mall tenants with an object of forCing the mall tenants to cease doing
business with DeBartolo in order to force DeBartolo and/or Wilson's to cease doing
business with High." 22 The NLRB therefore concluded that the handbilling violated the
Act. 30 As a result, the Board ordered the union to stop distribution of the hartdbills. 31
-
file union petitioned the Eleventh Circuit to set aside the Board's order, and the Board
cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. 32
The Eleventh Circuit granted the union's petition and denied enforcement of the
order." The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in Florida Gulf by acknowledging the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's policy to avoid addressing the constitutionality of a
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for
the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a
labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his em-
ployment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any
services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
24 DeBartolo, 463 U.S. at 152, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2955. For the NLRB decision, see Florida Gulf
Coast Building Trades Council, AFL—CIO (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 105
L.R.R.M. 1273 (1980).
" DeBartolo, 463 U.S. at 152-53, 113 L.R.R.M, at 2955. For the court of appeals decision, see
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d'264, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729 (4th Cir. 1981).
26 DeBartolo, 463 U.S. 155-57, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57.
" Id. at 155-56, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57. The Court decided that the publicity proviso was
intended to exempt publicity targeted to inform the public that the primary employer's product is
distributed by the secondary employer. Id. at 155-57, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57.
Because no products produced by High were distributed by DeBartolo or any of Wilson's co-
tenants, the union's handbilling did not fall within the terms of the proviso. Id. at 157, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 2956. Further, the Court decided that the publicity proviso did not exempt the handbilling.
Therefore, the Court held that the expansive reading of the Act resulted in an improper construc-
tion of the statute. Id. Nonetheless, the Court refused to address the issue of whether the Act
unconstitutionally prohibits the union's right to free speech, Id. at 157-58, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956.
28 Id. at 158, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
" Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1331, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
5D Id.
si Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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congressional act if alternative grounds for a decision exist. 34 More specifically, the court
recognized that this policy encourages courts to construe congressional acts in a manner
that does not raise serious doubt as to their constitutionality." Therefore, the court of
appeals applied a bifurcated approach to the questions presented in Florida Gulf. The
court first considered whether the NLRB's interpretation of the Act casts doubts as to
the constitutionality of the Act." If such doubt existed, the court stated, the court then
must analyze the statute's legislative history to identify Congress's clear intent to prohibit
the handbilling." If the analysis revealed no such intention, the court concluded, a
narrow construction of the Act would be warranted, and the handbilling, therefore,
would not violate the Act."
The court concluded that the NLRB's interpretation of the Act raises serious ques-
tions about the constitutionality of the statute. 39 To reach the decision, the court exten-
sively reviewed cases concerning the free speech aspects of picketing. It noted that
although picketing contains nonspeech elements, overly restrictive prohibitions of pick-
eting may violate the first amendment 4 0 In considering the facts of the present case, the
court emphasized that no picketing was involved. Thus, the nonspeech elements that
otherwise would permit limitations on picketing were not present." Additionally, the
court noted the protection granted to handbilling and pamphleteering in prior cases. 42
As a result of these two factors, the court decided that to construe the Act as prohibiting
the union's handbilling would implicate serious constitutional issues." In light of the
potential constitutional issues, the court concluded that an examination of the legislative
history was necessary to find a clear expression of congressional intent to prohibit
handbilling."
The court first noted that the Taft-Hartley Act, as originally enacted in 1947,
included loopholes that prevented it from effectively prohibiting secondary boycotts."
The court then extensively reviewed the legislative history of the 1959 amendments to
" Id. (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. .490, 500, 100 L.R.R.M. 2913, 2917
(1979)) (noting that the Court in Catholic Bishop held that Congress expects a statute to be narrowly
construed when the legislation limits communication in any way).
"Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1331, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2003 (citing International Ass'n Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 48 L.R.R.M. 2345 (1961)).
Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1332, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
57 Id.
" See id.
"Id. at 1335, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
4° Id. at 1332-35, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2003-06.
4 ' Id. at 1335, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
42 Id. (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
45
 Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1335, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
44 Id. at 1335-36, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2006-07.
45 Id. at 1336-37. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 64-65, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2964-65 for a discussion
of the loopholes in the Act. The Court, in Tree Fruits, described the loopholes as follows:
Since only inducement of "employees" was proscribed, direct inducement of a super-
visor or the secondary employer by threats of labor trouble was not prohibited. Since
only a "strike or concerted refusal" was prohibited, pressure upon a single employee
was not forbidden. Finally, railroads and municipalities were not "employers" under
the Act and therefore an inducement or encouragement of their employees was not
unlawful.
Id. at 64-65, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2964-65.
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the Act, which were intended to close these loopholes." The court emphasized that
proponents of both the Senate and House versions of the amendments initially consid-
ered direct economic actions against secondary parties, such as strikes and nonconsumer
picketing, as the evils to be cured. 47 Consumer picketing or publicity, the court concluded,
was not initially the problem to which Congress addressed itself."
The court then reviewed the change in focus that accompanied the 1959 amend-
ment's legislative evolution. 49 The court noted that a speech by President Eisenhower
outlined the problem as solely one of consumer picketing. 59 As further evidence of the
shift in the target of the Bill, the court presented an excerpt from House debates that
indicated that the Bill's sponsor proposed the amendments to target consumer picket-
ing." The court noted, however, that there was no evidencen that any of the Bill's
proponents advocated restrictions on any form of nonpicketing behavior."
In sum, after extensive review of the legislative history, the court concluded that
the intent of the amendments was to prohibit such coercive behavior by unions as
consumer picketing and direct economic actions." The court noted that the words and
actions of the 1959 amendments' sponsors offered no evidence that the amendments
were intended to proscribe such nonpicketing labor publicity as handbilling." Thus, the
court examined other aspects of the legislative history.
46 Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1336-46, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2007-12.
47 Id. at 1337-38, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2008. The court cited the Secretary of Labor's testimony in
support of the Administration's version of the Bill as an example of the proponents' lack of intent
to prohibit consumer picketing or publicity directed at consumers. Id. at 1337, 123 L.R.R.M. at
2007. The court also pointed to the Senate Report accompanying the Senate's version of the Bill.
The Report did not list consumer picketing or publicity as a problem. Id. at 1337-38, 123 L.R.R.M.
at 2008. Moreover, the court noted that the House version of the Bill and the original statements
of its sponsor offered no evidence that consumer picketing or publicity was deemed to be a problem.
Id. at 1338-39, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2008.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1339-43, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009-12.
'" Id. at 1339, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009. President Eisenhower, speaking in favor of labor reform,
presented an example of' a furniture store that was picketed because it sold furniture manufactured
by an employer with whom the union had a dispute. Id. Labelling the store an "innocent bystander,"
the President called for a "stop" to such tactics. Id.
61 Id. at 1339-40, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009-10.
" The court dismissed the only mention in the legislative history that would indicate that the
Bill would apply to nonpicketing labor publicity because the opponents of the amendments advanced
it. Id. at 1340, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2010 (citing Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 66, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2964).
Id. at 1340, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009-10. Handbilling, of course, is one form of nonpicketing
behavior. The coercive nature of picketing, however, was particularly problematic for advocates of
the Bill. Id. Although recognizing that the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits noted that the Act was
targeted to prevent coercive conduct such as picketing, 377 U.S. at 68, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2965, the
court, in Florida Gulf, dismissed the NLRB's argument stating that handbilling was coercive and
thus prohibited by the Act. Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1340 n,14, 123 L.R.R.M. 2009-10 n.14.
The court, following the rule of statutory construction advanced by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Fruit & Veg. Pack. & Wlue., Loc. 76, deemed the opponents' interpretation of the amend-
ments not to be controlling. Id. at 1340, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 66, 123
L.R.R.M. at 2953. The court concluded that the intent of' the sponsors of the legislation was the
proper source to consider.
"Florida Gulf, 796 F.2d at 1337-38, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2008.
55
	
at 1340, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009-10. Moreover, the court concluded that the opponents'
interpretation of the amendments, which indicated that nonpicketing labor publicity was prohibited,
was of no significance. Id. at 1340 n.14, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2009-10 n.14.
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The court next addressed the NLRB's argument that Congress intended the pub-
licity proviso to be an exception to the Act's secondary boycott prohibition. 56 The court
reviewed a report that summarized the compromise reached by the House and Senate
conference committees' From the conference committee's summary analysis, the court
concluded that the publicity proviso was added to the Bill to clarify that the Bill did not
encompass primary picketing or nonpicketing publicity. 55
The court stated that it could not ascertain any clear intention by Congress to
proscribe nonpicketing labor publicity. 59 Moreover, the court concluded that the legis-
lative history did not indicate that the proponents of the amendments intended to
prohibit nonpicketing labor publicity. 60
 Thus, the court held that because there was no
evidence that Congress intended to proscribe handbilling, the NLRB order should not
be enforced."
The Florida Gulf opinion represents an example of the judicially developed principle
that courts construe congressional acts narrowly when a broader construction raises
serious constitutional issues 62
 In Florida Gulf, adherence to this policy was warranted,
because handbilling, when peaceful and free of nonspeech elements, clearly deserves
first amendment protection. 65 To have ruled that the Act proscribes handbilling, the
court would have placed itself in the awkward and unneccesary position of being forced
to declare the Act unconstitutional. The court wisely, and with sufficient support in the
legislative history, avoided this consequence by applying a narrow construction of the
statute.
Florida Gulfs importance lies in the guidance it provides in evaluating secondary
nonpicketing union activities. Publicity oriented activities that avoid the "physical" specter
of patrolling and placarding will escape prohibition from the Act's secondary boycott
provisions. Although it is still argued that handbilling does not differ significantly from
picketing at secondary sites, courts have distinguished the two, and the Florida Gulf
decision broadens the distinction by recognizing that handbilling is outside the scope of
the Act64 Therefore, after Florida Gulf, organizers of union activities at secondary sites
can be assured that activities designed to publicize the union's position and that avoid
56 Id. at 1341, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2010. The NLRB argued that "if Congress had not intended to
restrict nonpicketing publicity under the [Act], it would not have drafted the publicity proviso." Id.
In short, the NLRB argued that the publicity proviso was an exception in favor of nonpicketing
publicity, and that therefore the amendments must have proscribed nonpicketing publicity. Id.
57 Id. at 1341-43, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2010-13.
5" Id. at 1343, 1344 n.19, 123 L.R.R.M. 2012, 2013 n.19.
The court strengthened its conclusion by noting that the publicity proviso was intended not as
an exception but rather as an interpretive, explanatory section. Id. at 1345, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2014.
The court, moreover, noted that a proponent of the Bill, Senator Goldwater, stated that, although
the final version of the Bill was pending, the prohibition extended only to picketing. Id. at 1346,
123 L.R.R.M. at 2014.
5' Id. at 1346, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2014-15.
60 Id,
61 Id
62 Id. at 1346, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2015.
" See supra notes 10, 34-43 and accompanying text. See also Goldman, supra note 3, at 1482-
1508 for the argument that nonpicketing labor publicity deserves the full protection of the first
amendment.
"4 For the NLRB's argument that handbilling is largely equivalent to picketing see Florida Gulf,
796 F.2d at 1334 n.6, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2005 n.6.
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elements of picketing escape the prohibitions of the Act and fully enjoy the protection .
of the first amendment.
B. *Union Picketing on Behalf of Independent Contractors Against Non-Neutral Parties Not
Prohibited as Secondary Boycott under the National Labor Relations Act: Production Workers
Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707 v. NLRB.'
Section 8(b)(4) 2 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) makes it an unfair labor
practice for any labor organization to engage in a "secondary boycott." Essentially, a
secondary boycott in a labor dispute involves the application of economic pressure on
an employer with whom the union has no dispute in an attempt to induce that employer
to cease doing business with another employer with whom the union does have the labor
dispute.' The purpose of the secondary boycott provision is to protect neutral third
parties from the direct effects of others' labor disputes.
* By Kevin W. Clancy, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REvrEw.
793 F.2d 323, 122 L.R.R.M. 2877 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. § l58(b)(4)(1982). The relevant portion of the section states:
(b) It shall be au unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (4)(i)
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce . . . to engage in, a strike ... or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce ... where in either case an object thereof
is — (B) forcing or requiring any person ... to cease doing business with any other
person ... Provided that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where riot otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
s The classic definition of secondary boycott, often quoted by the Supreme Court in connection
with section 8(b)(4), is by Judge Learned Hand;
The gravamen of a secondary boycott, is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer
who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern
in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this
will induce the employer to give in to his employees' demands.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37, 25 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2451 (2d Cir.
1950); see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 388, 70
L.R.R.M. 2961, 2968 (1969); Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 667, 672, 48 L.R.R.M. 2210, 2212 (1961), For a general discussion of the law of secondary
boycott, see Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 1363 (1962).
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 240 (1976)
The following hypothetical demonstrates the difference between primary and secondary boycotts:
[A] union may seek to organize the employees at Company P, or may seek to extract
economic concessions during a collective bargaining negotiation with Company P. An
inducement of P's employees to engage in a work stoppage would be treated as
"primary" concerted activity, and a request to Company S which buys the product of
Company P to refrain From doing so would be a "primary" product boycott; in either
situation the object is to cut off P's business and thereby to force capitulation to the
union's demands. If the request to Company S, however, is unsuccessful, and the
union attempts to coerce in turn that company to cease buying from (or supplying)
Company P — and that coercion takes the form of appealing to S's employees to
engage in a work stoppage or to S's customers to boycott S's products — the union's
pressure becomes "secondary." The attempted withdrawal of' services or patronage
from S (generically referred to as a "boycott") pressures a person with whom the union
has no underlying quarrel and whose employment relations it does not seek to alter.
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Although the term "secondary boycott" appears nowhere in the statutory language,
since the Act's passage courts have recognized that boycott actions must be "secondary"
in character6 to fall within the prohibition of section 8(b)(4). 7 The 1959 Landrum-Griffin
amendment to section 8(b)(4) affirms this interpretation making the section inapplicable
to any "primary strike or primary picketing." 8 Thus, the statutory language defines
neither the term "secondary boycott" nor the scope of the secondary boycott prohibition.
In National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB , 9 the United States Supreme
Court defined secondary boycott actions. 10 The Court stated that the central aspect of a
secondary boycott is "pressure tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor
dispute not his own."" In NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council," the
Supreme Court noted that the quality that makes union pressure secondary is that it is
brought against a third party not involved in the underlying labor dispute• 13 The Denver
Building Court reasoned that the policy behind section 8(b)(4)'s prohibition against
secondary boycotts was to shield unoffending employers and others from pressures in
controversies not their own."
In 1984 the National Labor Relations Board (Board), in Production Workers Union of
Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707, sought to expand the scope of section 8(b)(4) by inter-
preting it to include all picketing by unions on behalf of independent contractors within
its definition of secondary boycott, without regard to the neutrality of the third party. 15
The Production Worker's Board prohibited union involvement in picketing by independent
contractors, not only against neutral employers but also against employers intimately
involved in the underlying labor dispute with the independent contractors.I 6 This deci-
sion marked the first time that the Board included union pressure directed at non-
neutral parties within its interpretation of a secondary boycott under section 8(6)(4)."
The object, just as in the primary boycott, is to fracture the ongoing business relation-
ship between Company P and its suppliers or purchasers in order to make it increas-
ingly costly for that company to resist the union's demands.
Id.
5 A boycott is a refusal to have dealings with an offending person. In labor disputes, a boycott
cbnsists of economic pressure leveled at the offending person — the employer involved in the
dispute. See, Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L.
REV. 257, 271 (1959).
8
 The element of "secondary activity" is present when there is a refusal to have dealings with
one party because that party has dealings with the offending person. Id. at 271.
7 See Lesnick, supra note 3, at 1364.
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9 386 U.S. 612, 64 L.R.R.M. 2801 (1967).
to Id. at 644-45, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
ti Id. at 623, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2805.
12
 341 U.S. 675, 28 L.R.R.M. 2108 (1951).
15 Id. at 692, 28 L.R.R.M. at 2115.
" Id.
15 Production Workers Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 324–
25, 122 L.R.R.M. 2877, 2879 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Board reasoned that since independent con-
tractors were not statutory employees, their picketing did not advance one of section 8(b)(4)'s
primary purposes of promoting the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on
offending employers in labor disputes, and thus the Board ruled that section 8(b)(4) prohibited
picketing in aid of independent contractors. 793 F.2d at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
16 Id. at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2881.
17 Id.
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During the Survey year, in Production Workers Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707
v. NLRB, 18 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
Board's expanded interpretation of section 8(b)(4), holding that the prohibition against
secondary boycotts turns on the neutrality of the targeted third party. 19 Therefore,
according to the court, section 8(b)(4) does not prohibit picketing by unions on behalf
of independent contractors against non-neutral third parties in a labor dispute." In
reversing the Board's decision, the D.C. Circuit stated that its ruling was consistent with
the congressional intent behind the enactment of section 8(b)(4), and that the Board had
no legal authority to support its "novel interpretation" of the provision. 21
 Thus, the
Production Workers Union court reaffirmed the general rule that a secondary boycott
occurs only if the labor organization pressures a neutral employer in a labor dispute not
its own.22
In Production Workers Union, the labor dispute arose between two Chicago cab com-
panies, Checker Taxi Company (Checker) and Yellow Taxi Company (Yellow), and a
group of drivers who leased cabs from the companies." Before 1975, these companies
employed commissioned cab drivers, who were statutory employees under the Act. 24 In
1975, however, Checker and Yellow began to replace these commissioned drivers with
drivers who leased cabs from the companies." Because the Act specifically excludes
coverage of independent contractors, these leased cab drivers (LCDs) were not afforded
the Act's protection" and therefore the cab companies were under no legal obligation
to bargain with them."
The LCDs became dissatisfied with the cab lease terms, and because the companies
did not have to bargain with them, the LCDs began to organize in the hope that the cab
companies would agree voluntarily to deal collectively with them." In 1980, the leader
of the dissatisfied LCDs sought the Production Workers Union's assistance and together
18 793 F.2d 323, 122 L.R.R.M. 2877 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19 Id. at 327, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880. See National Woodwork Mfrs., 386 U.S. at 623, 64 L.R.R.M.
at 2805.
20 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 325, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
21 Id. at 333, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2886.
22 Id. at 327, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880. See National Woodwork Mfrs., 386 U.S. at 623, 64 L.R.R.M.
at 2805.
23 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 325, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
24 Id. The Act states that:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
25 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 325, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
26 The Act states that:
"The term 'employee' 	 shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or
in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, , .. or any individual having the status
of an independent contractor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Because the LCDs were independent
contractors they were, therefore, not statutory employees. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org.
Comm., Seafarers intl. Union of N. Am. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 881, 99 L.R.R.M. 2903, 2916
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
27 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 325, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
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they created the Leased Taxicab Division of Local 707 of the Production Workers
Union." The LCDs agreed that if the cab companies refused to negotiate, they would
stop working and picket the cab companies. 5° The union wrote to Yellow and Checker
requesting the companies to recognize and deal with the division, but the companies
refused. 3 ' As a result, the LCDs and some union officials began to picket the garages of
the cab companies in August 1980. 52
In September, 1980, Yellow and Checker responded by filing unfair labor practice
charges against the union under the secondary boycott provisions contained in section
0)(4). 55
 The NLRB Administrative Law Judge (ALI) heard the case in 1981, and
subsequently issued an order dismissing the complaint. 54 The ALJ held that the LCDs'
picketing fell entirely outside the ambit of the Act because it did not involve an employer-
employee relationship. Thus the cab companies' charges failed to present a labor dispute
falling within the NLRB's subject-matter jurisdiction.55
In 1984, a three member panel of the NLRB rejected the ALJ's ruling, holding that
the unfair labor practice complaint fell within the NLRA's subject-matter jurisdiction
because it was brought against a labor organization within the meaning of the Act."
Moving to the merits of the complaint, the Board noted that section 8(b)(4) generally
addresses situations in which the union acts against a neutral employer in order to
pressure another employer whose employees the union seeks to represent or benefit,
and that the matter at hand was clearly not such a case." The Board stated that section
8(b)(4) is intentionally broad and although the term "secondary boycott" generally is
used as the shorthand reference for the forbidden conduct, such a broadly drafted
provision should not be limited by a term that does not actually appear in the statute.35
Instead, according to the Board, the interpretation should be guided by the provision's
primary purpose to promote the labor organization's right to bring pressure on offending
employers in labor disputes. 59
"Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Except for one brief incident, the LCDs confined their picketing to the garages that
housed only vehicles operated by LCDs.
" Id.
3'1 Id. at 325-26, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879-80.
33 Id. at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880. The Act states that:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning the terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. 152(9) (1982).
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 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880. The Act states that:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
" Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
38 Id.
" Id.
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The Board found that because the LCDs were independent contractors and not
employees within the Act's scope, their picketing did not promote the right of labor
organizations, and thus their actions did not advance section 8(b)(4)'s primary purpose. 40
The Board, therefore, demanded a "strong indication" that section 8(b)(4)'s express
permission of primary picketing included picketing in aid of independent contractors. 4 '
The Board concluded that no such indication existed in either legislative history or case
precedent, and ordered the union to cease and desist from picketing the cab companies. 42
The Board thus held that section 8(b)(4) proscribes labor organization participation in
all picketing by independent contractors. 45
In Production Workers Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707 v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the Board's broad inter-
pretation of the Act's secondary boycott provisions. 44 The court held that section 8(b)(4)
does not prohibit picketing by unions on behalf of independent contractors against non-
neutral third parties in a labor dispute.45 The Production Workers Union court began its
analysis by noting that the Board did have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider whether
the union's picketing violated section 8(b)(4). 4C The D.C. Circuit found that although no
statutory employees were involved in the dispute because of the LCDs' status as inde-
pendent contractors,47 there still existed a labor dispute within the Act's scope." The
presence of a labor dispute, the court found, regardless of the statutory status of the
disputants, was sufficient to satisfy the Board's jurisdictional requirement." The Board's
task, according to the court, was not to pause at the threshhold to identify a conventional
labor dispute, but was instead to measure the union's conduct against section 8(b)(4)'s
prohibition on secondary activity. 50
Moving to the merits of the case, the Production Workers Union court noted that since
the adoption of section 8(b)(4) in 1947, the Board has decided many cases delineating
the labels "neutral" and "secondary boycott" but has never before held that section
8(b)(4) prohibits union participation in picketing against a party regardless of that party's
involvement in the underlying labor dispute. 5 ' The court recognized, however, that the
Board may change its interpretation of section 8(b)(4), and that when Congress' intent
is unclear the courts must uphold the Board's interpretation if based on a "reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies."52 But when the intent of Congress is clear, the
4° Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 324-25, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text for the definition of a statutory employee.
4° See supra note 35 and accompanying text for the definition of a statutory labor dispute.
" Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880. See Soft Drink Workers
Union Local 812, Int'l Bhd, of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. v.
NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252, 1258, 105 L.R.R.M. 2658, 2662 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5° Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
51 Id. at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2881.
52 Id. at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2881-82. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, hie., 467 U.S, 837, 842-43 (1984).
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court stated, it must give effect to that congressional intent regardless of the NLRB's
opinion."
Consistent with these rules, the Production Workers Union court assessed the clarity
of Congress' intent in enacting section 8(b)(4) to determine the validity of the Board's
expanded interpretation. 54 The court held that Congress' intent, as demonstrated by the
provision's legislative history and repeated and unambiguous Supreme Court precedent,
was completely clear: Congress designed section 8(b)(4) to prohibit only pressure brought
to bear On third personsI  wholly unconcerned with the labor dispute." The court found
that the legislative his!or clearly indicated that Congress intended section 8(b)(4) to
prohibit only secondary pressure, pressure against neutrals. 56
In particular, the D.C. Circuit noted that the Conference Report accompanying the
provision specified that section 8(b)(4) did not prohibit "the primary strike for recogni-
tion," and also listed as examples of prohibited conduct only classic secondary boycotts
involving pressure against neutral parties." Indeed, the court found the remarks of
Senator Taft, a sponsor of the bill, controlling. Senator Taft stated that "[a]ll this pro-
vision of the bill [section 8(b)(4)] does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary
boycotts," thereby making them illega1. 56 According to this unequivocal legislative history,
the court stated, the quality that makes behavior secondary is that it fits the common law
definition of a secondary boycott." The central aspect of a secondary boycott, the court
noted, was "pressure tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute not
his own.""
The Production Workers Union court also examined prior Supreme Court decisions,
finding that from its earliest construction of section 8(b)(4), the Court adopted the
aforementioned interpretation that secondary boycotts involve pressure against neu-
trals.6 1 The D.C. Circuit noted that in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades
Council, 62 the Supreme Court looked to the purposes of section 8(b)(4), observing that
the section was referred to in the Act's legislative history as one of the Act's secondary
boycott provisions and that this was made clear by Senator Taft's remark." The court
stated that the Denver Building Court described the policy behind section 8(b)(4)'s pro-
hibition of secondary boycotts as "shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own." 61 The D.C. Circuit noted that for the Denver
Building Court, the quality that made pressure secondary was the same as reflected in
the legislative history, namely that it was brought against a third party not involved in
the underlying labor dispute. 65 The Production Workers Union court further noted that
55 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882. See Securities Indus. Assoc.
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1984).
" Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
55 Id.
56 Id.
" Id. at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947).
5" Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882 (quoting 93 CONG. REC.
4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft on section 8(b)(4))).
" Id. at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
6° Id. (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 623, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2805).
61 Id. at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
62 341 U.S. 675, 28 L.R.R.M. 2108 (1951).
65 Id. at 686, 28 L.R.R.M. at 2113.
64 Id. at 692, 28 L.R.R.M. at 2115.
65
 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
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Congress approved the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 8(b)(4) by inserting a
proviso in the present version of section 8(b)(4) that explicitly protects primary union
activity." Thus, according to the court, case law has "universally and unambiguously"
held that Congress intended section 8(b)(4) to protect only neutral parties from coercion
in disputes not their own. 67
Based on the legislative history of section 8(b)(4) and the clear Supreme Court
precedent, the Production Workers Union court found the congressional intent plain and
not subject to genuine dispute.68 According to the court, secondary activity under section
8(b)(4) refers only to pressure on a neutral third party." The court noted that neither
in its brief nor in its ruling did the Board address a single case or a shred of legislative
history to support its interpretation that pressure directed against a non-neutral party
is secondary. 7° Consequently, the court stated, the Board misinterpreted Congress' spe-
cific intent in concluding that section 8(b)(4) prohibited union involvement in all picketing
by independent contractors." Consistent with the holding, the D.C. Circuit remanded
the case to the Board, requiring it to apply the proper standard, that section 8(b)(4)
proscribes picketing only against neutral parties to a labor dispute. 72
The Production Workers Union court's opinion represents the dearest statement of
the scope of section 8(b)(4) to date because, as the court noted, the case represents the
first instance in which the Board has suggested that section 8(b)(4) prohibits union
participation in picketing against a party regardless of that party's involvement in the
underlying labor dispute." The court's decision is significant because it demonstrates
that section 8(b)(4)'s application turns on the neutrality of the targeted party and not,
as the Board suggested, on the statutory relationship between that party and the picketing
employees. 74 According to the court, the primary purpose of section 8(b)(4) is not to
promote the right of labor organizations to bring pressure on offending employers in
labor disputes, as the Board erroneously concluded." The provision's primary purpose,
according to the D.C. Circuit, is to shield unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own." Thus, the court's holding indicates that only
neutral parties can be the objects of secondary boycotts as proscribed by section,8(b)(4),
and that non-neutral parties that are victimized by union pressure cannot prevail in
unfair labor practice actions under section 8(b)(4).
The D.C. Circuit, in Production Workers Union, correctly decided that picketing by a
union on behalf of independent contractors is not a secondary boycott as proscribed by
" Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for the relevant text of section 8(b)(4),
67 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2883. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local
825, lnt'l Union of Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297, 302-03, 76 L.R.R.M. 2129 (1971) (congres-
sional concern over involvement of third parties in labor disputes not their own prompted § 8(6)(4));
National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 623-24, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2805 (§ 8(b}(4) designed to make it unlawful
to resort to secondary boycott to injure business of third person wholly unconcerned in the dis-
agreement between employer and employees).
" Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 330, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 331, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2884.
71 Id .
72 Id. at 332-33, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
73 Id. at 328, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2881.
74 Id. at 326, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
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section 8(b)(4) where the picketed employer is not a neutral party in the dispute. As the
court properly found, the legislative history and Supreme Court precedent clearly dem-
onstrate that only neutral parties were to be protected by section 8(b)(4)." Prior to the
Taft-Hartley Act, secondary boycotts were legal, but as Senator Taft remarked, section
8(b)(4) of the Act only "reverse[d] the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts," thereby
making them illegal." According to this legislative history, the quality that makes union
behavior secondary is that it fits the common law definition of secondary boycott." As
the court noted, the classic definition, often quoted by the Supreme Court in connection
with section 8(b)(4), is that a secondary boycott's sanctions bear "not upon the employer
who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in
it."8° Clearly, only neutrals were to be protected by section 8(b)(4), as the court found,
and thus there was no basis for the Board's erroneous conclusion that the provision
banned picketing by a party against an employer regardless of the latter's involvement
in the underlying labor dispute. The court therefore correctly found that the Board's
broad interpretation of section 8(b)(4)'s scope was without merit.
For the practitioner, Production Workers iUnion's importance lies in its clarification
and reassertion of the application of section 8(b)(4). The case demonstrates that the
substance of the section 8(b)(4) claim, and not the form, is controlling, and that a claim
will be successful only where a neutral party is the object of the union pressure. The
practitioner should be aware that the proscription of section 8(b)(4) turns upon the
neutrality of the employer in relation to the party applying the pressure, and not upon
the latter's status under the Act. As the D.F. Circuit correctly held, section 8(b)(4) does
not exclude union involvement in all picketing by independent contractors." Rather, its
proscription is limited to picketing against neutral parties. 82
III. REMEDIES
A. *Employer Liability for Aggravation of a Preexisting Mental Disability — You Take Your
Victim as You Find Him; Wakefield v. NLRB'
Section 10(a) 2 of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), empowers the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board") to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice listed in section 8 3 of the Act. To this end, the Board may, among other
"Id. at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882-83.
78 1d. at 328-29, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
Id, at 329, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
8° Id. (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37, 25 L.R.R.M.
2449 (2d Cir. 1950)).
81 Production Workers Union, 793 F.2d at 332-33, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
82 1d. at 333, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
*By Kyle M. Robertson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 779 F.2d 1437, 121 L.R.R.M. 2305 (9th Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. § I60(a) (1982).
'Under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section [7][to organize
or support a union] ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I) (1982). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor
practice to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982).
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remedies, order the offending employer or union to compensate the affected employee
for backpay. 1 The backpay award is intended to remedy the economic consequences of
the unfair labor practice, and to deter future unfair labor practices. 5
Traditionally, backpay awards excluded compensation for any period of disability
between the time of the unlawful discharge and reinstatement, regardless of the cause
of disability." In the 1967 case of American Manufacturing Co., the Board reconsidered
the general rule which disallowed backpay for periods of disability, and modified it to
take into account the cause of an employee's inability to work.? Backpay awards for
periods of disability are proper, the Board held, where the causes of the disability are
known and are attributable to events or environmental factors that would not have been
present but for the unlawful discharges The Board in American Manufacturing distin-
guished between incapacity due to illnesses that were not related to the unlawful dis-
crimination, such as heart attacks and influenza, and those illnesses or injuries which are
"attributable to the unlawful conduct," such as assaults on an employee, detrimental
working conditions, or accidents suffered during the course of an interim job which the
employee held after the employer unlawfully discharged him or her. 9 The Board there-
fore concluded that equity required that where the disability is caused by the employer's
unlawful actions, the wages lost during the period of disability should be included in
backpay. r 9
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). The Board may also order reinstatement of the affected employee.
Id.
5 N.L.R.B. v. United Marine Div., Local 333, 417 F.2d 865, 868, 72 L.R.R.M. 2620, 2623 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970). Backpay frequently is awarded in cases where an
employer has wrongfully discharged, demoted or refused to reinstate an employee. See GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 138-39, 287, 533-34 (1976). For a discussion of the method of
calculating backpay, see N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S, 344, 346-49, 31 L.R.R.M.
2237, 2238-39 (1953) (although the Board once calculated backpay over the entire period between
discharge and reinstatement, less the amount earned in the interim, the Board now computes
backpay on a quarterly basis).
° See Melrose Processing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1352, 1354, 58 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1965), enforced, 351
F.2d (193, 60 L.R.R.M. 2328 (8th Cir. 1965) ("Broadly speaking, an employee who, has been discri-
minatorily discharged, or denied rehire, is entitled to receive what he would have earned during
the period of discrimination less backpay for periods during which he was voluntarily idle or unable
to work, and less his interim earnings.") The rule in Melrose was overruled in American Mfg. Co.
of Texas, 167 N.L.R.B. 520, 523, 66 L.R.R.M. 1122, 1126 (1967), which held that backpay awards
should include disability periods caused by the employer's unlawful conduct.
In some cases, however, the Board computed backpay without tolling payment for a period of
incapacity due to illness resulting from an accident on an interim job. See. e.g., Moss Planing Mill
Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, 419, 31 L.R.R.M. 1559 (1953), enforced, 206 F.2d 557, 32 L.R.R.M. 2530
(4th Cir. 1953) (the Board normally has excluded from computation of backpay any period of
physical incapacity to work, except that where employee's incapacity to work for a period following
his discharge was due to injury inflicted by employer, the Board would not abate backpay fur that
period); Charles T. Reynolds Box Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 11.1, 60 L.R.R.M. 1343, 1344 n.I
(1965), enforced, 399 F.2d 668, 68 L.R.R.M. 2974 (6th Cir. 1968) (allergic reaction to paint at interim
job was caused by or resulted from the discrimination against employee and would not have occurred
except for that discrimination; thus, backpay would not be abated during 11 month period of
illness).
7 167 N.L.R.B. 520, 522, 66 L.R,R.M. 1122, 1125 (1967).
8 Id.
9 Id.
ID Id.
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Subsequent Board decisions applied the American Manufacturing principle, and ex-
amined the causal relationship between the unlawful activity and the disability in deter-
mining whether a backpay award for the period of disability was proper." In 1979,
however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Graves Trucking v. N.L.R.B. limited the
rule of American Manufacturing.' 2 In Graves, the court found that an award of backpay
for a disability attributable to employer misconduct was proper, but held that the Board
abused its discretion in allowing backpay for as long in the future as the disability
continued." The court based its decision to limit the time period for a backpay award
on the Board's self-acknowledged lack of skill in personal injury matters where questions
of the continued existence of the disability, its cause, and extent would be outside the
Board's expertise." Thus, the Graves Trucking court suggested that the Board should
" For cases where the Board awarded backpay for disability caused by the employer's unlawful
activity, see, e.g., M.F.A. Milling Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1080, 68 L.R.R.M. 1077, 1079 (1968),
enforced, 463 F.2d 953, 80 L.R.R.M. 2412 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (employee entitled to backpay for period
of disability where employer's unlawful activity placed employee in situation where risk of injury
to his back was increased markedly: "[a]s it illegally set these environmental factors in motion,
[employer] cannot successfully disclaim liability For their consequences"); Fabric Mart Draperies,
182 N.L.R.B. 390, 390, 74 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1158 (1970) (employee entitled to backpay for period
of illness attributable to the employer's unlawful conduct in placing employee in a drafty work
station that aggravated employee's arthritic condition); Becton-Dickinson Co., 189 N.L.R.B, 787,
789, 77 L.R.R.M. 1627, 1631 (1971) (employee entitled to backpay for period of disability where
employer harrassment induced, or substantially contributed to, employee's acute anxiety reaction
and toss of consciousness: "No withhold a back pay order in these circumstances would permit
[employer] to escape all liability for the loss of wages which [employee] may have suffered because
of factor [employer] unlawfully set in motion, contrary to the remedial purposes of the Act");
Graves Trucking, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 344, 345 & n.9, 102 L.R.R.M. 1504, 1506 & n.9 (1979), enforced
as modified in relevant part, 692 F.2d 470, 111 L.R.R.M. 2862 (7th Cir. 1982) (employee, while never
discharged per se, was entitled to backpay where employer's brutal physical assault prevented
employee from resuming former position with employer and thus resulted in economic loss: "[t]he
relationship between [employer's] unlawful conduct and [employee's] injury is clear and direct ....
['Flo deny [employee] backpay would put him in a worse position than a discriminatee who has
suffered an industrial injury during the course of interim employment, an occurrence which the
Board has determined does not toll backpay. Yet, [employee's] injury is even more directly related
to [employer's] unlawful conduct than such industrial injuries, and we find he is entitled to at least
the same remedial relief."). For cases where the Board abated backpay during a period of disability,
see, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 1734, 1746 n.35, 69 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1968), enforced,
413 F.2d 1008, 71 L.R.R.M. 3003 (5th Cir. 1969) (employee not entitled to backpay for periods of
illness during interim period, citing American Mfg. Co. for principle that disallowance of backpay
for periods of illness is proper where the employee would have been absent from work because of
such illnesses even if the employer had not unlawfully discharged the employee).
692 F.2d 470, 477, 111 L.R.R.M. 2862, 2867 (7th Cir. 1982).
" Id. The court selected two years as the outer limit of a backpay award in the case. Id, at 477,
1 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 2868. The Board had awarded backpay to an employee for "a reasonable period
after his injury resulting from said unlawful conduct no longer precludes him from performing
his former or a substantially equivalent job . ..." Id. at 474, III L.R.R.M. at 2865.
14 Id. at 476-77, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2867. The court analogized to the Board's policy of refusing
to award employees backpay during periods of disability suffered as a result of assaults by union
agents. Id. at 475-76, 111  L.R.R.M. at 2866-67. ,Se, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 513, 145 N.L.R.B. 554, 556, 54 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1431 (1963):
[T]o the extent that satisfaction of individual claims which are primarily private in
nature may also serve to further the public interest in obtaining the peaceful resolution
of labor disputes, such interest is equally well served by the individual's resort to those
remedies traditionally used to process claims resulting from another's tortious conduct
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refrain from awarding backpay for extended periods of disability suffered as a result of
employer misconduct, and should leave the courts to fashion this remedy in a civil tort
action. 15
During the Survey year, in Wakefield v. N.L.R.B., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that an employer is liable for backpay during disability periods caused by the
employer's unlawful conduct aggravating the employee's nondisabling mental condition
into a disabling condition.'a In adhering to the "time-honored legal principle that a
wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him," the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's order excluding from the backpay computation the period that the employee
remained unable to work because the employer's unlawful conduct aggravated his preex-
isting psychological disability.' 7 The Wakefield decision consequently rejects the notion
that the Board lacks the expertise to apply principles of tort law in computing the
amount of backpay where the evidence reveals a causal relationship between the disability
and the unlawful conduct.
Harold Wakefield had been a driver with Greyhound Taxi ("Greyhound") for six
years when, in October 1974, he broke his arm while resisting an attempted robbery by
a customer.'a Wakefield was disabled for three months.'a During this time, Wakefield
alleged that he was harrassed by Greyhound officials who believed Wakefield was a
malingerer. 2a In response to the alleged harassment, Wakefield increased his union
activities and the General Counsel filed an N.L.R.B. action on Wakefield's behalf in
December 1975, charging Greyhound with unfair labor practices. 2 '
Wakefield's relationship with Greyhound continued to deteriorate, and in February
1976, while the N.L.R.B. action was pending, Greyhound agents physically assaulted
Wakefield. 22 Wakefield: sustained only minor physical injuries in the attack," but he soon
developed a severe post-traumatic anxiety neurosis requiring medical treatment.'" The
assault so frightened and intimidated Wakefield that he was forced to quit his job."
Mhe numerous and complicated factual questions involved in settling such claims
are not such questions as fall within the Board's special expertise, but do fall within
the special competence of judge and jury ...
Id. See also Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 414, 89 LR.R.M. 1741, 1742 (1975),
enforced, 540 F.2d 1, 92 L.R.R.M. 3425 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) ("Use of
[traditional] remedies would bring these employees before tribunals which have more expertise and
are better equipped than this Board to measure the impact of tortious conduct, including violence,
and to make the victims whole for loss of pay and any other injury.").
15 See Graves Trucking, 692 F.2d at 477, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 2867-68.
16 779 F.2d 1437, 1438, 121 L.R.R.M. 2305, 2306 (9th Cir. 1986).
17 Id.
t° Id. at 1437, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2305-06.
19 Id. at 1437, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
2° Id.
sl id. The complaint alleged violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. See Greyhound
Taxi Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 865, 865, 97 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1385 (1978). See supra note 3 for text of the
Act.
22 Wakefield, 779 F.2d at 1437, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
22 Wakefield suffered a sore back and sprained ankle. Id.
24 Id.
24 Greyhound Taxi Ca., 234 N.L.R.B. at 865, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1385. The Administrative Law judge
who heard the complaint found that the assault so frightened and intimidated Wakefield that he
was forced to quit his job: "[i[f the discriminatory action of the Employer here had created a
situation so intolerable to the employee, Wakefield, that he was compelled to quit his job, [employer]
is guilty of a constructive discharge." Id. at 879, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1385.
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Indeed, Wakefield's psychological disability prevented him from working at all for five
years. 26
In 1978, two years after the assault, the Board issued an order finding that Grey-
hound had committed unfair labor practices through its harrassment, assault, and con-
structive discharge of Wakefield." At a supplemental hearing to determine the amount
of backpay due Wakefield, an administrative law judge ("ALF) found that Wakefield's
psychological disability resulted solely from the circumstances surrounding the attack
and the unlawful discharge. 28 The ALJ recommended a backpay award that compensated
Wakefield for his entire disability period. 29
The Board accepted the ALys finding that Wakefield's physical disabilities resulted
from the employer's misconduct, but split over whether Greyhound's unlawful conduct
caused Wakefield's mental disability, and hence, whether Greyhound was liable for
backpay during that period.' 0 The evidence, according to the majority, contradicted the
conclusion that the attack and unlawful discharge were the sole cause of Wakefield's
disability, and failed to show that Wakefield would have been fit for work had the unfair
practices not occurred)' The Board majority found that Wakefield's psychological dis-
ability was at least partially, if not entirely, the result of a preexisting mental condition."
In support of its conclusion, the Board cited Wakefield's erratic behavior prior to the
discharge, his difficult relations with his own 'union, his unhappiness with previous
employers, and his previous psychiatric treatment." Thus, the Board ruled that Grey-
hound's backpay liability terminated when Wakefield recovered from his minor physical
injuries but remained unable to work because of a preexisting psychological disability.'''
In dictum, the Board stated that even where the employee can show that his
unavailability for work was due to the employer's unlawful conduct, "the Board [did not
know if should be in the business of making open-ended awards for disability in the
manner of a court in a civil tort action."86 Thus, the Board expressed the same hesitancy
that the Seventh Circuit noted in Graves Trucking about its expertise in matters involving
personal injury and a continuing disability. 86 The sole dissenting Board member, in
contrast, concluded that Greyhound's unlawful conduct aggravated Wakefield's mental
condition." Citing the tort law principle that a wrongdoer takes its victim as it finds him,
26
 Wakefield, 779 F.2d at 1437, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306. A forensic psychiatrist described Wake-
field's condition as a psychological disability which allowed him to go to college but not to work.
See Greyhound Taxi Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 459, 459, 118 L.R.R.M. 1568, 1569 (1985).
27
 Greyhound Taxi Co., 234 N.L.R.B. at 865, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1385.
28 See Wakefield, 779 F.2d at 1438, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
" See id.
36 See Greyhound Taxi Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 459, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1569. The Board, citing American
Mfg. Co., held that the employer was liable for backpay for the two week period of disability
attributable to Wakefield's physical injuries. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. The Board criticized the testimony of the General Counsel's principal psychiatric witness
as falling short in proving that the unfair labor practices were the immediate triggering cause of
Wakefield's psychological disability. See id.
34 Id. at 459-60, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
33 Id. at 459, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1569 (citing Graves Trucking, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 692 F.2d 470,
476-77, 111  L.R.R.M. 2862, 2867 (7th Cir. 1982)).
36 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
decision.
37
 Greyhound Taxi Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 460, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1570 (Dennis, dissenting).
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the dissent concluded that the employer was liable for backpay for the entire period of
disability."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a terse opinion, refused to enforce the
Board's supplemental order limiting the employer's liability for backpay. 39 The court
held that the Board's ruling lacked support in the record." The Board, stated the court,
rejected the ALJ's Findings of causation because the evidence did not establish that the
assault "standing alone" triggered Wakefield's psychological disability.'" The court noted,
however, that the Board failed to appreciate that the assault was not the only unfair
labor practice committed by Greyhound." Rather, Greyhound's overall pattern of un-
lawful conduct, including threats, harassment, and intimidation culminating in physical
assault, caused Wakefield's psychological disability." Thus, the assault did not have to
be shown to be the "sole" cause of Wakefield's disability to hold Greyhound liable for
Wakefield's backpay accruing since his unlawful discharge. 44
Having rejected the Board majority's decision, the court of appeals adopted the
dissenting 13oard member's opinion that aggravation of a preexisting condition suffices
to prove causation." The court agreed with the ALys finding that Greyhound's unlawful
conduct aggravated Wakefield's non-disabling mental condition into a disabling one."
The court then recomputed the period of disability for purposes of awarding backpay
and remanded the case to the Board to recalculate Wakefield's backpay award to include
the period during which Wakefield was psychologically disabled because of Greyhound's
unlawful conduct:"
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wakefield, consistent with labor and tort law princi-
ples, establishes that a backpay award should include the entire period that an employer's
unlawful conduct disables an employee, regardless of the nature of the disability. First,
" Id.
39 Wakefield, 779 F.2d at 1438, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
" Id. See supra note 33 for Board's criticism of the psychiatric testimony.
4 ' Id.
42 Id.
49 1d. at 1439, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2307.
44 Id. at 1438-39, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306-07.
" See id. at 1438, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306 (quoting Greyhound Taxi Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 460, 118
L.R.R.M. at 1570 (Dennis, dissenting)).
The court cited W. Pross-er, Law of Torts for the principle that a wrongdoer takes its victim as
it finds him. Id. Prosser describes the principle as follows:
It is as if a magic circle were drawn about the person, and one who breaks it,
even by so much as a cut on the huger, becomes liable for all resulting harm to the
person, although it may be death. The defendant is held liable when the defendant's
negligence operates upon a concealed physical condition, such as pregnancy, or a
latent disease, or susceptibility to disease, to produce consequences which the defen-
dant could not reasonably anticipate. The defendant is held liable for unusual results
of personal injuries which are regarded as unforseeable The defendant of course
is liable only for the extent to which the defendant's conduct has resulted in an
aggravation of the pre-existing condition, and not for the condition as it was; but as
to the aggravation, foreseeability is not a factor.
PROSSER AND KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS 291- 92 (W. Keeton, 5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
46 Wakefield, 779 F.2d at 1438, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
47 Id. at 1439, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2307. See Greyhound Taxi Co., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 123
L.R.R.M. (1986) (Because Greyhound Taxi had not objected to the computation of backpay, but
only to the ALj's finding of Greyhound's liability for that backpay, the Board, on remand, adopted
the ALys computation of Wakefield's backpay.)
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the decision is consistent with the principle established in American Manufacturing, which
focuses on whether the employer's unlawful conduct caused the disability, rather than
on the type of disability that results. Second, the decision is consistent with the tort law
principle which makes the wrongdoer liable for aggravation of a victim's preexisting
injury. Finally, the decision fulfills the objective of section 10(c) of the Act by compen-
sating an employee who has suffered from an employer's unlawful acts.
The Wakefield decision is consistent with the principles developed in American Man-
ufacturing," because it focuses on the causal link between the unlawful conduct and the
injury, not on the type of injury suffered. 49 In cases following American Manufacturing,
the Board had awarded backpay for disability periods where a preexisting physical
condition was aggravated by the employer's unlawful conduct. 50 As a limiting principle,
a distinction between preexisting physical conditions and preexisting psychological con-
ditions cannot withstand scrutiny. The important factor in awarding backpay is not the
type of disability aggravated by the employer's unlawful conduct, but the fact that the
employer's unlawful conduct set in motion the disabling consequences." Where the
causal relationship is clear, a period of disability for any preexisting condition aggravated
by the employer's unlawful conduct, physical or psychological, should be included in the
computation of backpay. Any limitation on the Board's ability to make open-ended
awards for disability should be imposed by statute, and not by imposing limitations on
time-honored legal principles.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wakefield v. N.L.R.B. extended the longstand-
ing tort law principle that "a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him" to the labor
law context. A wrongdoing employer whose unlawful conduct aggravated the victim-
employee's preexisting psychological condition committed an unfair labor practice and
should be responsible, no less than one who acts negligently, for the economic conse-
quences of his or her acts. The award of backpay for a victim of such acts will serve to
make the victim whole for his lost pay and deter future employment misconduct. Full
compensation for aggravation of an injury therefore serves the purposes of section 10(c)
of remedying the economic consequences of an unfair labor practice and deterring such
unfair labor practices.
B. *Awarding Backpay for Employer Unfair Labor Practices to Undocumented Workers
Regardless of Legal Immigration Status: Local 512 Warehouse and Office Workers' Union
v. NLRB'
Congress enacted section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) to deter
unfair labor practices. Under section 8(a)(5) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for
" See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of American Manufacturing.
49
	 Manufacturing, 167 N.L.R.B. at 522, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1125.
90 See M.F.A. Milling Co., 170 N.L.R.B. at 1079-80, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1079 (preexisting back
condition); Fabric Mart Draperies, 182 N.L.R.B. at 390, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1158 (arthritis).
'I See M.F.A. Milling Co., 170 N.L.R.B. at 1079-80, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1079. Furthermore, to toll
the computation of backpay during periods of disability where the employer's conduct has aggra-
vated a preexisting condition would be an abuse of the Board's discretion, for it would put the
employee who has suffered from the employer's egregious conduct in a worse position than an
employee who simply was discharged unfairly and suffered an accident in an interim job. See Graves
Trucking, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. at 345 n.9, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1506 n.9.
* By David L. Ruediger, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 795 F.2d 705, 122 L.R.R.M. 3113 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ant employer to refuse to bargain collectively with its employees' representatiyes. 3 If an
employer undertakes unilateral action that affects terms and conditions of employment
that are the subject of a collective bargaining agreement, without providing its employees'
bargaining agent reasonable notice and an opportunity to negotiate, then the employer
has violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 4 An employer's decision to layoff an employee
may violate section 8(a)(5) if the employer fails to notify its employees' bargaining agent
prior to the termination of the worker's employment.5 The employer may have com-
mitted an unfair labor practice in terminating a worker's employment even if a collective
bargaining agreement has not been executed so long as the employer and bargaining
agent have entered into contract negotiations. 8 Traditionally, when the NLRB finds that
an employer has laid off employees in violation of section 8(a)(5) it will order that the
employer reinstate the laid off workers and award them backpay for the period during
which their employment was unlawfully terminated.'
When an employer unlawfully terminates an undocumented worker's employment
in violation of section 8(a)(5), it is not clear whether the employee's illegal immigration
status precludes a backpay award. In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, held that undocumented workers employed within the United States were entitled
to the Act's protection, 8 and that affording such protection to workers who had been
discharged in violation of section 8 would not undermine the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act (INA). 8 The Court in Sure-Tan concluded, however, that in awarding
backpay to undocumented workers who had fled the country after their employers had
wrongfully terminated their employment, the NLRB was required to take into account
whether the employees had been legally available for work.I 0
In contrast, two years after Sure-Tan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, upheld an arbitration award mandating
reinstatement and backpay to illegal aliens who had remained in the United States
2 Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act states, in part, that:
[lit shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of-rights guar-
anteed in [this Act];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, or contribute financial or other support to it	 ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment in any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor orga-
nization ... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of [this Act].
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); see supra note 2.
4 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747, 50 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2182 (1962).
5 Local 512, 795 F.2d at 711, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3117 (citing NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co., 679
F.2d 200, 204, 110 L.R.R.M. 2566, 2569 (10th Cir, 1982)).
6 14 (citing Carbonex Coal, 679 F,2d at 205, 110 L.R,R.M. at 2570).
7 See a. at 710, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
8 467 U.S. 883, 892, 116 L.R.R.M. 2857, 2861 (1984),
9 Id. at 894, 116 1...R.R.M. at 2861.
1 ° Id. at 904-05, 1 l6 L.R.R.M. at 2866.
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available for work." Because Bevies involved the decision of a private arbitrator rather
than a ruling by the NLRB, however, it remained unresolved whether Sure-Tan required
the NLRB to condition backpay awards for undocumented workers, whose employment
was terminated in violation of section 8 and who remained in the United States, on the
employees' ability to prove that they were legally entitled to be present and employed in
the United States.
During the Survey year, the Ninth Circuit, in Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers'
Union v. NLRB, ruled that undocumented workers, whose employment had been ter-
minated in violation of section 8(a)(5) and who remained in the United States, were
entitled to receive backpay regardless of their legal status." The Local 512 court reasoned
that awarding backpay to undocumented workers, regardless of their legal status, would
not conflict with immigration laws, but might actually promote laws aimed at proscribing
legal entry, in addition to compensating for unfair labor practices." Consequently, in
the Ninth Circuit, once the NLRB has determined that an employer has violated section
8(a)(5) by unlawfully laying off undocumented workers, Local 512 obligates the employer
to reinstate all workers who remain in the United States and award them backpay,
regardless of whether the workers were legally entitled to be present and employed in
the United States.
In Local 512, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the employer, Felbro
Inc., shortly after beginning collective bargaining negotiations with the employees' bar-
gaining agent, laid off three undocumented workers without notifying the bargaining
agent." After the bargaining agent filed the complaint, but prior to the hearing before
the ALJ, Felbro reinstated the three employees." The ALJ concluded that Felbro's
termination of the workers' employment constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5)," and
recommended both reinstatement, with which the employer had already complied, and
compensatory backpay for the period during which the workers had been laid off."
The NLRB affirmed the ALys finding that Felbro had violated section 8(a)(5),' 5 but
amended the remedial order. Relying on Sure-Tan, the NLRB conditioned the backpay
awards on the undocumented workers' ability to demonstrate that they were legally
entitled to be present and employed in the United States." Following the NLRB's
decision, the bargaining agent petitioned for review of the conditional backpay remedy,
the NLRB petitioned for enforcement of its order, and the employer contested the
finding of liability as well as the award." The principal issue before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was whether Sure-Tan required the NLRB to
condition its backpay award on proof that the undocumented workers were legally
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.
" 791 F.2d 1391, 1394, 122 L.R.R.M. 2666, 2668 (9th Cir. 1986).
12 795 F.2d at 709, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
13 See id. at 719-20, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3124.
14 Id. at 709, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3115-16.
15 Id. at 709, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
1° Id. at 709, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3115. The ALJ also found that Felbro had violated sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §$ 158(a)(1), (a)(3), which prohibit employers from interfering
with, coercing, restraining or discriminating against employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by the Act. Id,
" Local 512, 795 F.2d at 709-10, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
Id. at 710, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
19 1d.
44 See id, at 709-10, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
December 1987]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 121
The Ninth Circuit, in concluding that the undocumented workers were entitled to
backpay regardless of their legal status, first reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in
Sure- Tan:11 The court in Local 512 noted that in Sure-Tan, the employer, for purposes of
retaliation, notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that it had reason
to believe that several of its employees were undocumented aliens. 22 As a result, the
Local 512 court indicated, five employees in Sure -Tan, after being arrested by INS
officials, voluntarily left the country to avoid deportation.2 3 The Local 512 court noted
that the Seventh Circuit, in Sure -Tan, had affirmed the NLRB's conclusion that the
employer had violated section 8 of the Act by constructively discharging the employees,"
and ordered that the employer extend an offer of reinstatement to the employees. The
court also suggested that the employer be required to pay the employees six months of
backpay. 29 The Local 512 court indicated that the Supreme Court, in Sure-Tan, affirmed
the Seventh Circuit's holding that undocumented aliens were entitled to protection under
the Act, and that such protection was consistent with both the purposes of fostering
collective bargaining and deterring illegal entry." Relying on the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in Sure-Tan, the court in Local 512 concluded that the undocumented
Felbro employees were entitled to protection under the Act. 27
The Local 512 court then addressed the propriety of awarding backpay to illegal
aliens. The Local 512 court noted that the Supreme Court, in Sure-Tan, concluded that
the backpay award violated the purposes of the Act because it was not conditioned upon
the employees' legal availability for work." To be consistent with Sure-Tan, the Local 512
court noted, a backpay remedy for violations of the Act must be formulated so that it
compensates employees for the actual damages they suffered from an employer's unfair
labor practices. 29 According to the Local 512 court, because the Sure -Tan workers left the
country with no indication of when they might legally re-enter, 30 the Supreme Court
held that, absent proof of the employees' legal availability for work, the imposition of a
six month backpay award was purely speculative and thus, could not accurately com-
pensate the workers for the actual damages they had suffered."
The Local 512 court interpreted Sure-Tan to apply only to workers who left_ the
United States and were unable to return legally. From this, the court extrapolated that
because the undocumented Felbro employees remained in the United States available
2 ' See id. at 720, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3124. The court in Local 512 first addressed the issue of its
jurisdictional authority to review the case and to amend the NLRB's conditional order. The court
concluded that it had both the authority to review the case and the right to amend the order prior
to the outcome of the compliance hearing. Id. at 710, 713-15, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3116, 3119-20.
22 Id. at 715, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3120-21 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2859).
23 Id. (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2859).
24 See id. at 715-16, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3120-21 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 888-89, 116 L.R.R.M.
at 2859-60).
22 Id. at 716, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3121 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 889-890, 116 L.R.R.M. at
2860).
26 Id. (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892-94, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2861).
' See id.
28 1d. (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903-05, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2866).
29 1d. (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 900-01, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2864).
3" Id. at 717, 122 L.R.R.M, at 3121 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904, 116 L.R.R.M, at 2866).
" Id, at 716-17, I22 L.R.R.M. at 3121-22 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 901-05, 116 L.R.R.M,
at 2864-66).
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for work, they were entitled to backpay regardless of their legal status." Unlike the
employees in Sure -Tan, the Local 512 court noted that all the Felbro employees had
returned to work thus making it possible for the NLRB to determine precisely the
amount of backpay which would compensate the workers for their lost wages." In
addition, the Local 512 court noted, the Sure -Tan. Court was concerned that awarding
backpay to undocumented workers who were no longer present in the United States
would undermine the INA by compensating aliens for work they could not legally
perform." Conversely, the Local 512 court concluded, because the Felbro employees
remained in the United States, the issue of whether awarding backpay would undermine
the INA was not relevant."
To support its conclusion that Sure-Tan did not require employees' legal status to
be considered in determining backpay, the Local 512 court cited Bevies Co. v. Teamsters
Local 986,s6 in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that Sure-Tan did not bar undocumented
aliens, whose employment was terminated in violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and who remained in the United States, from recovering backpay awarded by a
private arbitrator." In addition to Bevies, the Local 512 court cited a long line of cases
in which employees' legal status had been disregarded in determining their eligibility
for backpay." Nowhere in the Sure- Tan decision, noted the Local 512 court, did the
Supreme Court indicate its desire to overrule such cases." Rather, the Local 512 court
emphasized, the Supreme Court in Sure -Tan was concerned only with the effects of
awarding backpay to undocumented aliens who had left the United States and thus
could not be considered available for work."
Having concluded that Sure-Tan did not prohibit the awarding of backpay to un-
documented workers who remained in the United States, the Local 512 court turned to
the more general issue of whether awarding backpay to undocumented workers who
had not demonstrated that they were legally entitled to work in the United States
conflicted with the purpose of immigration laws. The court indicated that the Supreme
Court in Sure-Tan identified that the two major goals of the INA were the prevention
of the loss of American workers' jobs and the protection of wages and employment
conditions for American workers. 41
 While the Supreme Court concluded that extending
32 Id, at 717, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3122.
33 1d.
34 Id. at 719, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3123 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902-05, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2865-
66).
,5 Id.
36 Id. at 717, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3122.
" 491 F.2d at 1393, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2667.
" Local 512, 495 F.2d at 717-18, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3122 (citing NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604
F.2d 1180, 1183, 102 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2045 (9th Cir. 1979) (undocumented workers entitled to full
protection under the Act); Amay's Bakery Sc Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 214-15, 94 L.R.R.M.
1165, 1166-67 (1976) (reinstatement and backpay awarded to undocumented discriminatees);
Justrite Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 57, 65-68, 99 L.R.R.M. 1577, 1578 (1978) (underage discriminatee
entitled to backpay); New Foodland, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 418, 420-21, 84 L.R.R.M. 1253, 1254
(1973) (same); In re Local 57, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 108 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1227-28, 34
L.R.R.M. 1172, 1173-74 (1954) (engineer discriminatee without valid state license awarded back-
pay); Robinson Freight Lines, 129 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1042, 47 L.R.R.M. 1127, 1128 (1960) (truck
driver discriminatee awarded backpay despite no valid driver's license)).
"Id. at 717, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3122.
4° See id. at 716-17, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3121-22.
11 Id. at 720, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3124 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2861).
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the Act's protection to undocumented workers furthered both goals by decreasing the
economic advantage of hiring undocumented workers, 42 the Local 512 court reasoned
that conditioning backpay awards on proof that employees are legally entitled to be
present and employed in the United States denies undocumented workers full protection
under the Act, thereby making the hiring of undocumented workers more attractive to
employers." Thus, in addition to encouraging unfair labor practices, the Local 512 court
concluded that conditioning backpay on employees' legal status conflicts with the pur-
poses of the INA."
The Local 512 court also indicated that the determination of alien status is a matter
requiring the expertise of the INS. 45 In contrast, the Local 512 court stated, by condi-
tioning the award of backpay on employees' legal status, the determination of legal status
winds up in the hands of a NLRB compliance officer untrained in immigration law. 45
The court therefore concluded that because the complexity of immigration law requires
that the determination of the legal status of undocumented employees be left for INS
officials,47 backpay awards should not be conditioned upon the legal status of workers
whose employment has been unlawfully terminated. 48
Dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Beezer argued that while undocu-
mented aliens are entitled to the Act's protection, Sure-Tan requires that backpay not be
awarded absent proof of the employees' legal immigration status. 49 Judge Beezer rea-
soned that the majority's interpretation of Sure-Tan was too narrow. 50 To support his
argument, Judge Beezer noted that in Sure-Tan the Court stated that backpay was to be
tolled unless undocumented workers could prove that they were "lawfully entitled to be
present and employed in the United States." 5 '
In addition, Judge Beezer argued that the majority's holding in Local 512 conflicts
with immigration laws. 52 Judge Beezer stated that aliens who seek employment in the
United States without certification from the Secretary of Labor are subject to exclusion
from the country under the INA.m An alien who has obtained employment contrary to
INA regulations, asserted Judge Beezer, cannot complain when his employment is ter-
minated." Judge Beezer argued, however, that to permit backpay to be awarded to aliens
lacking documentation would have the effect of sanctioning violations of the INA by the
alien's continued illegal presence in the country. 55 For these reasons, Judge Beezer
concluded, the Local 512 court erred in holding that it was not bound by Sure-Tan to
require the NLRB to condition its backpay award on proof of the workers' legal status. 50
42 Id. (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2861).
45 Id.
44 1d.
45 Id. (citing Apulia Tire, 604 F.2d 1180, 1183, 102 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2045 (9th Cir. 1979)).
45 Id.
47 Id.
4 ' See id.
49 1d, at 723, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3126 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
55 Id, at 723, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3126-27 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
53 1d. at 723, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3126 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903,
116 L.R.R.M. at 2865).
52 Id. at 726, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3129 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
55 1d. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
55 Id. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
54 1d. at 727, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3129-30 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Local 512 is significant in that it expands the remedies
afforded to undocumented aliens under the Act. After Local 512, in the Ninth Circuit,
undocumented aliens whose employment was terminated by an employer in violation of
section 8 of the Act are entitled to backpay regardless of their legal status so long as
they remain in the United States. Nevertheless, as suggested by Judge Beezer in dissent,
despite the majority's attempt to justify its decision, the Local 512 holding is at odds with
the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan.
The contradiction between the two decisions stems from the Local 512 court's failure
to appreciate the importance of the term "legal availability" for work. Through clever
reasoning, the Local 512 court attempts to distinguish the two cases by emphasizing that
the workers in Sure-Tan were not legally available for work because they had left the
country and could not legally return, but the Felbro workers, who remained in the
United States, were available for work as evidenced by their reinstatement by Felbro
prior to the hearing before the ALI The Local 512 court dodged the issue of whether
the workers were lawfully entitled to work in the United States by reasoning that legal
status was not relevant. Yet, in defining when employees are to be considered unavailable
for work, the Supreme Court in Sure-Tan stated in plain language that "employees must
be deemed 'unavailable' for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during
any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the
United States."57 Thus, according to Sure-Tan, for the Felbro employees to receive
backpay, they must have been legally available for work which by definition requires that
they were legally entitled to be present and employed in the United States. As such, the
Local 512 court's holding entitling undocumented workers to backpay regardless of legal
status directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's ruling in Sure-Tan and, hence, it is
unlikely that the decision will be followed by other circuits.
Notwithstanding its failure to abide by the Supreme Court's holding in Sure-Tan,
the court's decision in Local 512 is meritorious in several respects. First, in ruling that
undocumented workers are entitled to backpay regardless of their legal status, the Local
512 decision lends support to the Supreme Court's initial ruling in Sure-Tan that undo-
cumented workers are entitled to the Act's protection. Prior to Local 512, the requirement
that undocumented workers demonstrate that they were legally entitled to be present
and employed in the United States to recover backpay effectively denied such workers
protection under the Act. Second, by ruling that undocumented workers are entitled to
receive backpay when employers violate section 8 of the Act regardless of the worker's
legal status, Local 512 deters unfair labor practices and promotes collective bargaining
by reducing the economic advantage that employers obtain by hiring undocumented
workers. Third, the Local 512 decision provides an indication of the proper role of the
NLRB in deciding immigration issues. According to Local 512, decisions regarding legal
immigration status are to be deferred to the INS. Thus, while the Local 512 decision
conflicts with that of the Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, it provides several strong reasons
why the Supreme Court might wish to re-evaluate its decision so as to allow undocu-
mented workers to recover backpay for section 8 violations regardless of the workers'
legal status.
In sum, Local 512 Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB dramatically expands
the protection afforded undocumented employees under section 8(a)(5).of the Act, by
57 Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2865.
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not requiring that backpay awards be conditioned upon proof of the employees' legal
status. In so doing, Local 512 is at odds with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Sure-Tan in which the Court clearly stated that backpay awards were to be conditioned
upon employees' legal availability for work. Nevertheless, absent reversal of Local 512
by the Supreme Court, in the Ninth Circuit undocumented workers, whose employment
was unfairly terminated by an employer in violation of section 8 of the Act, need only
prove that they remained in the United States available for work to be entitled to receive
backpay for the period during which the employer had unlawfully terminated their
employment.
C. *Permissible Remedies for Employer's Refusal to Allow Representation at Investigatory
Interviews: Communication Workers of America v. NLRB'
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Weingarten2 that it is an
unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) for an employer
to refuse an employee's request for union representation at an investigatory interview
that the employee reasonably believes could result in disciplinary action.' In the years
immediately following Weingarten, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) typ-
ically ordered reinstatement with back pay; in addition to cease and desist orders, as the
appropriate remedy when an employer discharged an employee following a meeting
that violated the Weingarten principle," Courts proved reluctant, however, to enforce
such "make-whole" remedies when the employer discharged the employee for cause and
not merely because the employee requested representation.' These courts reasoned that
the Board's remedy conflicted with section 10(c) of the Act, which grants the Board
* By Carole A. Casey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 784 F.2d 847, 121 L.R.R.M. 3078 (7th Gin 1986).
420 U.S, 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975).
3 National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides in pertinent part;
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
Id.; Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975).
4 Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 105 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1980); Certified Grocers of Calif.,
227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 94 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1977), enforcement denied on other grounds, 587 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Board's standard for determining the appropriate remedy for Weingarten cases was
articulated in Kraft Foods. Under Kraft Foods, an employee who was fired following An interview
violating his or her Weingarten rights, states a prima facie case that reinstatement with back pay is
the appropriate remedy by showing that the employer "conducted an investigatory interview in
violation of Weingarten and that [he or she] was subsequently disciplined for the conduct which was
the subject of the unlawful interview." 251 N.L.R.B. at 598, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1233. The employer
avoids the make-whole remedy only if it can prove "that its decision to discipline the employee in
question was not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview." Id.
a Communication Workers of America v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 848, 121 L.R.R.M. 3078, 3079
(7th Cir. 1986). See, e.g., Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 113 L. R.R. M.
3529 (9th Cir. 1983); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 109 L.R.R.M. 2005 (8th
Cir. 1981).
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broad discretion in fashioning remedies, but precludes reinstatement with back pay as a
remedy if the employer discharged the employee for causes
In 1984, in Taracorp Industries, the Board reconsidered its policy and ruled that it
would no longer order reinstatement with back pay for Weingarten violations if the
employer ultimately discharged the employee for cause.' The Board reasoned that
section 10(c) of the Act precluded a make-whole remedy where the employer disciplined
the employee because of misconduct unrelated to the request for union representation. 6
The Board stated further that permitting the prospect of reinstatement in Weingarten
cases was bad policy because it transformed investigatory interviews into formal adver-
sarial proceedings, thereby discouraging employers from holding investigatory interviews
before disciplining employees suspected of misconduct. 6 Thus, in Taracorp, the Board
expressly overruled a long line of its decisions that upheld the make-whole remedy for
Weingarten violations.w
During the Survey year, in Communication Workers of America v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the Board's new
policy of refusing to order make-whole remedies in Weingarten cases was permissible
under section 10(c) of the Act." The court held that the Board's construction was not
only a permissible interpretation of the Act, but a well reasoned one.' 2 In addition,
because of the procedural complexities of this case, the court examined whether the
Board could apply its new policy on remand, and revoke its original decision reinstating
the employee.' 6 The court stated that because the court had never held in its earlier
6 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 848, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3079. Section 10(c) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the evidence taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including rein-
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
subchapter .... No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement and back pay
of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for
cause.
Id.
Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984). The Board stated that a make-
whole remedy is still appropriate, however, if the employee was discharged or disciplined because
he or she asserted the right to representation. Id. at 223 n.12, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499 n.12. For an
analysis of the Taracorp decision, see 1984-85 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment
Discrimination Law, 27 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1985).
8
 Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at 222-23, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498-99.
° Id. at 223, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
1 ° Id. at 222, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1498. For examples of cases overruled by Taracorp, see, e.g., Kraft
Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 105 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1980); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 251 N.L.R.B.
932, 105 L.R.R.M. 1236 (1980); Ohio Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. 606, 105 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1980).
" 784 F.2d 847, 121 L.R.R.M. 3078 (7th Cir. 1986).
' 2 /d. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3082-83.
' 3 The decisions overruled by Taracorp included Illinois Bell Telephone, 251 N.L.R.B. 937, 105
L.R.R.M. 1236 (1980), the Board's earlier decision involving the same employer and employee as
in Communication Workers. When the Board sought enforcement of its order to reinstate Hatfield
with back pay, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's cease and desist
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decision that the Board's old policy was the only permissible one under the Act, the
Board, on remand, could apply its new policy. 14 Thus, after Communication Workers the
Board may refuse to order reinstatement with back pay in Weingarten cases, and further,
the Board may apply new policies to cases on remand where the new policy is a permis-
sible interpretation of the Act.
In Communication Workers,' 3 a co-worker told Cary Hatfield, a long distance operator
employed by Illinois Bell Telephone Company, that a security agent was coming to the
company to investigate operators who were adjusting toll calls and that Hatfield might
lose her job.' 6 When the security agent told Hatfield he would question her as part of
his investigation, Hatfield requested union representation. 17 Because the union steward
was unavailable to attend the meeting, Hatfield requested that the former assistant union
steward accompany her." The security agent refused to allow the representative to attend
on the grounds that the woman was not the current union steward. 19 The agent then
continued the interview, without informing Hatfield that she could terminate the inter-
view until a union steward was availabie. 20 During the interview, Hatfield signed a written
statement admitting that she had reduced the toll on several long distance calls and had
placed several calls for herself free of charge." One week later, Illinois Bell fired
Hatheld. 22
The Board found that the Illinois Bell Telephone Company had committed an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to allow union repre-
sentation at a disciplinary interview despite a request by the employee." The Board
ordered the company to cease and desist from further violations and to reinstate Hatfield
with back pay and expunge all references to the disciplinary action from her personnel
file. 24 When the Board sought enforcement of its order, the United States Court of
order but remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether reinstatement with back pay
was an appropriate remedy. 674 F.2d 618: 623, 109 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3248 (7th Cir. 1982). The court
instructed the Board to determine whether Illinois Bell could show it would have fired Hatfield
based on evidence available to the company independent from that obtained at the unlawful interview,
in which case reinstatement with back pay would be denied. Id. Before further determinations were
made, however, the Board changed its policy on make-whole remedies in Taracorp. See supra notes
7-9 and accompanying text.
14 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 849, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
' 5 784 F.2d 847, 121 L.R.R.M. 3078 (7th Cir. 1986). The facts of Communication Workers are set .
forth in more detail in the court's original decision, NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 618,
109 L.R.R.M. 3244 (7th Cir. 1982).
' 6 Illinois Bell, 674 F.2d at 620, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3246.
" Id.
18 Id. The union steward was unavailable because she worked a different shift. Id.
19 The court rejected the company's contention that the former assistant union steward,
Cheryl Simonton, was not an appropriate representative. The court pointed out that Simonton, as
a former union officer, had the knowledge and expertise needed to protect an employee at an
investigatory interview. Id. at 622, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3247.
Y0 Id. at 621, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3246.
21 Id. at 620, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3246.
22 Id. at 621, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3246.
23 Id. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), provides in pertinent
part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this tide ...." Id. For
the text of § 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, see supra note 3.
24 674 F.2d at 621, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3246.
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the cease and desist order, but refused to
enforce the make-whole remedy."
The court disagreed with the Board's make-whole remedy because Illinois Bell
discharged Hatfield for cause, not because she sought union representation. 28 The court
indicated that a make-whole remedy in the situation where an employee was discharged
for cause conflicted with section 10(c) of the Act, citing several instances where other
courts had refused to enforce make-whole remedies. 27 The court stated that it needed
to balance the company's need for an honest work force against the duty to ensure that
the Act's policies were carried out. 28 The court concluded, therefore, that reinstatement
was an appropriate remedy only if the decision to fire Hatfield resulted solely from
evidence gathered at the investigatory interview. 29
The court elaborated, however, that if the company could show that it had sufficient
evidence to fire Hatfield wholly independent from that obtained at the interview, then
the Board was precluded from ordering a make-whole remedy." Consequently, the court
remanded the case to the Board to determine whether or not reinstatement with back
pay was the appropriate remedy. 3, In so doing, the court ordered the Board to follow
the Board's earlier decision in Kraft Foods which held that once an employee shows that
disciplinary action was taken "for the conduct which was the subject of the unlawful
interview," the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it would have fired the
employee based on evidence independent from that gathered at the interview."
Before the Illinois Bell Board made further determinations upon remand, the Board,
in Taracorp, changed its policy, holding that make-whole remedies were inappropriate
when an employee was discharged for cause." Citing Taracorp, the Illinois Bell Board
withdrew its order to reinstate Hatfield, leaving intact only the cease and desist order."
In response, the union asked the Seventh Circuit to enforce the Board's original Illinois
Bell decision." The union stated two reasons for its request: first, the 1982 remand
required reinstatement; and second, the Board had misconstrued section 10(c) of the
Act in Taracorp. 36
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in Communication Workers, refused to revive its
previous order that the Board follow Kraft Foods, holding that the Board was not bound
25 Id,
26 Id. at 623, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3248.
27 Id. For the language of 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(c), see supra note 6. The court cited
NLRB v. Potter Elec. Co., 600 F.2d 120, 101 L.R.R.M. 2378 (8th Or. 1979) and Montgomery Ward
& Co,, Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 109 L.R.R.M. 2005 (8th Cir. 1981). Id.
26 Illinois Bell, 674 F.2d at 623, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3248.
29 Id.
so Id.
5 ' Id.
32 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 848, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3079. For a discussion of Kraft Foods,
see supra note 4.
" Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 848, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3079. In Taracorp, the Board
expressly overruled Illinois Bell, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 117 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1984).
34 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 848, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3079-80. The case was heard before
Board members Dotson, Hunter and Dennis. Board member Dennis dissented, stating that the
court of appeals' 1982 remand "required the Board to apply the Kraft Foods doctrine notwithstanding
the Board's abrogation of that doctrine in 1984." Id. at 849, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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by a remand order if it had changed its policy in the interim." Furthermore, the court
held that the Board's new policy under Taracorp was a reasonable construction of section
10(c) of the Act." Addressing first whether the Board was bound by the court's 1982
remand, the court pointed out that the Board was free to change its policy and rules as
long as the change was within the Board's power." The court stated that the Board was
not required to ask the court's permission before it implemented a new policy merely
because a case was pending on remand from the court." The court stated further that
at the time it remanded Illinois Bell, it was not ordering that the "only permissible test"
be applied; rather, it was ordering that the Board's current policy be applied." Nothing
in the remand order, the court pointed out, stated that the Board was required to apply
the Kraft Foods doctrine as the only permissible course of action under the Act.45
The court next addressed whether the Board's new policy of not ordering make-
whole remedies for Weingarten violations was a permissible construction of section 10(c)
of the Act ." The court held that the Board's new policy did comport with section 10(c)
of the Act, but the court cautioned that section 10(c) did not always preclude make-
whole remedies when the employer discharges the employee for cause." The court
emphasized that the phrase "discharged for cause," from section 10(c) of the Act, should
be viewed as a two-prong test." First, the requirement that there be a "cause" for the
discharge requires employee misconduct, not just a "good reason."'" Next, the court
stated, there must be a causal link between the misconduct and the discharge. 47 The
court explained that if Illinois Bell had fired Hatfield for joining the union and then
subsequently discovered her misconduct, the Board would not be precluded from or-
dering a make-whole remedy, because the real reason for her discharge was the protected
activity." Similarly, in a dual motive situation, the court elaborated, the Board could
order reinstatement with back pay, unless the employer could prove that she would have
been fired for the misconduct alone."
The court then suggested certain presumptions and burdens of proof that the Board
might use in establishing causal links. 55 For example, the court stated, if the Board found
that an employee was fired following a meeting where his or her Weingarten rights were
violated, the Board should presume that the employee was fired because of the request
for representation. 5 ' The employer would then bear the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the employee would have been fired for the misconduct
37 Id.
33 Id. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3082.
59 1d. at 849, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
40 Id,
41 Id.
42 Id.
"Id. at 850, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081. For the text of § 10(c) of the Act, see supra note 6.
44 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 850, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081.
45 Id. For the text of § 10(c) of the Act, see supra note 6.
45 Id. (citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-17, 57 L.R.R.M.
2609, 2614 (1964)).
47 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 850, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081.
48 Id.
45 Id.
"Id. at 850-51, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081-82.
5' Id. at 850, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081-82.
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alone." The court stated that the Board could require the employer to meet its burden
of proof from evidence other than that gathered at the unlawful interview." The court
explained, however, that the Board was free to choose the course it would take as long
as it was a reasonable one within the limits of the Act. 54
In upholding the Board's new policy, the court placed particular emphasis on the
wording of section 10(c) that the Board shall "take such affirmative action ... as will
effectuate the policies of this Act."55 The court pointed out that this language did not
require make-whole remedies, but rather gave the Board the power to execute whatever
remedies it decides will best carry out the Act's policies. ," The court concluded that it
had very little power to review the Board's actions where Congress had given the Board
such broad discretionary power."
The court also stated its approval of the Board's reasoning in Taracorp. The court
pointed out that the Taracorp Board sought to reduce the adversarial nature of investi-
gatory interviews.58 The Board expressed a valid concern, the court stated, because
make-whole remedies for every Weingarten violation would encourage employers to
forego investigatory interviews and act on suspicion without giving the employee the
chance to explain 59 The Board's new approach to Weingarten violations would still be an
effective deterrent, the court stated, because repeated violations would be dealt with
more severely." Furthermore, the court pointed out, dual motive cases, that is situations
where the employee was fired in part because he or she requested union representation,
would not fall under Taracorp, and therefore reinstatement with back pay would still be
a permissible remedy 6 1 Thus, the court stated, the Board's reasoning in reaching its new
policy in Taracorp involved permissible considerations under section 10(c) of the Act.
The Seventh Circuit, in Communication Workers, expressly approved the Board's new
policy, set forth in Taracorp, of refusing to order make-whole remedies in Weingarten
cases. The court's opinion is not surprising because the Board in Taracorp had brought
its own policy toward remedies for Weingarten violations in line with that of the appellate
courts, thereby ending ten years of conflict between the Board and the courts." The
32 Id. (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 113 L.R.R.M. 2857
(1983)).
33
 784 F.2d at 851, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081.
34 Id.
55 Id. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3082.
36 Id.
32 Id.
58 1d. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3083.
59 Id. at 853, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3083.
60 Id. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3082. The court pointed out that for the first Weingarten violation,
the Board would issue a cease and desist order. If that order were violated, the company would be
in contempt of court, a penalty companies do not take lightly. Id.
51 Id. The Board's counsel stated at oral argument that Taracorp would not apply in a dual
motive situation. Id. The court noted that this resulted in a continued application of the Kraft Foods
doctrine to dual motive cases. Id. Under the Kraft Foods doctrine, an employee whose Weingarten
rights are violated must establish that he or she was subjected to disciplinary action for the conduct
which was the subject of the unlawful interview." Kraft Foods, 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 105 L.R.R.M. 1233
(1980). The burden then shifts to the employer to show that it would have fired the employee
anyway based on evidence wholly apart from that gathered at the interview. Id. If the employer is
successful, the court will not order a make-whole remedy. Id.
62 The appellate courts consistently have refused to enforce make-whole remedies for Weingarten
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court's opinion in Communication Workers thus reinforces the Board's new policy that
section 10(c) of the Act precludes make-whole remedies for Weingarten violations, if the
employer discharged the employee for cause."
While the court stated that the Board is free to change its mind under section 10(c)
of the Act, and choose among various remedies, this statement in no way weakens the
Taracorp doctrine's future applicability. The court's statement instead affirmed the new
doctrine's retroactive application to Illinois Bell, which was pending further proceedings
on remand. The court stated that once the court remands a case, the Board is in control
of the proceedings." Thus, the court was able to find that a remand does not bar the
Board from applying its newly developed policy, a policy already favored by the courts."
In addition, the Communication Workers court reinforced the new doctrine's foun-
dation by re-emphasizing the Board's reasoning and by adding more detail to the
Taracorp doctrine. The court suggested a two-prong test as a guideline for determining
when an employee is "discharged for cause" under section 10(c) of the Act and suggested
presumptions and burdens of proof in determining causal links. 66 With both the Board
and the courts in full agreement as to the appropriate remedy for Weingarten violations,
the Taracorp doctrine has become a solid rule.
The Taracorp doctrine is a fair approach to remedying Weingarten violations, pro-
tecting both the employee and employers. Companies retain their freedom to terminate
unsuitable employees, yet employees' rights to union representation are not impaired.
With the threat of make-whole remedies removed, employers will be more willing to
hold investigatory interviews, giving employees the opportunity to explain their side of
the story with union protection. Employers who do violate an employee's Weingarten
rights will be ordered to cease and desist from further violations or face stiffer penalties,
and should the company fire an employee for engaging in protected activity, make-
whole remedies are still available. 67
In sum, the Seventh Circuit's Communication Workers decision reinforces the Board's
Taracorp decision that it need not automatically impose make-whole remedies on em-
ployers that violate the Weingarten doctrine. The Board's new policy, therefore, is closer
in line with that of the courts and section 10(c) of the Act. The court's approval and
development of the Board's new policy gives the doctrine a solid foundation for future
application by both the Board and the courts. The Board's policy protects the employee's
Weingarten rights during investigatory interviews by treating repeat or egregious viola-
tions more severely, while at the same time achieving the employer's interest in main-
taining an honest and efficient workforce.
violations when the employer fired the employee for cause. See, e.g., Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 137-38, 113 L.R.R.M. 3529, 3531-32 (9th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Kahn's
& Co., 694 F.2d 1070, 1071-72, 112 L.R.R.M. 2683, 2684 (6th Cir. 1982); General Motors Corp.
v. NLRB, 674 F.2d 576, 577-78, 109 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3346 (6th Cir. 1982); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 1097, 109 L.R.R.M, 2005, 2007 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Potter Eke.
Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 123-24, 101 L.R.R.M. 2378, 2380-81 (8th Cir. 1979).
65 Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 850, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081.
"Id. at 849, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
66 /d. at 848, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3079.
66 Id. at 850-51, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3081-82.
67 Id. at 852, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3082.
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D. *NLRB Acceptance of Settlement Agreements in Unfair Labor Practice Suits: Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB'
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Acts (the Act) to encourage peaceful
resolution of work-related disputes, equalize bargaining power between employees and
employers and reduce industrial strife and unrest. Section 10(c) of the Act empowers
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to adjudicate disputes arising from
unfair labor practices.° Where an unfair labor practice has been committed, the Act
grants the Board the remedial authority to "take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of
this [Act]."4
In the 1978 decision of Community Medical Services of Clearfield, Inc. (hereinafter Clear
Haven),3 the Board recognized that once an unfair labor practice complaint reaches the
Board, the Board must proceed in the public's interest rather than focusing on the rights
of the private parties .° In Clear Haven, prior to the Board hearing, the Administrative
Law Judge approved a private settlement between the parties.? The settlement provided
for reinstatement, without back pay, of the replaced workers and execution of a collective
bargaining agreement in exchange for withdrawal of the unfair labor practice charge.°
The Board rejected the settlement and held that a pending unfair labor practice charge
may be withdrawn only if the settlement agreement is in the public interest.° The Board
found that withdrawal of the charge in this case was not in the public interest because
the settlement did not substantially remedy the unfair labor practice and thus a settlement
would not effectuate the policies of the Act.'°
* By Deborah A. Kolodziej, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE Lew REVIEW.
' 806 F.2d 269, 123 L.R.R.M. 3129 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1982).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158, defines
employer unfair labor practices in subsection (a) and defines union unfair labor practices in sub-
section (b). See note 16 infra for a discussion of certain employer unfair labor practices.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
5 236 N.L.R.B. 853, 98 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1978).
6 Id. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315 (citing jack C. Robinson, 117 N.L.R.B. 1483, 1485, 40 L.R.R.M.
1035, 1035-36 (1957); Ingalls Steel Constr. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 584, 584 n.1, 45 L.R.R.M. 1353,
1353 n.I (1960)).
7 Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
Id.
3 1d. at 853-54, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315. Clear Haven's alleged unfair labor practices included
unilateral termination of an existing employee health plan, insistence on a non-mandatory topic of
bargaining and failure to furnish relevant information to the bargaining agent in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1314-15. Furthermore, the Board
charged Clear Haven with refusing to reinstate employees engaged in an unfair labor practice
strike after the employees unconditionally offered to return to work, a violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act. Id. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
' 0 1d. at 854, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315, 1316. The Board found it largely irrelevant that the
employees voted overwhelmingly in favor of the settlement stating "there is an overriding public
interest in the effectuation of statutory rights which cannot be cut off or circumvented at the whim
of individual discriminatees." Id. at 855, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1316. The court stated that by approving
settlement agreements that fail to provide the usual Board remedies it would "encourage wrong-
doers to subvert the collective-bargaining process by flouting their obligation to bargain in good
faith ...." Id. at 855, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1317.
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During the Survey year, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB," reversed the Board's approval of a
settlement agreement that included the withdrawal of an alleged unfair labor practice.
Such an agreement, the court reasoned, cannot be approved unless the underlying unfair
labor practice is substantially remedied." Thus, the court reaffirmed the Board's duty
to review settlement agreements in light of the public interest."
The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO ("union")
filed an unfair labor practice charge after the company ("TNS") permanently replaced
employees engaging in a work stoppage over unsafe working conditions." The union
alleged that the employer's permanent replacement of employees, arguably engaged in
an unfair labor practice strike," improperly coerced employees in their right to engage
in protected concerted activity and wrongfully discriminated against the employees
because of their union membership.ifi Thus, the union charged, the employer's action
violated the National Labor Relations Act," and the employees were entitled to rein-
statement.' 8
Although a Board attorney prosecuted the unfair labor practice at a hearing before
an NLRB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the ALJ granted seventy strikers the right
" 806 F.2d at 269, 123 L.R.R.M. 3129 (D.C. Cir, 1986).
12 Id. at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
" See Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 153, 98 L,R,R.M. at 1315.
" Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 270, 123 L.R.R.M, at 3130.
15 Id. Section 8(a) defines employer unfair labor practices. An employee striking over employer
unfair labor practices is an unfair labor practice striker. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). All other strikes, most
commonly those to extract bargaining concessions from the employer, are economic strikes.
The TNS employees arguably were unfair labor practice strikers because they allegedly were
engaged in an activity proscribed by section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U,S.C.
§§ 141-197 (1982). That section provides that "the quitting of labor by ... employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such ...
employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 143. The union claims, and
NLRB General Counsel agrees, that employees engaged in a section 502 work stoppage are the
equivalent of unfair labor practice strikers. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 270, 123
L.R.R.M. at 3130.
16 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 270, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130. Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), provides that it is an unfair labor practice
when employers "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7." Section 7 of the Act establishes the rights of employees to "engage in ...
concerted activity for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, states that it is an unfair labor practice for employers "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C, § 158(a)(3).
"See supra note 16.
le Unfair labor practice strikers engaged in "protected concerted activity" arc entitled to rein-
statement even if it is necessary to discharge replacements hired during the strike. See generally A.
Cox, D. BOK, R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 572-75 (10th ed. 1986). It is less clear that unfair labor
practice strikers engaging in unprotected concerted activity may also be reinstated. See Local 833,
UAW v. NLRB (Kohler Co.), 300 F.2d 699, 702-03, 49 L.R.R.M. 2485, 2487-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962); NLRB v, Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 753, 34 L.R.R.M. 2250, 2253 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). Economic strikers, by contrast, are entitled to reinstatement
only upon departure of their replacements. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368, 68 L,R,R.M.
1252, 1254 (1968).
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to intervene in the proceedings in their individual capacities. 19 William Shaw, the attorney
representing the intervening strikers, began negotiating a settlement with TNS, the
employer." After the hearings concluded, Shaw and TNS counsel presented fifty-six
individual settlement agreements for approval by the AL.J.21 In exchange for lump sum
payments to the employees of between $2,000 and $12,000, the employees agreed to
withdraw their unfair labor practice charge and waive their rights to reinstatement. 22
The AU rejected the settlement agreements, finding that neither Shaw nor the employ-
ees had "standing" in the case as intervenors independent of their union, the employees'
exclusive representative."
The Board, in a series of three orders, reversed the ALJ's decision to reject the
settlement. In its first order, the Board approved the settlements "in principle" and
remanded the case for a determination of whether the employees' agreement to the
settlement was informed and voluntary." After the company, the union and the em-
ployees stipulated that they had executed the agreements voluntarily, the Board, over
the General Counsel's objection, approved the settlement." In its third order, the Board
amended its first two orders, and elaborated on its reasons for approving the settle-
ments."
The Board noted its "longstanding policy of encouraging resolution of disputes
without resort to Board process," as a reason for approving the settlements." It then
offered several reasons why approving the agreements would further the policies of the
Act." Specifically, the Board noted that because not all of the employees had agreed to
the settlement, the legal issue present in the dispute remained open." Also, the Board
emphasized that the employees executed the agreements voluntarily and with informed
j9 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 270, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130.
RO Id.
21 Eventually 56 employees signed the agreement. Id. at 270 n.6, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130 n.6.
22 Id. at 270, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130. The monetary payments by agreement were to be in
consideration of employees' release of personal injury clainis arising from the unsafe working
conditions. They were not to be considered back pay. Id.
The agreement also provided that TNS would pay Shaw $450 for each employee who signed
the agreement. Id. at 270-71, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130.
23 Id. at 271, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130. Specifically, the ALA found that Shaw did not have standing
to settle claims for the employees who did not have power to bargain for settlement apart from
their union. The judge also was concerned about the appropriateness of the company's paying
Shaw and the quality of Shaw's legal representation. Id,
24 Id. The Board dismissed the AL's concern over Shaw, stating that the Board should not
"pass upon the ethical propriety of an attorney's conduct." Id.
25 Id. at 271, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131. The General Counsel is a branch of the National Labor
Relations Board. The General Counsel investigates unfair labor practice charges and directs the
prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints. See 29 U.S.C. 153(d).
26 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 271, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131.
27 Id. The Board cited two cases for this proposition. In Combustion Engineering, Inc, and Coca
Cola Boating Company, the Board upheld settlement agreements reached between unions and em-
ployers during the course of grievance procedures established by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 117 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1984); Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 501, 101 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1979).
2' Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 271-72, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131. Presumably the
Board was referring to its duty under section 10(c) of the Act to take affirmative action which "will
effectuate the policies of the Act." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
29 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 272, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131.
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consent." Finally, it noted that the issues in dispute were novel and that the employees
may not have prevailed.if the case had proceeded to litigation." For these reasons, the
Board accepted the fifty-six individual settlement agreements and dismissed the unfair
labor practice charges relating to those employees." The union petitioned for review of
the Board's decision.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's orders and
noted that the Board should not allow settlement agreements with individual employees
that include withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges unless the agreement substan-
tially remedies the unfair labor practice, or at least is "reasonable."" The court began
its analysis by noting that the Board in Clear Haven established the "well-settled" test for
determining whether to approve settlement agreements that call for withdrawal of unfair
labor practice charges. 34 The court interpreted Clear Haven as establishing a two part
approach to the issue. First, the Board assumes that the case has merit and the General
Counsel can meet its burden of proof." Next, the Board should approve the agreements
only if they substantially remedy the unfair labor practice." Generally, only agreements
that include traditional Board remedies such as back pay, reinstatement and the posting
of notices are considered to substantially remedy the unfair labor practice."
The court then reviewed the policy underlying the Board's refusal in Clear Haven
to defer to private settlement agreements." According to the court, once an unfair labor
practice is charged, the Board acts in the public interest, as the agent empowered to
enforce the Act: the Board's primary function is not to vindicate individual employee
rights." A settlement agreement is not in the public interest unless it discourages unfair
labor practices by seeing that they are substantially remedied." The court cautioned that
the public's interest should not be sacrificed simply because the parties to the dispute
agree to settle.'"
The Oil, Chemical &'.Atomic Workers court noted that the Board did not apply the
Clear Haven test, nor any other standard that recognized the policies underlying the
3° Id.
'' Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 274-75, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3133.
54 Id. at 272, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131.
"Id. (citing Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 855-56, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1317).
56 Id. (citing Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315).
"Id. See also Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 854-56, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1315-17 (settlement agree-
ment questioned because it surrended employees' back pay rights and failed to provide employees
notice of the rights of unfair labor practice strikers or of their rights to engage in section 7 activities
in return for withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges); ADP Transport Corp., 253 N.L.R.B.
468, 469-70, 105 L.R.R.M. 1675, 1677 (1980) (settlement agreement which fails to provide for
reinstatement and backpay falls short of substantial remedy).
°° Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 272-73, 123 •L.R.R.M. at 3131-32. The court
rejected the Board's concern that the employees may not prevail on the merits, noting that under
Clear Haven, when considering approval of a settlement agreement, the Board must assume that
the case is meritorious.
39 Id. at 272, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131.
10 Id. at 272, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3131-32. See also Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853, 98 L.R.R.M.
at 1315 (quoting jack C. Robinson, 117 N.L.R.B. at 1485, 40 L.R.R.M. at 1035-36); ADP Transport,
253 N.L.R.B. at. 469, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1676).
4 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 272, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132 (citing Clear Haven,
236 N.L.R.B. at 855, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1316).
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Board's role. 42
 The Board's decision rested largely on whether the employees executed
the agreements with voluntary and informed consent, a factor not included in the Clear
Haven analysis." The Board did not investigate whether approval of the agreement
would be in the public interest by substantially remedying the underlying unfair labor
practice.'" Indeed, because the private settlement contained none of the remedies typi-
cally ordered by the Board, the court stated, the settlement probably did not remedy
the unfair labor practice." Because the Board did not address Clear Haven's public
interest concerns, the court noted that the Board failed to fulfill its duty to substantially
remedy the unfair labor practice."
The court noted that promoting the bargaining relationship between the union and
the employer, and the use of procedures established under a collective bargaining
agreement, are fundamental policies of the Act. 47 It stated that resolution of disputes
without resort to Board processes should therefore be encouraged," but only if the
settlement agreement is reached between the union and the employers during the course
of an established grievance-arbitration procedure." Because the employer settled the
dispute with the individual employees, the court stated, negotiations were not conducted
under any procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement." Indeed, the
settlement at issue actually circumvented the bargaining relationship between the union
and the company because the union neither participated in nor approved of the settle-
ment agreement."
The court admonished the Board for departing from the "well-settled" Clear Haven
standards without justifying its reasons for doing so and rejected the Board's approval
of settlement agreements based upon a simple showing that the employees voluntarily
approved the settlements. 52 It noted that if the Board was not going to insist on sub-
stantial remedy of the unfair labor practice, it must at least insist that the settlement
terms be reasonable.53 The court, however, found it unlikely- that an agreement which
provided no remedy for the unfair labor practices would be deemed reasonable in light
of the policies of the Act.'" The court remanded the case for an examination of whether
the approval of the settlement agreement would effectuate the policies of the Act. 55
42 Id. at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
" See id. at 271, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3130-31.
44 Id. at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
45 Id. at 273, 275, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132, 3134.
46 1d, at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
17 hi .
45 Id.
49 Id.
5° Id.
5 ' Id.
52 Id. at 274, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3133.
" Id. The court did not specifically state that it was establishing a new standard of review of
settlement agreements based upon reasonableness. It seems odd that after emphasizing the Board's
duty to act in the public's interest to substantially remedy the unfair labor practice, the court
suggests a less strenuous "reasonableness" standard. It remains to be seen whether future Board
decisions will seize on the court's reasonableness language.
54 Id. at 275, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3133. The Board also was ordered to address the ethical issues
involved when an employer pays an attorney to represent unionized employees normally repre-
sented by their collective bargaining agent. Id.
55 Id. at 273-74, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132-33.
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In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers the D.C. Circuit reaffirms the principle that the
National Labor Relations Board performs a broader function than resolving individual
labor disputes. As first noted in Clear Haven, the purposes and policies of the Act are
geared toward the public interest. Clear Haven established, therefore, that once an unfair
labor practice dispute reaches the Board, any disposition of that case must also be in the
public interest.°
In addition, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers recognized that the public's interest in
effectuating the purposes of the Act is achieved by substantially remedying the under-
lying unfair labor practice." The court noted that where an agreement fails to provide
any of the traditional Board remedies for unfair labor practices, it is unlikely that such
an agreement would advance the policies of the Act. 5" The earlier Clear Haven decision
had noted that approval of such settlement agreements would encourage employers to
avoid their obligations under the Act, such as the duty to bargain in good faith, thereby
discouraging collective bargaining, a fundamental goal of the Act. 56
Although emphasizing the Board's duty to operate in the public interest, the Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers court suggested that courts may give greater deference to
settlement agreements negotiated by the union as compared to those negotiated by
individual employees.° The court also noted that agreements reached during an estab-
lished grievance and arbitration procedure should be accorded more deference than
agreements reached outside the collective bargaining contract."' The court pointed out
that deferring to privately negotiated agreements "in derogation of" the union/employer
bargaining relationship fails to effectuate the Act's policy of promoting the use of
collective bargaining. 62 Perhaps implicit in the court's decision is the notion that because
the Act accords the union exclusive representation status, the policy must be considered
along with the public interest in the context of unfair labor practice claims.
In sum, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers court's indication that the Board should
not allow settlement agreements with individual employees that include withdrawal of
unfair labor practice charges unless the agreement substantially remedies the unfair
56 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
57 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
58 Id.
" Id. See also Clear Haven, 236 N.L.R.B. at 855, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1316-17. The court stated,
we wonder how our approval of settlements of this nature could be thought to serve
as a deterrent to the commission of unlawful conduct .... ]'1-lo the contrary ... we
would encourage wrongdoers to subvert the collective-bargaining process by flouting
their obligation to bargain in good faith .... Such settlements ... would encourage
further unlawful misconduct ... to the detriment of the stability of bargaining ....
Id.
60 See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F.2d at 273, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132.
61 Id.
"id. The court quoted Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 417, 426, 107 L.R.R.M.
2155, 2163 (4th Cir. 1981) which stated
EDJeferring to [a grievance settlement], ... effected by the union's representative
... would not be repugnant to the national labor policy of respecting agreements
freely made between an employee and employer where such agreement had been
effected under the protection of the employee's bargaining agent .... That certainly
is promoting the use of the collective bargaining agent in resolving peaceably and
amicably grievances and this is one of the primary purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act.
Id. (cited in, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 806 F,2d at 273 n.33, 123 L.R.R.M. at 3132 n.33).
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labor practices or is at least reasonable establishes several important points. First, it. is
unlikely that the Board will sanction settlement agreements in which the union did not
participate, unless that agreement calls for traditional Board remedies that substantially
remedy the unfair labor practice. Also, the Board will probably accord more deference
to agreements negotiated with union involvement. The Board also may be more likely
to defer to agreements negotiated in the context of procedures established by the
collective bargaining agreement. Because public interest remains the primary consider-
ation for the Board, a simple agreement by the parties to a specific disposition of an
unfair labor practice will not suffice once the claim has been filed.
IV. ARBITRATION
A. *judicial Refusal to Enforce Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: E.1. DuPont
de Nemours and Company v. Graselli Employees lndependant Association of East
Chicago.'
Historically, judicial review of arbitration awards has been extremely limited? In
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 3 the Supreme Court
recognized that courts would undermine the well established policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration if they had broad powers to review arbitral awards." To encourage
the collective bargaining process, courts defer to arbitrators who are more knowledgable
about industry custom and practices The arbitrator, however, is confined to interpreting
the collective bargaining agreement and cannot go beyond the scope of the arbitral role
to dispense "his own brand of industrial justice."6 Courts enforce the award, therefore,
only "so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."'
Courts' deference to arbitral awards prevents potential judicialization of the arbitra-
tion process 8 and underscores courts' commitment to this alternative method of dispute
resolution. 8
 The Enterprise Wheel Court recognized that the arbitrator's authority would
* John A. Gordon, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw REVIEW.
I 790 F.2d 611, 122 L.R.R.M. 2217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186, 123 L.R.R.M. 2592
(1986).
2 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1855). The Burchell Court wrote:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to
them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive
every encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is within the submission,
and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the
parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary
course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges
chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of
litigation.
Id.
3 363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423 (1960).
4 Id. at 596, 46 L.R.R.M. 2425.
5 Id.
6 1d. at 597, 46 L.R.R.M. 2425.
7 1d.
8
 Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 183-84, 119 L.R.R.M. 3566, 3568
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1184, 121 L.R.R.M. 2736 (1986).
9 See id.
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be severely impaired if the judiciary were given broad powers of plenary review in
arbitration cases."' Because the parties agree to abide by an arbitrator's interpretation of
the collective bargaining contract, it is the arbitrator's decision that the court should
enforce — not a court's later reinterpretation."
Arbitrators are not, however, given unlimited decision-making power.1 2 Courts will
not enforce an arbitral award when they find evidence of misconduct, fraud, or absence
of jurisdiction." Furthermore, just as courts will not enforce contracts between parties
requiring illegal acts or conduct contrary to public policy, they will similarly dismiss
arbitration awards calling for such conduct.' 4 In W.R. Grace and Company v. Local Union
759, the Supreme Court held that courts may determine when an arbitration award
violates public policy," and that courts should not enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments that do so. la
The W.R. Grace Court established, however, that courts should not vacate arbitral
awards based on vague or nebulous policy considerations." The Supreme Court stressed
that: "[A] public policy ... must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained
'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests."8 Consequently, courts may invalidate an arbitration award
on public policy grounds only when the award contravenes either explicit public policy,
or when the policy in question is "well defined.""
Although in W.R. Grace the Supreme Court announced the "well defined and
dominant" standard of review for public policy considerations in arbitration cases, courts
have approached the standard differently." Some courts view the p .ublic policy exception
'° Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
" Id. Courts may defer even when an arbitrator's award seems incorrect or unreasonable. See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR 585 (1976). For example, in Safeway Stores v. American
Bakery and Confection Workers, 390 F.2d 79, 67 L.R.R.M. 2646 (5th Cir. 1968), when Safeway
changed its pay day from Wednesday to Friday and issued paychecks to cover those interim two
days until the new schedule would begin, id. at 80-81, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2647, the union filed a
grievance objecting to the company's violation of a contract provision insuring forty hour work
weeks. Id, at 81, 67 L.R.R.M, at 2647. The arbitrator found for the union and ordered an additional
three days pay for work never performed. Id. Because the arbitrator based his decision on the
contract's terms, the court sustained the award. Id, at 83-84, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
12 International Ass'n of Mechanics v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238, 242-43, 49 L.R.R.M. 2210,
2213 (5th Cir. 1961) ("To compel arbitration in the first instance is not to approve carte blanche in
advance any decision which might be reached.").
13 R. GORMAN, supra note I I, at 586.
"Id. at 593,
15 461 U.S. 757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645 (1983).
15 1d. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645. See also Hurd v. Hodge 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) (restrictive
covenant precluding sale of property to blacks unenforceable as against public policy).
W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
" Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S, 49, 66 (1945)).
15 Although policy concerns are within the province of judicial review, judges should not invoke
policy considerations as a mere excuse to evaluate the arbitrator's decision. Dunau, Three Problems
in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 446 (1969). To do so would defeat the purposes of the
judiciary's traditional deference in cases of binding arbitration. Id. "It is an arbitrator's judgment
for which the parties have contracted, and it is essential to the success of their plan that his judgment,
be it good or bad, possess finality." Id. at 447.
25 See infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text for examples of courts' varied application of
the W.R. Grace standard.
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as extremely narrow," applying only upon clear violation of statutory or case law. 22 Other
courts, however, take a less restrictive view, holding the exception applicable when a
policy is embodied in general law — and when violation obviously would harm the
public. 25
During the Survey year, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company v. Grasse& Employees
Independent Association of East Chicago," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered
a district court decision that overturned an arbitration award on public policy grounds. 25
The court held that the arbitrator's determination to reinstate an employee with a history
of violent behavior did not violate public policy." The court split, however, as to how
narrowly courts should construe the public policy exception?' The majority adopted a
broad view of the public policy exception, and reasoned that an arbitration award
inconsistent with a significant public policy was subject to judicial invalidation." In
contrast, the concurrence argued that courts could not overturn an arbitral decision on
policy grounds unless the award violated a rule of positive law."
In DuPont, the employer discharged Willie McClendon, a member of the defendant
union, who worked the night shift at plaintiff's corporation. 5° McClendon had not slept
prior to starting his 11:30 P.M. to 7:30 A.M. shift." After McClendon's shift ended, a
supervisor found him sitting naked in a changing house 3 2 An hour later, without
provocation, the naked McClendon flew into a rage," attacked the supervisor, and
damaged company property:" Still naked, he then ran to another building where he
assaulted a second employee and attempted to create a potentially dangerous chemical
reaction."
21 See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d I, 8, 9, 122
L.R.R.M. 2094, 2100 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding an ill-defined public policy exception would run the
risk of "swallowing the rule" in favor of judicial deference to arbitration). The court stated,
"[o]bviously, the exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial review
of arbitration awards under the guise of 'public policy."' Id. at 8, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2100.
" See id. at 8, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2100.
23 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Great Western
Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124, 114 L. R. R.M. 2001, 2003 (5th Cir. 1983). In Great Western, for instance,
the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce an order compelling reinstatement of a truck driver who
admittedly drank while on duty although there was no positive law which forbade rehiring an
employee known to drink on the job: "In a nation where motorists practically live on the highways,
no citation of authority is required to establish that an arbitration award ordering a company to
reinstate an over-the-road truck driver caught drinking liquor on duty violates public policy." Id.
at 125, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2002. The court stated further, "the public policy of preventing people
from drinking and driving is embodied in the case law, the applicable regulations, statutory law,
and pure common sense. The policy is 'well defined and definite." Id. at 125, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2003
(incorrectly quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645).
24 790 F.2d 611, 122 L.R.R.M. 2217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 186, 123 L.R.R.M. 2592
(1986).
25 1d. at 613-14, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2217.
22 Id. at 617, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221.
27 Id, at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220.
23 Id.
" Id. at 620, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2224 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
50 1d, at 613, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2217.
3 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
'4 Id.
"Id. at 613, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2217-18.
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Police subdued McClendon and placed him in a psychiatric facility for thirty days."
Although McClendon initially tested positively for both barbituates and amphetamines,
upon retesting three days later, his results were negative." The different test results
thus presented the possibility that the initial tests could have been falsely positive." The
hospital released McClendon and he was not treated subsequently."
Officially, DuPont discharged McClendon for assaulting fellow employees and de-
stroying company property.'" Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
McClendon's union (The Grasselli Employment Association) filed a grievance protesting
the dismissal as lacking 'just cause."'" The parties submitted the dispute to an arbitrator
who evaluated the evidence and concluded that a mental breakdown, rather than misuse
of drugs, precipitated the incident.9 2 Furthermore, the arbitrator determined that the
likelihood of recurrence was remote." Because a nonvolitional mental breakdown caused
the outburst, the arbitrator reasoned that McClendon was not at fault"' and found,
therefore, no just cause for dismissal's The arbitrator explicitly considered the need for
safety in the workplace and the damage to DuPont's property, but he concluded that
those concerns were not significant in light of McClendon's favorable prognosis." 1 As a
result, the arbitrator ordered McClendon reinstated.°
DuPont brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
resisting enforcement of the arbitrator's reinstatement order. The district court vacated
the arbitrator's award, reasoning that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding
the case based on personal notions of equity rather than on the terms laid out in the
collective bargaining agreement." Furthermore, the court stated that the arbitrator gave
too little regard to the public policy consideration of an employer's duty to provide a
safe workplace," and denied enforcement of the arbitrator's decision to reinstate Mc-
Clendon."
The Grasselli union appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit claiming that the district court should not have denied enforcement of the
arbitrator's award seeking McClendon's reinstatement. The Seventh Circuit agreed,
reversed the district court, and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award." Stressing
'8 Id. at 613, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218.
37 Id.
38 Id. Because drugs of this type remain in the system longer than three days, a physician
testified that the initial tests could have been falsely positive. Id.
59 1d.
40 Id.
'I Id.
42 Id.
' 5 Id. The arbitrator gave additional consideration to DuPont's failure to follow its own policy
of conducting full investigations prior to dismissals, Id. At that investigation, McClendon would
have been able to present the facts from his perspective. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. ("[LJack of fault must be considered in determining just cause for discharge.").
46 Id.
57 Id.
* 8 Id. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of an arbitrator going beyond
the terms of the contract.
49 Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 613, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218.
50 /d. at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218.
31 1d. at 617, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221.
142	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:67
the limited scope of judicial review in collective bargaining cases, 52 the court noted that
the judiciary has no power to reach the merits of an arbitration award even if it strongly
disagrees with an arbitrator's interpretation of the contract. 55 Consequently, the appeals
court found no basis for the district court's conclusion that the arbitrator employed
personal notions of equity in construing the phrase 'just cause." 64 The court stated that
mere disagreement — even strong disagreement" — with an arbitrator's construction
did not constitute sufficient grounds to deny enforcement."
Because courts may not review the arbitrator's factual findings the Seventh Circuit
dismissed DuPont's contention that the arbitrator failed to consider sufficiently workplace
safety.57 The court noted, in fact, that workplace safety received the arbitrator's explicit
consideration and that he made the informed judgment that it was unlikely McClendon
would have future breakdowns." Because the arbitrator acted within his legitimate role
as contract interpreter, the court declined to review the factual determination."
The court then turned to the issue of enforcing arbitration awards violative of public
policy." It recognized the public policy exception to the strong deference generally
accorded to an arbitrator. 61 The court noted that use of the public policy exception could
undermine the deference accorded arbitration awards and thus the court specified that
the judiciary should use the public policy doctrine cautiously when refusing to enforce
an arbitrator's award. 62 The Grasselli court noted, however, that it was free to decide de
"Id. at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the necessity for limited judicial review in collective bargaining cases.
55 Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218. See also Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers
of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 184, 187, 119 L.R.R.M. 3566, 3568, 3570 (7th Cir. 1985).
54 Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the district court's treatment of the arbitrator's construction of 'just cause."
Because the arbitrator's requirement of a fault element for a just cause dismissal was not personal
whim, Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219, it could not be said that he administered
"his own brand of industrial justice." Id. at 615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219 (quoting Enterprise Wheel,
363 U.S. at 597, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2425).
Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 614, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2218.
55 Id. at 615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219.
" Id.
55 Id. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the arbitrator's treatment
of workplace safety vis a vis McClendon's potential for relapse.
Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219.
60 1d.
51 Id.
62 Id. at 615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219-20. The majority reiterated that even when a court overturns
an arbitration award on policy grounds, it still accepts the factual findings of the arbitrator. Id. at
615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220. Therefore, even if the court disagreed with the arbitrator's concep-
tualization of the public policy in question, the court should continue to defer to the arbitrator's
findings of fact. Id. at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220. For example, in United States Postal Service v.
American Postal Workers Union, a postal worker who confessed to embezzling postal funds was
discharged by the postal service. 736 F.2d 822, 823, 116 L.R.R.M. 2870, 2870 (1st Cir. 1984). An
arbitrator ordered reinstatement, reasoning the dismissal lacked "just cause" because the worker
had not intended to keep the money. Id. The postal service sued successfully to vacate the arbitrator's
award as contrary to the public policy of discouraging embezzlement of government money. Id. at
824, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2871. The union appealed to the First Circuit which affirmed the district
court's finding. Id. at 826, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2872. Although not disputing the arbitrator's factual
basis for making his decision, the First Circuit took exception to the arbitrator's judgment that no
public policy was contravened. Id. at 825-26, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2872. The First Circuit commented
that "it violates public policy to force the Postal Service to reinstate an employee who was recently
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novo whether the arbitral judgment endangered public welfare es In light of both the
narrow application of the public policy exception and the unwillingness of courts to
question an arbitrator's factual findings, however, the court rejected DuPont's contention
that the arbitration award reinstating McClendon violated public policy."
Just as the various circuits have split on construction of the public policy exception
announced in the W.R. Grace case, the Grasselli court itself split on how narrowly the
exception should be construed. Although the majority held that the W.R. Grace standard
was not meant to be narrowly interpreted," the concurrence claimed that courts had
too much discretion to set aside arbitral awards on nebulous policy grounds. 6° The
concurrence argued for nonenforcement of arbitration decisions only upon a violation
of existing laws. 67
The majority found persuasive authority for its broad interpretation of the W.R.
Grace standard in other circuits. 68 Specifically, the Graselli court reviewed the First Cir-
cuit's decision of United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union," which
rejected the argument that there had to be a violation of a "direct legal prohibition"
before a court could overturn an arbitrator's decision on public policy grounds." The
First Circuit reasoned that as long as a policy met the W.R. Grace "well defined and
dominant" standard, courts could permissibly overturn arbitral awards — even if no
positive law were violated. 7 '
Similarly, the Grasselli majority also cited the Seventh Circuit case of Local No. P-
1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jones Daily Farm, 72
convicted of directly violating his fiduciary duties through the embezzlement of a large sum of
money from it," Id. at 826, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2872.
62 Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 617, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221.
64 Id. at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221. The court separated its analysis into an assessment of the
arbitrator's factual findings and an assessment of the arbitrator's judgment based on those findings.
Id. at 616-17, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221. The arbitrator made an explicit determination that the potential
for future violent episodes was remote. Id. at 617, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2221. In his judgment, therefore,
workplace safety was not an issue and no policy would be contravened by McClendon's reinstate-
ment. Id, Based on the facts presented — which the court was bound to accept as valid — the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the arbitrator's judgment was permissible. Id. In dicta, the court noted
that the appropriate standard for reviewing facts pertaining to the public policy exception had not
yet been judicially established. Id. It was mindful, however, that a plaintiff appealing an adverse
judgment might invoke a public policy argument in order to "end run" the deferential standard of
review currently accorded arbitrators' factual findings. Id. Under these circumstances a narrow
standard of review properly serves to discourage plaintiffs from bringing unwarranted suits. Id.
Alternatively, where a plaintiff legitimately petitions for judicial review of an arbitration decision
contrary to public policy, courts should not be impaired in their ability to overturn the arbitrator's
award merely because courts are compelled to accept arbitral facts as true. Id. In these legitimate
petitions, a less deferential standard of review is more appropriate. Id. The Grasselli court suggested
the "clearly erroneous" standard embodied in rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.
62 Id. at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220.
" Id. at 618, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
67 Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
"Id. at 615-616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220.
66 736 F.2d 822, 116 L.R.R.M. 2870 (1st Cir. 1984). See supra note 62 for a discussion of the
Postal Workers case.
70
 Postal Workers, 736 F.2d at 824, 116 L.R.R.M. at 2871.
7 ' See id. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard an-
nounced in W.R. Grace.
72 680 F.2d 1142, 110 L.R.R.M. 2805 (7th Cir. 1982).
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as a decision "in complete harmony with" its broader construction of the public policy
exception." The Jones Dairy court held that a rule prohibiting the workers from reporting
unsanitary conditions directly to federal inspectors was unenforceable as against public
policy even though the rule itself violated no law. 74
 The Seventh Circuit balanced the
company's right to control plant management against the public's right to sanitary meat
packing plants and held that the public's welfare outweighed the company's interests."
The Grasselli court, therefore, relying on United Postal Workers and Jones Dairy, held that
courts could refuse to enforce arbitration awards even when the award violated no law."
The concurrence argued that courts should defer to arbitral judgments unless the
order violated positive law.'" It distinguished Jones Dairy, claiming that the case did not
turn only on public policy considerations but that it involved an actual law which would
have been violated had the arbitrator's construction of the collective bargaining agree-
ment been enforced." According to the concurrence, the Jones Dairy court reached a
correct conclusion precisely because the company rule interfered with enforcement of
federal safety laws." In Grasselli, however, the arbitrator's construction of the collective
bargaining agreement violated no law. 80 The concurrence argued Janes Dairy, therefore,
could not be read to support the "broader proposition that a court may set aside an
award even when the arbitrator accurately construes the contract and the contract, so
construed, is lawful." 8 '
In further support of its reasoning, the concurrence argued that the power to set
aside arbitral awards on policy grounds (rather than on express rules of law) conflicted
with section 9 of the Arbitration Act.82 That statute," according to the concurrence,
" Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220-21. In Janes Dairy, the union submitted a
worker's reprimand to arbitration. 680 F.2d at 1143, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2806. The arbitrator found
in favor of the company, reasoning that the rule came under the collective bargaining contract
which gave the company "exclusive management control of ... the employees." Id. The union filed
a complaint in district court alleging that enforcement of the company rule pursuant to the
arbitrator's decision contravened public policy. Id. The district court agreed, reversed the arbitrator's
award, and permanently enjoined the company from enforcing its rule. Id. at 1143, 110 L.R.R.M.
at 2806-07. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit the Jones Dairy judgment was affirmed. Id. at 1142,
110 L.R.R.M. at 2805.
74 See id. at 1143, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2806.
76 Id. at 1145, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2808. The court held that the rule was overly broad in that it
forbade the workers from ever dealing with the U.S.D.A. Id. The court noted, however, that as part
of balancing the interests a company could require its employees to first report sanitation violations
to management before reporting uncorrected conditions to the U.S.D.A. within a specified period.
Id.
76 See Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 616, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2220-21.
77 Id. at 620, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2224 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 619, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
79 1d. (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Although the Grasselli concurrence does not specify which
federal safety laws are at issue, Jones Dairy cites the Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
Jones Dairy, 680 F.2d at 1144, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2807.
86 See Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 618-19, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). "If the
firm, honestly implementing its contract with the employees, reinstates the berserker, ... no public
policy would stand in the way." Id. at 619, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Nor
did DuPont argue that reinstating McClendon violated any rule of law. Id. at 620, 122 L.R.R.M. at
2224 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
Id. at 619, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222-23 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 618, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
86 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
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limits courts to confirming awards unless the arbitrator exceeded his or her power. 84
Therefore, the Arbitration Act abrogated "any equitable power courts formerly enjoyed
to decide which awards to enforce."s5 The concurring judge concluded that enforcement
of arbitral awards necessarily focuses on the meaning of the contract rather than notions
about public policy.so He stated, "OW the contract violates a rule of law, then the contract
itself may be set aside .. . . But if the contract is lawful, and the arbitrator follows or
interprets the contract within his authority, the court 'must grant ... an order' enforcing
the award." 87
The W.R. Grace decision should have clarified the standard courts use for vacating
arbitration awards on public policy grounds. As the Grasselli case illustrates, however, no
clear principle dominates judicial reasoning in this area of the law. Both the majority
and concurring opinions cite W.R. Grace to support their position."
The actual language of the W.R. Grace opinion is ambiguous and subject to two
plausible interpretations." In W.R. Grace, the Supreme Court stated that courts should
determine public policy "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."" While this language proclaims a
generalized command to use objective criteria when ascertaining public policy, the term
"by reference to the laws" falls short of mandating the strict construction advocated by
the Grasselli concurrence. Alternatively, an admonition not to determine public policy in
"general considerations of supposed public interests" is contrary to the looser construc-
tion followed by the Grasselli majority.
Prior to W.R. Grace there was considerable conflict among the circuits regarding the
public policy grounds on which courts could vacate arbitration awards. For example, the
Seventh Circuit took a broad approach in Jones Daily" and held an arbitration award
need only violate general public policy for the exception to apply." The Third Circuit,
however, took a narrow approach in Kane Gas Light and Heating v. Local 112," holding
that the public policy exception only pertained when the arbitrator's decision "conflicts
directly with federal or state law." 94
Although in W.R. Grace the Supreme Court may have intended to clarify the stan-
dard for vacating arbitral awards, no such clarification resulted and the circuits have
Grasselli, 790 F.2d at 618, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2222 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
85 Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
" Id, (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
87 Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (quoting 9 U.S.C. 1 9 (1982)).
88 See id. at 615, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2219, and id. at 620, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2224 (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring). Obviously the majority reasoned that the "well defined and dominant" standard
afforded courts leeway to address the public policy exception even when no positive law was violated.
The concurrence, however, argued that the W.R. Grace standard was meant to be more narrowly
construed and stated: "the Court has never held that an arbitration award that complies with the
contract and positive law may be set aside on the basis of vague beliefs about public policy." Id. at
620, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2223-24 (Easterbrook, J.. concurring).
89 See W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
80 1d. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
91 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
"Janes Dairy, 680 F.2d at 1143-45, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2807-08.
93 687 F.2d 673, 681, 111  L.R.R.M. 2094, 2099 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011, 112
L.R.R.M. 2808 (1983) (holding arbitrator's decision should be reversed on public policy grounds
only when the award conflicts directly with positive law).
94 Id. at 681, 111 L,R.R.M. at 2099.
146	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:67
continued to apply varying standards." For instance, in Local 540 v. Great Western Food
Company,96 the Fifth Circuit, relying on W.R. Grace, adopted a broad approach and held
that an amorphous public policy against drunk driving served as a proper basis for
application of the public policy exception. 97 At the same time, in American Postal Workers
Union v. United Stales Postal Service," the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that W.R. Grace proposed a narrow standard, applicable only when
the arbitral award conflicted with "clear statutory or case law.""
Practitioners should note this apparent conflict among the circuits. Under the cur-
rent state of the law, outcome of a case in which parties are requesting that the court
vacate an arbitral award may well depend upon which circuit the case is brought in
rather than on the factual issue the case presents.'" The Supreme Court, however,
denied certiorari in Grasselli,'°' so clarification seems unlikely in the near future.
There is a delicate balance between the federal policy of encouraging peaceful
resolution of labor disputes by means of collective bargaining, and the societal interests
protected by the public policy exception. As the Grasselli case illustrates, no clear direction
is currently provided to the courts as to how these competing interests should be brought
into alignment. Until the Supreme Court clarifies its position, the controversy is likely
to continue.
B. *Arbitration of Post-Termination Grievances: Teamsters, Local Union 238 v. C.R.S.T.,
Inc. I
Most collective bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures to resolve dis-
putes over contract interpretation. 2 These grievance procedures generally provide that
95 See, e.g., National Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 625 F. Supp.
1527, 1530, 121 L.R.R.M. 2384, 2386 (D.D.C. 1986) ("[C]ourts in this Circuit have effectively
rejected the liberal reading of the public policy exception adopted by the First Circuit and the Fifth
Circuit.").
"712 F.2d 122, 114 L.R.R.M. 2001 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra note 23 for a discussion of the
Great Western case.
97
 See Great Western, 712 F.2d at 124, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
99
 789 F.2d 1, 122 L.R.R.M. 2094 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See supra note 21 for a discussion of the
case.
" American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 8, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2100.
100
 In fact, two circuits have arrived at opposite conclusions based on virtually identical factual
situations. Compare American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 8-9, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2100-01 (holding
public policy exception not applicable when there was no specific legal prohibition against rehiring
a confessedly dishonest employee) with United States Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 826, 116 L.R.R.M. at
2872 (holding public policy exception was applicable despite absence of law prohibiting reinstating
a convicted embezzler).
10 ' 107 S. Ct. 186, 123 L.R.R.M. 2592 (1986).
* By Loretta Rhodes Richard, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
795 F.2d 1400, 122 L.R.R.M. 2993 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 647, 123 L.R.R.M.
3192 (1986), rev'g, 780 F.2d 379, 121 L.R.R.M. 2223 (8th Cir. 1985).
2 A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 704-707 (10th ed. 1986)
[hereinafter GoamAx]. Over 25 years ago the United States Supreme Court delineated the principles
governing judical enforcement of labor arbitration clauses in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423 (1960). In 1986, the Supreme
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the parties will submit unresolved disputes over the meaning of the agreement to a
neutral third party whose interpretation of the contract is finals Federal labor policy
strongly favors arbitration as a means of preventing industrial strife.4
The strength of federal labor policies favoring arbitration manifests itself in a variety
of ways. For example, the federal court's jurisdiction over disputes is limited to deter-
mining whether the dispute is arguably within the ambit of the arbitration dause.s The
court, in such a case, does not have jurisdiction to resolve the dispute itself, but must
submit the dispute to arbitration. 6 Further, where a grievant presents a colorable claim
under the contract, the federal courts will presume the grievance is arbitrable.' Thus,
most grievances are subject to arbitration unless the union and the employer make an
explicit provision in the contract to exclude that subject from arbitration.H If doubt exists
as to the arbitrability of a particular grievance, the court will compel arbitration,
Courts may compel the union and employer to arbitrate even where a dispute arises
after the expiration or termination of a collective bargaining agreement.'° In 1977, the
United States Supreme Court held in Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confec-
tionery Workers that the duty to arbitrate survives the termination of the contract, even if
the dispute arises after the collective bargaining agreement expires, so long as it arises
under that contract." The Court, however, did not define when a grievance "arises
under" a contract.
Court reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy in AT & T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of Am., 106 S. Ct, 1415, 1418, 121 L.R.R.M. 3329, 3331 (1986).
See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 704-707.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2416.
5 See AT & T Technologies, 106 S. Ct. at 1418, 1420, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331, 3332. The courts
may compel specific performance of the obligation to arbitrate. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. at 582, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2415-16. The issue of a grievance's arbitrability under the contract is
a question of law. AT & T Technologies, 106 S. Ct. at 1418, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331. In determining a
grievance's arbitrability under the contract, the court may not consider the merits of the substantive
claim. Id. at 1419, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3332. As the Court stated in AT & T Technologies:
[w]hether 'arguable' or not, indeed even if it appears to the court to be frivolous, the
union's claim that the employer has violated the collective-bargaining agreement is to
be decided, not by the court asked to order the arbitration, but as the parties have
agreed by the arbitrator. 'The courts ... have no business ... determining whether there
is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.'
Id. (citations omitted).
9
 AT & T Technologies, 106 S. Ct. at 1419, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3332.
See Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local Union 295, 786 F.2d 93, 99, 121 L.R.R.M. 3240, 3244-
45 (2d Cir. 1986); Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 886, 111  L.R.R.M. 2153,
2155 (2d Cir. 1982).
" See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 583-85, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2419-20.
9 Id. at 582-83, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2420.
1 ° Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 251, 94
L.R.R.M. 2753, 2756 (1977). The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on the
issue of post-termination arbitrability seems to be that any grievance presented to an employer after
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement is arbitrable as long as the grievance would
have been arbitrable under the expired contract and no contractual language states that the duty
to arbitrate expires along with the collective bargaining agreement. Leonard, Post-Contractual Ar-
biirability after Nolde Brothers: A Problem of Conceptual Clarity, 28 N.Y.L. &Ft. L. REV. 257, 268-69
(1983).
11 Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at 249, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2755. For thorough discussions of Nolde see
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This ambiguity in the Nolde Court's opinion has resulted in a myriad of judicial
opinions attempting to delineate when a grievance arises under a contract. 12 Indeed, in
the decade since the Supreme Court decided Nolde, the federal courts of appeals have
issued inconsistent decisions reflecting the continuing confusion over the arbitrability of
post-termination grievances.' 3 Some courts have interpreted the case to compel arbitra-
tion where the union presents a "colorable claim" under the expired agreement. 14 Other
courts, in contrast, have interpreted Nolde narrowly to deny arbitration unless the grie-
vant can show that the facts giving rise to the grievance occurred, or that the benefits
claimed "accrued or vested," before the labor agreement expired or terminated."
Following the latter approach, during the Survey year, the Eighth Circuit held in
Teamsters, Local 238 v. C.R.S.T., Inc., that a grievance arising after a contract's expiration
or termination is not arbitrable unless the dispute involves a benefit that "vested or
accrued" under the expired contract, or unless the facts giving rise to the dispute occur
before the contract's expiration." While recognizing the broad language in the Supreme
Court's Nolde opinion, the Eighth Circuit specifically construed Nolde to apply only to a
limited class of post-termination grievances, such as severance pay, retirement benefits,
and vacation pay.' 7 Local 238 represents a narrow approach, in contrast to a broader
one which other courts have used, to determine the arbitrability of post-termination
grievances.
Local 238 (the Union) represented truck driver employees of C.R.S.T. (the Com-
pany)." Local 238 and the Company operated under a collective bargaining agreement
for the period July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1982.' 9 Before the expiration of the
Geotz, Arbitration After Termination of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 63 VA. L. REV. 693 (1977);
Leonard, supra note 10.
See, e.g., Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 93, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3240; Graphic Communications
Union v. Chicago Tribune Co., 794 F.2d 1222, 123 L.R.R.M. 2488 (7th Cir. 1986); Teamsters v.
Kennicott Bros., 771 F.2d 300, 120 L.R.R.M. 2306 (7th Cir. 1985); Glary, 688 F.2d at 883, 1 I 1
L.R.R.M. at 2153; Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 648 F.2d 856, 107
L.R.R.M. 2271 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., 454 U.S. 1031, 108 L.R.R.M. 2924 (1981);
Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union, Local No. 80, 605 F.2d 1290, 102 L.R.R.M.
2476 (2d Cir. 1979). See Leonard, supra note 10, at 273-91 for a discussion of the NLRB and
federal circuit court decisions interpreting Nolde from 1977-1983.
13 See, e.g., Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 96-99, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3243-44 (Second Circuit held
that to meet the requirement that the grievance arise under a contract the party raising it need
only point to a provision in the contract that arguably covers the dispute); Graphic Communications
Union, 794 F.2d at 1227, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2941 (Seventh Circuit held that grievances arising under
an expired agreement arbitrable only where they involved accrued rights or obligations); Federated
Metals Corp., 648 F.2d at 861, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2275 (Third Circuit held that it is not necessary that
a disputed right have vested or accrued under the expired agreement to be arbitrable so long as
the dispute turns on differing interpretations of the agreement).
" See, e.g., Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 99, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3244-45; Ouley, 688 F.2d at 886,
111 L.R.R.M. at 2155.
See, e.g., Graphic Communications Union, 794 F.2d at 1227, 123 L.R.R.M. 249; County of Ottawa
v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. 1, 377 N.W.2d 668, 120 L.R.R.M. 3260 (1985).
16 795 F.2d 1400, 122 L.R.R.M. 2993 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 647, 123
L.R.R.M. 3192 (1986). The Eighth Circuit's en bane decision reversed a prior three judge panel that
held the post-termination discharge arbitrable. See 780 F.2d 379, 384, 121 L.R.R.M. 2223, 2227.
"Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1404, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
18 1d. at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
19 Id.
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contract, the parties began negotiations for a new contract, but failed to reach an
agreement before the old agreement expired. 2° Among the proposals discussed in the
negotiations were changes in the then existing grievance procedure. 2 '
In December 1982, the Company determined that negotiations had reached an
impasse and notified the employees that effective December 27, 1982, the Company was
going to impose unilaterally a schedule of wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment consistent with its final offer to the Union. 22 The Company's final offer
included a grievance procedure." The new "schedule" of terms and conditions instituted,
however, contained no express arbitration provision, although it did provide that disputes
over seniority were to be subject to the grievance procedure. 24
In January 1983, C.R.S.T. discharged a truck driver employee represented by Local
238 after the Company determined that the employee had caused an automobile acci-
dent." The Union, following the grievance procedure in the expired agreement, sought
to arbitrate.28 The Company refused, asserting that the grievance procedure in the
expired contract no longer applied because more than one year had elapsed since the
contract expired and also that no grievance procedure existed under its unilaterally
imposed schedule, except as to disputes over seniority."
The Union filed a state court action to compel arbitration. 28 The Company removed
the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa." The
district court granted the Company's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
only grievable matters under the unilaterally imposed schedule were seniority dates."
The Union appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuits'
On appeal, the Union presented three arguments to demonstrate the existence of
the grievance procedure. First, the Union argued, the court should infer a grievance
procedure from C.R.S.T.'s unilateral schedule, which retained a grievance procedure to
resolve seniority disputes." Alternatively, the Union contended, the grievance procedure
in the expired agreement remained in effect." Finally, the Union asserted that because
the Company's last offer contained a grievance procedure, and the Company adopted a
schedule consistent with the final offer, a grievance procedure existed." In its original
three judge panel decision, the Eighth Circuit accepted the Union's argument that the
grievance procedure retained in the seniority provision of the schedule rendered the
2° Id.
21 Id. at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2999 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
22 Id, at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
28 Id. at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M, at 2999 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
24 Local 238, 780 F.2d at 380, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2444.
23 Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1401-02, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2993.
28 Id. at 1401, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2993.
29 Id.
'° Id.
Id.
32 Id. at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
83
59 Id.
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agreement ambiguous and thus the discharge was subject to the grievance procedure
and arbitration thereunder." In a rehearing en bane, the Eighth Circuit reversed."
The majority summarily dismissed the Union's argument that the grievance proce-
dure contained in the Company's last offer applied because, the court found, the agree-
ment had not been raised before the district court?' Moreover, the court rejected the
panel's holding that the Company's reference to "the grievance procedure" in the sched-
ule's seniority clause created the inference that an arbitration provision existed." The
court found that the unilateral schedule did not provide a broad arbitration clause, but
rather contained a limited procedure which applied to disputes over seniority only."
Thus, the court concluded, a dispute over a wrongful discharge was not arbitrable based
on the grievance procedure in the unilateral schedule.°
The majority also considered whether the grievance procedure contained in the
expired agreement applied to the employee's discharge." The court found that the old
grievance procedure did not apply.° The court began its analysis by briefly reciting the
conflict between the federal labor policy favoring arbitration and the principle that a
party who did not explicitly agree to arbitration in the contract may not be required to
arbitrate.'" The court also noted that arbitration provisions are presumed to survive the
expiration or termination of a contract unless clearly negated." The court stated, how-
ever, that the presumption does not operate unless the grievance arose under the expired
contract's Thus, the court's analysis focused on whether the disputed discharge arose
under the expired agreement. 4°
The Eighth Circuit held that the discharge did not arise under the expired agree-
ment." The court construed Nolde's holding narrowly.° The court stated that all courts
which have considered this question have required, to some degree, that post-termination
grievances must be based on rights which vested or accrued under the expired agree-
ment, or relate to events which occurred before the agreement expired or terminated.°
The court found that because the truck driver employee was discharged after the
agreement expired, and the discharge was based on an accident which occurred after
the agreement expired, the employee's discharge did not "arise under" the agreement
and thus was not arbitrable."
35 Local 238, 780 F.2d at 3384, 121 L.R.R.M at 2227.
33 Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1400, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
37 Id. at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
se /d. at 1404, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
39 Id,
"Id. at 1405, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
4, Id. at 1403, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
53 Id, at 1404, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2995-96.
"Id, at 1403, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994-95.
44 Id,
Id. The court relied on the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Jaklinski, 423 Mich. at 17,
377 N.W.2d at 674, 120 L.R.R.M. at 3264, which characterized the presumption set forth in Nolde
as mere dicta. See Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1403, 1404, 122 LR.R.M. at 2995.
"Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1403-04, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994-96.
" Id. at 1404, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
48 1d. at 1403, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
49 1d.
54 Id. at 1404, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
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Three judges dissented from the majority opinion. 51 The dissenters took a position
similar to courts which have adopted a broad view of the type of post-termination
disputes arbitrable under Nolde.52 Chief Judge Lay stated in his separately written dissent
that he would have found the grievance arbitrable for two reasons. First, the Company's
unilaterally imposed schedule constituted, in his opinion, a contract between the Com-
pany and the Union that contained an arbitration clause that arguably covered the
employee's grievance. ," Second, the Chief Judge continued, the employee's continuing
right to employment was as much a vested right as the severance pay considered under
Noide. 54 Thus, Chief Judge Lay concluded, the grievance should be arbitrated."
Chief Judge Lay asserted that even if the terms of the schedule failed to include
the last grievance procedure which the Company had proposed, the reference to the
grievance procedure in the unilaterally implemented seniority provisions rendered the
grievance procedure ambiguous." Chief Judge.Lay argued that the majority improperly
failed to apply the traditional principle of judicial construction which requires that an
ambiguously drafted provision be construed against the drafter." Moreover, given that
doubts regarding arbitrability should be resolved in favor of coverage, the grievance
should have been sent to arbitration."
Chief Judge Lay recognized the unique nature of collective bargaining agreements."
Labor agreements are not ordinary contracts, the Chief Judge stated, but a private code
under which the parties order their continuing employment relationship." This rela-
tionship, Chief Judge Lay explained, does not cease when a contract expires et Thus,
the Chief Judge argued, the right to continued employment existed. 62 To hold otherwise,
Chief Judge Lay asserted, would result in relegating all Union employees to employees
at will upon the expiration of the contracto
In the second dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney challenged the majority's findings
on two grounds. First, Judge Heaney noted, the final proposal which the company
offered to the Union, and which the company subsequently unilaterally imposed, con-
tained a grievance procedure." According to Judge Heaney, because the Company stated
that its last offer would be implemented and the. last offer contained a grievance pro-
cedure, the Company led the Union employees to rely on the existence of an arbitration
51 Id, at 1405-1410, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996-3000 (Lay, C.J., Heaney, J., Wollman, J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Lay and Judge Heaney each wrote dissenting opinions. Id. (Lay, C.J., and Heaney, J.,
dissenting). Judge Wollman joined in a part of Chief Judge Lay's opinion. Id. at 1410, 122 L.R.R.M.
at 3000 (Wollman, J., dissenting).
57 Id. (Lay, C.J., Heaney, J., Wollman, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 93,
121 L.R.R.M. at 3240.
" Id. at 1406, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2998 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1405, 122 L,R.R.M. at 2997 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 1406, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2998 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
56 Id, at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2998 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2998-99 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
55 ld. at 1406-07, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2997 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
09 1d. at 1405, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2997 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
00 Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
01 Id. at 1405, 122 L.R,R.M. at 2996 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1405, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2997 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2999 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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procedure in preference to striking. 65 Thus, Judge Heaney argued, the Company should
remain obligated to arbitrate post-termination grievances 66
Second, Judge Heaney asserted, the grievance would be arbitrable under the se-
niority provision of the contract, because the schedule containing the seniority provision
could be interpreted only with reference to the expired agreement. 67 Inasmuch as the
seniority provision contained the term "discharge," Judge Heaney stated, and the only
way to determine the meaning of "discharge" was to look at the wrongful discharge
provisions in the expired agreement, the employee's discharge arguably arose under the
expired agreement." Thus, pursuant to Nolde, Judge Heaney argued, the grievance was
presumed arbitrable because the parties did not negate this presumption explicitly. 69
The majority opinion in Local 238 is inconsistent with the fundamental principles
of arbitration set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy. The Steelworkers Trilogy is the foundation
for the modern labor policy favoring labor arbitration to resolve conflicts between
workers and employers. 70 In the Trilogy, the Supreme Court recognized that arbitration
is not merely an alternative dispute resolution mechanism stated in a commercial con-
tract, but is an integral part of the ongoing labor relations process." The grievance
procedure, the Supreme Court has stated, stands at the core of the system of industrial
self-government. 72 To remove a subject from the grievance procedure requires the
strongest evidence that the parties did not intend that the subject be arbitrable. 73 Thus,
as Chief Judge Lay correctly stated in his dissent, any doubts as to whether a particular
grievance should be arbitrated should be resolved in favor of coverage. 74
Moreover, the Nolde Court expanded the presumption of arbitrability to include
post-termination disputes. Under Nolde, the Supreme Court held that, absent strong
reasons to the contrary, a court considering post-termination arbitrability should presume
that the parties did not intend that their arbitration duties would terminate automatically
with the contract. 75
 Further, under the traditional arbitrability analysis to determine a
grievance's arbitrability, a court should review the scope of the arbitration clause to see
if it is broad, governing all disputes, or narrow, excluding particular subjects from
arbitration. 76 Where the arbitration clause is broad, a court should order arbitration if
the claim is "on its face governed by the contract." 77 Where the arbitration clause is
narrow, a court also should order arbitration if the dispute is within the purview of the
arbitration clause. 76 Given the broad presumption of arbitrability, therefore, as long as
the party raising the grievance can point to a provision in the contract that covers the
dispute, the grievance — even if it appears patently baseless or frivolous — is arbitrable. 79
65 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
54 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 1409-10, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3000 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
08 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Co Id, at 1410, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3000 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
70 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy.
'I Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2418.
" Id. at 581, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2419.
" Id. at 585, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2420.
74 Id. at 583, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2420.
Nolde Bros,, 430 U.S. at 253, 254-55, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2756, 2757.
75 Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 97, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3243.
77 Id.
78 Rochdale Village, Inc., 605 F.2d at 1295, 102 L.R.R.M, at 2480.
79
 Emery Air Freight, 786 F.2d at 98-99, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3244.
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The Eighth Circuit seems to have discarded this presumption of' arbitrability that
the Nolde Court so strongly emphasized. 8° Further, the court ignored the Nolde Court's
specific refusal to require that an event giving rise to the claim must have occurred
during the life of the contract in order for a post-termination grievance to be arbitrable. 8 '
Indeed, in Local 238, the court's approach to the issue of arbitrability under the expired
agreement is contrary to the principles set forth in Nolde and the Steelworkers Trilogy.
The Local 238 court never examined whether the parties clearly intended the arbi-
tration clause to terminate with the expired agreement. Moreover, the court-itself noted
that arbitration clauses are presumed to survive the collective bargaining agreement's
expiration. 82 The court erroneously failed to reach the question of the scope of the
expired contract's arbitration clause, or whether the employee's discharge arguably fell
within it. Rather, the court stated that unless the benefits accrued or the events giving
rise to the grievance occurred under the old agreement, the presumption of arbitrability
did not apply." Nowhere in Nolde, however, did the Supreme Court require that the
events arise before the old agreement expired, but instead, the Court emphasized the
parties' intent to continue to arbitrate. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning does not
follow the Supreme Court's approach properly.
As Judge Heaney noted in his dissent, even assuming the court was correct in not
applying the expired contract's arbitration clause, a dispute over the meaning and
applicability of the unilaterally imposed schedule existed." Because a dispute existed,
the court should have considered whether the dispute arguably fell within the ambit of
the provision. When the collective bargaining negotiations reached an impasse, as Judge
Heaney's dissent pointed out, the Company stated that it was adopting a contract con-
sistent with its last offer." The last offer included a grievance procedure." As Judge
Heaney stated, the majority failed to examine the scope of the grievance procedure or
whether the employee had a colorable claim under the new contract. 87 Indeed, the court
merely noted that the general grievance procedure in the new contract covered seniority,
but ignored the specific language of the seniority provision, which stated that disputes
would be resolved under "the grievance procedure." 88 Because there was no grievance
procedure contained in the unilaterally imposed schedule, the clear inference is that the
statement referred to the grievance procedure contained in the expired contract.
The Eighth Circuit failed to take into account the unique nature of the collective
bargaining relationship explicitly recognized in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Specifically, the
court ignored the parties' continuing bargaining relationship and expectation that the
new contract would contain a grievance procedure and arbitration. Federal labor policy
favors arbitration of disputes to promote industrial peace. 89 To the contrary, the Local
238 decision does not promote industrial peace because unions can no longer be certain
" Nolde Bros„ 430 U,S. at 243, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2753.
81 1d. at 252-53, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2756.
" Local 238, 795 F.2d at 1403, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2995-96.
83 Id.
"Id. at 1406, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2997-98 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1402, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2994.
8" Id. at 1408, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2999 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 1404-05, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
89 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416,
2416 (1960).
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that the employer will be required to arbitrate post-termination disputes. Because of this
uncertainty, unions may choose to strike over post-termination disputes.
In sum, arbitration is the favored method of resolving labor disputes. The Eighth
Circuit in Local 238 v. C.R.S.T., Inc., however, held that a post-termination grievance is
not arbitrable under an expired agreement unless the claim is based on benefits that
accrued or events that occurred during the life of the agreement. The court construed
the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Nolde to encompass only a limited group of griev-
ances. This interpretation is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the Steelworkers
Trilogy and Nolde because the Local 238 court viewed the arbitration clause as a mere
creature of contract and not as an integral part of the industrial relations process.
C. *NLRB Standards for Deferral to Arbitration Awards: Garcia v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with an employee's right to engage in protected concerted activities,
including self-organization and collective bargaining. 2 When a labor dispute involves
both an unfair labor practice charge under the Act and a grievance subject to arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement, the Act authorizes the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) to adjudicate the unfair labor practice charge despite prior arbitration
of the grievance.' Because the Act also provides that arbitration is the "desirable method"
of settling grievances arising under collective bargaining agreements, 4 however, the
Board may decline to adjudicate an unfair labor practice and defer to an arbitration
award when doing so "will serve the fundamental purposes of the Act."' Thus, when a
labor dispute results in both a grievance subject to arbitration and an unfair labor practice
charge, the Board, in deciding whether to defer to an arbitration award, balances the
Act's competing concerns: to encourage private dispute resolution through collective
bargaining and the arbitration process, on the one hand, and to protect the Board's
statutory responsibility to adjudicate unfair labor practices, on the other hand. 6
* By Kate H. Lind, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
785 F.2d 807, 121 L.R.R.M. 3349 (9th Cir. 1986), denying enforcement of, United Parcel Serv.,
274 N.L.R.B. 667, 118 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1985).
2 Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982); Section 7, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1982). Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section (7] of this title
...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)( I) (1982).
Section 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection .. .." 29 U.S.C. 157 (1982).
3 See Section 10(a), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1982). Section 10(a) of the Act provides:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from en-
gaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section (8] of this title) affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
Id. See also International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156 (1962).
4 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
5 International Harvester, 138 N.L.R.B. at 925-26, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1156.
6 Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 1435, 1438, 115 L.R.R.M. 3067, 3069 (9th Cir. 1984). See also
Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1518, 122 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2086 (11th Cir. 1986).
December 1987]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 155
Although the Board's standards for deferral have fluctuated considerably, 7 the
Board recently announced deferral standards in its 1984 decision in Olin Corp' In Olin,
the Board held that it would defer to an arbitration award when: (1) the arbitration
proceedings appeared "fair and regular"; (2) the parties had contracted to be bound by
the arbitration; (3) the arbitration award was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act"; (9) the contractual and unfair labor practice issues were "factually
parallel"; and (5) the arbitrator was "presented generally" with the facts relevant to the
unfair labor practice charge. 9 Although the first three criteria had been part of the
Board's prior standard of deferral prior to Olin,R) the Olin Board added the last two
criteria to ensure that the Board would defer to arbitration only when the arbitrator
had "adequately considered the unfair labor practice."" More importantly, however,
while the Olin Board set out these five criteria for deferral, the Board relied on a strong
national labor policy favoring arbitration, and infrequent, inconsistent Board deferrals
to hold that the burden of persuasion would now be on the party arguing against deferral
to show that the arbitration proceeding did not meet one of the Olin deferral criteria. 12
Regarding the third criterion for deferral, the Olin Board clarified that an arbitration
award was not repugnant to the Act unless it was "palpably wrong" and thus "not
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.'" In the past, courts have found
arbitration awards to be repugnant to the Act where, for example, the award allowed
an employer to cause employees to violate the law. 14
During the Survey year, in Garcia v. NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's deferral to an arbitration award because
the Board, contrary to its own standards announced in Olin, deferred to an arbitration
award that the court found to be repugnant to the Act." In Garcia, the court found that
an employee who refused to obey an order to tap his horn in violation of California law
had engaged in protected concerted activity, and thus an arbitration award punishing
the employee for such conduct violated the Act." The court also found that, in punishing
7 See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 94 L.R.R.M, 3229 (9th Cir. 1977); Suburban
Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980); Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
8 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573-74, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057-58 (1984). See generally Ray,
Individual Rights and NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: A Proposal, 28 B.C.L. REV. I, 2 (1986);
Henkel & Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration after Olin and United Technologies: Has the NLRB Gone Too
Far?, 43 WAst-t. & LEE L. REV. 37, 38 (1986).
9 Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573-74, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1057-58.	 •
ID Spielberg Mfg. Co. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955).
" Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
t2 Id. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058: Olin's shifting of the burden of proof means that the Board
will presume that the arbitrator adequately considered the unfair labor practice charge. See id. at
579, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1062 (Zimmerman, dissenting). Olin has been criticized as going too far in
expanding the Board's authority to defer to arbitration awards at the expense of the statutory rights
of individual employees and the Board's statutory obligation to adjudicate unfair labor practice
claims. Id. at 579, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1063 (Zimmerman, dissenting). See Ray, supra note 8, at 3.
18 Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
14 See, e.g., Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2009 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For
a discussion of Banyard, see infra note 54.
18 Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807, 810, 121 L.R.R.M. 3349, 3352 (9th Cir. 1986), denying
enforcement of United Parcel Serv., 274 N.L.R.B. 667, 118 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1985).
15 1d. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351-52.
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the employee for refusing to break the law, the arbitration award violated public policy."
The court thus held that the arbitration award was repugnant to the Act and that the
Board had violated the Olin standards in deferring to the award.' Because the court
found that the Board's decision to defer was inconsistent with the standards the Board
set out in Olin, however, the court never addressed the validity of the standards them-
selves.' 2 The decision in Garcia therefore leaves open the question of whether the Ninth
Circuit would uphold the Olin deferral standards if squarely faced with the issue of their
validity.
Garcia was a package delivery driver for United Parcel Service (UPS) 20 During a
"ride-check" designed to improve Garcia's productivity, a supervisor told Garcia to tap
his horn when making a delivery as part of UPS's "Four-Way Attract Attention
Method." 21 Garcia refused to tap his horn, expressing his belief that it was against the
law to do so.22 In fact, the California Motor Vehicle Code prohibits drivers from using
their horns except when necessary for safety or to prevent theft." The Division Manager
later told Garcia that, instead of refusing to tap his horn, Garcia should have complied
with the order and then filed a grievance through his Union, and that UPS would pay
any fines incurred. 24 When Garcia said he still would not tap his horn, UPS discharged
him for gross insubordination."
The Teamsters Union filed a grievance on Garcia's behalf which a Joint Arbitration
Committee heard pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between UPS and the
Union. 26 This committee reduced Garcia's discharge to a 10-day suspension. 27 Garcia
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board claiming that UPS had violated
section 8(a)(l) of the Act in discharging him for engaging in protected concerted activ-
ity." The Administrative Law Judge found that Garcia's refusal to tap his horn did not
constitute protected concerted activity and dismissed the complaint." The Board af-
firmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision, but did so because it decided that
deferral to the arbitration award was appropriate."
The Board found that Garcia's actions constituted concerted activity under the
Board's rule announced in Interboro Contractors, and recently upheld by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc." Under the Interboro doctrine, the Board
17 1d. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
18 id.
' 9 See id. at 809, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
"Id. at 808, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3350.
21 Id.
22 id.
"Id. at 808 n.1, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3350 n.I (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 27001 (West 1985)).
" Id. at 808, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3350.
25 Id.
" Id,
27 Id. at 808-09, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3350. The Union later filed a grievance relating to the horn-
tapping policy claiming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement that provided that
employees could not be required to violate traffic laws. Id. at 809, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3350. The
company subsequently denied the Union's grievance when UPS agreed to assume responsibility for
any fines its employees received. Id.
211 Id.
" Id.
" United Parcel Serv., 274 N.L.R.B. 667, 669, 118 L.R.R.M. 1414, 1417 (1985).
31 /d. at 668, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1416 (citing NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822,
•
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held, when an employee asserts a right derived from the collective bargaining agreement,
the employee engages in concerted activity." The Board noted that the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the Teamsters and UPS provided that employees would not
be required to violate any statute or traffic law." Even though the Board therefore found
that Garcia's refusal to tap his horn was concerted activity, the Board dismissed Garcia's
unfair labor practice charge because it decided that deferral to the arbitration award
was appropriate." Specifically, the Board found that Garcia failed to show, as required
under Olin, that the arbitration award was "clearly repugnant" to the Act. 35
In reaching its decision, the Board reasoned that the arbitration award disciplining
Garcia for engaging in concerted activity would not be inconsistent with the Act if Garcia's
refusal to tap his horn was not protected concerted activity." The Board read the Supreme
Court's City Disposal Systems decision as suggesting that concerted activity might not be
protected when an employee has a more reasonable means available for securing his
rights than to engage in the activity." The Board stated that the arbitration committee
might reasonably have found that Garcia should have resorted to the grievance proce-
dure provided for in the collective bargaining agreement rather than refusing to tap his
horn as ordered, and that, therefore, the committee's award disciplining Garcia was not
"palpably wrong." 53 Thus, the Board held, deferral was proper because Garcia had not
met the Olin burden of showing that the arbitration award was repugnant to the Act."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's decision to defer to the
arbitration award because it found that the award was repugnant to the Act. 4° The court
held that the employee's refusal to tap his horn was protected concerted activity and thus
disciplining him for engaging in such activity both violated the Act and was against
public policy." For these reasons, the court found, the arbitration award was repugnant
to the Act and the Board acted improperly in failing to follow its own Olin standards
when it deferred to that award.42 Thus, the court remanded the claim to the Board to
consider the merits of Garcia's unfair labor practice charge. 43
The central issue before the Ninth Circuit in Garcia was whether the Board properly
deferred to the arbitration committee's award. The court initially observed that it should
115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984) and Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537,
enf'd, 988 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir. 1967)).
"Id.
"Id. at 667-68, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1415-16. The court quoted from the collective bargaining
agreement which provided at Art. 11, § 2: "Under no circumstances will an employee be required
or assigned to engage in any activity involving dangerous conditions of work or danger to person
or property or in violation of a government regulation relating to safety of person or equipment."
Id. at 668 n.7, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1416 n.7. Moreover, Art. 11, § 3, also quoted by the court, provided
that "[n]o driver shall be required to violate traffic laws or overloading regulations." Id.
"4 /d. at 668, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1416.
15 Id.
S" Id. at 669, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1417.
' 7 Id. (citing City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. at 837, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200). For a discussion of
the decision in City Disposal Systems, see 1984.85 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment
Discrimination Law, 26 B.C.L. REV. 237 (1984).
" United Parcel Serv., 274 N.L.R.B. at 669, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1417.
"See id.
10 Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807, 810, 121 L.R.R.M. 3349, 3352 (9th Cir. 1986).
" Id. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351-52.
42 Id. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
4 ' Id. at 812, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3353.
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enforce the Board's decision unless "the Board clearly depart[ed] from its own standards
or the standards themselves are invalid.'" The court thus considered whether the Board,
in this case, had clearly departed from its own standards as set forth in Olin."
The Ninth Circuit stated that deferral to arbitration was appropriate under Olin
when: (1) the proceedings were fair and regular; (2) the parties had agreed to be bound
by the arbitration; (3) the decision was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act"; (4) the contractual and unfair labor practice issues were factually
parallel; and (5) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving
the unfair labor practice issue." The court specifically noted that, under Olin, an award
would not be repugnant to the Act unless the party arguing against deferral demon-
strated that the award was "palpably wrong" or "not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act."47
Garcia, the court observed, argued that deferral was inappropriate because the
arbitration award was "clearly repugnant" to the Act," The Board, the court noted, had
rejected Garcia's argument, finding that Garcia's refusal to tap his horn was not protected
concerted activity:19 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Board, holding that
Garcia's concerted activity was protected and that the arbitration award disciplining
Garcia was therefore "palpably wrong" and repugnant to the Act."
The court cited several Board decisions that held that an employee's refusal to
violate state law constituted protected concerted activity." Specifically, the court stated
that the Board had upheld as protected concerted activity an employee's refusal to drive
a truck which exceeded the legal length, 52 and employee refusals to drive defective or
overweight trucks." Moreover, the court noted the decision of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Banyard v. NLRB, which reversed a Board decision that deferred to
an arbitration award permitting the employer to require its employees to violate state
law. 54 The court in Garcia emphasized the Banyard court's finding that such an award
was against public policy and repugnant to the purposes of the Act." Thus, the Garcia
44 /(1. at 809, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351 (citing Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 1435, 1439, 115
L.R.R.M. 3067, 3069 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Id.
46 Id. (citing Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573, 574, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057, 1058 (1984)
and Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955)).
47 Id. (citing Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058). The court also noted the Olin
Board's shifting of the burden of showing a failure to meet one of the criteria on the party arguing
against deferral. Id.
49 See id. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351. Garcia conceded that the other four deferral criteria
had been met. Id.
49 Id.
"See id. at 810, 121.L.R.R.M. at 3151-52.
5 ' hi. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
99
 Id. (citing Varied Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 126, 132, 100 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1305 (1979)).
" Id. (citing Ogden & Moffet Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1352, 106 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1984) and
Transport Serv. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 910, 911, 111  L.R.R.M. 1107, 1108 (1982)).
" Id. (citing Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
In Banyard, an employee had been discharged for refusing to drive a truck that was overloaded in
violation of Ohio state law. 505 F.2d at 343, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2002. The court asserted that:
"[riegardless of the purpose of the Ohio statute, it remains axiomatic that it was still the law; for
this or any other company to require its employees to act in violation thereof can never be upheld
by the Board or this court." Id. at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
55 Garcia, 785 F.2d at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352 (citing Banyard, 505 F.2d at 347, 87 L.R.R.M.
at 2004).
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court concluded that the Board had a "longstanding policy" of upholding employee
refusals to violate the law as protected activity. 56
The court rejected the Board's argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in City Disposal Systems required a new policy providing that an employee's activity is not
protected when the employee has a reasonable alternative to refusing to follow an order."
In fact, the court noted, the Supreme Court in City Disposal Systems specifically did not
decide whether the employee's actions in that case were protected." Rather, the Ninth
Circuit observed, City Disposal Systems did suggest in dicta that an employee's activity
might not be protected when he engages in concerted activity in an "abusive manner." 59
The Ninth Circuit found, however, that Garcia did not act in an abusive manner in
refusing to violate the law."
Rather, the court held that the Board distorted the holding of City Disposal Systems
in finding that the existence of a reasonable alternative to Garcia's refusal to obey the
order to tap his horn made his failure to follow the order abusive. 61 The Ninth Circuit
stated that Garcia's refusal was a "natural prelude to" the filing of a grievance.''' Thus,
the court found, Garcia's refusal to follow the order to tap his horn was protected
concerted activity," and the arbitration award which punished him for engaging in this
activity violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 64 The court therefore held that the arbitration
award was repugnant to the Act and that the Board's deferral to the award was inap-
propriate."
In addition to finding that the arbitration award was repugnant to the Act because
it punished Garcia for engaging in protected concerted activity, the court also held that
the award was repugnant to the Act because it was against public policy to punish Garcia
56 Id. at 811, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
• 51 Id,
55 1d. (citing City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 837, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193, 3200 (1984)).
52 Id. (citing City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. at 837, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200). The Supreme Court
in City Disposal Systems cited two cases in support of its suggestion that conduct by an employee
might be so abusive that the employee would lose the protection of § 7. 465 U.S. at 837, 115
L.R.R.M. at 3200 (citing Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729, 731, 74
L.R.R.M. 2855, 2859, 2860 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that "La]n employee may not act with impunity
even though he is engaged in protected activity," but finding that the employees' use of epithets
and accusations at a grievance meeting did not cause them to lose the protection of § 7); Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 181, 103 L.R.R.M. 1154, 1154 (1980) (employee's delay in
completing a freight haul constituted a work slow-down or stoppage expressly prohibited by the
contract)).
Garcia, 785 F.2d at 811, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3353.
61 Id. at 811, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
52 Id. (quoting City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. at 837, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200). The court in Garcia
noted the finding in City Disposal Systems that, although filing a grievance is the "principal tool" for
employee enforcement of rights under their collective bargaining agreement:
there is unlikely to be a bright-line distinction between. an incipient grievance, a
complaint to an employer, and perhaps even an employee's initial refusal to perform
a certain job that he believes he has no duty to perform. It is reasonable to expect
that an employee's first response to a situation that he believes violates his collective-
bargaining agreement will be a protest to his employer.
Id. (quoting City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. at 836, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3199-200).
1 Id,
" Id. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351-52.
55 1d. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
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for refusing to break the law. 66 The court dismissed the Board's assertion that it was not
the purpose of the Act to ensure compliance with traffic laws.° The court emphasized
that the Board should not be allowed to condone violations of the law by deferring to
an arbitration award that disciplined an employee for asserting his contractually-guar-
anteed right not to violate the law. 68 The court held that to require an employee first to
obey an order to break the law and then to file a grievance was not a "responsible course
of action," and thus was repugnant to public policy and to the Act by
The Ninth Circuit in Garcia addressed the issue of when the Board properly can
defer to a prior arbitration award. As an initial matter, the court determined that it
would uphold the Board's decision to defer unless the deferral did not comply with the
Board's own announced standards or "the standards themselves are invalid." 70 The court
then set out the Board's criteria for deferral as announced in Olin. 71 Although appearing
to endorse the Board's standards of deferral to arbitration as announced in Olin, the
Ninth Circuit in fact based its decision in Garcia on finding that the Board did not follow
the standards of Olin when it deferred to an arbitration award which was repugnant to
the Act." The Ninth Circuit thus did not have to decide whether the Olin standards
themselves were invalid and, specifically, whether the Olin Board's shifting of the burden
of showing noncompliance with any of the criteria for deferral to the party arguing
against deferral was proper." Because the court did not need to examine the validity of
Olin's extension of the Board's ability to defer to arbitration awards, the question remains
after Garcia whether the Ninth Circuit would approve the Olin standards if squarely
faced with the issue.
Several commentators have criticized Olin as going too far in the direction of sup-
porting private settlement of labor disputes at the expense of individual employee rights
guaranteed by the Act. 74 These commentators, relying on recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in other areas of the law, assert that prior arbitration does not preclude an indi-
66
 Id. at 811, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3353.
67 Id.
.	 " Id. The court expressly disapproved the subsequent agreement between the Teamsters Union
and UPS that UPS would pay any fines incurred by employees who tapped their horns in compliance
with UPS's attract attention method, finding that this agreement:
serves only to breed or reinforce a cynical view of the operation of the law in this
society — that those with enough sophistication, money, and influence are exempt
from its requirements and may be specially licensed or privileged to ignore and disobey
the law and-that obedience to the law is reserved for the unsophisticated, the poor,
and the powerless.
Id. at 812, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3353. See supra note 27 for a discussion of the resolution of Garcia's
unfair labor practice claim.
69 Garcia, 785 F.2d at 812, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3353.
70 Id. at 809, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3351 (citing Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 1435, 1439, 115
L.R.R.M. 3067, 3069 (9th Gir, 1984)).
71 Id. (citing Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573-74, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057-58 (1984)).
72 ./d. at 810, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
75 See Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
74 See, e.g., Ray, supra note 8, at 23. Henkel & Kelly, supra note 8, at 62. See also Peck, A Proposal
to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355, 381 (1985). But see Briggs, Jr.,
The National Labor Relations Board's Policy of Deferring to Arbitration, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1141, 1169
(1986) (supporting the newly-stabilized NLRB deferral standards as a policy decision favoring
mutually agreed-upon arbitration procedures to protect employee rights under the Act).
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vidual from bringing his or her statutory claim before a court." The commentators
reason that the Board's presumption that the unfair labor practice was resolved in
arbitration results in the Board's abdicating its responsibility to protect individual sta-
tutory rights, 16 Furthermore, at least one federal appellate court has adopted this posi-
tion." Thus, it is possible that, if squarely faced with the issue of the Olin standards'
validity, the Ninth CircUit would not endorse Olin's extension of the Board's ability to
defer to arbitration.
In Garcia v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issues of when an individual
employee's actions are protected concerted activities within the meaning of the Act, and
when the Board's deferral to an arbitration award is inappropriate as repugnant to the
Act. In Garcia, the court held that an employee who had disobeyed an order to tap his
horn in violation of state law rather than obeying the order and filing a grievance had
engaged in concerted activity and had not done so in an abusive manner. The court thus
found that the Board had abused its discretion by deferring to an arbitration award that
punished the employee for engaging in the protected concerted activity. Because the
award violated section 8(a)( I) of the Act and public policy, it was repugnant to the Act
and the Board improperly departed from its own standards, previously set forth in Olin,
by deferring to the award. Although the court found that the Board's deferral in this
case was an abuse of discretion because the Board had not followed its own standards,
the court did not address whether the Olin standards themselves were appropriate.
Because commentators have criticized the Olin standards, and because at least one other
court has found that Olin's standards improperly favor deferral to arbitration, the Ninth
Circuit, when squarely laced with the issue of the standards' validity, may decide that
Olin's deferral standards unfairly deprive individuals of their statutory rights under the
Act.
75 See, e.g., Henkel & Kelly, supra note 8, at 54-60 (describing McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984) (§ 1983 of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII)).
75 See Henkel & Kelly, supra note 8, at 61-62.
77 Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1520, 122 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2087 (11th Cir. 1986), denying
enforcement of Ryder Truck Lines, 273 N.L.R.B. 713, 118 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1985). In Taylor, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the Olin standards, finding that, by presuming the employee's unfair labor
practice claims were resolved by the arbitration proceedings, the Olin standards do not go far
enough in protecting employee rights under the Act. Id. at 1521, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2088-89. The
employee in Taylor was terminated after refusing to drive a tractor assigned to him. Id. at 1517,
122 L.R.R.M. at 2085, The arbitration committee denied Taylor's grievance without discussion, and
Taylor filed charges with the Board. Id. The Board deferred to the arbitration proceeding because
it found that Taylor had failed to meet the Olin burden of showing that the unfair labor practice
was not adequately considered in the arbitration proceeding. Id. at 1518, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2085. The
Eleventh Circuit found invalid the Olin Board's deferral policy because, in presuming that the
unfair labor practice claim was resolved in arbitration, the Board in effect abdicates its responsibility
to protect individual statutory rights under the Act. Id. at 1522, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2089.
The Eleventh Circuit noted Four factors which demonstrate the need for employees to be able
to assert their statutory rights despite prior arbitration proceedings: (1) the arbitrator may not be
competent to resolve complex statutory questions; (2) the arbitrator is authorized only to enforce
the contract, not to enforce the statute; (3) the union processing the employee's grievance may have
interests which differ from those of the employee; and (4) the factfinding in arbitration proceedings
is not the same as that in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1521, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2088 (citing McNair v.
United States Postal Serv., 768 F.2d 730, 736 n.7, 120 L.R.R.M. 2147, 2151 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985)).
For an analysis of the Taylor decision, see Ray, supra note 8, at 2-3.
162	 BOSTON COI I FOE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:67
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. *Texas Mass Picketing Statute Unconstitutionally Overbioad and Vague: Nash v. Texas'
Under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, Congress can "make
no law abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people to peaceably
assemble ...."2 The first amendment applies to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendments The United States Supreme Court, however, has never
interpreted the first amendment to prohibit absolutely governmental bodies from en-
acting laws that interfere with a person's expression. 4 Thus, states have enacted statutes
that regulate expression on the basis of its content,5 as well as statutes that focus on time,
place and manner restrictions of expression, regardless of their content. 6 Statutes that
affect free expression rights are frequently challenged as being unconstitutionally ov-
erbroad or vague, even where they are not content based.? A statute is overbroad when
it is capable of being used to penalize persons who have engaged in constitutionally
protected expression. 8 A statute is vague when it fails to provide adequate notice of what
speech is prohibited, or when it fails to provide specific guidelines for its application,
thereby allowing arbitrary enforcement. 9 The concern with overbroad and vague statutes
stems from the possibility that their application might deter individuals from engaging
in constitutionally protected speech. 10
The right of freedom of expression is often related to the right to assemble and
demonstrate" — a right of extreme importance to labor unions. 12 Consequently, labor
unions frequently challenge the constitutionality of governmental regulation of picket-
ing. 13 In 1940, in Thornhill v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that
* Royal C. Gardner III, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
632 F. Supp. 951, 121 L.R.R.M. 3140 (1986).
2 U.S. CoNs-r. amend. I.
3 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" — such as obscenity, profanity, libels and
fighting words — may be proscribed without violating the first amendment).
See, e.g., F,C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding F.C.C.'s authority to prohibit
offensive speech on the radio waves); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (obscenity
not protected expression).
6 See, e.g„ Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564, 566 (1965) (upholding constitutionality of statute
prohibiting picketing near a courthouse); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding
constitutionality of ordinance that prohibited sound trucks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
576 (1991) (stating that municipality may control parades using public streets through reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions).
7 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the Court upheld an anti-noise
ordinance against overbreadth and vagueness challenges. Id, at 114-15.
Id. at 114.
9 1d. at 108-09.
10 Id. at 114.
11 See generally Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussion
of rights of peaceful assembly and petition).
14 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05, 6 L.R.R.M. 697, 704 (1940) (discussing employ-
ees' need to enlighten public on nature of labor dispute).
13 See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 218, 110
L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003 (1982) (longshoremen boycott of Russian goods found to be an illegal sec-
ondary boycott); Teamster, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 40 L.R.R.M. 2208 (1957) (state
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peaceful picketing during a labor dispute fell under the protection of the first amend-
ment." The Court soon retreated, however, from its broad pronouncement in Thornhill,
later holding that the government could regulate peaceful labor picketing. 15 Because
labor picketing involved more coercion and little communication, the Court reasoned,
the first amendment did not fully protect the union's activity." Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has upheld state regulations that prohibit secondary labor boycotts," rec-
ognition picketing,'H and picketing that seeks to coerce a self-employed individual to join
a union." At the same time that the Court withdrew full first amendment protection
from labor picketing, Congress, through the National Labor Relations Act, prohibited
secondary boycotts, work-assignment strikes and some recognition picketing as unfair
labor practices." The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions of the Act in the face
of constitutional challenges." Thus, both the Court and the Congress implicitly have
relegated peaceful labor picketing "to the status of an economic activity subject to
extensive regulation" 22 with diminished first amendment protections.
may restrain labor picketing that seeks to induce employees to join union); Building Serv. Employees
Intl Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam 339 U.S. 532, 540-41, 26 L.R.R.M. 2068, 2071 (1950) (state may
enjoin labor union from peaceful picketing intended to compel an employer to sign a contract
which would coerce his employees to choose a particular bargaining representative); Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 471, 481, 26 L.R.R.M. 2076, 2076, 2080 (1950) (state may enjoin labor union
from peaceful picketing intended to compel self-employer to join the union); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 102, 6 L.R.R.M. 697, 703 (1940) (labor picketing protected by the first amendment).
" 310 U.S. 88, 102, 6 L.R.R.M. 697, 703 (1940). The statute in Thornhill prohibited any person,
without legal excuse, to picket a place of business for the purpose of interfering with that business.
Id. at 91-92, 6 L.R.R.M. at 698, Reasoning that the picketer was communicating the facts involved
in a matter of public interest, id. at 101-03,6 L.R.R.M. at 703, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 105, 6 L.R.R.M. at 704. The companion case to Thornhill, Carlson
v. California, also stated that labor picketing was entitled to first amendment protection. Carlson,
310 U.S. 106, 113, 6 L.R.R.M. 705, 707 (1940).
15 See Vogt, '354 U.S. at 289, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2210; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 501, 23 L.R.R.M. 2505, 2509 (1949). See also R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
211-13 (1976) (discussing labor unions' right to picket).
16 See, e.g., International Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 226, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2006; Vogl, 354 U.S. at
289, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2210; Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776, 10 L.R.R.M.
507, 511 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 See International Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 226, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 533, 541, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2068, 2071.
Hanke, 339 U.S. at 471, 481, 26 L.R.R.M. at 2076, 2080.
20 R. GORMAN, supra note 15, at 213. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1982).
21 See International Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 226, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2006 (stating that the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected the claim that section 8(b)(4) prohibition on secondary picketing by
labor unions violates the first amendment),
n Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech,
91 YALE L.J. 938, 938 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Labor Picketing].
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., however, the Supreme Court distinguished between
labor and non-labor picketing. 458 U.S. 886, 912-13 (1982). In Claiborne, a civil rights group
picketed in support of a boycott of white merchants' businesses. Id. at 909. The boycott's purpose
was to encourage civil and business leaders to take measures to eradicate racial injustices. Id. at 889.
The Supreme Court afforded the non-labor picketing full first amendment protection and held
that it was subject only to reasonable content-neutral regulations. See id. at 912-13. The Claiborne
Court noted, however, that this case did not involve labor picketing, which could be prohibited. Id.
The Court distinguished Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 26 L.R.R.M. 2072 (1950),
which upheld an injunction against picketing to coerce an employer to hire employees, illegally, on
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During the Survey year, in Nash v. Texas, a federal district court in the Eastern District
of Texas declared that the Texas mass picketing statute" was unconstitutionally over-
broad and vague. 24 Specifically, the court struck down a time, place and manner restric-
tion that regulated how many labor picketers could congregate near the entrance of the
place being picketed, and how far apart the picketers were required to remain from
each other ("section one"). 25 The court also struck down a content based regulation that
proscribed the use of intimidating, threatening or obscene words intended to interfere
with any employee's lawful right to work ("section two")."
In holding sections one and two of the Texas mass picketing statute unconstitutional,
the Nash court produced a lengthy opinion which, at first glance, vindicates the free
speech rights of labor unions. The Nash decision is less significant than it first may
appear, however.27 For the court, applying the principle that federal courts lack the
jurisdiction to interpret authoritatively state statutes," found the Texas statute uncon-
stitutional as written 49 Had a Texas state court previously interpreted and narrowed the
statute, that statute might have been held constitutional." Consequently, the validity of
a similar mass picketing statute might be upheld if a state court definitively interprets
and narrows its provisions to give it constitutionally acceptable effect.
In Nash, Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc., a company based in Tyler, Texas, began
bargaining in September 1978 with the plant's recently certified union, Local 746 of the
United Rubber Workers." On February 8, 1979, as a result of the failed negotiations,
the union organized a strike which included establishing picket lines at the plant's
entrance." Company security guards made violent threats and crude remarks to female
picketers." In response, a large number of union members from the Kelly-Springfield
Tire Company's plant in Tyler joined the picketing at the Schoellkopf plant on March
the basis of race, by stating that "we [are notl presented with a boycott designed to secure aims that
are themselves prohibited by a valid state law." Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915 n.99.
" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d (Vernon 1971). For the text of the statute, see infra
notes 25-26.
24 632 F. Supp. 951, 981, 121 L.R.R.M. 3140, 3160 (1986).
25 N. at 968-72, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3150-54. Section one proscribes "more than two (2) pickets
at any time within either fifty (50) feet of any entrance to the premises being picketed, or within
fifty (50) feet of any other picket or pickets." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d § 1 (1) (Vernon
1971).
26 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 972-79, 121 .L.R.R.M. at 3154-59. Section two prohibits
any person, singly or in concert with others, by use of insulting, threatening or obscene
language, to interfere with, hinder, obstruct, or intimidate, or seek to interfere with,
hinder, obstruct, or intimidate, another in the exercise of his lawful right to work, or
to enter upon the performance of any lawful vocation, or from freely entering or
leaving any premises.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d § 2 (Vernon 1971).
27 See infra text accompanying notes 104-20.
" Nash, 632 F.Supp. at 964, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520
(1972)). "A federal court can only construe a federal statute so as to save it from constitutional
infirmity." Id. at 964 n.18, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147 n.18 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
769 n.24 (1982)) (emphasis by the court).
"Id. at 980-81, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 104-20 for an analysis of the opinion.
" Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 957, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3141.
"Id. at 957, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3141-42.
" Id. at 957, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
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12.34 The picketers taunted and threatened the non-striking employees who returned
the jeers and threats." A few picketers broke off antennas from cars owned by non-
striking employees." In addition, the president of Local 746, John Nash, appeared in
the picket line with a shotgun, for which he was arrested." These incidents, however,
were the only significant threats of violence throughout the entire strike,"
On March 14, company officials sought and obtained a temporary restraining order
enjoining the union's picketing activities." In accordance with the Texas mass picketing
statute," the Tyler police department marked off an area fifty feet from each of the
plant's entrances, allowing two picketers to stay within the boundaries.'" The police
required other picketers and their sympathizers to remain behind the markers.'" Within
two weeks thereafter, the police made ninety arrests for alleged violations of the Texas
mass picketing statute."
The police arrested picketers for violating three provisions of the statute. 44 First,
under section one's time, place, and manner regulation, police arrested anyone who
approached the two picketers within the fifty foot markers, even if that person only
intended to relieve the picket on duty. 43 Second, police arrested any picketer who caused
a vehicle driven on the plant's access road to stop, even momentarily, for violation of
section one. 4° Finally, under section two's content regulation, police arrested any striker
who shouted profanities or who called non-striking employees "scabs."47 The Tyler police
made no arrests, however, for violent threats or actions. 48
On March 21, 1979, the union amended a pending complaint to aver that the
company, its officers and officials of the City of Tyler impinged upon the strikers' first
amendment rights through enforcement of the Texas mass picketing statute. 49 A federal
district court granted the union's request for a preliminary injunction enjoining Tyler
officials and police from arresting picketers who approached the picket line to relieve
picketers on duty, picketers who momentarily halted traffic on the plant roads, and
picketers who shouted "scab" at non-strikers." The City of Tyler appealed the prelimi-
34 Id,
35 Id.
3° Id.
37 Id. at 957-58, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
" Id. at 958, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3142.
59 Id.
40 The company held a meeting with city officials and the Chief of Police to ensure that the
police would enforce the Texas mass picketing statute at the plant. Id. at 958, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3143.
At the meeting, company representatives made copies of the statute available to city officials. Id.
Id. at 959, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3143.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. The court noted that when the union's attorneys crossed the boundary to speak with the
sole picket on duty, the police arrested the two attorneys. Id. at 959, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3143-44. Out
of the ninety arrests, only the union's attorneys were placed in handcuffs. Id. at 959, 121 L.R.R.M.
at 3144.
" Id. at 959, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3143. The constitutionality of paragraph two of section one was
not challenged. Id. at 961, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3144-45.
47 Id. at 959, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3143.
46 Id .
" Id. at 960, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3144.
5D Id.
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nary injunction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 ' On May 30, 1980, the Fifth
Circuit dismissed the appeal of •the preliminary injunction as moot because the strike
had ended and because the union had been decertified as the Schoellkopf employees'
collective bargaining agent.52 By subsequent order, however, the union's complaint at-
tacking the constitutionality of sections one and two of the Texas mass picketing statute
survived."
At trial on the merits, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas
concluded that the issue was not moot." The court then examined Texas state courts'
construction of the mass picketing statute, particularly sections one and two." The court
noted the principle that federal courts lack the jurisdiction to construe state legislation
authoritatively." Accordingly, the court stated, if state courts have not definitively inter-
preted a state statute, a federal court may consider only its literal terms in evaluating
the statute's constitutionality.''' The Nash court found that state court decisions did not
provide conclusive constructions of sections one and two." Therefore, in analyzing the
constitutionality of the statute, the court stated, it would consider only the literal terms
of the statute." •
The court began its analysis by stating that a statute is unconstitutionally broad if it
substantially interferes with expression protected by the first amendment. 6° A statute
need not be unconstitutional in every application, the court pointed out; rather, it could
be impermissibly overbroad merely because of its potential to infringe unconstitutionally
upon protected expression. 61 Accordingly, the court examined the manner in which the
Texas mass picketing statute might be applied." The court concluded that the mass
picketing statute applied not only to labor disputes, but to all forms of picketing."
51 Id. at 960, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3144.
52 Id. at 960-61, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3144.
" Id. at 961, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3144-45. The court stated that .
(1) leave was granted to the striking employees to intervene individually; (2) ... the
Attorney General of Texas was notified that the constitutionality of Article 5154d had
been challenged; (3) leave was granted to the State of Texas to intervene; (4) plaintiffs'
claim for injunctive relief was dismissed; (5) plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment
concerning the constitutionality of § I, paragraph 2, of Article 5154d was dismissed;
(6) the claims against all private parties-defendants were dismissed; (7) the claims for
damages of two named plaintiffs were severed in conformity with FED. It Civ. P. 21
[the action was later dismissed]; and (8) all other damage claims were dismissed.
Id.
" Id, at 964, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147. The court stated that mootness "becomes an issue when
the actions which provoked the suit have ended or been settled." Id. at 961, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3145.
An exception to the mootness doctrine, the court noted, exists when "the conduct is capable of
repetition, yet evades review." Id. Additionally, the court stated that the United States Supreme
Court had "explicitly recognized that when declaratory relief is sought, mootness should not
preclude review of a statute that will be enforced in the future against the complainants." Id. at
963-64, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147 (citing Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 121-22
(1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-73 (1974)).
55 Id. at 964-67, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147-49.
56 Id. at 964 & n.18, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147 & n.18.
57 Id. at 966, 967, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3148-49.
55 Id. at 964-67, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3147-49.
55 1d. at 966, 967, 121 L.R.R,M. at 3148-49.
65 Id. at 967, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3149.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 967-68, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3149-50.
55 Id. at 967, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3150. See supra note 22 for a brief discussion of the Supreme
Court's treatment of non-labor picketing.
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The court interpreted section one of the statute, which made it illegal for "'more
than two (2) pickets at any time'' to be "'within either fifty (50) feet of any entrance to
the premises being picketed, or within fifty (50) feet of any other picket or pickets,'" 64
as a time, place and manner regulation of speech." A time, place and manner restriction,
said the court, must not be so sweeping as to interfere with protected speech." The
court stated that the provision, as written, broadly prohibits "more than two persons
from standing, fifty feet apart, near a building entrance."67 Because there was no re-
quirement that the picketers physically block the entrance and because there was no
threshold number of picketers that was required to trigger the provision, the court
found that the numbers-distance provision "'denie[d] demonstrators many meaningful
methods of expression — and thus interfered with protected speech." Accordingly, the
court invalidated section one as unconstitutionally overbroad. 69
The court determined that section two, which proscribed the use of insulting,
threatening or obscene language to interfere with another's right to work, was a content
based regulation of speech." Accordingly, the court stated, section two would be consti-
tutional only if it was narrowly drawn to proscribe only unprotected speech, 7 ' such as
"fighting words," which by their mere utterance tend to provoke violent behavior.72
Thus, in analyzing the constitutionality of section two, the court examined whether the
action prohibited only fighting words. 73
Section two was overbroad, the Nash court concluded, because it was capable of
being applied to protected speech. 74 Rejecting the state's assertion that section two only
punished "words coupled with conduct,"" the court stated that the section could be
violated "based on pure speech." 76 The court found that section two was aimed not only
at unprotected words that caused imminent violence, but also targeted protected words
that merely interfered with or intimidated others. 77
To buttress its conclusion that section two was not sufficiently narrow, the Nash court
further explored the potential applications of the intimidating language provision."
Using dictionary definitions," the court determined the meaning of "insulting, threat-
ening or obscene language." 8° The court noted that some insults, words which belittle
64 Id, at 968, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3150 (quoting Tex. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d § I, paragraph
1 (Vernon 1971)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 971, 121 L.R.R.M, at 3152.
67 Id.
55 Id. (quoting Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1968)).
69 /d. at 971, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3153.
76 Id. at 973, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
71 Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1970)).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 973-76, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3154-57,
74 See id. at 974, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155.	 1
75 Id. at 973, 121 L.R.R.M, at 3154.
76 Id. "[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968).
77 MIA, 632 F.Supp. at 974, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
78 Id. at 976-79, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157-59.
79 The court used Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (17th ed. 1969). See Nash, 632 F.Supp.
at 977 n.42, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157 n.42.
86 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 976-79, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157-59.
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others," like "scab" or "fink", could be fighting words in some situations." The court
observed, however, that many other demeaning words that might be used at a picket
line, such as "clown," "goon" or "turncoat," are not ordinarily fighting words becatise
they do not tend to incite acts of violence." The court concluded that section two's
proscription of "insulting" words would make punishable constitutionally protected
speech, thus rendering that provision overbroad and therefore invalid."
Similarly, the court found that "threatening" words cover a broad range of expres-
sion that is likely to be used at a picket line. 85 As an example, the court stated that a
picketer's shout of "'You'll live to regret going to work for that company" to a non-
striking employee could either be a warning of dire consequences or a mere prediction
of future remorse. 86 The key element as to whether "threatening" words are fighting
words, the court reasoned, is the intent of the speaker." Because the statute lacks a
requirement of the picketer's willfulness to carry out the proposed threat, the court
concluded, section two's punishment of "threatening" words was overbroad."
The court noted that section two's restriction on obscene words probably referred
to profanity." The court also found that "obscene" words covered a broad range of
strong language that is likely to be used at a picket line.9° Reasoning that the lack of
guidelines as to what constitutes "obscene" speech allows too much discretion in the
enforcement of the statute, the court concluded that this provision was overbroad as
well. 5 '
Finally, the court also questioned whether the state could prohibit as fighting words
language intended to "interfere with," "hinder," "obstruct" or "intimidate." 82 Noting that
state courts had not definitively interpreted this section two provision to mean language
coupled with conduct, the court found that section two's plain meaning applied only to
language that obstructs." The court found it difficult to conceive of a situation where
words alone could block a person from entering a work site. 94 Noting the similarity
between section two's prohibition of language that obstructs and an Ohio statute that
prohibited annoying conduct, previously held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court," the court held that this provision was overbroad. 5° Consequently, the
61 Id. at 977, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157.
AP ,rd.
" Id.
84
 Id.
95 Id,
"Id. at 977 n.46, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157 n.46.
" Id. at 977-78, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3157-58. The Nash court noted that the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in CISPES v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1985), upheld the constitutionality of a
federal statute that punished any person who "'willfully ... intimidates, coerces, threatens, or
harasses a foreign official.'" Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 975, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3156 (quoting CISPES, 770
F.2d at 470-71). The Nash court distinguished the federal statute from the Texas statute on the
basis of the former's specific intent requirement. Id. at 976, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3156-57.
Id.
49 1d. at 978 & n.48, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158 & n.48.
" Id. at .978, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158.
92 Id. at 978, 979, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158, 3159.
"Id. at 978-79, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158-59.
85 1d. at 978-79, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158.
94 /d. at 979, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158.
95 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
96 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 979, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3158-59. Quoting the recent United States
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court held that section two was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibited more
than unprotected fighting words. 97 Indeed, the court noted that police arrested picketers
at the Schoellkopf plant for merely attempting to persuade non-striking employees not
to cross the picket line."
In addition to holding section two overbroad, the Nash court also found section two
to be fatally vague. 99 The court stated that a vague statute is one that does not provide
persons fair notice of what conduct is illegal or that lacks explicit standards that limit
law enforcement officials' discretion. 09 The court concluded that under the Texas statute
"'persons of common intelligence — could not determine with sufficient clarity what
speech is "insulting," "threatening" or "obscene."L 01 Moreover, the court noted that in
its present form, section two gave police discretion to arrest union members who merely
shouted "fink" or "strikebreaker" to non-striking employees.m Accordingly, the court
invalidated section two as too vague to withstand constitutional scrutiny.'"
In striking down sections one and two of the Texas mass picketing statute, the Nash
court produced a lengthy opinion which, at first glance, vindicates the free speech rights
of labor unions. Although the United States Supreme Court has diminished the first
amendment protection of labor picketers over the past few decades,'" the specific
holding of Thornhill that states may not enact blanket prohibitions against picketing
remains good law.'"Nash reaffirms Thornhill by holding that blanket prohibitions against
picketing violate the first amendment's free expression guarantees. Yet Nash probably
will have only a minimal impact om first amendment challenges to picketing regulations
because in its analysis, the Nash court, without conclusive interpretations of sections one
and two by Texas state courts, could consider only the literal terms of these provisions.'"
Indeed, the State of Texas conceded that without a narrowing state court construction
of section one, the statute was overbroad and thus unconstitutional.' 97 Consequently, a
similar mass picketing statute may be held valid if a state court definitively interprets
and sufficiently narrows its provisions before a federal court considers the statute's
constitutionality.
Section one was overbroad, in part, because it applied to all forms of picketing,'"
thereby enabling the court to use traditional first amendment analysis. 199 The court may
Supreme Court decision of N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S..886, 910 (1982), the court
stated that "'[s]peech does not lose its protected character, simply because it may embarrass others
or coerce them into action.'" Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 974, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155.
97 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 974, 981, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155, 3160.
9" Id at 974, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155.
99 Id. at 981, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
at 979 & n.57, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3159 & n.57 (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-09 (1972)).
1ui Id. at 980, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
LOS Id. at 980, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3159-60.
'" Id, at 981, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
194 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's
treatment of first amendment challenges to labor regulations.
j°5 Teamster, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294-95, 40 L.R.R.M. 2208, 2212 (1957).
1 °6 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of why the district
court felt bound to interpret the statute literally.
107 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 966 n.22, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3149 n,22.
wa Id. at 967, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3150.
1 °9 See supra note 22 for a brief description of N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982) (non-labor picketing afforded full first amendment protection).
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have reached a different result if the Texas courts had interpreted the Texas mass
picketing statute as applying only to labor disputes. The Nash court erroneously sug-
gested, however, that the statute, if applied only to labor related grievances, would be
"patently unconstitutional" because it would discriminate among pickets based on the
content of their speech." A statute which regulates only labor related pickets, while
exempting non-labor related pickets, is not necessarily unconstitutional."' Because the
Supreme Court has recognized that labor picketing involves more than the mere com-
munication of ideas, 119 labor picketing has less first amendment protection than other
forms of picketing." 3 Accordingly, under the Supreme Court's reasoning, a statute may
permissibly regulate only labor pickets.
The Nash court found section two overbroad, in part, because it prohibited speech
that, although embarrassing or coercive, did not necessarily provoke violence.'" To
support this conclusion, the court adopted the United States Supreme Court's position
that speech does not lose its protected character simply because it coerces others into
action. 15 The Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished, however, between labor and
non-labor, political picketing" and has recognized "the strong governmental interest in
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulations may have an inci-
dental effect on rights of speech and association."" 7 Specifically, labor picketing may be
prohibited, the Supreme Court has stated, as part of a state's "'striking of the delicate
balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
strife. — " 8 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that labor picketing is not afforded full
first amendment protection because of its coercive nature." 9
Perhaps the Nash court ignored the Supreme Court's statements because the Texas
statute applied to all forms of picketing, not just labor picketing. Consequently, if the
intimidating language provision of section two applied only to labor unions, the provision
would not necessarily be unconstitutional.'" Thus, if a state court had interpreted the
Texas statute as applying only to labor unions, the Nash court could have upheld section
two as constitutional.
In sum, in Nash v. Texas, a federal district court examined the constitutionality of
the Texas mass picketing statute. Because no Texas state court had definitively inter-
10 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 968, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3150. The court misread Police Dept. v. Mosley,
which invalidated a regulation that prohibited all non-labor related pickets. 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972).
The Supreme Court has declared that non-labor pickets are entitled to greater first amendment
protection than are labor pickets. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 912-13.
"I See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C• § 8(b)(4) (1982).
"2 See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
" 4 Nash, 632 F. Supp. at 973-74, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155.
" 3 Id. at 974, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3155 (quoting Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 910).
11 ° Claiborne involved a secondary boycott organized by a civil rights group and, therefore, dealt
with political, not labor, picketing. Id. at 913. For a discussion which criticizes this distinction, see
generally Note, Labor Picketing, supra note 22.
1L7 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 910.
Id, at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring)).
119 See International Longshoremen's Assn v. Allied Intl, Inc:, 456 U.S. 212, 226, 110 L.R.R.M.
2001, 2006 (1982).
1 " See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii).
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preted the statute, the Nash court could examine only the statute's literal terms. As
written, the Texas mass picketing statute applied to all forms of picketing, both labor
and non-labor, and the Nash court therefore held that both sections one and two were
overbroad and section two was also vague. The decision in Nash, however, will have only
a minimal impact on first amendment challenges to picketing regulations. Had a Texas
state court previously interpreted and narrowed the statute so that it applied only to
labor picketing, the statute may have been constitutional. Consequently, the validity of
a similar mass picketing statute might be upheld if a state court definitively interprets
and sufficiently narrows its provisions.
VI. PREEMPTION
A. *Federal Court Jurisdiction over LMRA Section 301 Cases Involving the Horseracing
Industry: Richards v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers'
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) gives federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear private suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements
that involve employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, notwithstanding
the amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship. 2 The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), in contrast, empowers the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to prevent
unfair labor practices listed in section 8 of the NLRA that affect interstate commerce.'
Because a labor dispute may give rise to both an unfair labor practice and a violation of
contract, the NLRB and the federal courts may each have jurisdiction over different
causes of action arising from a single labor dispute. 4
* By James P. Hawkins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
790 F.2d 633, 122 L.R.R.M. 2380 (7th Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1982). Section 301(a) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
5 NLRA 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). Section 10(a) reads, in relevant part: "The Board is
empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . affecting commerce." Id. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), proscribes certain employer
and union activities as unfair labor practices.
4 See Pari Mutuel Clerks Union v. Fair Grounds Corp., 703 F.2d 913, 918, 113 L.R.R.M. 2201,
2204-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846, 114 L.R.R.M. 2568 (1983). 11 the trade involved is
essentially local, however, the state's labor law controls. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982). For example,
the Board historically has refrained from exercising jurisdiction over industries such as horse and
dog racing, see, e.g., American Totalisator Co.', 243 N.L.R.B. 314, 101 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1979) (hor-
seracing operator, manufacturer of pari-mutuel betting equipment for the horseracing and dog
racing industries, and the union all sought reversal of Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over the
industries); Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R.B. 744, 51 L.R.R.M. 1375 (1962) (horseowners/breeders);
Los Angeles Turf' Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 20, 26 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1950) (horseracing track), non-
profit institutions for emotionally disturbed children, see, e.g., NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home,
576 F.2d 256, 258 n.1, 98 L.R.R.M. 3003, 3004 n.I (9th Cir. 1978); and hotels and motels, see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538, 541, 77 L.R.R.M. 2866, 2867-68 (5th Cir. 1971), because
of extensive state regulation and local concern of such businesses.
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To conserve the Board's limited resources, section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA, however,
allows the Board the discretion to decline jurisdiction over certain labor disputes.'
Specifically, the Board may decline jurisdiction where, in its opinion, the dispute's effect
on interstate commerce is not substantial enough to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. 8
Where the Board declines jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may seek relief for unfair
labor practices under the state's applicable labor law. 7
Federal courts disagree over how the Board's decision to decline jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice claims affects federal jurisdiction over labor disputes under the
LMRA. Some courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction in LMRA section 301 claims arising
out of a labor dispute in an industry over which the Board has refused to exercise
jurisdiction. 8 Courts denying jurisdiction reason that given the lack of substantial effect
on interstate commerce, the labor dispute would be resolved best in state courts. 9 Other
courts, in contrast, hold that as long as the federal court determines that the labor
dispute affects interstate commerce, the Board's refusal to exercise discretionary juris-
diction does not affect the independent jurisdiction of the federal courts.'° Courts
retaining jurisdiction reason that the Board enjoys the discretion to refuse cases not
significantly affecting interstate commerce, which discretion is not given to the federal
courts under section 301." Thus, a conflict exists over whether federal courts may refuse
to entertain LM RA section 301 claims where the NLRB has declined jurisdiction in an
unfair labor practice claim arising from the same labor dispute. 12
s29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1982). Section 14(c)(1) reads, in pertinent part: "The Board, in its
discretion, may . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category
of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is
not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction ...."
6 Id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982). Section 14(c)(2) reads, in pertinent part: "Nothing in this
subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory
... from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines,
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction." See supra note 5 for the relevant
text of § 14(c)(1).
8 See San Juan Racing Ass'n Inc. v. Labor Relations Bd. of Puerto Rico, 532 F. Supp. 51, 55,
96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1114,155, 24,016 (D.P.R. 1982) (reasoning that the Board is the best judge of
"whether the asserting of jurisdiction over the racing industry would further the objectives of the
Act"); Independent Ass'n of Pari-Mutuel Employees v. Gulfstream Racing Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 855,
856-67, 92 L.R.R.M. 2680, 2680-81 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (deferring to Board's general expertise,
agreeing that horseracing industry is essentially a local concern, and declining to reconsider the
same factors prompting the Board's decision).
g San Juan, 532 F. Supp. at 54, 96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 24,016; Gulfstream, 407 F. Supp. at 857,
92 L.R.R.M. at 2681.
Pari Mutuel Clerks Union v. Fair Grounds Corp., 703 F.2d 913, 918, 113 L.R.R.M. 2201,
2205 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1501 v. American Totalisator,
529 F. Supp. 419, 421, 109 L.R.R.M. 2585, 2587 (D. Md. 1982)), cm. denied, 464 U.S. 846, 114
L.R.R.M. 2568 (1983). The Fifth Circuit adopted the American Totalisator court's reasoning that the
two mechanisms which the LMRA has established to promote industrial stability and peaceful
resolution of labor disputes — private enforcement of labor contracts under § 301 and the Board's
sanction of unfair labor practices — are neither mutually exclusive nor subject to the same juris-
dictional limitations in their respective forum). Id.
" Fair Grounds, 703 F.2d at 918, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2205; American Totalisator, 529 F. Supp. at
421-22, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2587.
In some of these hybrid § 301/unfair labor practice cases, the Board previously had denied
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During the Survey year, in Richards v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,' 3 the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
improperly declined jurisdiction over a section 301(a) suit alleging that the employer
violated the labor contract and the union breached its duty of fair representation,
notwithstanding the Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice
claims arising from the dispute." The Richards court specifically agreed with courts that
hold that federal court jurisdiction to hear LMRA section 301 claims is independent of
the NLRB's discretionary jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice claims." Thus, the
Richards court made clear that where the statutory requirements of section 301(a) are
met, the district courts must hear contract disputes involving an industry that, in the
court's opinion, affects interstate commerce, even if the Board has declined to assert
jurisdiction over the industry."
In Richards, Arlington Park Race Track dismissed from employment Nicholas Rich-
ards, a pari-mutuel clerk and a member of Local 134 of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (IBEW), for insubordination.'? Richards filed a grievance under
the grievance procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement between
Arlington Park and Local 134, alleging that he had been improperly discharged." The
grievance mechanism did not produce a final settlement of Richards' claim.'9 Richards
elected not to pursue the internal appeal procedures provided in the union constitution. 29
Approximately six months after Richards filed his grievance, he brought an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that Local
134 and Arlington Park violated section 301(a) of the NLRA. 2 ' Richards claimed that
Arlington Park violated the collective bargaining agreement by firing him without just
cause, and that Local 134 breached its duty to represent him by conspiring with the
employer "to make a sham of the grievance procedure in allowing his dismissal to
stand."22
The defendants sought dismissal of Richards' section 301(a) action for failure to
state a claim.23 The employer and union contended that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under section 301(a). 24 Because horseracing is not an industry affecting
jurisdiction to the party seeking judicial resolution of the dispute on the unfair labor practice
charge, while in others the plaintiff brought the initial action in federal district court.
/3 790 F.2d 633, 122 L.R.R.M. 2380 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Id. at 634-35, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2381.
15 Id. at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2382-83.
1 ° Id. at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383.
" Id. at 634, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2381.
IN Richards v. Local 134, Ina Bhd. of Elec. Workers, No. 85—C71 1, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
1985).
19 /d.
2" Id.
21 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). The decisions make no reference to Richards having applied to
the Board for unfair labor practice relief prior to filing his section 301 claim.
22 Richards, No. 85—C71 I, slip op. at 8.
23 Id. at 3.
24 Id. The defendants also sought dismissal for failure to state a claim on two other grounds.
The first ground was that the six-month statute of limitations provided under NLRA § 10(b), 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), barred Richards' suit. Richards, No. 85—C711, slip op. at 6. Secondly, the
defendants asserted that the plaintiff's failure to plead that he had exhausted the available intra-
union remedies before instituting the § 301 suit barred the claim. Id. at 8.
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commerce, the defendants claimed, the Board consistently has refused to assert juris-
diction over that industry.25 Thus, the defendants asserted, the court should defer to
the NLRB's expertise and decline subject matter jurisdiction."
The district court, agreeing with the defendants, held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the employee's section 301 claims." The district court reasoned that
horseracing is a matter of particularly local concern and did not "affect commerce." 29
Deferring to the Board's expertise, the district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the
district courts must hear labor contract suits that satisfy the section 301 statutory re-
quirements, notwithstanding the NLRB's refusal to entertain jurisdiction." While intense
" Richards, No, 85—C711, slip op. at 3-4. See cases cited supra note 4.
28 Richards, No. 85—C711, slip op. at 3.
21 Id. at 6.
' 8 Id.
" In deferring to the Board's determination that the horseracing industry's effect on interstate
commerce is insufficient to warrant exercise of the Board's jurisdiction, the court noted two justi-
fications for the Board's position. Id. at 4. First, the Board has characterized horseracing operations
as local in character, and therefore unlikely to disrupt interstate commerce in the event of a labor
dispute. Id. See Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.I3, 20, 26 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1950). Second,
section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA allows the state to assume jurisdiction in the event that the Board
declines to do so. Id. See supra note 7. See also NLRB v. National Survey Serv., Inc., 361 F.2d 199,
61 L.R.R.M. 2712 (7th Cir. 1966) (small company deriving most of its revenues from intrastate
business unsuccessfully challenged Board's jurisdiction to certify results of representation election).
Therefore, the court held that the Board's position does not leave the horseracing industry unre-
gulated. Richards, No. 85—C711, slip op. at 4.
At trial below, the district court in Richards did not distinguish the Fair Grounds holding, but
characterized it as an anomaly "directly contradicting the wide body of law which defers to the
NLRB's discretion and expertise to determine the industries over which it exercises or declines
jurisdiction." Richards, No. 85—C711, slip op. at 6. Stating that no other court had followed or
adopted the Fifth Circuit approach, the Richards court dismissed the § 301 action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
Moreover, the court also sustained the six-month statute of limitations and Richards' failure to
exhaust intraunion remedies as grounds for dismissal. Id. at 6-8. The Supreme Court has developed
a policy that an employee must exhaust his remedies under the collective bargaining agreement
before he can pursue judicial action. See, e.g., Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965)(discharged employee filed breach of contract suit against employer instead of pursuing
collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration mechanism). The court cited the well-
settled, court-developed rule that the employee must exhaust all unquestionably adequate and
mandatory internal remedies. Richards, No. 85-0711, slip op. at 8 (citing Baldani v. Local 1095,
581 F.2d 145, 99 L.R.R.M. 2535 (7th Cir. 1978); Harrison v, Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 95
L.R.R.M. 2953 (7th Cir. 1977); Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 86 L.R.R.M. 2468 (7th
Cir. 1974); Orphan v. Furnco Instruction Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 81 L.R.R.M. 2058 (7th Cir. 1972)).
The court determined that Richards' failure to plead any facts which suggested an attempt to utilize
the union constitution's mandatory internal appeal procedures, or which supported his assertion
that the grievance process was merely a sham, was fatal to his claim. Id.
" Richards, 790 F.2d at 634-36, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2381-82. The circuit court reversed the lower
court on the jurisdiction and statute of limitations issues, and remanded the case for further findings
on the internal remedy question. Id. at 635, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2381. On the statute of limitations
question, the circuit court agreed with the district court that six months was the applicable period,
but found that the lower court had erred in determining when a combination § 301/fair represen-
tation cause of action accrues. Id. at 636-37, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383. Both courts looked to DelCostello
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983), as the controlling law
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state regulation, a concern for allocation of resources, and a critical backlog of cases may
on the question. In DelCostello, the Court addressed the accrual of a combination § 301/fair repre-
sentation claim arising out of an employee's discharge and grievance hearing. Id. See infra this note
for a discussion of the DelCostello facts, The appellate court determined that the claim accrues from
the time the grievance mechanism renders a final decision on the employee's grievance, Richards,
790 F.2d at 636-37, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383 (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 113 L.R.R.M. at
2745), or when a reasonably diligent employee should realize that no further action would be
forthcoming on his grievance, whichever is earlier. Id. (citing Metz v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 715
F.2d 299, 304, 114 L.R.R.M. 2340, 2344 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070, 115 L.R.R.M.
2360 (1984)). In this case, Richards filed hiS grievance on August 5, 1984, the day he received
written notice of his termination. Id. at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383. He filed the § 301 claim on
January 29, 1985. Id. Accordingly, the court found, the earliest time that Richards' claim could
have accrued was the grievance filing date, thus bringing the complaint filing within the six-month
limitation period. Id.
The Seventh Circuit made clear that where a § 301 claim alleges collusion by the employer and
union during the grievance procedure, the claim cannot accrue until the allegedly violative conduct
has taken place. See id. at 636-37, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383. Even where the alleged wrongful discharge
is the basis for a § 301 breach of contract suit, the employee is not aware that he or she requires
judicial remedies until the contract grievance procedure has proven unsatisfactory. To start the
clock before the employee/grievant could recognize the necessity of judicial recourse would not be
logical. See id. at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383. The circuit court's reversal on the accrual of a cause
of action question resulted from an obvious misconstruction by the trial court of the Supreme
Court's decision in DelCostello. The operative dates in DelCostello were: discharge on June 27, 1977;
grievance committee decision relayed'to employee on August 19, 1977; grievance committee minutes
approved by committee on. September 20, 1977; suit filed on March 16, 1978. 462 U.S. at 155, 113
L.R.R.M. at 2738. The Court remanded the case because the trial court had not addressed the
plaintiff's contentions that certain events tolled the statute of limitations. Id. at 172, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 2745. The Court, however, referred to the date of the committee's decision as the determinative
date of accrual. Id.
Finally, the circuit court discussed the trial court's holding that Richards' failure to exhaust the
internal grievance mechanism barred his ft 301 claim. Richards, 790 F.2d at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at
2383. The court identified three circumstances under which such a failure would be excused: (1)
no prospect of obtaining a fair hearing because of union officials' hostility towards the grievant; or
(2) inadequacy of relief as compared to section 301 or inability to reactivate the grievance; or (3)
unreasonable delay or the employee's opportunity for court adjudication on the merits. Id. (citing
Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 689, 107 L.R.R.M, 2385, 2389 (1981)). The
appellate, court remanded Richards' case to the district court for findings on the enumerated
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383-84. The court anal-
ogized Richards' situation to the plaintiff in Clayton, where the employee also sought reinstatement
at his job as well as monetary damages from the employer and union. Id. at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at
2383 (citing Clayton, 451 U.S. at 690, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2389). In Clayton, the Court characterized
the agreement as similar to most other collective bargaining agreements which impose strict time
limits on grievance decision appeals, thereby precluding the union from seeking arbitration or
other remedy for the grievant that might adequately compensate him. 451 U.S. at 691 & n.18, 107
LR.R.M. at 2389 & n.18.
The Seventh Circuit's remand on the exhaustion of intraunion remedies requirement provides
appropriate recognition that, under modern pleading rules, the lack of specificity in the pleadings
should not be grounds for dismissal when the complaint at least raises the operative issues under
the Clayton exceptions to the exhaustion rule. See supra this note. Even under the limited facts that
Richards pleaded, the court could discern possible excuses for failing to exhaust internal remedies
on any of the three grounds: futility, inadequacy of remedy, or unreasonable delay. See Richards,
790 E2d at 637, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383.
The Seventh Circuit also reprimanded the district court for failing to follow circuit court rules
before rejecting the direct authority of the Fifth Circuit. Id. Circuit Rule 16(e) requires that "a
proposed opinion that would create a conflict between circuits must be circulated among the active
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be appropriate bases for the Board to decline jurisdiction over an industry," the court
stated, the federal courts do not enjoy such discretionary jurisdiction." The threshold
inquiry in determining if federal courts must exercise jurisdiction in section 301 cases is
whether the purported dispute is in an industry affecting commerce." If the court
answers the question in the affirmative, then federal courts have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the claim, notwithstanding the NLRB's decision to decline jurisdiction." The
Seventh Circuit found in Richards that the horseracing industry clearly affects interstate
commerce." Thus, the court concluded, the district court was bound to assert jurisdiction
over the section 301 claim."
The Seventh Circuit in Richards correctly interpreted federal court jurisdiction over
LMRA section 301 claims. Section 501 of the LMRA defines the phrase "industry
affecting commerce," as used in the section 301(a) jurisdictional grant, as an industry
"in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct .. the free flow of
commerce." 37 The corresponding NLRA section 2(7) definition addressing the Board's
jurisdiction is, for all practical purposes, identical."
Without more, therefore, the jurisdictional scope of the Board and the federal
courts would be identical. The Board, however, retains statutory discretion under section
301 to decline jurisdiction over disputes that are not likely to have a sufficiently substan-
tial impact on commerce, but which may nonetheless satisfy the definition of an industry
affecting commerce." The Board bases its long-standing refusal to exercise jurisdiction
in horseracing cases on its belief that the detailed state regulation of horseracing oper-
ations and the importance of horseracing revenues to the state minimize the risk of a
labor dispute persisting long enough to interfere significantly with interstate commerce. 4 °
Consequently, although horseracing involves extensive dependence on customers, horse
owners, employees and supplies from other states, and thus technically satisfies the
definition of an industry in interstate commerce, its labor disputes may not sufficiently
burden or obstruct interstate commerce so as to require Board review. Rather, the Board
relies on the assumed ability and desire of the states to intervene quickly and resolve the
disputes.
The federal courts, unlike the Board, are in the unenviable position of being literally
bound to exercise jurisdiction over labor contract disputes that affect interstate com-
merce, even when the disputes might best be resolved in state courts. It is arguable that
members of this court to determine whether a rehearing
district court did not circulate its opinion which flatly
holding. Id.
"1 See San Juan Racing Ass'n Inc. v. Labor Relations
55, 96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 9 14,155, 24,016 (1).P.R. 1982).
32 Richards, 790 F.2d at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2382.
"Id, at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2382-83.
" Id. at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2382.
35
en banc is necessary." Id. Apparently, the
rejected the Fifth Circuit's Fair Grounds
Bd. of Puerto Rico, 532 F. Supp. 51, 54—
" Id. at 636, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2383.
" 29 U.S.C. § 142(1) (1982).
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1982). Section 2(7) reads, in pertinent part: "The term 'affecting com-
merce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce,
or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce."
" See LMRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(I) (1982).
10
 See Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R.B. 744, 51 L.R.R.M. 1375 (1962).
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because, as a general matter, courts should construe statutes in the manner which best
promotes the laws' underlying purposes, federal courts should not adjudicate collective
bargaining agreement disputes in which the state has a much greater interest and which
the state courts are empowered to resolve." Congress, however, in defining the authority
of the Board and the courts to enforce federal labor policy, expressly granted the Board
a discretionary power, but granted no such discretion to the courts. Whether Congress
made this distinction because of a greater concern for the demands on the Board's
limited resources or because it felt that the Board was more qualified to exercise such
discretion, Congress clearly implied that it intended to open the federal courts to all
claims of labor contract violations in industries which affect interstate commerce, not-
withstanding the Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction. Unless and until Congress
amends the jurisdictional language of sections 301 and 501 of the LMRA, litigants should
not expect the courts to be constrained by the Board's discretionary jurisdiction deter-
minations.
In sum, section 19(c) of the NLRA allows the Board the discretion to refuse juris-
diction in labor disputes not significantly affecting interstate commerce. The Seventh
Circuit, in Richards, held that even if the NLRB declines to exercise jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices in the industry in question, the district courts must exercise
jurisdiction over LMRA section 301 collective bargaining agreement disputes involving
industries which affect interstate commerce. Thus, the Richards court concluded, the
district courts must make an independent determination of the industry's effect on
interstate commerce. If the industry falls within the definition of interstate commerce,
the federal courts retain jurisdiction over the section 301 claim. Although perhaps
unfortunate, the federal courts do not enjoy the discretion that Congress has granted to
the Board to evaluate the relative necessity of federal government intervention into the
labor disputes of a given industry.
VII. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. *The Third Circuit Adopts The Thurston Willfulness Standard For Determination Of
Violations Under The Fair Labor Standards Act: Brock v. Richland Shoe Co.'
Section 255(a) of Title 29 of the United States Code establishes a two year statute
of limitations for any action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 2 for unpaid,
minimum wages, unpaid overtime, or liquidated damages. 3 If the violation of the FLSA
is willful, however, a three year statute of limitations applies. 4 Thus, the effect of this
provision is to add one year to the statute of limitations in cases involving willful violations
of the FLSA, thereby subjecting the employer to the risk of a damage figure based on
three years back pay, rather than twos
41 See WRIGHT', THE LAW OF FEDERAL Coutrrs § 52, 308-11 (4th ed. 1983).
* By Joseph A. DiBrigida, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 799 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1986).
2 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 1-19,29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1983).
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. 255(a) (1983).
Id.
See Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 84 n.6 (3d Cir. 1986). Although the effect of
this provision is also to allow the complainant an additional year in which to bring an action under
the FLSA, Richland Shoe was not concerned with the timing aspect. The only issue considered was
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The first appellate court to set the standard for measuring whether a violation of
the FLSA was willful was the Fifth Circuit in Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms. 6 Under the Jiffy
June standard, an employer's violation is willful when the "employer knew or suspected
that his actions might violate the FLSA." 7 The court stated the test simply as: "Did the
employer know the FLSA was in the picture?" 8 This standard has been followed by the
Courts of Appeals in the First, Fourth and Tenth Circuits,
The United States Supreme Court, considering whether an employer's conduct was
a willful violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 1 ° set a different
standard in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston." This new standard states that the employer's
violation was willful if the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter
of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 12 The Seventh Circuit, in Walton
v. United Consumers Club, 13 held that the Thurston standard was the correct one to apply
in both ADEA cases and in cases brought under section 255(a) for violations of the
FLSA. 14
 Thus, when determining willfulness under section 255(a), the First, Fourth,
Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the jiffy June standard, while the Seventh Circuit applies
the Thurston standard. In determining willfulness under the ADEA, the proper standard
to apply is the Thurston standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
During the Survey year, the Third Circuit, in Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., adopted the
Thurston standard as the willfulness standard to be used for section 255(a) cases in its
jurisdiction. 15 Thus, in the Third Circuit, a violation of the FLSA will be willful under
section 255(a), and the three year statute of limitations will apply, if the employer "[kinew
or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the FLSA." 48 Consequently, after Richland Shoe, a knowing violation of the FLSA or
deliberate ignorance of the FLSA in the Third Circuit will subject an employer to
damages based on three years of back pay, rather than two.''
Richland Shoe involved an action by the Secretary of Labor, William E. Brock, to
enjoin Richland, a manufacturer of footwear and other leather products, from violating
the "willfulness" of the violation for purposes of determining back wages. Id. at 81. The effect of
a two or three year limitation is to establish a cut-off point for measuring damages in FLSA cases
involving ongoing violations. Id. at 84 n.6.
6 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
Id. at 1142.
8 Id.
9 See Secretary of Labor v. Daylight Dairy Products, 779 F.2d 784, 789 (1st Cir. 1985); Donovan
v. Bel-Loc Diner, 780 F.2d 1113, 1117 (4th Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Simmons Petroleum, 725 F.2d
83, 85 (10th Cir, 1983),
10 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2-17, 7(b), 29 U.S.C. NI 621-34, 626(b)
(1983).
" 469 U.S. 111, 126, 36 FEP Cases 977, 984 (1985). This new standard was established under
the ADEA by the Second Circuit's decision in Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d
940, 956, 114 L.R.R.M. 2241, 2252 (2d Cir. 1983). The Thurston Court adopted this standard as set
out by the Second Circuit. 469 U.S. at 126, 36 FEP Cases at 984.
12
 469 U.S. at 126, 36 FEP Cases at 984.
' 3
 786 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Id. at 311.
1,
 799 F.2d at 81, 83.
16 1d. at 81.
17 Id.
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the FLSA's overtime's and recordkeeping provisions and from withholding compen-
sation owed to seven plant mechanics for overtime work." In his deposition, the vice
president and general manager of Richland stated that he knew the FLSA applied to
overtime pay arrangements such as those between Richland and its mechanic0' The
Secretary moved for summary judgment."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
the Secretary's summary judgment tnotion and enjoined Richland from violating the
FLSA's overtime and recordkeeping provisions." Furthermore, the district court applied
the jiffy June standard 24 of willfulness under section 255(a) in calculating the amount of
back overtime pay to award." Because of the vice president-general manager's admission,
the district court found that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might
violate the FLSA.ss Willfulness established, the court awarded the mechanics $11,084.26
plus interest," the amount of back overtime pay due based on the three year statute of
limitations period." Richland appealed to the Third Circuit, contending that the district
court calculated the wrong back overtime pay award under section 255(a) because it
applied an improper standard of willfulness." The Third Circuit thus faced a question
of first impression in its jurisdiction: what constitutes willfulness under section 255(a)?"
The Third Circuit rejected the Jiffy June standard, adopting a more rigorous one."
Under this new standard, an employer would willfully violate section 255(a) if "the
employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the FLSA." 32 The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision in
favor of the Secretary, but vacated the court's order concerning the statute of limitations
and remanded the case for recalculation of the amount of back overtime pay due under
the new standard." On remand, the trial court was to make a "willfulness" evaluation
m 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2) (1983). Section 215(a)(2) states that it is unlawful to violate section
207. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (1983). Section 207 states that employees who work for longer than forty
hours in one workweek should receive compensation for their employment in excess of forty hours
at one and one-half times their regular rate. 29 U.S.C. 207 (1983). Richland paid its mechanics
time and one-half only for time worked in excess of forty-eight hours per week. 799 F.2d at 81 n.1.
The Secretary brought this action to recover overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of forty
per week. Id.
'° 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c), 215(a)(5) (1983). Section 215(a)(5) states that it is unlawful to violate
section 211(c). 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (1983). Section 211(c) states that employers shall keep records
of the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment maintained, and shall report
them to the Administrator when so directed. 29 U,S.C. § 211(c) (1983). The Richland Shoe opinion
does not specify how Richland violated these provisions.
2° 799 F.2d at 81.
2I Id. at 82.
22 1d. at 81.
28 1d.
24
 Id. at 82.
" Id. at 81.
23 Id. at 82,
" Id. at 81.
28 1d. at 82.
29 id. at 81.
so /d. at 82.
51 1d, at 81.
32 Id.
" Id.
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under the new standard, thus deciding the number of years on which to calculate back
pay. 34
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the fifb June standard for three reasons."
First, the court found that willfulness requires more than mere negligence; it requires
deliberate effort" The court cited to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, which defines
"willful" as "done deliberately: intentional."" The court stated that a willful act requires
"reckless disregard of the consequences" at the very least." The JiffyJune "in the picture"
standard is a mere negligence standard and allows for no consideration of whether the
employer violated the FLSA deliberately or recklessly." Finding the Jiffy June standard
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the Third Circuit therefore rejected such
"in the picture" analysis."
Second, the court rejected the Jiffy June standard because it frustrated legislative
intent." The court here relied on Walton v. United Consumers Club, in which the Seventh
Circuit found that section 255(a) was designed to establish a two-tier statute of limitations
with two years as the rule and three years as the exception." The Richland Shoe court
agreed with the Walton court that the Jiffy June standard is too tax because under it
almost any employer could be found to have acted willfully.,' Thus, use of the "in the
picture" standard would turn a two-tier statute into a one-tier statute and thus frustrate
congressional intent." Furthermore, the Third Circuit stated that although a statute's'
plain meaning may be overcome by clear evidence that Congress intended a different
construction," the court found no evidence of such legislative intent in the present case,
Jiffy June or any of the cases that have followed Jiffy June." Thus, the Third Circuit
rejected the Jiffy standard as frustrating legislative intent."
Third, the court was swayed by the Supreme Court's rejection of the Jiffy June
standard in Thurston." In Thurston, the Supreme Court was faced with defining willful-
ness under the double damages provision of the ADEA." The Supreme Court rejected
the contention of the plaintiffs who argued, under the Jiffy June standard, that the
employer was liable for double damages because he knew that the ADEA was "in the
picture."" In support of its holding, the Thurston Court stated that it would be almost
34 Id. at 84 n.6.
" Id. at 82-83.
39 Id. at 82.
37 Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1331 (1979)).
33 Id, at 82 & n.5.
39 Id. at 83.
4° Id.
4 ' Id.
42 Id. (citing Walton, 786 F.2d at 310).
▪ Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. (citing Paskel v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1 985)).
49 Id.
• Id.
• Id. (citing Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 36 FEP Cases 977 (1985)).
49 469 U.S. at 125-30, 36 FE? Cases at 984-86. Under the ADEA, the prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to double damages only when the employer willfully has violated the provisions of the
ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1983).
39
 469 U.S. at 127-28, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
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impossible for an employer to prove that it was unaware of the ADEA, or that the ADEA
was not in the picture. 5 ' The Court further found that Congress intended a two-tier
liability system under the ADEA and refused to apply a willfulness standard that would
frustrate this intent." The Thurston Court established that a willful violation is one in
which "'the employer • . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.''SS The Court found this standard consistent
with its interpretation of the term in other criminal and civil statutes." Because Thurston
involved the interpretation of the ADEA, not the FLSA and section 255(a), it did not
control Richland Shoe. The Third Circuit, in Richland Shoe, however, relied on Thurston
as persuasive precedent in its interpretation of willfulness under section 255(a). 55
The Third Circuit also relied on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Walton which held
that the Thurston standard was the proper standard to apply both in ADEA cases and in
cases brought under section 255(a) for violations of the FLSA." In Walton, the Seventh
Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Thurston, found that the Jiffy June standard would
frustrate congressional intent by turning a two-tier system into a one-tier system." Like
the Thurston Court, the Walton court found that it would be virtually impossible to find
an employer unaware that the FLSA was "in the picture."" The Seventh Circuit, there-
fore, rejected the Jiffy June standard arid held that the correct standard of willfulness
under both the ADEA and section 255(a) is the Thurston standard." Thus, relying on
Thurston and Walton, the Third Circuit in Richland Shoe held that an employer violated
the FLSA willfully if it "knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether
its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA." 6°
The Richland Shoe court also addressed two objections to its disposition. 61 The first
objection relied upon the First Circuit's refusal in Secretary of Labor v. Daylight Dairy" to
extend the Thurston standard to section 255(a)," In Daylight Dairy, the First Circuit
characterized Thurston as involving the question of whether the employer should pay
double damages under the ADEA, a punitive statute." The First Circuit distinguished
Thurston from Daylight Dairy by finding that the statute of limitations provision of section
61 Id, at 128, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
62 Id.
55 Id, at 126, 36 FEP Cases at 984 (quoting Air Line Pilots, 713 F.2d at 956, 114 L.R.R.M. at
2252).
56 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43 (1938) (defendant's
failure to unload a cattle car was willful because it showed a disregard for the governing statute
and its requirements); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933) (defendant's action was
willful because it was "marked by reckless disregard [for] whether or not one has the right so to
act").
55 799 F.2d at 83.
56 Id.
" 786 F.2d at 310.
56 Id. at 311.
59
ou 799 F.2d at 83.
01 Id. at 83-84. The second objection was brought by the Secretary. Id. at 84. The first was
presumably brought by the Secretary as well, although the opinion does not so state. Id.
67 779 F.2d 784 (1985).
65 799 F.2d at 83-84.
54
 779 F.2d at 789.
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255(a) is not punitive." Thus, the First Circuit did not feel bound to extend Thurston to
section 255(a). 66
The Third Circuit in Richland Shoe disagreed with the First Circuit, stating that
section 255(a) increased the employer's liability based on willfulness and thus was pu-
nitive.° Stating that the increased risk of liability could not be explained as anything but
punitive, the court reasoned that the harm caused to the workers by willful violations is
no more difficult to detect and no more severe than the harm caused by unwillful
violations." The court thus found that the congressional extension of liability for an
additional year where the violation was willful clearly is based on its perception that
"willful violations are more culpable than negligent ones." 69 Therefore, the court rea-
soned, the extension of an additional year is a punitive measure and no different than
the double damages provision in Thurston. 7° For this reason, the court refused to follow
Daylight Dairy. 71
The second objection the Richland Shoe court addressed was one raised by the
Secretary. 72 The Secretary argued that the Jiffy June standard was preferable because it
furthered the remedial ends of the FLSA by making it easier for an employee to recover
wrongfully withheld wages." The Third Circuit dismissed this objection as overly broad,
stating that it could be used to object to any statute of limitations 7 4 The court further
stated that any statute of limitations in a damage action seeks a balance between proof
and timeliness on one side and the recovery of damages on the other." Finally, the
Richland Shoe court found no evidence offered by the Secretary that the congressional
intent was to strike the balance in a way that contradicted the plain meaning of section
255(a). 76 Thus, it dismissed this second objection."
Richland Shoe is a sound and stable decision. To begin with, it relied heavily on the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction in interpreting the term "willful" under
section 255(a). Furthermore, Richland Shoe also adhered to congressional intent in con-
struing the statute. Still further, Richland Shoe relied persuasively and effectively on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Thurston, which also involved the interpreta-
tion of the term "willful" in a punitive statute.
First, Richland Shoe was an extremely well reasoned decision which is likely to stand
in the Third Circuit and quite possibly could influence other circuits to abandon the Jiffy
June standard and adopt the Thurston standard. Richland Shoe gains a portion of its
strength from its strict adherence to the plain meaning of "willful." Asserting that the
dictionary's plain meaning of "willful" requires deliberate action with intent, the court
referred to several instances where courts and commentators have stated that willfulness
63 Id.
"Id.
67 799 F.2d at 84.
"Id.
89 Id.
7° Id.
71 Id,
72 Id.
75 Id.
'4 Id.
75 Id.
76 1d.
77 Id.
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"requires an intent to bring about certain ends or a reckless disregard to those ends." 78
The Richland Shoe court thus correctly rejected the Jiffy  June standard as too far removed
from this plain meaning.
Second, the Richland Shoe opinion also is a proper interpretation of the congressional
intent of section 255(a). By establishing a two year statute of limitations for ordinary
violations of the FLSA and a three year statute of limitations for willful violations,
Congress established a two-tier system. The negligence standard of JO June frustrates
this two-tier system by finding a willful violation whenever the employer knew the FLSA
was "in the picture." Thurston, Walton and Richland Shoe therefore correctly rejected this
standard as too lax.
Third, the Richland Shoe court's opinion is extremely sound because it follows the
United States Supreme Court's Thurston decision, which construed "willful" in a situation
quite similar to the situation in Richland Shoe. Both cases involved punitive statutes which
increased the liability of the employer where its violation was willful. Because the statutes
were so similar and because the Thurston standard is consistent with the way in which
the Supreme Court has interpreted "willful" in other civil and criminal statutes, the
Third Circuit was correct in following Thurston.
Moreover, the Richland Shoe court, in rejecting the first objection to its disposition,
was correct in determining the punitiveness of the statute by focusing on its impact on
the employer. 79 As the Seventh Circuit stated in Walton: "'punitive-ness' is in the eye of
the beholder; both [the ADEA and section 255(a)] increase the plaintiff's recovery ...." 80
Thus, the increased risk of liability to the employer under section 255(a) cannot be
considered anything but a punitive measure. 8 '
The Richland Shoe court also was correct in rejecting the.Secretary's objection that
the Jiffy June standard is preferable because it furthers the ends of the FLSA by making
it easier for employees to recover wrongfully withheld wages. This argument is far too
broad because it destroys the balance sought by any statute of limitations. As the Walton
court stated: "It is true ... that the 'entire legislative history of the 1966 amendments
of the FLSA indicates a liberalizing intention on the part of Congress.' But the direction
of the change (in favor of employees) does not tell us how far the change was to go." 82
The Secretary offered no evidence that the balance was to be tipped so far as to contradict
the plain meaning of the statute in establishing a two-tiered standard. The Richland Shoe
court therefore correctly rejected the Secretary's objection.
The Third Circuit's decision in Broth v. Richland Shoe Co. contains several caveats
for the practitioner. Under Richland Shoe, employers in the Third Circuit will not be
held to the "in the picture" standard of Jiffy June but to the more rigorous "reckless
79 Id, at 82 & n.5.
79 Furthermore, the impact of the Daylight Dairy court's contention that because section 255(a)
is not a punitive statute the Thurston standard should not apply to it is diminished by the fact that
Daylight Dairy and jiffy June were authored by the same judge. Compare 779 F.2d at 786 with 458
F.2d at 1140. Although the author, Senior Circuit Judge Wisdom, was of the Fifth Circuit, at the
time of Daylight Dairy he was sitting in the First Circuit by designation. 779 F•2d at 786. Thus, the
Daylight Dairy court that so adamantly rejected Thurston and adopted Jiffy June was not a court of
first impression, but a court presided over by a Senior Circuit judge who had previously formulated
Jiffy June.
80 786 F.2d at 309.
8 ' 799 F.2d at 84.
82 786 F.2d at 310-11 (emphasis in original).
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disregard" standard of Thurston. Counsel for employees seeking to recover back wages
under section 255(a) should advise their clients that they may not take advantage of the
three year statute of limitations for bringing an action and may not collect a damage
figure based on three years back wages where the employer's violation was merely
negligent. Conversely, counsel for employers should advise their clients to take pains not
to ignore the knowledge of any of the company's officers, managers, supervisors or
administrators concerning the FLSA. If the employer, or any of its administrative per-
sonnel, possess knowledge as to the FLSA, a later violation in reckless disregard of the
FLSA by the employer may, as in Richland Shoe, be deemed willful. Lastly, counsel in
circuits which still use the Jiffy June standard should be wary of the possibility of the
abandonment of that standard and the adoption of the Thurston standard because of the
strength of the Thurston, Walton and Richland Shoe opinions.
In conclusion, the circuits are split on the proper construction of "willful" under
section 255(a). The First, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the Jiffy June "in the
picture" negligence standard. Until Richland Shoe, only the Seventh Circuit applied the
more rigorous Thurston "reckless disregard" standard. In Richland Shoe, the Third Circuit
adopted the Thurston standard and seriously challenged the validity of the Jiffy June
standard. Thus, in the Third Circuit, a violation of the FLSA will be willful under section
255(a) if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. Because it was so strongly reasoned, Brock v.
Richland Shoe Co. could influence other circuits to reject the Jiffy June standard and adopt
the Thurston standard.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Suing Municipalities Under Title VII and Section 1983: Hamilton v. Rodgers'
Congress enacted Title VI 1 2 in 1964 to provide relief to individuals from discrimi-
nation in employment. 5 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against a
person based on his or her race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' Under Title VII,
a successful plaintiff may obtain equitable relief and back pay, 5 but may not recover such
compensatory damages as awards for emotional distress or pain and suffering.° When a
plaintiff brings an action under Title VII, he or she may also bring a parallel claim
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which permits recovery of such damages.?
Section 1983 provides a private right of action for violation of individual rights
protected by the United States Constitution and federal law by any "person" acting
under color of state law. 5 Possible defendants under section 1983 include state and
municipal employees, municipal governments, and private individuals whose behavior
may be classified as state action.° In cases where a plaintiff brings both section 1983 and
Title VII claims, the proof shown for Title VII liability will generally support liability
under section 1983 as well°
Although the elements of Title VII and section 1983 claims are similar, there are
some major differences. The applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to
* By Mary V. Deck, Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 40 FEP Cases 1814 (5th Cir. 1984).
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976). 2000e•2(a)(2) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3 Case Note, Chemical Construction Corporation: Eviscerating Title VII, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
987 (1983).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a). See supra note 2.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
6 B. SCHLEI, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1258-59 & 1259 n.127 (1976).
See id. at 1259; see also Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121, 22 FEP Cases 1296,
1298 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1980).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the Unified States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
9 Baumann, Civil Rights Litigation: Section 1983, 1975 ANN. SURV. or Am. L. 203, 203 (1986).
1 ° See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442, 40 FEP Cases 1814, 1816 (5th Cir. 1986);
Whiting, 616 F.2d at 121, 22 FEP Cases at 1298.
186	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 29:67
establish liability of the municipal'etnployer constitutes one major distinction. The doc-
trine of respondeat superior applies under Title VII to establish the vicarious liability"
of municipal and other employers who are not directly responsible for the violation.' 2
Although courts have interpreted the term "persons" in section 1983 to include corporate
and municipal agencies," such entities are liable under section 1983 only when "official
policy or custorn"R is the direct cause of the discrimination charged. Therefore, courts
do not hold municipal agencies indirectly liable under the theory of respondeat superior
for acts of their employees that violate the individual rights of others."
Courts have not yet adopted a clear standard for determining when official policy
or custom exists for the purpose of establishing municipal liability under section 1983."
Generally, a municipality may be held liable where discriminatory action is taken by an
official vested with authority to make decisions representative of official policy.' 7 Alter-
natively, a pattern of unlawful behavior by those lacking policy-making authority may
also constitute official policy." Under this view, such a pattern would constitute the
constructive knowledge and acquiescence of the policy-making authority and justify
imposition of liability."
During the Survey year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the distinction
between municipal liability under section 1983 and under Title VII. 20 The court deter-
mined that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies under Title VIP' and therefore
held the plaintiff's immediate supervisors and the fire department for whom they worked
jointly and severally liable under Title V11. 22 The court, however, stated that respondeat
superior does not apply under section 1983; instead, the court noted, a municipality is
liable under section 1983 only where official policy or custom is the cause of the discrim-
ination." The court applied this test and found that twelve racial incidents cited by the
plaintiff within a two-and-a-half year period did not constitute a pattern sufficient to
establish a custom or official policy under section 1983. Finally, the court found the
individual employees of the department liable under section 198324 and allowed com-
" Vicarious liability is defined as the liability of one without personal fault or involvement in
the violation imposed due to his or her relationship (i.e., employer, employee) with the person
directly responsible for the violation. Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Superiors Under 42 USCS
§ 1983 for Subordinate's Acts in Deprivation of Civil Rights, 51 A.L.R. FED. 285, 286 (1981).
12 See, e.g., Gay v. Bd. of Trustees of San Jacinto College, 608 F.2d 127, 128, 23 FEP Cases
1569, 1570 (5th Cir. 1979); Kirkland v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 760, 773, 23 FEP Cases
1537, 1546 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), aff 'd, 622 F.2d 1066, 23 FEP Cases 1547 (2d Cir. 1980); Helbling v.
Unclaimed Salvage and Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956, 961, 22 FEP Cases 1620, 1624-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
13 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89, 17 FEP Cases 873, 884 (1961).
"Mandl, 436 U.S. at 694, 17 FEP Cases at 1886; Annotation, What Constitutes Policy or Custom
for Purposes of Determining Liability of Local Government Unit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Modern Cases,
81 A.L.R. FED. 549, 558 (1987).
"Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92, 17 FEP Cases at 885.
13 See, Annotation, supra note 14, at 558-59.
" Id.
See id. See also Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984).
13
 See Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443, 40 FEP Cases at 1817.
" Id. at 443-44, 40 FEP Cases at 1817-18.
21 Id. at 444, 40 FEP Cases at 1818.
22 Id. at 445, 40 FEP Cases at 1817-19.
25 1d. at 443, 40 FEP Cases at 1817.
2' Id. at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816.
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pensation for emotional injuries sustained. Due to the plaintiff's insufficient showing of
proximate cause, however, the court denied compensatory damages under section 1983
for physical injuries suffered. 25
In Hamilton v. Rodgers, the plaintiff, James Hamilton, was employed by the Houston
Fire Department as a radio technician. 26 Soon after he was hired in January of 1979, his
co-workers began subjecting him to racial slurs and pranks because he was black."
Hamilton began to receive critical evaluations from his supervisors late in 1980. 28 Before
November of that year he filed an EEOC charge, claiming discrimination." In January
1982, he filed suit in the district court under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983 and Title
VII alleging retaliation and racial harassment on the part of the fire department and
other individuals." That summer, Hamilton was suspended, and later reinstated with
lower pays' In October 1979, Hamilton found that he had abnormally high blood
pressure, and by 1980 he required hospitalization." In November 1982, he suffered a
stroke, and he died in February 1983."
The district court held the Houston Fire Department and Hamilton's supervisors
jointly and severally liable under both Title VII and section 1983, finding evidence of a
racist work environment and retaliatory efforts to punish Hamilton for seeking equal
treatment.'' Accordingly, the district court ordered that Hamilton receive back pay, as
well as compensatory damages for mental anguish and the physical problems attributed
to the stress he suffered during his employment."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the liability of the individuals responsible for
the discriminatory activity, but absolved the fire department from all liability on the
theory that it could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees." After a
subsequent petition for rehearing, however, the Hamilton court withdrew its earlier
opinion, and substituted an opinion finding the fire department liable under Title VII,
but not under section 1983."
In making its finding on the rehearing, the Hamilton court determined that when
claims under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983 are brought as parallel causes of action
with claims under Title VII, the proof required under Title VII will also demonstrate
section 1981 and section 1983 liability." Therefore, a plaintiff seeking relief for unlawful
retaliatory termination under these statutes must establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that the activity engaged in is protected under Title VII; (2) that an adverse
employment action occurred; and (3) that the adverse employment action was caused
23 Id. at 444, 40 FEP Cases at 1818.
26 Id. at 441, 40 FEP Cases at 1815.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 441, 40 FE? Cases at 1815-16.
" Id.
." Id. at 441, 40 FEP Cases at 1816.
32 Id.
"Id. A federal district court later substituted Hamilton's wife as plaintiff in this action. Id. See
Hamilton v. Rodgers, 573 F.Supp. 452, 454, 33 FEP Cases 302, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
34 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 441, 90 FE? Cases at 1816.
" Id.
36 Hamilton v. Rodgers, 783 F.2d 1306, 40 FE? Cases 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1986).
32 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 441, 40 FEP Cases at 1815.
"Id. at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816,
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by plaintiff's engaging in the activity." Alternatively, the court stated that a plaintiff may
establish a Title VII violation and a parallel section 1983 claim by proving that discrim-
ination is so pervasive in the work environment in question that it could seriously
undermine the stability of minority employees."
After determining the elements of a Title VII and parallel section 1983 claim, the
Hamilton court analyzed separately the liability of the plaintiff's supervisors, who were
directly responsible for the discrimination against Hamilton, and the liability of the fire
department. 41
 First, the court approved the district court's finding that Hamilton's su-
pervisors had intentionally discriminated against him." The court cited testimony that
the supervisors intentionally hindered his gaining proficiency in radio management,
which ultimately led to an excuse for his suspension." The Hamilton court then examined
whether the supervisors could be considered "employers" under Title VII, a prerequisite
to statutory liability.' The court noted that the term "employer" as defined in 2000e(b)
includes "agents," which courts have interpreted to include participants in the decisions
that result in discrimination." Because it determined that the supervisors had authority
over staffing shifts, assignments, and filing reports, the Hamilton court held them liable
under Title VII and accordingly under the parallel section 1983 action."
The Hamilton court next turned to the issue of liability for the Houston Fire De-
partment. 47 The court refused to hold the department liable under section 1983 for its
employees' action because respondeat superior does not apply in section 1983 actions."
Instead, the court found that section 1983 liability is contingent upon a deprivation of
a right secured by the Constitution or federal law that is the result of official policy."
The court stated that official policy may be defined either as an official regulation,
ordinance or decision, or alternatively as a "persistent widespread practice" of city
" Id. at 441, 40 FEP Cases at 1816. See also Dickerson v. Metropolitan Dade County, 659 F.2d
574, 580, 27 FEP Cases 41, 46 (5th Cir. 1981). Title VII liability is established upon a showing of
these factors unless a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason exists for the defendant's action, and
the plaintiff is unable to show that this reason is a mere pretext for discriminatory behavior. Hamilton,
791 F.2d at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816.
40 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816.
41 Id. at 442-43, 40 FEP Cases at 1816-17.
42 Id. at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816. A finding of intentional discrimination is considered to be
a finding of fact, and, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) must not be set aside unless it is "clearly
erroneous." Id. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 11.S. 564, 573, 37 FEP Cases 396, 400 (4th Cir.
1985). Therefore, the Hamilton court approved the district court's holding, finding that there was
plausible support for the district court's conclusions. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442, 40 FEP Cases at
1816.
42 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816.
"Id.
42 42	 2000e(b); Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443, 40 FEP Cases at 1817. The court cited two
reasons for this interpretation. First, Tide VII is often accorded liberal interpretation in order to
best carry out the congressional purpose of ameliorating discrimination and unfairness. Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238, 4 FEP Cases 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1971). Second, the Hamilton court observed
that to hold otherwise would facilitate violations of Title VII by leading supervisory personnel to
believe they are shielded from liability under the statute. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443, 40 FEP Cases
at 1817.
" See Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442-43, 40 FE? Cases at 1817.
" Id.
" Id.
49 Id. ; Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.
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officials and employees that, although not officially adopted, is a custom that may be
fairly characterized as municipal policy. 50
The Hamilton court agreed with the district court's finding that there existed no
formal fire department policy encouraging discrimination, but reversed the district
court's determination that the discriminatory conditions of the fire department were
tantamount to official policy.51 Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Hamilton's
co-workers and supervisors "tainted" the work environment with their bigotry, the court
was unwilling to concede that the twelve instances of bigotry that Hamilton cited consti-
tuted a "custom." 57 The court reasoned that twelve incidents over a two-and-a-half year
period could not be considered a "continual pattern" of bigotry such that knowledge
could be imputed to officers of the fire department.° Therefore, the court stated that,
even though the officers may have been aware of some of the incidents cited, there was
not sufficient evidence that they should have known of a "nagging problem of racism." 54
Furthermore, the Hamilton court disagreed with the district court's finding of implied
official policy. The Hamilton court noted that the district court based its finding on the
policy-making officials' inability to correct the situation. 55 The Hamilton court instead
found contrary evidence indicating that fire department officers speedily discouraged
and took action against racial incidents that had been brought to their attention. 56 The
court reasoned that requiring greater action of the fire department officials would
interfere unreasonably with the department's policy-making. 57 The court held that an
employer is not able and accordingly not required to guarantee a complete absence of
bigotry within the ranks of its employees. 58 In addition, the court reasoned that regu-
lation of employees' bigoted behavior is not within the scope of federal judicial power,
because judicially imposed enforcement would be ineffective to change the employees'
"belief."5° Therefore, the Hamilton court absolved the fire department of liability under
section 1983.60
The Hamilton court, however, held the fire department liable under Title V11. 61 The
court concluded that no showing of official policy or custom is necessary in order to
hold an employer liable under Title V11.67 Instead, the court reasoned that an employer
may incur liability for the acts of its supervisory personnel, because it chose to put them
in positions of responsibility.° Accordingly, the court found the fire department liable
for the discriminatory acts of the supervisors against the plaintiff. 64
58 Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.
51 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443, 40 FEP Cases at 1817.
58 Id.
55 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
58 Id.
57 Id. at 444, 40 FEP Cases at 1817.
58 Id. at 444, 40 FEP Cases at 1817-18.
50 Id. at 444, 40 FEP Cases at 1818.
0 1d.
I Id.
82 Id.
63 Id. (citing Gay v. Board of Trustees of San Jacinto College, 608 F.2d 127, 23 FEP Cases 1569
(5th Cir. 1979)).
84 Id.
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Finally, the court turned to the issue of compensatory damages." Because the
plaintiff established a section 1983 claim against his supervisors, the court found him
entitled to compensatory damages." The Hamilton court, however, disagreed with the
district court's finding of compensation for the plaintiff's physical damages, as distinct
from his emotional darnages. 67 Although the court recognized the degree of stress which
the plaintiff's work environment may have caused him, the Hamilton court found that
the plaintiff's smoking habit (one and one-half to two packs per day), his coffee con-
sumption (six to twelve cups per day) and the liberal amount of salt in his diet may have
contributed to his high blood pressure." Because the court found the connection between
racial harassment and the plaintiff's physical decline tenuous, it held the connection was
an overly speculative basis for a damage award. 69 The court, however, still permitted
compensatory damages for emotional and mental distress caused by the racial harass-
ment. 7° Consequently, the court ordered a remand for recalculation of compensatory
damages to be based only on the plaintiff's emotional injuries. 71
The Fifth Circuit in Hamilton v. Rodgers was justified in finding that vicarious liability,
although available under Title VII, is not available under section 1983. The Fifth Circuit
was also justified in reinforcing its general opposition to imposing vicarious liability
under section 1983. 72 Courts routinely apply vicarious liability in Title VII actions." The
rationale for this is that Title V II's definition of "employee" expressly includes any agent
of the employer. 74 Therefore, under Title VII, courts should attribute the unlawful
behavior of an employer's supervisory personnel, acting within the course of their duty,
to the employer." In contrast, section 1983 does not make reference to any principal
and agent relationship. It merely permits a private right of action against any person
who, under color of state law, deprives another of a right secured by federal law." Thus,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Hamilton court correctly distinguished between
section 1983 and Title VII in determining the application of vicarious liability.
66 Id.
66 Id. Although Congress did not explicitly address the issue of compensatory damages under
§ 1983, it has been implied through apparent incorporation in other sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256 (1978).
67 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 444-45, 40 FE? Cases at 1818.
"Id, at 444, 40 FE? Cases at 1818.
69 Id.
76 Id. at 444-45, 40 FEP Cases at 1818.
" Id. at 445, 40 FEP Cases at 1818.
72 See, Annotation, supra note I I, at 299. See also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1979) (rejects application of vicarious liability under § 1983 as to sheriffs and other officials
although state law provides for such liability). Prior to Baskin, the Fifth Circuit had consistently held
in section 1983 actions that courts should apply state law imposing vicarious liability on officials for
violations caused by subordinates. See Annotation, supra note 11, at 304 & n.20.
72 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). See, Gay v. Board of Trustees, 608 F.2d 127, 128, 23 FE? Cases 1569,
1570 (5th Cir. 1979).
75 See Calcotte v, Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 98, 20 FEP Cases 1685, 1688 (5th Cir.
1978).
76 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While municipalities and governmental entities are "persons" within the
scope of § 1983, the Supreme Court has held in Monel! v. Department of Social Services that such
bodies are not vicariously liable under § 1983. 436 U.S. at 694, 17 FEP Cases at 886. See Annotation,
supra note 11, at 286 n.2.
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Not only is the Hamilton decision justified from the standpoint of statutory inter-
pretation, but it is also correct from a policy 'standpoint. Hamilton limits liability for
municipalities and other officials who have not sanctioned acts violative of section 1983. 77
This is appropriate because unlike Title VII, which limits relief to employees, the scope
of section 1983 is broad and potentially provides relief to any individual harmed by
another person acting under color of state law. As a result, some limitations of liability
are critical to prevent the depletion of state funds in paying section 1983 damage claims
to every variety of plaintiff. Limiting section 1983 liability to actors directly responsible
for the violation or to those who appear to have sanctioned it is therefore apprOpriate,
The Hamilton court was also justified in holding that twelve incidents of racial
discrimination over two and a half years does not constitute a custom or official policy
under section 1983. 76 In evaluating whether the incidents indicated custom or policy,
the Hamilton court noted that when officials actually learned of the incidents, they acted
quickly to discourage them, "reprimanding those responsible and noting incidents in the
offenders' files."79 Prompt remedial action by officials should dispel charges that an
official policy or custom violates section 1983. The high number of alleged violations in
Hamilton,s° however, indicates that officials may not have taken effective action against
the alleged violators. Thus, the Hamilton court's conclusion that twelve incidents over
two and a half years is not sufficient to prove official policy under section 1983 may
signal a strengthening reluctance to impose municipal liability under section 1983. 81
The decision in Hamilton clearly sets out the distinction between section 1983 and
Title VII in the area of municipal liability for employment discrimination. Because the
elements of a Title VII and a section 1983 claim are substantially similar, 82 and because
a plaintiff may receive compensatory damages only under section 1983, a plaintiff has
an incentive to join Title VII and section 1983 claims wherever possible. Under Hamilton,
however, vicarious liability for discriminatory practices is not available under section
1983. Therefore, where no official policy or custom exists, a section 1983 employment
discrimination claim will fail. A plaintiff who loses a section 1983 claim, and wins a
parallel Title VII claim will be limited to equitable relief and back pay." Thus, in assessing
the merits of any proposed litigation, the practitioner should note the practical distinc-
tions between Title VII and section 1983 highlighted by Hamilton, keeping in mind that
77 Monett, 436 U.S. at 658, 691-93 & 692 n,57, 17 FEP Cases at 885 & 885 n.57.
78 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443, 40 FEP Cases at 1817.
74, Id. at 443-44, 40 FEP Cases at 1817. Cf: Gant v. Alguippa Borough, 612 F. Sum), 1139, 1143
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (complaint withstood summary judgment where governing body knew of incidents,
investigated them, yet failed to take corrective action).
80 Cf, Mariani v. City of Pittsburgh, 624 F. Supp. 506, 512 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (two previous
complaints of excessive force do not establish custom or policy); Law v. Cullen, 613 F. Supp. 259,
263 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (one substantiated and four unsubstantiated complaints do not constitute
custom or policy).
81 Other recent Fifth Circuit decisions in this area include: Carbalan v. Vaughn, 760 F.2d 662,
665 (5th Cir.) (city not liable under section 1983 for actions of municipal judge), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1007 (1985); Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir, 1984) (actions of city attorney and
building inspector do not constitute city policy); Thomas v. Sams, 739 F.2d 185, 193 (5th Cir. 1984)
(actions of mayor empowered by city council held official policy of city).
82 Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442, 40 FEP Cases at 1816; Whiting, 616 F.2d at 121, 22 FEP Cases at
1298.
" 42 U.S.C. 2000e(2)(a)-5(g).
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vicarious liability for employment discrimination is available only under Title VII, where
relief is limited.
B. *Extension of Younger Abstention to Pending State Administrative Proceedings: Ohio Civil
Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools'
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that federal courts shall
exercise jurisdiction over limited categories of disputes. 5 Additionally, federal courts
have developed a doctrine of abstention, under which a federal tribunal, although vested
with jurisdiction, declines to adjudicate a matter which is pending in a state court.' One
special application of the abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from
hearing constitutional challenges to state action where federal action would be an im-
proper intrusion into a state's right to enforce its laws in its own courts.'
The Supreme Court first applied this special type of abstention, coined "Our Fed-
eralism," in the 1971 case of Younger v. Harris.' In Younger, the Court held that, due to
notions of comity' and federalism, federal courts should abstain from granting injunc-
tions against state criminal proceedings unless there is an immediate threat of irreparable
harm or the plaintiff shows bad faith or harassment on the part of the state government.?
The Court left open, however, the issue of whether "Our Federalism" applies to civil
proceedings.' Subsequent cases first applied the doctrine only to civil proceedings of a
criminal nature" Later cases extended the application of Younger abstention to matters
pending in state court whenever important state interests are involved.'" In 1984, how-
* By Valerie L. Passman, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw REVIEW.
106 S. Ct. 2718, 41 FE? Cases 78 (1986).
2
 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. The jurisdiction clause states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between
two or more States; — between a State and Citizens of another State; — between
Citizens of different States; — between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
3 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS II 52-52A (4th ed. 1983).
C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 52A at 320.
5 40 1 U.S. 37 (1971).
6 "[The] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws
and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of
deference and mutual respect." Black's Law Dictionary 242 (5TH ED. 1979).
7
 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-46, 54. In Younger, the plaintiff, Harris, sought a federal injunction
against a California prosecution for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Id. at 38-39.
A three-judge court granted the injunction, holding the Act void for vagueness, and overbroad, in
violation of the first amendment right to free speech. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that abstention was appropriate. Id. at 54.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 52A at 328.
' See Huffman v, Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975) (Younger abstention applies to
request for an injunction against state civil proceedings against a public nuisance).
10 See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)
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ever, the Court refused to extend Younger abstention to state administrative proceedings
which were not judicial."
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court decided, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission
v. Dayton Christian Schools, that Younger abstention applies to a constitutional challenge
to certain pending state administrative proceedings. 12 In Dayton Christian, the Court ruled
that Younger abstention principles applied to an employer's first amendment challenge
to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission's actions concerning sex discrimination claims
against the employer. (3 The Court held that federal courts should abstain from enjoining
state administrative proceedings where the challenged action will not cause great and
immediate irreparable injury, an important state interest is involved, and arty constitu-
tional claims may be raised in subsequent state court review of the administrative pro-
ceedings. 14 Thus, employers whose employment practices may be constitutionally pro-
tected cannot expect federal court intervention into administrative proceedings
concerning those employment practices unless the proceeding falls within the limited
exceptions to Younger abstention established in Dayton Christian.
The dispute in Dayton Christian arose when Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (the
school), a corporation which provides education as an extension of two Dayton, Ohio
Christian churches, decided not to renew a pregnant schoolteacher's contract. 15 The
school informed the teacher that it would not renew her contract because it ascribed to
the religious doctrine that mothers should stay home with pre-school age children. 18
Upon receiving this information, the teacher, through her attorney, threatened the school
with litigation based on state and federal sex discrimination laws. 17 The school then
revoked its initial decision related to the teacher's pregnancy and fired her immediately
for violating its contractually mandated internal grievance procedures, which specified
a "biblical chain of command." 18
Upon her termination, the teacher filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (Commission).' 8 After conducting an investigation and finding probable
cause to believe the school acted discriminatorily, the Commission proposed a conciliation
agreetnent.20 Failing to obtain any cooperation from the school, the Commission initiated
(disciplinary hearing against an attorney); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (child custody
proceeding).
" Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984). In Midkiff, the state law author-
izing the challenged administrative proceedings specified that the proceedings were not judicial
proceedings. Id.
12 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2720, 41 FEP Cases 78, 80 (1986).
15 Id.
14 Id. at 2723-24, 41 FEY Cases at 82-83.
15 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2721, 41 FEP
Cases 78, 80 (1986).
16 Id,
17 Id,
18 Id, at 2721, 41 FEY Cases at 80-81. The "biblical chain of command," is "rooted in passages
from the New Testament...that one Christian should not take another Christian into Courts of the
State." Id. at 2721, 41 FEP Cases at 80. The school's "biblical chain of command" proceeds first
through the teacher's immediate supervisor, and then to the corporation's Board of Directors, which
has final authority over any grievances. Id.
19 Id. at 2721, 41 FEP Cases at 81.
20 Id. The proposed conciliation agreement required the school to reinstate the teacher and
194	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 29:67
administrative proceedings against the schoo1. 21 Dayton Christian Schools responded by
stating that the Commission's action violated the school's first amendment rights because
the school's action against the teacher was taken pursuant to .sincere religious beliefs. 22
The school filed a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 23 in the United States
District Court for the District of Ohio while the administrative proceedings were pending,
seeking an injunction against the proceedings on the ground that the Commission's
action against the school was unconstitutional. 24 The District Court refused to issue the
requested injunction, holding that, because the Commission had not yet taken any action
against the school and the proposed proceedings did not violate the Constitution, the
controversy between the state and the school was not ripe. 25 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that it was unconstitutional for the
Commission to exercise jurisdiction over the matter or enforce Ohio's anti-discrimination
statute against the school, because of the burden on the school's religious liberties under
the first amendment. 26
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Younger line of cases applied?'
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the district court should have abstained from
exercising its jurisdiction over the dispute between the Commission and the school." In
prohibited the school from taking retaliatory action against employees who cooperated with the
Commission's preliminary investigation. Id.
21 Id, Although warned that failure to accept the agreement would result in the filing of formal
administrative proceedings against it, the school did not respond. Id.
22 Id.
23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id.
24 Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2721-22, 41 FEP Cases at 81. The first amendment to the
Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U.S. CoNs -r. amend. 1. The Supreme Court has held that
both the religion clauses are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (free exercise clause). The school claimed that the Commission's proposed
actions violated the school's rights under the religion clauses, and, thus the school was able to bring
suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U,S.C. § 1983 (1982). Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2722, 41
FEP Cases at 81.
2' Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2720, 41 FEP Cases at 80. See generally Dayton Christian Schools
v. OCRC, 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1006, 33 FEP Cases 1548, 1575 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("The infringement
on Plaintiff's freedom of religion rights, however, must be more than a mere possibility or specu-
lation.").
26 Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2720, 41 FEP Cases at 80. See Dayton Christian Schools v.
OCRC, 766 F.2d 932, 934, 955, 38 FEP Cases 155, 157, 172 (6th Cir. 1985).
" Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2720, 2722, 41 FEP Cases at 80, 81. justice Rehnquist authored
the opinion, in which Chief justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined. Justice
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined.
26 Id. Before addressing the abstention issue, however, the Court rejected several arguments
that other dispositive issues precluded it from reaching the abstention issue. First, the Court
concluded that its review of the matter was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which granted
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applying Younger abstention, the Court rejected the argument that the Commission's
concession of federal jurisdiction in the district court barred it from raising the abstention
issue, stating that this argument demonstrated a misunderstanding of the nature of
abstention. 29 Conceding federal jurisdiction is unlike conceding the abstention issue, the
Court explained, because abstention is appropriate when the federal court has jurisdic-
tion over a matter, but strong policies advise against exercising it." Accordingly, although
the Commission yielded to federal jurisdiction, the Court found that the Commission
was not precluded from arguing that the district court should have abstained from ruling
in this cases'
In addressing the matter of federal court abstention, the Supreme Court reviewed
the purposes and evolution of the Younger principle since 1971." Courts normally do
not interfere with state proceedings due to the importance of comity and federalism,
stated the Court." Accordingly, the Court explained, federal courts justify interference
only in the unusual situation in which great and irreparable harm otherwise will result. 34
The Court noted that the Supreme Court applied Younger abstention to a variety of
state court proceedings which shared the common characteristic of affecting important
state interests."
The Court next considered whether the abstention doctrine applies to state admin-
istrative proceedings as well as court proceedings." The Dayton Christian Court first
focused on language in Gibson v. Berryhill," in which the Supreme Court in dictum stated
that injunctions requested against state administrative proceedings might be subject to
the abstention doctrine if the proceedings commanded the respect due state court
actions." The Court observed that a later case, Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Association," demonstrated that the abstention doctrine applies to proceedings
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court under these circumstances. Id. at 2722, 41 FE!' Cases
at 81 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 76 n.6 (1970) (jurisdiction includes cases holding a state
statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case)). Next, the Court summarily dismissed
the district court's finding that an injunction would be premature because the issue was unripe for
adjudication and stated that precedents required only a "reasonable threat of prosecution." Id. at
2722 n.1, 41 FEP Cases at 81 n.1 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)).
29 Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2722, 41 FEP Cases at 81-82.
" Id. The Court clarified that a state may voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction even though
it has a tenable claim for abstention, but that the Commission did not urge the federal court to
proceed to the merits in this case. Id. (citing Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Intl Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9, 116 L.R.R.M. 2921, 2924 n.9 (1984); Ohio Bureau of
Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 n.3
(1975)).
3 ' Id. at 2722-23, 41 FEP Cases at 82.
12 Id. at 2723, 41 FEP Cases at 82.
11 Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971)).
14 Id. (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45).
11 Id. (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)).
36 Id.
17
 411 U.S. 564 (1973). In Berryhill, the Supreme Court did not abstain from enjoining actions
of the Alabama Optometric Association because the Board's bias rendered it incompetent to adju-
dicate the issues. Id. at 577.
" Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2723, 41 FEP Cases at 82 (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 576-77 (1973)).
" 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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which are "judicial in nature," whether taken by administrative bodies or courts, if the
proceedings are within the appellate jurisdiction of a higher state court." Thus, the
Court concluded that Younger abstention is appropriate for constitutional challenges to
administrative proceedings where there is no immediate threat of great and irreparable
harm, there is an important state interest at stake, and the challenged proceedings are
judicial in nature and subject to a state court's appellate review.
After determining that federal courts may apply the abstention doctrine to state
administrative proceedings, the Court decided that the circumstances presented in Dayton
Christian were appropriate for abstention.'" First, the Court reasoned that Ohio's interest
in preventing sex discrimination was sufficiently important to merit applying the absten-
tion doctrine.42 Second, the Court stated, the school would have an opportunity to raise
its constitutional challenge within the state-provided process.45 The Court countered the
school's argument that the administrative proceedings themselves provided no oppor-
tunity to challenge the constitutionality of the anti-discrimination statute by noting that
the Commission has in the past considered religious justifications for discriminatory
behavior.44 Additionally, the Court stated, the Commission should construe the anti-
discrimination statute in light of constitutional principles. 45 The Court pointed out that,
in any event, Ohio provides for judicial review of the Commission's actions, which
provides ample opportunity for constitutional challenges. 46
The Court also rejected the school's contention that the Commission's exercise of
jurisdiction over the sex discrimination claim violated first amendment principles. 47
Noting that even religious schools are subject to some state regulation," the Court stated
that the Commission's investigation and planned hearing to ascertain whether the reli-
gious-based reason was the actual reason for dismissing the teacher was constitutionally
permitted." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
holding that the district court should have abstained from enjoining the Commission's
actions against the schoo1. 56
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in
the judgment, but disagreed with the majority's application of Younger abstention to
Dayton Christian." Justice Stevens agreed with the district court's ruling that the issue
before the court was not ripe for adjudication." Justice Stevens distinguished between
(1) a constitutional challenge to the Commission's investigation and hearing, and (2) a
4° Dayton Christian, 106 S. CL at 2723, 41 FEP Cases at 82 (citing Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at
433-34). This principle was verified in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984),
the Court noted, in which the challenged proceedings were not judicial proceedings and the
Supreme Court did not apply the abstention doctrine. Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2723 n.2, 41
FEP Cases at 82 n.2.
41
 Dayton Christian, 106 S. Ct. at 2723, 41 FEP Cases at 82.
42 Id.
"Id. at 2723-24, 41 FEP Cases at 82.
4" Id. at 2724, 41 FEP Cases at 83.
" 5 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2724, 41 FEP Cases at 82-83.
48 Id. at 2724, 41 FEP Cases at 82 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1982)).
42 Id. at 2724, 41 FEP Cases at 82-83.
40 Id. at 2720, 41 FEP Cases at 80.
61 Id. at 2724-26, 41 FEP Cases at 83-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
52 /d. at 2726 & n.4, 41 FEP Cases at 84 & n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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constitutional challenge to the possible future remedies resulting from the Commission's
hearing," The former was a ripe controversy, but did not call for an injunction because
the Commission's investigation was constitutional, Justice Stevens stated." A challenge
to the possible remedies was not ripe because the Commission had not yet conducted
the hearing, Justice Stevens concluded, and thus the district court properly did not
enjoin the Commission's hearing."
Dayton Christian is a significant case in the evolution of the Younger abstention
doctrine. Although grounded in language of comity and federalism, the Dayton Christian
Court's application of Younger abstention to pending state administrative proceedings
is far removed from the Younger Court's abstention from enjoining state criminal pro-
ceedings. The effect of Younger abstention is to deny the plaintiff a federal forum for
a constitutional claim. The ruling in Dayton Christian increases significantly the number
of plaintiffs who are now relegated to state courts for vindication of their rights under
the federal Constitution.
The employment discrimination bar likewise will be affected by the Dayton Christian
ruling's limitation on the accessibility of a federal forum for constitutional claims. Al-
though employment practices may fall within the range of constitutionally protected
actions, federal courts will not enjoin state administrative proceedings concerning the
challenged practice so long as the requirements of the Dayton Christian ruling are satisfied.
Thus, employers who claim special constitutional privileges are now required to assert
them through the state-provided procedure, and may not rely on an additional federal
forum for intervention.
Finally, although the Court's expansion of Younger abstention limits the availability
of federal courts to employers, the Court's reasoning nonetheless provides proper pro-
tection for employees harmed by employers' allegedly constitutional activity. The Court's
preliminary ruling that the Commission's investigation and planned hearing were not
unconstitutional is sound. An opposite ruling, that the Commission's exercise of juris-
diction infringed on the school's first amendment rights, would have allowed some
employers to shield constitutionally forbidden actions behind claims of religious freedom.
It would unduly hamper the work of state civil rights commissions to forbid them to
investigate whether a claimed constitutionally protected religious justification was actually
the reason for an employer's discriminatory action.
In Dayton Christian, the Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to state ad-
ministrative proceedings in which there is no immediate threat of great and irreparable
harm, an important state interest is at stake, and the constitutional claim may be raised
in later state court review. The effect of this ruling is to decrease significantly the number
of litigants who may seek vindication of their constitutional rights in a federal forum,
including employers whose employment practices may be constitutionally protected. In
furtherance of employment discrimination goals, however, the Court correctly ruled that
" Id. at 2726 n.4, 41 FEP Cases at 84 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
54 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
"Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens noted that he disagreed with
the majority's application of Younger abstention to Dayton Christian. Id. at 2726 ri.5, 41 FEP Cases
at 85 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). justice Stevens asserted that the result of Dayton
Christian would "subject a federal court plaintiff to an allegedly unconstitutional state administrative
order when the constitutional challenge to that order can be asserted, if at all, only in state court
judicial review of the administrative proceeding." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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mere investigation into whether an asserted constitutionally protected reason was the
real reason for an employer's action does not violate the federal Constitution.
II. SCOPE OF TITLE VII
A. *Requisite Employment Relationship for Tide VII Claims: Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital
of Fort Wayne'
Section 2000e-2 of Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any
individual with respect to the terms of his or her employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 2
 Therefore, for Title VII provisions to apply to an
employer's act, the act must adversely affect an individual in an employment setting.'
Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce"'
and "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer."5 The provisions, thus, do
not explicitly require that the claimant be an employee of an employer. 6 In short, Title
* By Eric I. Lee, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 788 F.2d 411, 40 FEP Cases 820 (7th Cir. 1986).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2(a)( I) (1982). The statute provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
3 B. SCIILEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 997 (2d ed. 1983).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The statute provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department
or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive
service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership
club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt From taxation under section
501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons
having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered
employers.
5
 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f). The statute provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State
or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the con-
stitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State govern-
ment, governmental agency or political subdivision.
Id.
6 Webster's defines "employee" as: (1) "one employed by another usu[ally] in a position below
the executive level and usu[ally] for wages;" (2) "any worker who is under wages or salary to an
employer and who is not excluded by agreement from consideration as such a worker." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 743 (1981). Webster's defines "employer" as: "one that
employs something or somebody as the owner of an enterprise (as a business or manufacturing
firm) that employs personnel for wages or salaries." Id.
Id.
Id.
10
I I
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VII gives courts little express guidance as to what types of economic relationships it
protects.
It is presumed that a salaried worker is an "employee" and may bring a Title VII
claim for employment discrimination. On the other hand, courts agree that an indepen-
dent contractor is not within the requisite relationship and is not entitled to Title VII
protections.? Between these extremes, however, courts disagree as to what types of
employment relationships Title VII protects. Although a relationship must have some
connection with a traditional common law employment relationship for Tide Vii pro-
tections to apply, the connection with employment need not necessarily be direct. 8
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson held valid a Title VII claim even in the absence of a
traditional employer-employee relationship where the defendant's actions allegedly in-
terfered with an individual's employment opportunities with another party. 9 The Sibley
court reasoned that the congressional objective in Title VII is to achieve equality of
employment opportunities, and that the language of the legislation does not require the
aggrieved individual to be the employee of an employer.t° The Sibley court thus held
that where supervising nurses at a hospital allegedly discriminated against a male private
duty nurse on the basis of sex, the latter could enter a Title VII employment discrimi-
nation claim by showing that the former interfered with his access to employment
opportunities."
Courts have adopted the Sibley test to allow Title VII employment discrimination
claims despite the lack of a direct employment relationship.' 2 In Puntalillo v. New Hamp-
shire Racing Comthission, for example, the court allowed a Title VII claim by a driver-
trainer of harness horses against the state racing commission and a trade association for
discriminatorily denying him a racing license and stall space at a race park. 13 Although
the driver-trainer was not an employee of either defendant, the Puntolillo court held
valid the Title VII action because the alleged discriminatory acts could have effectively
denied the claimant's access to employment opportunities. 14 Other courts, however, have
applied the Sibley analysis and reached different results. 18 For instance, the court in
Beverley v. Douglas rejected a physician's Title VII claim alleging that a hospital discri-
minatorily denied her staff privileges.I 8 The Beverley court reasoned that because the
physician-patient, relationship is not one of "employment," the defendant could not have
interfered with the physician's "employment opportunities." 17
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed this issue of who has rights under Title VII, and held in Doe v. St. Joseph's
See, e.g., Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 517, 13 FEP Cases 979, 981 (N.D.
Cai. 1976),
8 Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883, 24 FEP Cases 859, 861-62 (9th Cir.
1980).
9 488 F.2d 1338, 1341, 6 FEP Cases 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id.
Id.
12 See, e.g., Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 10 FEP Cases 292
(D.N.H. 1974).
18 Id. at 1090, 10 FEP Cases at 293.
14 Id. at 1092, 10 FEP Cases at 295.
" See, e.g., Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321, 35 FEP Cases 1860 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
16 Id. at 1328, 35 FEP Cases at 1865.
17 Id.
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Hospital of Fort Wayne's that a private physician denied staff privileges by a hospital may
bring a Title VII employment discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
a hospital whose allegedly discriminatory acts interfere with a physician's employment
opportunities with his or her patients may be subject to a Title VII employment discrim-
ination action."' Holding the trial court's dismissal at the pleading stage premature, the
appeals court reversed and ordered that the St. Joseph's plaintiff be allowed to make a
showing that the hospital discriminatorily interfered with her employment opportuni-
ties.2°
In St. Joseph's, the plaintiff, Dr. Doe, was a female Korean-born physician engaged
in private practice in Fort Wayne, Indiana. 21 Five months after Dr. Doe received staff
privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital, the hospital administration summarily suspended these
privileges based on alleged incidents of unprofessional conduct. 22 Dr. Doe sought review
of the suspension by the hospital executive committee." The committee unanimously
upheld the suspension and advised Dr. Doe that she would have to complete physical,
psychological and psychiatric examinations and successfully complete a "certified Phys-
ician's Re-Training Program" before being eligible for staff privileges in the future. 24
Testing and recertification were not required by the hospital by-laws nor were they
routinely required of physicians seeking staff privileges at the hospita1. 25
 Dr. Doe then
sought review of her suspension by the hospital board of directors, which refused to
revoke the suspension. 25 The plaintiff then sued St. Joseph's Hospital, alleging employ-
ment discrimination in violation of Title VI I. 27 Finding no direct employment relation-
ship between Dr. Doe and St. Joseph's Hospital, the district court dismissed the action
sua sponte. 28
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the
position of the district court that one must be an "employee" in order to enter a Title
VII claim, and thus held that the trial court improperly dismissed Dr. Doe's Title VII
claim. 29 The court noted that section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII provides for the protection
" 788 F.2d 411, 425, 40 FEP Case's 820, 830.
19 Id. at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
20 Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
"Id. at 413, 40 FEP Cases at 821. The opinion makes no mention of whether Dr. Doe claimed
discrimination based on race, sex or both.
22 Id. The suspension followed a formal complaint filed by another physician at the hospital.
Id. The complaint dealt with an incident where Dr. Doe allegedly entered the room of another
doctor's patient and in a "loud, abusive manner" castigated the other physician in a "most demean-
ing, unethical manner." Id, The patient was scheduled for major surgery the next day. Id,
22 id.
24 Id .
" Id.
28 Id.
27 Id. at 413-14, 40 FEP Cases at 821. The plaintiff also entered claims under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d (1982)), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), the Hill-Burton Act (42 U.S.C. 300s-6 (1982)), and Indiana state law. Id. at
413-14, 40 FEP Cases at 821. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's Title VII and Sherman Act claims and reversed and remanded the dismissal of the
§ 1981 claim. Id. at 426, 40 FEP Cases at 831. The plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of the Hill-
Burton Act claim. Id. at 414 n.1, 40 FEP Cases at 821 n.l.
" Si. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 414, 422, 40 FEP Cases at 822, 828.
28 Id. at 422, 40 FEP Cases at 82728. Dr. Doe did not argue that she was an employee of the
hospital. Id. at 422, 40 FEP Cases at 828.
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of "any individual" and does not specify that the aggrieved person necessarily be an
"employee" of' an "employer."" Hence, the court stated, the mere fact that Dr. Doe was
not a salaried employee of the hospital did not necessarily mean that she was not entitled
to bring a Tide VII action.'" According to the court, this application of the statute was
consistent with the judicial position that Title VII be liberally construed to further its
goal of eliminating discrimination in employment."
In concluding that the district judge prematurely dismissed Dr. Doe's claim because
of the absence of a traditional employment relationship, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson 33 in which, the St. Joseph's court noted, the District of
Columbia Circuit held that Title VII prohibits parties from foreclosing any individual's
access to employment opportunities." The St. Joseph's court noted that, in Sibley, the
plaintiff was a male private duty nurse who worked in a hospital for patients who
required a private nurse." When a patient needed such a nurse, the hospital's nursing
office communicated the request to a central registry. 36 The registry matched the patient
with an available nurse, and the nurse reported to the patient." The Sibley plaintiff
alleged that supervising nurses at the defendant hospital had rejected him and prevented
him from reporting to a patient if the patient was fetnale. 36 The St. Joseph's court
emphasized the Sibley holding that the sex discrimination claim was valid under the
statute despite the lack of a direct employment relationship between the private duty
nurse and the hospital."
The Seventh Circuit in St. Joseph's also relied on Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing
Commission, 4° which adopted the Sibley analysis that courts may afford Title VII protec-
tions in the absence of a direct employment relationship.'" The court noted that in
Puntolillo, the plaintiff, a driver-trainer of harness horses, alleged that the defendants
denied him a necessary racing license and stall space at the race park. 42 The plaintiff
claimed that these actions effectively curtailed his opportunity to take part in his occu-
pation.'' The St. Joseph's court observed that, although the driver-trainer was not hired
or employed by either defendant A 4 the Puntolillo court found the defendants' actions
may have denied the plaintiff's access to employment opportunities° and held the claim
to be within Title VII coverage.°
3° Id. at 922, 40 FEY Cases at 828.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 488 F.2d 1338, 6 FEP Cases 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34 St. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 828 (quoting Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341, 6 FEP
Cases at 1031).
" Id. at 422, 40 FEP Cases at 828.
Id,
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id .
4 ' 375 F. Supp. 1089, 10 FEP Cases 292 (D.N.H, 1974).
41 St. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 828-29.
42 Id. at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 828. The defendants were the New Hampshire Racing Commission
and the New Hampshire Trotting and Breeding Association. Id.
" Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1091, 10 FEP Cases at 299.
44 St. Joseph 's, 788 F.2d at 423, 40 FE? Cases at 828. The plaintiff was employed by the horse
owners. Id.
43 See Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1092, 10 FEP Cases at 29 5.
48 Id.
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Furthermore, the St. Joseph's court emphasized the result in Pao v. Holy Redeemer
Hospital,17 the only cited case that considered valid a Title VII claim for denial of a
physician's staff privileges at the pleading stage. 48 The court discussed the Pao outcome
with approval, noting that the plaintiff, an ophthalmologist of Chinese ancestry, alleged
that the defendant hospital had impaired his ability to practice by repeatedly denying
him staff privileges.49
The St. Joseph's court took note of the analogy between the positions of the Pao
plaintiff and that of the nurse in Sibley, stating that the hospital in each case had the
same capacity to control the plaintiff's access to his prospective patients." Emphasizing
the language in Pao that such prospective patients are "ultimate 'employers,'" the Seventh
Circuit indicated that a physician may have a sufficient employment relationship with
his or her patients to bring a Title VII claim."
Applying the Sibley analysis to the facts in St. Joseph's, the Seventh Circuit held that
Dr. Doe need not necessarily be within a traditional employment relationship with the
hospital to enter a Title VII discrimination claim." Instead, the St. Joseph's court held a
Title VII action may be valid where a defendant hospital discriminatorily interferes with
a physician's employment opportunities." The court, therefore, stated that Dr. Doe
should be allowed to make a showing that St. Joseph's Hospital had discriminatorily
interfered with her employment opportunities in such a way as would fit under the Sibley
analysis."
In reaching this result, the St. Joseph's court rejected the defendant's argument that
Sibley and Puntolillo were distinguishable." St. Joseph's argued that, in Sibley, the defen-
dant hospital could entirely foreclose the nurse's access to patients, while in the present
case St. Joseph's had no control over Dr. Doe's access to her patients elsewhere S 6 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this reading of the facts in Sibley, noting that the private duty
nurse in Sibley had employment opportunities outside of the hospital that remained
unimpaired by that hospital's actions. 37 The court also rejected the defendant's argument
that Puntolillo was distinguishable in that the plaintiff in that case could not race at all
without a license,58 whereas Dr. Doe still could see patients outside of the defendant
hospital. The court disagreed with this argument because it determined that a defendant
need not foreclose all employment opportunities in order to incur Title VII liability. 59
In its discussion of Sibley, Puntolillo, and Pao, the St. Joseph's court elaborated on the
type of employment opportunities that Title VII protects, noting the language in Pao
which implies that a physician's relationship with his patients constitutes such an em-
47 547 F. Supp. 484, 31 FEP Cases 589 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
45 St. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 424-25, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
49 St. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 424, 40 FEP Cases at 830. The plaintiff had staff privileges at other
hospitals in the area, but the Pao court stated that this was not relevant to the question of whether
there was a violation under Title VII, Id. at 424 & n.27, 40 FEP Cases at 830 & n.27.
5° Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
51 id.
52 Id. at 422, 40 FEP Cases at 828.
55 Id. at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
54 Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
55 Id. at 423-24, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
56 Id. at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
57 Id. at 423-24, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
55 Id. at 424, 40 FEP Cases at 829.
59 Id.
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ployment opportunity.° The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that there was "substantial
uncertainty" as to whether the physician-patient relationship is the type of employment
opportunity that is protected under the Sibley analysis. 6 ' The court declared that, because
of this uncertainty, the district court's dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. 62
Judge Ripple, in a dissenting opinion, stated that Dr. Doe did not establish the
necessary connection between herself and the hospital to state a claim under Title VII.
He argued that Sibley and Puntolillo did not provide support for Dr. Doe's clairri.63 The
focus of Judge Ripple's dissent was the degree of control exercised by the defendant
over the plaintiff's access to employment opportunities. 64 Judge Ripple contended that
in both Sibley and Puntolillo the defendant had total effective control over the plaintiffs'
abilities to practice their profession. 65 In Sibley, judge Ripple argued, the hospital's actions
prevented the plaintiff private duty nurse from contacting the patients.° Likewise in
Puntolillo, Judge Ripple noted, the action of the racing commission prevented the driver-
trainer from performing his occupational duties for the horse owners." Judge Ripple
argued that St. Joseph's had no such control over Dr. Doe's ability to contact her patients,
because the hospital could not prevent or preclude her from maintaining or establishing
any relationship with her patients." The dissent also noted that although Dr. Doe no
longer had staff privileges at the hospital, she was still free to see patients at her office
or any other health facility. 69 Because St. Joseph's Hospital did not control Dr. Doe's
access to patients, Judge Ripple argued, its actions could not be characterized as inter-
ference with employment opportunities."
In the fact-specific setting of a hospital's denial of staff privileges to physicians, the
dissent declared that the result in Pao was an incorrect resolution of the issue. Preferring
the outcome in Beverley v. Douglas, 7 ' Judge Ripple reiterated the principle in Beverley that
in order to enter a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must allege and prove some link
between the defendant's actions and an employment relationship. 72 Judge Ripple argued
that, in the present case, Dr. Doe was an independent contractor for Title VII purposes,
with no employment relationship with the hospital." Furthermore, he stated that a
physician's relationship with his patients is not one of employment and does not represent
an employment opportunity the interference with which Title VII prohibits. 74 Judge
Ripple characterized the physician-patient relationship as that of client-professional, one
60 Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
61 Id.
62 Id,
Id. at 427, 40 FEP Cases at 832 (Ripple, J., dissenting). Judge Ripple concurred with the
majority's disposition on all other claims appealed. Id. at 426, 40 FEP Cases at 831 (Ripple, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 427, 40 FEP Cases at 832 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
69 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 428, 90 FEP Cases at 832 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
72 /d. (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1328, 35 FEP Cases at 1865).
" Id. at 428, 40 FEP Cases at 833 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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beyond the scope of Title VII coverage." Thus, the dissent argued that under the facts
presented Dr. Doe did not state a Title VII claim.
The Seventh Circuit in St. Joseph's indicated that a Title VII plaintiff need not
establish a direct employment relationship but only need show that the defendant's
actions interfered with his or her employment opportunities. The court thus allowed a
Title VII discrimination claim by a party who is in a position of economic interdepend-
ence with another if the actions of the latter foreclosed the former's access to employment
opportunities." The Sl. Joseph's court justifiably suggested that Title VII may protect a
private physician with staff privileges at a hospital from adverse decisions by the hospital.
The St. Joseph's court's adoption of "interference with employment opportunities"
as a test for determining whether an individual may enter a Title VII claim, though not
statutorily mandated, is consistent with the provisions' legislative objectives. The court's
requirement that the defendant discriminatorily interfere with the plaintiff's employ-
ment opportunities notably widens the scope of Title VII protections beyond that of the
traditional employee-employer setting. The actual text of Title VII does not impose such
a requirement to establish standing; yet examining whether the defendant interfered
with the claimant's employment opportunities as a determinative test for Title VII rights
seems proper in light of the congressional objective to eliminate discrimination in em-
ployment and to achieve equality of employment opportunities." The language of the
statute as enacted is broad, extending protection to "any individual" from discriminatory
acts by "an employer"" with respect to one's compensation, terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment." Moreover, courts have consistently held that Title VII be liberally
construed to achieve its purpose to bring about basic social changes." Hence, the Si.
Joseph's court's examination of the defendant's interference with the claimant's employ-
ment opportunities as a test for the validity of a Title VII claim is supported by estab-
lished legislative objectives.
The St. Joseph's court's "interference with employment opportunities" test, which
tends to expand Title VII coverage beyond the traditional employee-employer relation-
ship, is especially justified upon consideration of the often complicated nature of dis-
criminatory practices that occur in the current employment scene. As one court noted,
employment discrimination can no longer be viewed as "a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, manifesting itself, for example, in an employer's practices of hiring,
firing, and promoting."81 Employment discrimination today is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon; 82 an employer may practice discriminatory acts with great sub-
tlety and craftiness. If St. Joseph's is illustrative of such a practice, then Title VII protec-
78 Id, (Ripple, J., dissenting). Judge Ripple analogized the physician-patient relationship to that
between an attorney and client. Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429, 3 FEP Cases 175, 177 (1971).
78 See supra note 4 for the statutory definition of "employer."
7842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). See supra note 2 for the text of this provision.
80 See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336, 32 FE? Cases 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1983);
Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n.8, 26 FE? Cases 1025, 1030 n.8 (7th Cir.
1981); Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131, 22 FEP Cases 1307, 1308-09
(5th Cir. 1980); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831, 20 FEP Cases 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391, 15 FE? Cases 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1977).
8 ' Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238, 4 FEP Cases 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1971).
es Id.
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tions ought to be available to Dr. Doe, especially because staff privileges are a significant
part of a physician's practice. A physician in private practice, and not directly employed
as a salaried staff member of a hospital or clinic, may rely greatly on hospital staff
privileges to develop his or her professional practice. These privileges enable a physician
to admit patients at the hospital, to take advantage of the sophisticated equipment
available at a modern medical facility, and to be present for patient referrals from other
physicians. Such benefits would substantially enhance a physician's ability to broaden his
or her practice and establish his or her reputation in the community." Thus, a Title VII
claim seems proper in circumstances where a hospital interferes with a significant portion
of a physician's practice by discriminatorily revoking the latter's staff privileges.
The St. Joseph's opinion, however, is lacking in that it does not enunciate definable
dimensions of a valid Title VII discrimination claim. A Title VII claim must have some
identifiable connection with an employment setting." Otherwise, virtually any claim, with
only a marginal relationship to one's vocation, could prevail under the statute. A party
who, meets the statutory definition of "employee" should not be subjected to unlimited
Title VII liability over matters only tangentially related to a claimant's employment
concerns. Every Title VII action must arise from an employment scenario. As the Si.
Joseph's court noted, Title VII was intended to "achieve equality of employment opportu-
nities" and to provide individual's "equal access to the job market." 86 Although the Si.
Joseph's court justifiably adopted the Sibley approach that an individual may enter a Title
VII claim when the defendant has allegedly interfered with his or her access to employ-
ment opportunities, it did not elaborate sufficiently on what constitutes such employment
opportunities.
Applying the Sibley analysis, the St. Joseph's court indicated that an additional em-
ployment relationship between a claimant and a third party may constitute a protectable
employment opportunity. 87 The court, however, left open the question of whether the
presence of such a relationship is only one of several indicia of an employment oppor-
tunity or whether it is the only means by which such a protected interest is established.
Furthermore, mention of the additional employment relationship with a third party
evokes questions of whether this relationship is a traditional employee-employer" rela-
tionship, or merely one of economic interdependence." Perhaps the court could have
addressed some of these concerns better by requiring that a protectable employment
opportunity be one that constitutes a substantial part of an individual's economic activity.
Absent even this general limitation, St. Joseph's does little to elaborate upon the basic
requirements for Title VII standing as set forth in Sibley.
In summary, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Fort Wayne reversed
the district court's dismissal of a physician's Title VII claim against a hospital for alleged
88 The hospital granting staff privileges also benefits in that it increases its capacity for billable
services.
84 See supra note 5 and accompanying text fur the statutory definition of "employee."
" See supra note 4.
86 St. Joseph's, 788 F.2d at 423, 40 FEP Cases at 828 (quoting Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson,
488 F.2d 1338, 1339-40, 6 FEP Cases 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
eeJudge Ripple's dissenting opinion subscribes to this view, See id. at 428, 40 FEP Cases at 832-
33 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
" The St. Joseph's court stated: ''There is substantial uncertainty about the type of employment
relationship that is protected .. , ." Id. at 425, 40 FEP Cases at 830.
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discriminatory suspension of staff privileges. 3° In reaching its decision, the St. Joseph's
court indicated that it would adopt the analysis the District of Columbia Circuit enun-
ciated in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson and held that a plaintiff who alleges a defendant
interfered with his or her employment opportunities may bring a Title VII claim. 31 The
court stated that a plaintiff need not allege the existence of a traditional common law
employment relationship to sue under Title VII. 62 Hence, the court suggests Title VII
coverage extends to a party in economic interdependence with another, namely, a private
physician with staff privileges at a hospital. Because the Seventh Circuit did not elaborate
on what constitutes an employment opportunity and did not specify how much inter-
ference with such an opportunity violates Title VII, the St. Joseph's opinion may lead to
more confusion in future attempts to define the scope of Title VII coverage.
B. *Application of Title VII to the Armed Forces: Hill v. Berkman'
Section 2000e-16(a) of Title VII prohibits employment discrimination in military
departments based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 Section 2000e-16(a)
defines "military departments" by referring to section 102 of Title 5. 3
 Under section 102
of Title 5, "military departments" include the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force.'
Federal courts have consistently held that section 2000e-16(a) applies to employment
decisions regarding only civilian military personnels These courts have reasoned either
that uniformed military personnel are not federal employees for the purposes of section
2000e-16(a),6
 or that "military departments" include only civilian military personnel.?
Consequently, uniformed military personnel have been unable to bring claims of dis-
crimination in military decisionmaking under Title VII. 3
'°" Id. at 426, 40 FE? Cases at 831.
Id. at 425, 40 FE? Cases at 830.
92 Id. at 422, 40 FEP Cases at 828.
* By Ieuan Mahony, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
/ Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 40 FE? Cases 1444 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
242 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982). Section 2000e-16, "Employment by Federal Government,"
provides in subsection (a): All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment
... in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5 ... shall be made free from any
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).
Congress extended Title VII's protection to cover federal employees in 1972. Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111  (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(a)).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). For the relevant text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), see supra note 2.
5 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) provides in full: "The military departments are: The Department of
the Army. The Department of the Navy. The Department of the Air Force."
° Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928-29, 34 FE? Cases 1850, 1852 (9th
Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200, 28 FEP Cases 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson
v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224, 16 FEP Cases 894, 898 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986, 18
FEP Cases 965 (1978); Cobb v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, 592 F. Supp : 640, 642,
38 FE? Cases 1257, 1258 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Hunter v. Stetson, 444 F. Supp. 238, 239, 16 FE? Cases
358, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (dicta).
See Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223-24, 16 FEP Cases at 898; see also Taylor, 653 F.2d at 1200, 28
FEP Cases at 1028.
	 •
7 Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 927-28, 34 FEP Cases at 1851-52; see Cobb, 592 F. Supp. at 642, 38 FEP
Cases at 1258.
° See cases cited supra note 5. Courts have allowed uniformed military plaintiffs to bring claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Taylor, 653 F.2d at 1200, 28 FEP Cases at 1028; see Johnson, 572
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During the Survey year, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York rejected the reasoning of other federal courts and ruled that section 2000e-
16(a) protects both civilian and uniformed military personne1. 9 In Hill v. Berkman, the
court held that military service was a form of employment covered by section 2000e-
16(a), 1° and that "military departments" under section 2000e-16(a) included uniformed
military personnel." The Hill court therefore concluded that the plaintiff could bring a
claim of sex discrimination under Title VII. 12 The court, however, applied a standard
of review which was deferential to military decisionmaking and held that the Army did
not violate Title VII when it reclassified the plaintiff's position as a combat position,"
from which, the court determined, women are lawfully prohibited."
Consequently, under the Hill court's interpretation of section 2000e-16(a), uni-
formed members of the military may bring claims of discrimination under Title VII."
Title VII will provide military personnel with broad protection against discrimination,
and in particular will allow military plaintiffs to utilize a disparate impact theory of
discrimination. 16 Under the Hill court's deferential standard of review, however, military
plaintiffs will not enjoy the same protection as civilian plaintiffs under Title VII. Title
VII, moreover, will provide the exclusive remedy for victims of discrimination in the
military.'? Therefore, plaintiffs must follow the administrative procedures and strict
limitations period of Title VII."
F.2d at 1223, 16 FE? Cases at 897. Courts have also suggested that 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982), and
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) may provide a statutory remedy for discrimination. See Gonzalez, 781
F.2d at 929 n.2, 34 FEP Cases at 1852 n.2 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303, 305 n.3,
34 FEP Cases 1846, 1849, 1850 n.3 (1983)). A plaintiff, however, may not bring a claim of sex
discrimination under § 1981. Manzanares v, Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.
1979).
9 Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1238, 40 FEP Cases 1444, 1451 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
i° Id. at 1236-38, 40 FEP Cases at 1450-51.
" Id, at 1238, 40 FEN Cases at 1451.
12 Id.
" Id. at 1241, 1243, 40 FEP Cases at 1453-54, 1455.
14 Id. at 1240, 40 FEP Cases at 1452.
" Id. at 1238, 40 FE? Cases at 1451.
16 Under a disparate impact theory of discrimination, a plaintiff does not need to prove that
the employer intended to discriminate against him or her. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432, 3 HP Cases 175, 178 (1971). Instead, the plaintiff need only show that an employment
selection device adversely impacts on a class protected under Title VII. See id. at 429-31, 3 FEP
Cases at 177. Unless the employer can show that the selection device is a business necessity, the
plaintiff will succeed. See id. at 431, 3 FEP Cases at 178. Disparate impact theory is only available
to plaintiffs under Title VII. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 12 FEP Cases 1415,
1418 (1976). Consequently, where a plaintiff brings a non-Title VII claim of discrimination, he or
she must prove the employer's discriminatory intent. E.g., id. at 248, 12 FEP Cases at 1422 (claim
of discrimination under fifth amendment's equal protection component); General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391. 29 FEP Cases 139, 146 (1982) (claim of discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Because disparate impact theory is only available to challenge certain employment decisions,
see infra note 94, plaintiffs may also bring Title VII claims based on disparate treatment theory,
which requires proof of discriminatory intent. Teamsters v, United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1519 n.15 (1977). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-15, 82-83 (2d ed. 1983).
17 Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1238, 40 FEP Cases at 1451 (citing Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
425 U.S. 820, 829, 12 FEN Cases 1361, 1364 (1976); see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
la 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982) requires that a federal employee file a civil action under Title
VII either within 30 days of final action taken by his or her department, or the Equal Employment
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In Hill, the Army Reserve accepted the plaintiff for the position of Nuclear Biological
and Chemical Specialist (NBC Specialist) in May, 1982. 19 From May to November, 1982,
the plaintiff attended required weekend drills," and was assured that she would begin
receiving full time training." In December, 1982, however, the Army informed the
plaintiff that it had reclassified the position of NBC Specialist as a "combat support role"
and consequently had closed it to women." The Army had closed the position to women
three months earlier, but failed to notify the plaintiff. 23
The Army closed the NBC Specialist position based on a study" which indicated
that people in the position would be likely to engage in direct combat." The study
divided Army positions into seven categories based on the probability that a soldier in a
particular position would engage in direct combat." Because combat replacements were
drawn from the NBC Specialist position, the Army determined that too many women
in this position would jeopardize combat readiness." The Army therefore closed the
position as a whole to women."
Opportunity Commission with regard to his or her charge of discrimination, or within 180 days of
the filing of the initial charge of discrimination. In contrast, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for example,
the statute of limitations on a claim is the time period applicable to similar claims arising under
state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
18 Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1231, 40 FEP Cases at 1445. The plaintiff qualified for the position on
the basis of her education, a written examination, and a medical examination. Id. Upon enlistment,
the plaintiff agreed first to participate in weekend drills prior to basic training, then to undergo
two months of basic training, two months of specialized training, and finally to work approximately
one weekend per month and two weeks per summer for the next six years. Id.
20 Id. During these drills, men in the plaintiff's unit, and her supervisor, told her that women
should not be NBC Specialists. Id.
" Id. The plaintiff was due to begin basic training on November 12, 1982. Id. When the plaintiff
reported for a transfer to basic training on November 12, Army personnel informed her that she
needed to gain weight. Id. at 1231, 40 FEP Cases at 1446. Army personnel subsequently refused to
see the plaintiff when she returned at the correct weight on about November 22. Id. On approxi-
mately December 3, 1982, the Army notified the plaintiff that, although she was now medically
qualified, there was no transportation available to bring her to basic training. Id.
22 Id. The Army also informed the plaintiff that she would receive an honorable discharge
immediately. Id, The plaintiff, however, 'did not receive her honorable discharge papers until March
29, 1984. Id. Without these papers, the plaintiff had difficulty finding a job, and was without income
from November 12, 1982 to February, 1983 when she obtained a job with her former employer.
Id. at 1231-32, 40 FEP Cases at 1446.
23 Id. at 1231, 40 FEP Cases at 1445-46.
24 Id. at 1232, 40 FEP Cases at 1446. The study was compiled by General Hines, a Ph.D in
social psychology. Id.
26 Id. at 1232, 40 FEP Cases at 1446. The Women in the Army Policy Group, an organization
within the Pentagon which studies issues relating to women in the Army, made the recommendation
to the Army that it close the position. Id, According to the plaintiff, women had little input in this
particular recommendation. Id. at 1242, 40 FEP Cases at 1454,
26 Id. at 1241-42, 40 FE? Cases at 1454. General Hines determined the probability of combat
for each position by referring to organizational descriptions and questionnaires. Id. at 1232, 40 FEP
Cases at 1446. The Army closed to women positions which fell within the category with the highest
risk of combat. Id. at 1242, 40 FEP Cases at 1454.
27 Id. at 1232, 40 FEP Cases at 1446. The Army authorized 1,429 entry level NBC Specialist
positions; 1,385 of the positions were classified in the highest risk of combat category. Id. at 1242,
40 FEP Cases at 1454. Of the 44 places remaining open to women, the Army determined that men
had to fill 43 in order to ensure combat replacements. Id. Because only one position remained open
to women, General Hines recommended that the NBC Specialist position as a whole be closed to
women. Id.
28 Id. at 1232, 40 FEP Cases at 1446. Because of newly created personnel categories, the Army
December 1987]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 209
The plaintiff claimed that the Army had discriminated against her by its reclassifi-
cation of the NBC Specialist position, and brought a claim under Title VII. 29 The
defendants argued that Title VII did not apply to the military, and that, even if Title
VII applied, the Army was justified in excluding the plaintiff from the NBC Specialist
position. 3° The defendants therefore moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim, and, in the alternative, for summary judgment." The court granted summary
judgment, first determining that Title VII's protection extended to the plaintiff, but
then concluding that the Army's reclassification of the plaintiff's position had not violated
Title VII."
In determining that Title VII applied to uniformed personnel, the Hill court began
with an analysis of the meaning of the term "military departments" in section 2000e-
16(a)." The court stated that section 2000e-16(a) on its face appears to include both
civilian and uniformed military personnel in its provisions." The court observed that
section 2000e-16(a) defines "military departments" by reference to Title 5, which specifies
that military departments include the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
without further explanation."
Turning from the language of section 2000e-16(a), the court considered both the
legislative history of the term "military departments" and the executive orders which led
up to the amendment extending Title VI I's coverage to federal employees, and deter-
mined that these sources did not indicate that section 2000e-16(a) distinguished between
uniformed and civilian military personnel." The court noted that Congress, in its original
reference to the Army, Navy, and Air Force as "military departments" in the National
Security Act Amendments of 1949, expressly included both civilian and combat person-
nel." The court, however, also noted that the executive orders which were the precursors
to section 2000e-16(a)'s protection of federal employees from job discrimination applied
reconsidered the classification of the NBC Specialist position in April 1983. Id. With the use of
General Hines' methodology, the Army determined that the position could accommodate more
women without adversely affecting combat readiness, Id. The Army therefore reclassified the
position as non-combat in October 1983, and allowed women to serve as NBC Specialists once
again. Id.
Id. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the
Army Reserve, and other officers. Id. at 1230-51, 40 FEP Cases at 1445. The plaintiff also brought
a claim for damages under the fifth amendment, which the court dismissed. Id. at 1232, 40 FEY
Cases at 1446.
" See id. at 1231, 40 FEY Cases at 1445.
S1 Id. The defendants also sought Rule l 1 sanctions, which the court denied. Id.
32 Id. at 1243, 40 FEP Cases at 1455.
"Id. at 1235-38, 40 FEP Cases at 1448-51. For the relevant text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)
(1982), see supra note 2.
94 Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1233, 40 FEP Cases at 1447. The court noted that § 2000e-16(a) was
the only jurisdictional basis under Title VII for asserting a claim against a federal organization. Id.
at 1234, 40 FEP Cases at 1447. Because section 2000c-16(a) is the only section which expressly
prohibits employment discrimination by the federal government, the court concluded that a member
of the armed forces could bring a claim only under this section of Title VII. Id. The court reasoned
that, if the United States was an "employer" For all Title VII purposes, Congress would have
included the United States in its definition of "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Id. at 1233,
40 FEP Cases at 1447.
"Id. at 1232-33, 40 FEP Cases at 1446-47. For the text of 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1982), to which 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) refers, see supra' note 4.
36 Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1235-36; 40 FEP Cases at 1448-49.
" Id. at 1235, 40 FEP Cases at 1448 (citing National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Pub.
L. No. 81-216, ft 2, 63 Stat. 578, 579 § 2).
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only to civilian employees." The court therefore concluded that the legislative history
did not indicate whether "military departments" excluded uniformed military person-
nel."
The Hill court also considered prior case law which held that "military departments"
did not include uniformed personnel, and determined that this case law was unpersu-
asive.° The Hill court specifically rejected the approach of the Ninth Circuit in its 1983
decision of Gonzalez v. Department of the Army," which held that Title VII did not apply
to uniformed military personnel.° In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit relied on a distinction
between "armed forces" in Title 10, and "military departments" in Title 5 to conclude
that Congress intended the former term to designate uniformed personnel, and the
latter term to designate civilian personne1. 43 The Hill court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
approach because section 2000e-16(a) expressly refers only to Title 5 for the purpose of
defining the federal employees protected by Title Thus, because case law holding
that Title VII did not cover uniformed personnel was unpersuasive, and because the
legislative history did not clearly exclude uniformed personnel from "military depart-
ments," the Hill court concluded that uniformed personnel were members of "military
departments" for the purposes of section 2000e-16(a). 43
The court in Hill then analyzed the meaning of "employees," the other ambiguous
term in section 2000e-I6(a), and determined that uniformed military personnel were
federal employees covered by the section." In so holding, the Hill court rejected the
approach of the Eighth Circuit in its 1978 decision of Johnson v. Alexander." In Johnson,
the Eighth Circuit held that military service differs materially from civilian employment,"
28 Id. at 1235, 40 FEP Cases at 1448-49 (citing Executive Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319
(1965); Executive Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967); Executive Order No. 11478, 34
Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969)).
39 Id. at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1449.
40 Id. at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1449-50.
'" Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 34 FEP Cases 1850 (9th Cir. 1983).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 927-28, 34 FEP Cases at 1851-52. In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit noted that section
102 of Title 5, the provisions of which section 2000e-16(a) uses to define the term "military
departments," contains a Reviser's Note which refers to section 101(7) of Title 10. Id. (citing 5
U.S.C. § 102 Reviser's Note (1982)). Section 101(7) of Title 10 provides that: "'Military departments'
means the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air
Force." 10 U.S.C. 101(7) (1982). The Gonzalez court reasoned that because section 101(7) is near
section 101(4), which contains a separate definition of "armed forces," Congress intended a dis-
tinction between "military departments," which include only civilian personnel, and "armed forces,"
which contain only uniformed personnel. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928, 34 FEP Cases at 1851-52 (citing
10 U.S.C. 101(4) (1982)). In rebuttal, the Hill court pointed out that section 101(5) of Title 10 is
also close to section 101(7), and that its definition of the term "department" seems to include both
civilian and uniformed personnel. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1449-50 (citing 10
U.S.C. 101(5) (1982)).
"Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1449. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit
had held that "military departments" includes members of the armed forces in other contexts. Id.
at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1449-50. .
45 /d. at 1238, 40 FEP Cases at 1451. .
46 /d. at 1235-38, 40 FEP Cases at 1448-51.
" Id. at 1236, 40 FEP Cases at 1450 (citing Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224, 16 FEP
Cases 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1978)).
"Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223-24, 16 FEP Cases at 898. The Johnson court noted that, unlike
civilian employment, enlisted people cannot quit their jobs, and the Army cannot fire them freely.
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and that therefore courts should not protect uniformed military personnel under Title
VII absent an express inclusion in the statute." The Hill court rejected the Eighth
Circuit's approach because it determined first that military service was similar to civilian
employment, and second that Title VII should apply absent evidence of a contrary
legislative intent."
In determining that service in the armed forces is a form of employment under
Title VII, the court reasoned that the government's role resembles that of an employer. 5 '
The court noted that the draft had been eliminated, 52 that military benefits nearly
equaled civilian benefits," and that the military offered invaluable training opportuni-
ties.54
The court then reasoned that because the equal protection clause applies to uni-
formed military personnel," Title VII, which embodies equal protection policies, should
apply to uniformed personnel absent a clear congressional indication otherwise. ," Be-
cause of Congress's inconsistent treatment of the term "employees" in other statutes, the
Hill court determined that it was unclear whether Congress intended to exclude members
of the uniformed services from the term "employees" under section 2000e-16(a). 57 Al-
though in some statutes Congress expressly excluded uniformed military personnel from
the definition of "employees," 56 the court noted that in other statutes Congress specifically
included uniformed personnel in the term. 59 Therefore, relying on the similarity between
military and civilian employment, Title VI l's policy of equal protection, and Congress's
failure to define clearly "employee," the court found that uniformed military personnel
were "employees" under section 2000e-16(a) and allowed the plaintiff to pursue her
claim of sex discrimination under Title V11. 6°
Applying Tide VII to all military personnel, the Hill court stated, would be to the
Army's advantage. 5 t The court noted that Title VII would become the exclusive remedy
for service people claiming discrimination. 62 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the wealth
Id. at 1223 n.4, 16 FEP Cases at 898 n.4. Furthermore, the court observed, soldiers are subject to
both military discipline and military law. Id.
49 Id. at 1224, 16 FEY Cases at 898. In Johnson, the court reasoned that: "if Congress had
intended for the statute to apply to the uniformed personnel of the various armed services it would
have said so in unmistakable terms." Id.
5° Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1236-38, 40 FE? Cases at 1450-51.
51 Id, at 1236-37, 40 FEP Cases at 1450.
82 Id.
55 Id. at 1237, 40 FEP Cases at 1450. The court noted that in some instances, women obtain
better benefits in the military than in civilian employment. Id.
55 Id. For example, the court pointed out that over 80 percent of the commercial pilots in
America were trained in the Navy and Air Force. Id.
55 Id, (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 9 FEP Cases 33 (1975); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 9 FEP Cases 1253 (1973)).
56 Id, at 1237, 40 FE? Cases at 1450-51.
57 See id. at 1235, 40 FEP Cases at 1448.
55 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2) (1982) ("'employee' means an individual employed in an
agency ... but does not include ... a member of the uniformed services")).
59 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) ("moneys ... due from ... the United States ... to any
individual, including members of the armed services ...")).
a' Id. at 1238, 40 FEP Cases at 1451.
61 Id,
62 Id. (citing Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829, 12 FE? Cases 1361, 1364
(1976) (all non-Title VII avenues, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, are foreclosed to federal employees
with rights under Title VII)).
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of case law interpreting Title VII would give the military clear guidelines on what conduct
is prohibited, and might increase military effectiveness. 63 Therefore, the court concluded
that the Army might benefit from its holding in Hil/.64
In addition, the court stated that military employment decisions would be entitled
to greater deference than civilian employment decisions under Title Vu . 65 Although
holding that service in the armed forces is a form of employment, the court nonetheless
recognized that, because of its need for discipline, the military of necessity cannot be as
sensitive to individual rights as civilian employers. 66 The court therefore reasoned that
it would be inappropriate to apply the same standard of review to military employment
decisions as that applied to civilian employment decisions. 67 The court noted that in
other contexts the Supreme Court had recognized the military's need for discipline and
applied a deferential standard of review to military decisions." Although the cases
establishing a deferential standard of review were based on the United States Constitu-
tion, the Hill court reasoned that it was necessary to give great deference to the military
regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the claim." Recognizing, therefore, that applying
a more rigid standard of review would potentially undermine discipline in the armed
forces," the Hill court held that the judiciary should not intervene in a military policy
decision" unless the decision was clearly erroneous, with adverse effects present at the
time of trial."
Applying this deferential standard of review, the Hill court found that the defen-
dants did not violate Title VII." The court noted that an employer74 does not violate
Title VII where it makes decisions on the basis of gender if gender is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the position." The court reasoned 'that federal
68 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1241, 40 FEP Cases at 1453-54.
66 Id. at 1240-41, 40 FEP Cases at 1452-53.
67 See Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1240-41;40 FEP Cases at 1452-53.
68 Id. at 1240-41, 40 FEP Cases at 1453 (thing Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 40
FEP Cases 543 (1986) (military regulation did not violate first amendment's free exercise clause);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 34 FEP Cases 1846 (1983) (uniformed military personnel have
no implied right of action under Constitution against superiors for injuries due to race discrimi-
nation); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (serviceman convicted for speeches against Vietnam
war)).
69 Id, at 1241, 40 FEP Cases at 1953.
70 Id. The court emphasized the importance of discipline in the armed forces: "[discipline]
becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes
combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline
and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly
different from civilian patterns." Id, (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 34 FEP Cases
1846, 1848 (1983)).
" Id. at 1241, 40 FEP Cases at 1453-54. The court noted that day-to-day decisions in the
military, which the court considered to be more crucial to military discipline than policy decisions,
would be entitled to greater deference. Id. at 1241, 40 FEP Cases at 1453.
72 Id. at 1241, 40 FEP Cases at 1453-59.
" Id. at 1242, 40 FEP Cases at 1454.
'4 Although the Hill court did not consider the United States an employer for the purposes of
liability under Title VII, see supra note 34, the court apparently determined that the United States
was an employer for the purposes of exceptions to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(I) (1982).
76 Hill, 534 F. Supp. at 1238, 40 FEP Cases at 1451 (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1)). Section
2000e-2(e)(1) provides in part: "[An employer may employ an individual] on the basis of his religion,
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Statutes which prohibited women from serving in combat positions in the Navy and Air
Force established a BFOQ exception to Title VII." Although no federal statute codified
the Army's policy of prohibiting women from combat positions, the court nonetheless
concluded that the policy should be given the same weight as a statute.77 The court
therefore held that being male was a BFOQ for a combat position, and that the Army
therefore could lawfully prohibit women from those positions."
The court then examined the Army's reclassification of the NBC Specialist position
as a combat position, and determined that this decision was not clearly erroneous." The
court reasoned that, although there may have been flaws in the study upon which the
reclassification was based," these flaws were not sufficient to violate Title VII. 8 ' The
court stated, furthermore, that the defendants' subsequent reopening of the position to
women indicated that the Army was acting in good faith.82 According to the court, a
clearly erroneous standard allows the military the flexibility to change its policy and to
make mistakes." Thus, the Hill court determined that the defendants did not violate
Title VII by closing the NBC Specialist position to women.84
The Hill court's application of Title VII to uniformed military personnel is a sig-
nificant departure from prior case law." By reviewing the Army's employment decision
with extreme deference under Title VII, however, the Hill court followed the general
rule that the judiciary should refrain from intervening in military decisions." The Hill
court was justified both in holding that the plaintiff had rights under Title VII, and in
reviewing the reclassification of the position with deference.
Section 2000e-16(a) of Title VII on its face does not distinguish between civilian
and uniformed military personnel. 87 The Hill court's detailed analysis of the terms
"employee" and "military departments" demonstrates convincingly that there are no
indications Congress intended to exclude uniformed military personnel from Title VII. 88
In the absence of any clear congressional guidance to the contrary, the plain language
of section 2000e-16(a) indicates that Title VII protects both civilian and uniformed
military personnel."
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex,
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
business or enterprise ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e)(1).
76 Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1239-40, 40 FEP Cases at 1452 (citing 10
10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1982) (Air Force)).
" Id. at 1240, 40 FEP Cases at 1452.
m Id.
" Id, at 1242, 40 FEP Cases at 1454.
80 Id. The plaintiff pointed out that the study's use of statistics was questionable, that women
had little input in the study, and that male commanders may have requested the study because of
a bias against women. Id.
81 Id.
86 Id. For a discussion of the time sequence of the Army's closing and subsequent reopening of
the NBC Specialist position, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
86 Hell, 635 F. Supp. at 1241, 1242, 40 FEP Cases at 1454.
" Id. at 1243, 40 FEP Cases at 1455.
as For a list of cases holding that Title VII covers only civilian military personnel, see supra
note 5.
86 See cases cited supra note 68.
87 For the text of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) (1982), see supra note 2.
" See supra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.
89 See Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1238, 40 FEP Cases at 1451.
or national origin is a bona
operation of that particular
U.S.C. § 6015 (1982) (Navy);
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Having rights under Title VII will affect uniformed military personnel in a number
of ways. Plaintiffs will benefit from Title VIPs broad protection against employment
discrimination. In challenging employment decisions under a statute other than Title
VII," or the Constitution," a plaintiff may utilize only a disparate treatment theory of
discrimination, and consequently must prove the employer's discriminatory motivation."
Under Title VII, however, a plaintiff may also challenge an employment selection device
with a disparate impact theory of discrimination, which does not require that the plaintiff
prove discriminatory motivation." Consequently, when challenging certain military de-
cisions,94 uniformed personnel will be relieved of the burden of proving the decision-
maker's discriminatory intent."
Military plaintiffs, however, will be bound by Title VII's procedural requirements."
Federal employees with rights under Title VII are required to bring their claims of
employment discrimination under Title VII exclusively." To preserve their claims, plain-
tiffs therefore must follow the administrative procedures and adhere to the statute of
limitations set out by Title VII." Furthermore, Title VII will limit the remedies available
to plaintiffs." Thus, although plaintiffs will gain a significant advantage through the use
of disparate impact theory, they must adhere to Title VII's strict procedural require-
ments.
Furthermore, under Hill military plaintiffs will not enjoy the same protection from
Title VII as civilian plaintiffs because of the court's deferential review of military em-
ployment decisions. The Hill court's deferential review, however, is appropriate. Courts
have traditionally exercised restraint in reviewing or intervening in military matters.'"
This judicial restraint is based in part on a recognition of the need for discipline in the
armed services.'" Courts have recognized that military organizations are unique in that
" See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 29 FEP Cases
139, 146 (1982) (42 U.S.C. § 1981).
gl See, e.g., Washington v, Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 12 FEP Cases 1415, 1418 (1976) (fifth
amendment's equal protection component).
92 See supra notes 90-91. For a discussion of disparate treatment theory, see supra note 16.
"See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-432, 3 FEP Cases 175, 177-78 (1971).
'" A disparate impact theory is usually available to challenge only an objective selection device,
such as a scored test, which has a disproportionate impact on a protected class. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 82-83.
95 In Johnson v. Alexander, for example, because the plaintiff was denied rights under Title VII,
he was unable to utilize disparate impact theory to challenge an Army regulation which limited the
enlistment of people who had "frequent encounters with the law." 572 F.2d 1219, 1220, 1224, 16
FEP Cases 894, 895, 898 (8th Cir. 1978). In contrast, civilian plaintiffs have successfully challenged
similar employment policies prohibiting the hiring of people with arrest or conviction records under
disparate impact theory. E.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir.
1975).
w See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
97
 Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829, 12 FEP Cases 1361, 1364 (1976).
98
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). For a discussion of these requirements, see supra note 18.
99 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) limits a plaintiff's relief under Title VII to reinstatement,
backpay, or other equitable relief. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for example, a plaintiff alleging dis-
crimination may obtain compensatory or punitive damages, Johnson v. Railroad Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), although sovereign immunity may bar damages in cases against the
federal government. Brown, 425 U.S. at 827 n.8, 12 FEP Cases at 1363 n.8.
'Go See Harris, Protection., Against Discrimination Afforded to Uniformed Military Personnel: Sources
and Directions, 46 Mo. L. REV. 265, 309 (1981).
101 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Judicial restraint in military matters is also based
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they must enforce a standard of discipline which would be unacceptable in a civilian
context.'" Although noting that military service is a form of employment,'" the court
recognized that it is different from civilian employment.]°' Thus, in applying Title VII
to military employment decisions, the court in Hill correctly accounted for the unique
relationship between military personnel and the government by applying a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review to the reclassification decision.
In contrast to other jurisdictions, the court in Hill held that uniformed military
personnel are protected from employment discrimination under Title VII.'" Because
they have rights under Title VII, military plaintiffs will be able to utilize a disparate
impact theory of discrimination to challenge certain military decisions.'" The Hill court,
however, applied a deferential, "clearly erroneous" standard of review to military em-
ployment decisions.'" Therefore, under Hill, military plaintiffs will not receive the same
protection under Title VII as civilian plaintiffs. Moreover, Title VII will provide military
plaintiffs with their exclusive remedy for employment discrimination.'" Consequently,
to preserve their claims, victims of employment discrimination in the military must
adhere to Title VII's administrative procedures and statute of limitations.'"
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. *Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson'
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee on the basis of sex. 2 Following the Guidelines of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 3 the lower federal courts recognize two
causes of action for workplace sexual harassment as illegal sex discrimination under
on separation of powers concerns. See Note, Federal judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions,
51 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 612, 614 (1983). Because the Constitution grants the President and Congress
power over the military, courts have been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over the military without
authority from Congress or the Executive Branch. See id.
LOS Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 34 FEP Cases 1846, 1848 (1983).
303 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
3 " See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
1 07 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
3 " See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
LOU See supra note 18 and accompanying text,
* By Alan J. Applebaum, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW Review.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 40 FEP Cases 1822 (1986).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(01), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter Title VII].
Title VII provides:
[It is] an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I).
' The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) characterizes sexual harassment
in the workplace as a form of employment discrimination. 29 C.F,R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). According
to the EEOC, sexual harassment includes lulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature," id., even if it does not involve an exchange
of sexual favors for job benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985).
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Title VII. First, courts have recognized a cause of action if a female employee's continued
employment, promotion, evaluation, or other job-related interest is conditioned on her
accepting the sexual advance of a male superior ("quid pro quo" sexual harassment).*
Second, courts have held that harassment which is severe or pervasive enough to create
an offensive or hostile work environment is also actionable even where no tangible job
detriment results. 5 Courts agree that petty slights or insults will not trigger a Title VII
claim; the harassment must be so severe and offensive that it rises to the level of a "term
or condition" of the plaintiff's employment. 6
Although lower federal courts have unanimously recognized that sexual harassment
is a form of sex discrimination which violates Title VII, the question of when an employer
is vicariously liable when one employee sexually harasses another has depended on which
type of harassment the plaintiff alleges. The EEOC Guidelines suggest that courts hold
an employer strictly liable for the discriminatory actions of its employees.' Courts gen-
erally have held employers strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors
having authority over the plaintiff. 5
 Courts have tended not to find an employer strictly
liable, however, for "hostile environment" type harassment committed by its employees. 9
In general, courts find an employer liable for "hostile environment" sexual harassment
only when the employer has actual knowledge of the harassment, or if the harassment
is so severe and pervasive that "constructive knowledge" can be imputed to. the em-
ployer.'° Only where the offending employee was the plaintiff's supervisor has a court
held the employer strictly liable, without actual or constructive knowledge of the ha-
rassment."
4 Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49, 16 FEP Cases 22, 25
(3rd Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990, 15 FEP Cases 345, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
5
 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901, 29 FEP Cases 787, 790-91 (11th Cir. 1982);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945, 24 FEP Cases 1155, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5 See, e.g., Scott v. Sears Roebuck, 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1050-51, 1055, 37 FEP Cases 878, 880,
884 (N.D. III. 1985) (no "hostile environment" harassment created by mere flirting, winking, and
implied "propositions" by plaintiff's fellow auto mechanics).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985).
5 E.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 81, 33 FEP Cases 187, 190 (3rd Cir. 1983);
Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213, 20 FEP Cases 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979).
9 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255, 31 FEP Cases 1521, 1524 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson,
682 F.2d at 910, 29 FEP Cases at 799 (actual or constructive knowledge required for employer
liability for "hostile environment" even where the wrongdoer is a supervisor).
LO See supra note 9.
" Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50, 36 FEP Cases 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Vinson,
the appeals court found that:
[An employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of the occurrence.
Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604,11(c)). For a similar rationale, see Henson, 682 F.2d
at 913, 29 FEP Cases at 801 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (employer should
be strictly liable even for "hostile environment" harassment if the offender is plaintiff's supervisor,
but actual or constructive knowledge should be required if offender is plaintiff's co-worker). The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had previously expressed its approval of strict employer liability for
hostile environment harassment in Bundy, but did not reach the strict liability question because it
held that the plaintiff's employer had constructive knowledge of the harassment and thus was liable
under either rule, Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943, 24 FEP Cases at 1159.
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During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court considered a Title VII
sexual harassment claim for the first time in Merilor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,I 2 and
unanimously recognized both the sex-for-job benefits ("quid pro quo") form of harassment
and the "hostile work environment" type of harassmant as valid causes of action under
Title V11. 0 The Court declined to decide whether an employer is strictly liable for
"hostile environment" sexual harassment by one of its supervisors." The Court reasoned
that because workplace sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, recognition
of a cause of action for sexual harassment would further Congress's intent in enacting
Title VII. 15
In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson, the plaintiff, brought a Title VII action against her
former employer Meritor Savings Bank ("the bank"), claiming that Sidney Taylor, one
of the bank's vice-presidents and the branch manager of Vinson's place of work, had
sexually harassed her during most of her term of employment there."' At trial, the
parties presented conflicting testimony concerning whether Taylor had sexually harassed
Vinson." Vinson claimed that Taylor had pressured her into having sex with him on
forty or fifty occasions, had raped her on several occasions, and fondled her in front of
other employees during working hours." Vinson alleged that she had tolerated Taylor's
behavior because she feared she would lose her job if she did not comply.]' Taylor denied
these charges and asserted that Vinson had fabricated them because of an unrelated
business dispute. 20
Without resolving these factual questions, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia entered judgment in favor of the bank, concluding that the evidence
did not show that Vinson had suffered sexual harassment which violated Title VII."
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
holding that the creation of a "hostile environment" violates Title VII, and remanded
for a determination of whether Taylor's behavior created such an environment. 22 The
court also held that an employer is strictly liable for "hostile environment" harassment
committed by the plaintiff's supervisor or any other employee with apparent or actual
authority over the plaintiff."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court in part, holding that
a valid Title VII claim exists not merely when an employee must submit to sexual
17 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 40 FEP Cases 1822 (1986).
15 Id. at 2405-06. 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
14 id. at 2408, 40 FEY Cases at 1829,
15 Id. at 2406, 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
16 Id. at 2402, 40 FEP Cases at 1824.
17 Id.
15 Id.
is Id.
2" Id. at 2403, 40 FE? Cases at 1824,
21 Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FEP Cases 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1980). The court did not explicitly state the
ground on which it made this finding. See Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2406, 40 FE? Cases at 1827. It is
probable that the court did not recognize a cause of action under a "hostile environment" theory,
because the trial occurred before the Bundy case, announcing the theory, had been decided. See
Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945, 24 FEP Cases at 1161. In the absence of such a theory, the court could
have found that because Vinson's job benefits were not conditioned on her granting sexual favors
to Taylor, she did not suffer actionable sexual harassment.
77 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 152, 36 FE? Cases at 1431.
25 Id. at 149-50, 36 FE? Cases at 1430.
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advances to gain or retain job benefits, but also when a sexually hostile or abusive
environment exists at the worksite. 24 The Court began by rejecting the bank's argument
that Congress intended Title VII to apply only to quid pro quo sexual harassment and
not to sexual harassment affecting only the psychological aspects of the work environ-
ment. 25 The Court reasoned that the language of Title VII did not prevent the phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" from being read to include psycholog-
ical harassment in the workplace." Instead, the Court gave substantial deference to the
1980 EEOC Guidelines, which explicitly stated that a sexual harassment claim is not
limited to an economic quid pro quo." The majority recognized that both the EEOC and
lower federal courts have determined that Title VII provides a right to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Therefore,
the Court concluded, the district court erred if it dismissed Vinson's claim because it
refused to recognize the "hostile evironment" theory on which her claim was based. 29
Having affirmed the validity of a Title VII "hostile environment" sexual harassment
claim, the Court then considered the question of whether Vinson had stated a cause of
action under this theory." While noting that not all workplace harassment rises to the
level of a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment, the Court asserted that the
facts alleged by Vinson easily , met this standard." The Court speculated that the district
court, although it may have recognized the validity of a Title VII "hostile environment"
claim, may have rejected Vinson's claim because it determined that she had engaged in
voluntary sexual relations with Taylor. 32 A "hostile environment" plaintiff's voluntary
compliance with sexual advances does not defeat her claim, the Court stated." Rather,
the Court determined that the correct test is whether the advances were "unwelcome." 34
Although it approved Vinson's cause of action under Title VII for sexual harassment
due to a "hostile environment," the Court declined to resolve the question of whether
the bank should be held strictly liable for sexual harassment by their employee Taylor."
The Court noted that the EEOC Guidelines hold an employer strictly liable for the acts
24 Meritar, 106 S. Ct. at 2405-06, 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
25 Id. at 2404, 40 FEP Cases at 1826.
26 Id.
" Id. at 2405, 90 FEP Cases at 1826 (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). According to the
Court, the EEOC Guidelines gave persuasive, although not binding, guidance to the interpretation
of Title VII. Id.
28 Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 4 FEP Cases 92 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957, 4 FEP Cases 771 (1972); 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1972)).
29 Id. at 2406, 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
20 Id.
31 Id. ("Respondent's allegations in this case — which include not only pervasive harassment
but also criminal conduct ... are plainly sufficient to state a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual
harassment.").
32 Id.
22 Id.
34 Id. The Court commented that the court of appeals had incorrectly instructed the district
court in its remand that evidence concerning Vinson's dress and personal fantasies were inadmissible
on the question of whether she found Taylor's advances "unwelcome." Id. at 2407, 90 FEP Cases
at 1827-28. The Court stated that this evidence was "obviously relevant," and that it was within the
district court's discretion to admit it in any case. The Court reiterated that appellate courts must
defer to a trial court's determination of the prejudicial and probative value of evidence. Id. at 2407,
40 FEP Cases at 1828.
55 Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
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of its agents." The Court continued, however, by acknowledging that the EEOC had
argued against strict liability in "hostile environment" sex discrimination claims in its
amicus brief." This argument, the Court noted, was in "tension" with the EEOC Guide-
lines, which appeared to hold employers strictly liable for all forms of Title VII discrim-
ination." In view of the unresolved facts of the current case and the ambiguity of the
EEOC's position, the Court declined to establish a rule regarding employer liability."
The Court merely denied the court of appeals' assertion that employers, even absent
actual or constructive knowledge, are always strictly liable for sexual harassment com-
mitted by their supervisors.°
In deciding against the automatic imposition of strict liability, the Court inferred
that Congress intended to place some limit on employer liability for actions of employees
because Title V II's definition of "employer" includes any "agent" of an employer." The
Court noted that both Congress and the EEOC intended that courts use agency principles
in interpreting Title VII.4 2 Because these principles often hold employers strictly liable
for actions of their employees, and courts have consistently held employers strictly liable
for Title VII violations other than "hostile environment" sex discrimination,43 the Court
commented that employer ignorance, while not insulating the employer from liability,
would not necessarily prevent employer liability either.'"
Although declining to announce a bright-line rule regarding employer liability, the
Court noted that the existence and nature of an employee grievance procedure was
relevant to, although not dispositive of, the question of employer liability. 45 The Court
rejected the bank's claim that merely because it had an employee grievance procedure
which the plaintiff had failed to invoke it was insulated from liability for sexual harass-
ment committed by Taylor. 46 In the instant case, the Court noted that the bank's pro-
cedures and policies were not specifically directed at sexual harassment, and therefore
5!i
	
The Court also stated that when considering Title VII racial harassment claims, the
federal courts have consistently held employers strictly liable for discriminatory actions of super-
visors. Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1828 (citing Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc.,
464 F.2d 723, 724, 4 FEP Cases 987, 988 (fith Cir. 1972)).
57 Id. at 2407-08, 40 FEP Cases at 1828-29 (citing Brief for United States and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 26, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106
S. Ct. 2399, 40 FE? Cases 1823 (1986)). The EEOC argued that because the plaintiff's work status
was not affected by "hostile environment" harassment, the offender was not exercising power
granted by the employer; therefore the common-law agency principles which led to the general
rule imputing supervisor discrimination to the employer should not apply to "hostile environment"
cases. Id. at 2407-08, 40 FEP Cases at 1828-29. According to the EEOC brief, the Court noted, if
an employer has a grievance procedure by which an employee could file a sexual harassment
complaint, but fails to do so, the employer should not be liable. Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1828.
The Court also commented, however, that an employer could be held to have "constructive knowl-
edge" of discriminatory activity if the prohibited activity was pervasive or sufficiently long-lasting.
Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
56 Id.
39 Id.
" Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 2407-08, 40 FEP Cases at 1828.
" Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
45 Id. at 2408-09, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
46 See id.
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did not alert bank employees to the bank's concern about that form of discrimination."
Moreover, the Court continued, the bank's procedure required Vinson to complain to
her supervisor, Taylor, the very individual who had allegedly harassed her. 48 The Court
commented that Vinson's failure to complain would have strengthened the bank's case
only if its grievance procedure had been designed so as to encourage her to report the
harassment.49
Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens," in which he argued that an employer is strictly liable under Title VII for
sexual harassment by supervisors. 51
 Asserting that the question of employer liability was
properly before the Court, 52 Justice Marshall then urged the application of the EEOC
Guidelines to the question of employer liability in Title VII "hostile environment" sexual
harassment claims." The Court had previously held that these Guidelines were to be
accorded great deference, Justice Marshall noted. 54 The Guidelines, according to the
concurrence, hold employers strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisors. 55 Ar-
guing that strict liability for "hostile environment" sexual harassment would be a logical
extension of Title VII precedent, Justice Marshall stated that federal courts were unan-
imous in holding employers strictly liable not only for race-related Title VII violations,
but also for quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors. 56
In addition to his arguments that EEOC Guidelines and Title VII precedent sup-
ported a rule of strict employer liability for "hostile environment" sexual harassment,
Justice Marshall also argued for a strict liability rule on policy grounds." Justice Marshall
reasoned that the rule of strict employer liability under Title VII for discrimination by
4' Id. at 2409, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
4a id.
49 Id.
5° Id. at 2409, 40 FE? Cases at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens
wrote a short concurrence in which he simply stated that he agreed with both the other opinions
and saw no inconsistency between them. Id. at 2411, 40 FE? Cases at 1829 (Stevens, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 2411, 40 FE? Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
52 Id. at 2409, 40 FEP Cases at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority
did not defer to the EEOC's position because the EEOC's amicus brief argued against strict liability,
contrary to the Guidelines. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
55
 Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2409-10, 40 FEP Cases at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment).
" Id. at 2409, 40 FEP Cases at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34, 3 FEP Cases 175, 179 (1971)).
55 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c),(d) (1985)). The Guidelines do not distinguish between quid
pro quo and "hostile environment" sexual harassment on the question of employer liability. See
generally EEOC Guidlines, 29 C.F.R §1 1604.11(c),(d) (1985). They do distinguish between supervisor
and co-worker harassment, however. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985) (employers strictly liable
for sexual harassment committed by the plaintiff's supervisor) with 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1985)
(no strict liability for sexual harassment committed by the plaintiff's co-worker; employers liable
for harassment by co-workers only when the employer has actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment).
55
 Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2410, 40 FEP Cases at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)..
57 See id. at 2411, 40 FEP Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). The
concurring Justice stated that the Solicitor General, in his brief arguing against strict liability for
"hostile environment" sexual harassment, had incorrectly distinguished the "hostile environment"
situation from other discriminatory treatment for which the Guidelines hold employers strictly
liable. Id. at 2410-11, 40 FEP Cases at 1831.
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supervisors is based on the notion that the employer who granted the offender economic
power over the victim should be responsible for its abuse." It is this grant of power
which makes both "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harassment possible,
Justice Marshall noted, because in both situations the threat of economic retribution may
deter the victim from resisting harassment."
Not only is "hostile environment" sexual harassment an abuse of the employer's
grant of power, Justice Marshall continued, but it is also a dereliction of the supervisor's
duty." A supervisor's duties include not merely making economic decisions about an
employee, but also providing a safe, productive workplace, Justice Marshall noted. 61
Therefore, the concurring opinion suggested, both types of sexual harassment involve
an abuse of the offender's authority over the victim as well as an abuse of the respon-
sibility delegated by the employer. 62 Because the policy considerations underlying the
EEOC Guidelines' strict liability rule for other types of Title VII discrimination thus
apply to "hostile environment" discrimination as well, Justice Marshall argued, the rule
should be extended to include "hostile environment" discrimination.°
Justice Marshall concluded by noting that a rule imposing strict liability would not
necessarily be unfair to employers." In a typical "hostile environment" case, the plaintiff
seeks not money damages, but an injunction, Justice Marshall stated. 65 According to
Justice Marshall, Title VII requires the EEOC to notify an employer when an employee
files a discrimination complaint, and, if it finds the complaint to be based on reasonable
cause, to attempt to remedy the offending practice through persuasion." Therefore,
Justice Marshall implied, an employer is not harmed by a rule of "strict liability" when
only an injunction is involved, because the injunction merely notifies the employer of
the complaint and requires future efforts to remedy the situation. 67 If an employer
actually had effective internal procedures in place to address sexual harassment, so that
it would be unfair to hold it liable without notice, the employer could set these procedures
in motion upon receiving notice of plaintiff's complaint and thereby stave off an in-
junction, Justice Marshall reasoned. 66 In constrast, when a "hostile environment" plaintiff
seeks money damages in the form of back pay on a theory of constructive termination,
Justice Marshall continued, a court, even if it holds the employer liable, need not award
damages when the plaintiff purposely bypassed existing, effective grievance proce-
dures. 69 Therefore, Justice Marshall suggested, a strict liability rule puts an employer at
58 Id. at 2410, 40 FE? Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). The offender
in a "hostile environment" claim, even though not exercising work-related authority over the victim
or acting in the scope of employment, is still abusing the employer's grant of power, Justice Marshall
explained. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
39 Id. at 2411, 40 FE? Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) ("it is precisely
because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to
impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates").
60 Id, at 2410, 40 FEP Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
62 Id. at 2410-11, 40 FEP Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
63 Id. at 2411, 40 FE? Cases at 1831 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
64 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
6" Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
67 See generally id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 Id, (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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greater risk only if the employer has no effective grievance procedure available to the
plaintiff.7°
Merilor is an important landmark in the development of employment discrimination
law because for the first time the Supreme Court recognized that workplace sexual
harassment is a form of illegal employment discrimination. The Court applied prior
caselaw and the EEOC Guidelines in holding that abusive, sexually-related behavior at
the workplace can be a substantial impediment to equal employment opportunity, even
when the defendant has not conditioned job benefits on sexual favors but has merely
created an abusive or offensive environment at the workplace." In its decision, the Court
correctly noted that sexual harassment in the workplace is "every bit the arbitrary barrier
to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." 72
The Supreme Court in Merilor also announced an important principle for evaluating
"hostile environment" discrimination claims by refusing to dismiss Vinson's complaint
because she had voluntarily engaged in sexual relations with Taylor. The Court correctly
recognized that Vinson's acquiescence in Taylor's advances did not go to the relevant
question of whether the advances themselves constituted sexual harassment under the
EEOC Guidelines. 73 As the appeals court noted, a victim of sexual harassment should
not be forced to choose between acquiesence in harassment, overtly resisting it on a
regular basis, resigning from her job, or submitting to the sexual advances and thus
losing her chance for redress." The correct inquiry, as the Court stated, is whether
Taylor's advances were not only unwelcome but also severe and pervasive enough to
constitute a "term or condition" of her employment. 75
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide as clear a guidepost on the question of
employer liability as it did on the existence of the two types of Title VII sexual harassment
70 See generally id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 2405-06, 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
72 Id. at 2406, 40 FEP Cases at 1827.
73 Id.
74 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146, 36 FEP Cases at 1427.
" Merilor, 106 S. Ct. at 2406, 40 FEP Cases at 1827. The-Court easily characterized Taylor's
alleged behavior as severe and pervasive enough to constitute a term or condition of Vinson's
employment. Id. See also supra note 28. The standard normally used by federal courts to determine
whether such behavior is a "term or condition" of employment is an objective one. See, e.g., Scott
v. Sears Roebuck, 605 F. Supp: 1047, 1050-51, 1055, 37 FEP Cases 878, 880, 884 (N.D. III. 1985).
The Scott court noted that "'[t]he focus should be on defendant's conduct, not on plaintiff's
perception or reaction.'" Id. at 1056, 37 FEP Cases at 884 (quoting Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101
F.R.D. 549, 551, 34 FEP Cases 1423, 1425 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
The Court's ruling that evidence concerning Vinson's dress and sexual fantasies was not per se
inadmissible on the question of whether she found Taylor's sexual advances unwelcome, Meritor,
106 S. Ct. at 2407, 40 FEP Cases at 1828, comports with the deference usually accorded trial judges.
The court of appeals, however, formulated the better approach when it said that "[a] woman does
not waive her Title VII rights by her sartorial or whimsical proclivities ...." Vinson v. Taylor, 753
F.2d at 146 n.36, 36 FEP Cases at 1427 n.36 (citing Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944, 945-46, 24 FEP Cases
at 1155, 1161-62). The relevant question is whether Vinson communicated to Taylor her dislike
for his advances, not what her fantasies were. The Court, in stating that Vinson's dress and fantasies
were "obviously relevant" to the question of whether the advances were unwelcome, Meritor, 106 S.
Ct. at 2407, 40 FEP Cases at 1828, seems to assume that a woman's dress and fantasies are to be
• taken as an actual expression of desire. The "rape shield law," Feo. EVID. 412(a), acknowledges that
a woman's past sexual history is not relevant to the question of whether she consented to intercourse
on a particular occasion. A similar rule might be appropriate in the sexual harassment area as well.
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claims. The Court rejected the easily-applied rules that the employer is always or never
strictly liable," thereby assuring that the employer liability issue will continue to be a
source of fact-bound litigation in future "hostile environment" claims. Nevertheless, the
Court did provide some guidance in resolving the question of employer liability, com-
menting that a defendant employer would be aided by a showing that the plaintiff had
bypassed a realistic existing grievance procedure," and that common-law agency prin-
ciples should apply in determining whether the offender was an "agent" of the em-
ployer.78
A rule of strict liability as proposed in Justice Marshall's concurrence, however,
would have better served the goal of voluntary employer cooperation with Title VII. If
employers are held strictly liable for sexual harassment in the workplace, the threat of
employee lawsuits will give employers an incentive to take preventive measures against
it, lacking any other way of avoiding liability. This incentive to employers should provide
an effective tool to rid the workplace of sexual harassment. As Justice Marshall argues,
a rule of strict liability will motivate employers to institute effective grievance procedures
for use by victims of sexual harassment." The need to implement grievance procedures
will increase employer awareness that sexual harassment at the workplace is a problem
employers must address. Employers, who have economic power over their supervisors,
are in a good position to dissuade these supervisors from unacceptable behavior once
the employers are aware of it. Safe, effective means of communicating the problem to
management will ensure that victims of sexual harassment report it to their employers. 80
Although the Court did not set out a specific test for employer liability, it correctly
rejected the arguMent that an employer must always have actual or constructive knowl-
edge of sexual harassment to be held liable. A rule requiring actual or constructive notice
would send employers the wrong message. Those employers who prefer, either for
economic or cultural reasons, to allow workplace sexual harassment, could infer from
such a rule that as long as they remain officially ignorant of the harassment, and the
harassment is not pervasive enough to constitute "constructive notice," they need not
take steps to remedy the problem. These employers would thus have an incentive to
avoid creating grievance procedures through which an employee could effectively com-
plain of sexual harassment, because such a procedure would increase the chance that
the employer would become officially aware of the harassment, and thus be required to
remedy it. A rule requiring notice for employer liability thus discourages rather than
encourages the creation of effective grievance procedures. This defeats the intent of
Title VII, which is to foster private solutions to employment:discrimination problems. 81 .
Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
" See id, at 2409, 40 FEP Cases at 1829. The Court did take a realistic step to promote employer
cooperation, however, by indicating that the mere existence of a "paper" grievance procedure would
not be enough to shield the employer from liability. Id. at 2408-09, 40 FEP Cases at 1829. In
making this statement, the Court implicitly acknowledged that Title VII requires an employer not
only to actively discourage sexual harassment in the workplace,, but also to provide victims of
harassment with a viable private form of relief.
78 Id. at 2408, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
78 Id. at 2411, 40 FEP Cases at 1831 (Marshall, j., concurring in the judgment). See also supra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
" As the majority noted, an effective grievance procedure is one which encourages the offended
employee to step forward. Id. at 2409, 40 FEP Cases at 1829.
el The intent of Title VII is to induce employers to take preventive measures, not to encourage
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In summary, the Supreme Court in Meritor provides an important first step toward
a settled judicial interpretation of those Title VII sex discrimination claims based on
workplace sexual harassment. The decision in Meritor does not extend Title VII caselaw;
it affirms the unanimous approval in the lower courts of both the quid pro quo and "hostile
environment" theories of sexual harassment, but does not resolve a split in the circuits
concerning employer liability. Nonetheless, by recognizing at the highest judicial level
the reality that workplace sexual harassment is a form of prohibited sex discrimination
under Title VII, the decision gives a boost to sexual equality in the workplace.
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. *Classification of Professional Corporation Members as Employees Under the ADEA:
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or Act) makes it unlawful for
an employer to discharge or to refuse to hire any individual solely on account of that
individual's age.2 Although the statute expressly applies to "any individual," judicial
decisions hold that an "individual" must be an employee in order to receive the Act's
protection." The Act defines employee as an individual employed by any employer.' In
turn, "employer" is defined as a "person" 5 employing twenty or more employees and
engaged in an industry which affects commerce.5
 Because of the Act's circular definition
of employee, the issue of whether the ADEA's protection extends to a particular claimant
often arises.
Although the statutory language defining "employee" is vague, a line of cases has
developed which provides some guidance in determining whether a particular individual
them to look the other way. See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 151, 36 FEP Cases at 1431. As the appeals court
noted,
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropri-
ate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue
of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id. at 151 n. 80, 36 FEP Cases at 1431 n. 80 (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1 984 )).
* By Stephen W. Bernstein, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 41 FEP Cases 183 (2d Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). § 623(a)(1) provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age ....
Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 980, 33 FEP Cases 487, 488 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing
Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 31 FEP Cases 238 (5th Cir. 1983)).
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982).
5 Person is defined as:
One or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations,
business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized groups of persons. 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(a) (1982).
U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
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is protected under the ADEA. 7 These cases make clear that officers, directors and high
level executives are employees for purposes of the ADEA and are therefore protected. 9
In contrast, courts do not consider partners employees under anti-discrimination statutes
by reason of their ability to control and operate the business. 9 In determining whether
an individual is a partner or an employee, the prevailing standard focuses on the
individual's co-ownership, ability to control the business and determine compensation,
and his or her responsibility for administering profits and losses." Where an individual
possesses such proprietary interests, control and responsibilities, courts and the EEOC
will treat him or her as a partner, and thus deny coverage under the Act."
In the few cases that address the issue, courts have not uniformly resolved whether
member-shareholders of a professional corporation" are employees or partners." In
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
7 See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop. Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Zimmerman v. North Am.
Signal Co„ 704 F.2d 347, 31 FEP Cases 634 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. First Catholic Siovack Ladies
Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 30 FE? Cases 819 (6th Cir, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819, 32 FEP Cases
1672 (1983); Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 25 FEP Cases 355 (2d Cir. 1981); Hoy
v. Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 27 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1168,868 (1954).
8 See supra note 7 for precedent protecting officers, directors and high level executives under
the ADEA,
9 EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 930, 38 FEP Cases 1846, 1847 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1263 (1986). Courts likewise hold that partners are not employees
for purposes of Title VII. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 77, 34 FEP Cases
1406, 1410 (1984); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869, 15 FEP Cases 34, 35 (7th Cir. 1977);
EEOC decision No. 85-4, EM,'. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6845 at 7040 (Mar. 18, 1985).
EEOC decision No. 85-4 at 7041 n.4.
1 1 Id.
12 Professional corporations are statutory creations of the 1960s. J. CRANE & A. 13ttomagitc,
Law OF PARTNERSHIP 184 (1968). They developed as a means of providing favorable tax benefits
as well as affording professionals the ability to create defined benefit pension plans for themselves
while still maintaining a professional association, with others. See R. HamwroN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS, 31-36 (3d ed. 1986). Member-shareholders of these corporations must be
licensed to practice by a professional regulatory body and the members' interest cannot be trans•
ferred except to another licensed professional. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP at
184-85. According to one court,
A professional corporation has numerous legitimate business purposes. By conducting
a ... practice through the structure of a professional corporation, its shareholders
realize the advantages of more orderly business operations, greater ease in acquiring,
holding and transferring property, and more continuity of existence. Additionally, a
professional corporation affords to its shareholders insulation against liability for
obligations which do not arise as a result of a breach of a (professional's] obligation to
his client or an act of professional malpractice. The shareholders of a professional
corporation have the same insulation from liability as shareholders of other corpora-
tions with respect to obligations of a purely business and nonprofessional nature.
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 846, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, in regard to liability arising out of the professional's own misdeeds, a corporate
veil does not exist and hence, there is no distinction between partnerships and professional cor-
porations. Id. at 847, 302 S.E.2d at 676, That is, a member of a professional corporation is not only
responsible for his own malpractice but also for those acts by other members of the firm. Id.
"Compare EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 763 F.2d 1177, 34 FEP Cases 1815 (7th Cir. 1984)
(shareholder in professional corporation similar to partner and is not an employee under Title VII)
with Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 41 FEP Cases 183 (2d Cir. 1986)
(shareholder of professional corporation designated an employee and held not a partner under the
ADEA).
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held that under Title VII a. shareholder in a professional corporation is not an em-
ployee.' 4 The court reasoned that the role of a shareholder in a professional corporation
is more like a partner in a partnership, and therefore, professional corporation members
are not employees for purposes of Title VII. 15
During the Survey year, in Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit departed from the Dowd court's reasoning
under Title VII and held that shareholder-members of a professional corporation who
are designated as employees of the corporation, are employees and not partners under
the ADEA. 16 In Hyland, the appeals court ruled that because New Haven Radiology
Associates (NHRA) had elected favorable tax treatment by its decision to incorporate as
a professional corporation, it could not escape the remedial sanctions of the Act by
claiming that it was a partnership and its members partners," The court reasoned that
because the roles of corporate employee and partner are mutually exclusive, use of the
corporate form precludes any examination designed to determine whether the entity is
a partnership. 18 Thus, according to the court, individuals employed by a corporation are
employees and are protected under the Act. 1 ° Consequently, after Hyland, there is a split
between the Second and Seventh Circuits regarding the classification of member-share-
holders of professional corporations as employees for the purposes of anti-discrimination
statutes.
In 1977, the plaintiff, Hyland, and four other radiologists organized NHRA as a
professional corporation. 2° As part of the member-shareholder agreement, each member
contributed equal amounts of capital, and received in return equal shares of stock and
equal compensation. 2 ' Furthermore, all member-shareholders were officers and directors
of the group, had an equal voice in management and shared equally in all profits and
losses. 22
As part of the incorporation process, each shareholder signed a separate two-year
renewable employment agreement. 23 The agreement provided that each member would
be compensated $60,000 annually and that each was required to be "a full time employee
of the company during the term of [the] agreement." 24 The agreement also provided
14 Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 763 F.2d at 1178, 34 FEP Cases at 1816.
' 2 1d.
16 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
17 Id.
Id.
19 Id.
20 See supra note 12 for discussion of professional corporations.
21 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 794, 41 FEP Cases at 183.
n Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 618, 37 FEP Cases 979,
979 (D. Conn. 1985), reu'd, 794 F.2d 793, 41 FEP Cases 183 (2d Cir. 1986). Additionally, the
members agreed that stock could only be held by licensed physicians and that upon death, with-
drawal, or termination of any member, that member or his or her successor in interest was required
to sell his or her stock to NHRA and NHRA was required to purchase that stock in accordance
with the valuation terms of the agreement. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 794, 41 FEP Cases at 183.
23 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 795, 41 FEP Cases at 184. It should be noted that Hyland's employment
agreement differed from the other co-founders and required him to provide six-months written
notice of his intention to leave. Id. It is unclear from the facts why Hyland was singled out for such
notice. Yet, it does not appear to affect the reasoning of the case.
24 Id. The employment agreement also required each member to comply with all company
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for disability payments, paid vacations, reimbursement for continuing professional ed-
ucation and certain other payments upon termination of employment. 25
In 1980, complaints of Hyland's unavailability, lack of cooperation, and abusive
conduct prompted the members of NHRA to ask Hyland to resign as a member and
employee. 2" Hyland, who was 51 years old at the time of his dismissal, brought an action
claiming that the group had discriminated against him on the basis of his age. 27 In
considering whether Hyland met the jurisdictional requirements of the ADEA, the
district court found that Hyland was not an employee as defined by the Act and granted
summary judgment for the corporation. 20
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling,
reasoning that although the distinction between partnerships and corporations, and thus
partners and corporate employees, is at times difficult to draw, this difficulty does not
provide a sufficient reason to ignore legal form. 29 Therefore, because NHRA had chosen
to incorporate, the court held that the group could not now protect itself by asserting
that it was, in substance, a partnership.'° As a result, the court determined that Hyland
was an employee as defined by the Act and permitted him to press forward with his age
discrimination claim. 3
The Hyland court began its analysis by acknowledging that the Act is remedial in
nature and that its provisions must be broadly interpreted to carry out its purposes. 32
According to the court, the Act's goal is to prohibit age discrimination against employ-
regulations and policies and to contribute to the group all compensation earned from their profes-
sional services and invoked a duty on all members to devote his or her best efforts to assisting
NHRA's patients. Id.
25 Id. In addition, the agreement provided that termination without cause could only result by
a vote of three-fourths of all member stockholders. Id. Seven physicians, including the plaintiff-
appellant, were member-shareholders at the time of this action. See id. at 793, 41 FEP Cases at 183.
Since the group's formation, it had offered membership to other radiologists it had employed for
a number of years. Hyland, 606 F.Supp at 618, 37 FEP Cases at 979. If admitted, the new member
would purchase stack in order to equalize his or her share with that of existing members. Id. Once
admitted, the new member would receive the same salary as the original members and would
possess the same profit sharing rights and incur the same responsibility for losses. Id.
Hyland, 794 F.2d at 795, 41 FEP Cases at 184.
27 Id. Hyland also asserted other claims in the district court, which were eventually dismissed.
See Hyland, 606 F.Supp, at 618, 37 FEP Cases at 980.
28 Hyland, 606 F.Supp. at 621, 37 FEP Cases at 982. The district court reasoned that although
NHRA was organized as a professional corporation to gain advantageous tax treatment, in reality
NHRA was operated and managed as a partnership. Id. In its analysis, the court followed two
general rules of interpretation. First, according to the court, an entity's legal status should be
ignored when necessary to avoid "exalting form over substance." Id. at 619, 37 FEP Cases at 981
(citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). Second, the court utilized an "economic realities
test," viewing the plaintiff's ownership and management interest in the group as reflecting the role
of a partner rather than an employee. Id. at 620, 37 FEP Cases at 981. The court cited Dowd and
subsequently held that because plaintiff could not separate himself from his management and
ownership role in NHRA, he therefore could not be considered an employee entitled to the
protections of the Act. Id. at 621, 37 PEP Cases at 982.
29 See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
"Id.
Id. at 798, 41 FE? Cases at 187.
32 Id. at 796, 41 FEY Cases at 184-85 (citing Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 353, 31 PEP Cases at 638;
First Catholic Slovack Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d at 1070, 30 FEP Cases at 820-21).
228	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:67
ees." With this goal in mind, the court looked to interpretations of "employee" under
similar anti-discrimination statutes."
The court first reviewed an established line of precedent and acknowledged that an
officer, director or major shareholder may be an employee for purposes of the ADEA."
Relying on additional precedent, the court further concluded that a proprietary interest
is not inherently inconsistent with an employment interest." Therefore, the court con-
cluded that officers, directors and major shareholders can be employees and thus,
protected under the Act.
The court next examined contrasting precedent that concluded that members of a
partnership are not employees for purposes of the ADEA." Specifically, the court cited
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, a Title VII sex discrimination case, to hold that the anti-
discrimination statutes do not protect members of a partnership." The Hyland court noted
that the Supreme Court in Hishon held that a member of a partnership is not an employee
for the purposes of Title VII." In Hishon, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that once a court determines that an entity is a partnership and that the claimant is a
partner within that partnership, he or she is not an employee and not entitled to benefits
under Title VII.0 Because it found that Title VII and the ADEA are similarly worded,
the Hyland court relied on Hishon to find that members of a partnership are not em-
ployees for the purposes of the ADEA. 41
Finally, the court found unpersuasive the Seventh Circuit's holding in Dowd that
members of professional corporations are not employees for the purposes of Title VI I .12
The Hyland court noted that the Dowd court held that a professional corporation is more
similar to a partnership than to a corporation because, aside from tax treatment, a
professional corporation retains management control, conducts itself as a partnership
and is subject to similar liabilities.43 The Hyland court dismissed this analysis because it
held that "the use of the corporate form precludes any examination designed to deter-
mine whether the entity is in fact a partnership."'" The court reasoned that once an
entity decides to avail itself of the favorable tax treatment of a professional corporation,
'5 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796, 41 FEP Cases at 185.
Id. The court cited the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982) and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982), as statutes providing similar
definitions of employee as under the ADEA.
95 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796, 41 FEP Cases at 185. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 28-29 (shareholders
in knitting cooperative considered employees); Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 351, 31 FE? Cases at 636
(active vice president implicitly considered employee); First Catholic Slovach Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d at
1070, 30 FE? Cases at 820 (officers receiving salary considered employees); Stanojev, 643 F.2d at
916, 920, 25 FEP Cases at 355, 359 (high level executive considered employee).
56 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796, 41 FEP Cases at 185 (citing Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32).
57 Hyland. 794 F.2d at 797, 41 FEP Cases at 185-86.
58 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797, 41 FEP Cases at 185 (citing Hishon, 467 U.S. 79, 80, 34 FEP Cases
1411, 1412 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)). See also Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., 775 F.2d at 930,
38 FEP Cases at 1847; EEOC decision No. 85-4 EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) at 7040,
" See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797, 41 FE? Cases at 185 (citing Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80, 34 FEP
Cases at 1411-12 (Powell, J., concurring)).
4° See Hishon at 80, 34 FEP Cases at 1411 (Powell, J., concurring).
4 E Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797, 41 FEP Cases at 185.
42 Id. at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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it must also bear the responsibility of adhering to appropriate discrimination laws. 45 The
court therefore concluded that although modern partnerships and corporations are
difficult to differentiate on the bases of structure and operation, this difficulty is not an
appropriate reason to disregard the entity's legal form"
The court also refused to apply the "economic realities test," which requires inquiry
into the actual responsibilities of the claimant in question. 47 Although the court conceded
that an economic realties test may be applicable when distinguishing between an em-
ployee and a partner in an already formed and legally existing partnership,9 8 the court
stated that the test has no place as a means of identifying a partner within a corporate
enterprise. 49 For the Hyland court, the terms corporate shareholder and partner are
mutually exclusive. 58
Given this position, the Hyland court had little difficulty characterizing the plaintiff
as an employee rather than a partner. 5 ' According to the court, the plaintiff was not
only an officer and a shareholder, but the explicit terms of his original agreement also
designated him an employee of the corporation. 52 Furthermore, the court added that
there was nothing inconsistent between a proprietary interest and a term of employment,
and thus the plaintiff should be protected from discrimination under the Act," Having
determined that the plaintiff was an employee within the meaning of the Act, the court
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the plaintiff had
indeed suffered discrimination on the basis of his age."
Judge Cardamone dissented urging affirmance of the district court's ruling. 55 Judge
Cardamone emphasized the need to focus on the manner in which the corporation
functioned and insisted that labels did not provide appropriate guidance for purposes
of the discrimination laws. 58 Admonishing the majority for choosing form over substance,
the dissent asserted that NHRA would be most appropriately characterized as a part-
nership because each founding member had contributed equally, was required to practice
in the same specialty, had agreed to share profits, losses and management responsibilities,
and was subject to the same exposure to liability. 57 The dissent further supported its
emphasis of substance over form by looking at the Act. According to Judge Cardamone's
interpretation, Congress left the definition of "employee" deliberately vague in order to
encourage courts to assess the individual's status on a case-by-case basis regardless of the
form chosen by the business. 58
" Id. The court stated that NI.IRA's decision to incorporate, should prevent them from now
saying that their corporation is "essentially a medical partnership among co-equal radiologists." Id.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 797-98, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
48 Id. at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
4° Id.
5°
 Id.
5 ' Id.
" Id. at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 187.
53 Id.
" Id.
" Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 799, 41 FEP Cases at 187 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 800, 41 FEP Cases at 188 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
5° Id. at 799, 41 FEP Cases at 187 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In addition to its reliance on
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, the dissent cited Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 32 FEP Cases 369 (6th
Cir, 1983), which provides for examination of the entity's function and nut its form. See Hyland,
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After establishing the NHRA's status as a partnership in fact, the dissent's inquiry
proceeded to examine the plaintiff's role within the "partnership." Again, the dissent
reasoned that although it is tempting to label individuals based on legal categorizations,
no per se rule exists that appropriately characterizes all individuals working for a cor-
poration as employees under the Act." The dissent concluded that because the plaintiff
had the ability to determine compensation as well as control the direction of the entity,
he could only be characterized as a partner, and would not be protected by the terms of
the Act. 6°
The majority's holding that members of professional corporations are employees,
and thus entitled to protection under the ADEA creates a direct split between the law
of the Second and Seventh Circuits. By definition, the Second Circuit refuses to classify
members of a professional corporation as partners. Although the Second Circuit's anal-
ysis admittedly chooses form over substance, its emphasis on plain meaning, its concern
for consistency in corporate title and meaning, and its emphasis on the policy purposes
of the ADEA make it a more persuasive analysis than that of the Seventh Circuit.
The Second Circuit's decision can be analyzed from at least two perspectives. On
one level, the court took a simple, straightforward, plain meaning approach. By exam-
ining the plain words and meaning of the statute, 61 the terms of the plaintiff's employ-
ment contract62 and the corporate form of the employer," the court easily reached the
conclusion that the plaintiff was an employee. Therefore, he was appropriately entitled
to protection under the ADEA.
On another level, the court's analysis centered on the policy implications of its
decision. By examining the purposes of the Act and by focusing on its remedial nature,
the court adopted a broad interpretation of "individuals" under the Act 6V By including
members of professional corporations within the ADEA's definition of "employee," the
court extended the Act's coverage.
In Hyland, the Second Circuit found that the Act's goal of protecting individuals
against discrimination outweighed the negative aspects of continuing to label as a cor-
poration an entity acting like a partnership. The court's approach may result in over-
inclusive protection because under the Hyland approach courts will tend to label more
individuals as employees. Nevertheless, this broad protection is consistent with the Act's
remedial nature and justifiably will advance civil rights in the area of age discrimination.
794 F.2d at 799, 41 FEP Cases at 187 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Dowd, 763 F.2d at 1177,
34 FEP Cases at 376). Justice Cardamone extended the reasoning of the Armbruster case to the
situation presented by NHRA and concluded that the entity was best characterized as a partnership.
/d, at 799, 41 FEP Cases at 187-88 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
"See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 799, 41 FEP Cases at 187-88 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Interest-
ingly, the dissent ultimately relied on the relevant precedent which the majority acknowledged
conclusively held that partners are not employees. See id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Hishon,
467 U.S. at 77, 34 FEP Cases at 1410; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co,, 775 F.2d at 930, 38 FEP Cases
at 1847; EEOC decision No. 85-4 EMP. Flux. GUIDE at 7040).
60 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 802, 41 FEP Cases at 190 (Cardamone, j., dissenting).
61 See Garrett, 721 F.2d at 980-81, 33 FEP Cases at 488-89 (a plain reading of the statute
provides that only those individuals directly employed by the employer are protected).
62 The plaintiff's contract terms stated that each physician was required to be a full time
employee. See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 795, 41 FEP Cases at 184.
63 The entity was titled a corporation for tax and employee benefit purposes. See id. at 798, 41
FEP Cases at 186.
m See id. at 796, 41 FEP Cases at 185.
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The court additionally emphasized the need to maintain consistency in the business
entity's behavior. In emphasizing that NHRA was organized specifically as a corporation
in order to gain tax benefits, the court stressed that the corporation also should be
required to comply with the laws applicable to traditional corporations." The court's
desire to hold businesses to a relatively consistent categorization seems appropriate. To
allow corporations to classify themselves as partnerships for one purpose yet maintain
their corporate status for another would encourage evasion of the entity's responsibilities.
The traditional notion is that choosing form over substance fails to account for the
reality of the operation and thus creates a veil over the business' true identity. 66 The
dissenting opinion in Hyland hinges on this idea, and builds its case by focusing on a
wide range of precedent which disfavors rigidly holding entities to their legally declared
forms.° Although it may be true that the continuing use of labels promotes a legal
fiction, where fictions are created and acknowledged as legitimate business forms, ap-
plicable laws must be administered consistently in order best to fulfill their intended
policies and meet the entity's need for predictability concerning its responsibilities. Thus,
continuing to label and treat NHRA as a professional corporation under the ADEA gives
both the corporation and its employees notice concerning their obligations accompanying
NHRA's corporate status.
In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that members of a professional corporation are employees
for purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court's treatment of
employees under the ADEA is significant because it provides a counterweight to the
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Dowd under Title VII. Although both courts' approaches are
persuasive, the Second Circuit's two level analysis, particularly its emphasis on protecting
individuals from discrimination and its emphasis on the inconsistency of classifying
corporate shareholders as partners for only some purposes makes it a more persuasive
opinion.
B. *Waiver of Fact-Based Claims Under the ADEA: Runyan v. National Cash Register
Corp.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects workers over the age
of 40 from arbitrary age discrimination in employment. 2 When Congress enacted the
65 See id. at 798, 41 FEP Cases at 186.
66 See id. at 799, 41 FEN Cases at 187 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Gregory.v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935)).
67 See id, at 800, 41 FEP Cases at 188 (citing First Catholic Slovack Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d at 1070,
30 FEP Cases at 820-21).
* By David Y. Bonnard, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Runyan v. National Cash Register (NCR) Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 40 FEN Cases 807 (6th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 178, 41 FEN Cases 1712 (1986).
2 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982) (hereinafter ADEA].
Section 623(a) of the ADEA provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual's age . ..." Id. § 623(a)(1). The 1986 amendments to the ADEA removed any
upper age limit for those to be protected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. 631(a) (amended 1986). Section
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ADEA, there was considerable debate concerning the most effective means of enforcing
the Act's provisions.' Congress considered three separate approaches: seeking to protect
workers as a group, as in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 4 equating age
discrimination with racial discrimination, as in Title VII,' and incorporating the enforce-
ment provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) . 8 Congress ultimately adopted
a hybrid of these approaches based primarily on the FLSA's enforcement provisions.?
This approach, however, has caused confusion regarding an employee's ability to waive
his or her rights under the ADEA. 8
The Supreme Court has held that courts should interpret the enforcement provi-
sions of the FLSA and the ADEA alike, unless the ADEA specifically provides to the
contrary. 9 The Court has also found, however, that parts of the ADEA and Title VII
are virtually identical, 10 and, furthermore, has stated that Congress enacted these two
statutes for the common purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination." Thus, it is
not altogether clear to what extent interpretations of the enforcement provisions of the
FLSA and Title VII apply to the ADEA. 12
The Supreme Court has held that, in most cases, an employee may not waive an
FLSA claim." The Court has not addressed, however, whether an employee may waive
a fact-based FLSA claim," but has cited with approval a lower court decision authorizing
631(a) now provides that: "The prohibitions in this chapter ... shall be limited to individuals who
are at least 40 years of age." Id.
Section 621(b) states that the purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
Ste Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577-79, 16 FEP Cases 885, 886 (1978).
4 29 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. (1982).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1982).
6 See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 578, 16 FEP Cases at 886 (citing 29 U.S.C. 216 et seq. (1970)).
Id. Section 626(b) provides that: The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accor-
dance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in section 211(b), 216 (except for
subsection (a) thereof ), and 217 of this title (referring to the FLSA's enforcement provisions), and
subsection (c) of this section." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
6 See Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1039, 40 FEP Cases at 807.
9 Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 582, 16 FEP Cases at 887-88.
m See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755, 19 FEP Cases 1167, 1169 (1979). The
Court referred specifically to § 14(b) of the ADEA, comparing it with § 706(c) of Title VII. Id.
" Id. at 756, 19 FEP Cases at 1169.
12 See Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1039, 40 FEP Cases at 807. Compare Runyan v. NCR Corp., No. 83-
3862, 37 FEP Cases 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1985) (opinion withdrawn June 17, 1985) [hereinafter
Runyan II] (FLSA analysis precludes all waivers of claims arising under the ADEA) rev'd, 787 F.2d
1039, 40 FEP Cases 807 (1986) (en bane) with Runyan v. NCR Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1454, 1462, 33
FEP Cases 322, 328 (S.D. Ohio 1983) [hereinafter Runyan I] (Title VII analysis allows valid waiver
when bona fide dispute concerning employer's liability exists and employee's release is knowing
and voluntary).
"See, e.g., Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
" A fact-based claim is a dispute whose resolution turns on an issue of fact, such as the number
of hours worked, or whether an employee was dismissed because of advanced age. See, e.g., Runyan
III, 787 F.2d at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811 (whether employee discharged because of age at issue
in ADEA dispute); Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co., 51 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (D. Minn.
1943) (number of hours worked at issue in FLSA dispute). A law-based claim, in contrast, is a
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just such a waiver.'s Thus a waiver of an employee's fact-based claim may also be allowed
under the ADEA.
If a court allows waiver of a fact-based claim under the ADEA, the issue remains as
to what standard the court should apply to determine whether the waiver was validly
executed. Because the Supreme Court has not yet allowed waivers of ADEA claims,Is
the Court has not yet articulated a standard for determining when such a waiver would
be valid. The Court, however, has allowed and encouraged employee waivers of fact-
based Title VII claims. 17 Such waivers are valid, the Court has held, when the employee
executes them knowingly and voluntarily.'8 Thus, two major issues are presented by
waivers of fact-based ADEA claims: whether courts may allow such waivers, and, if they
are allowed, what standard courts should apply to determine whether a waiver was
validly executed. 19
During the Survey year, in Runyan v. National Cash Register (NCR) Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, found that the release of
an employee's fact-based ADEA claim unsupervised by the EEOC was valid." At issue
in Runyan was whether an employee's release of all claims arising from his employment
and termination would bar his later suit under the ADEA." The Sixth Circuit held that
an employee, under the circumstances of Runyan, may validly waive his or her claims
arising under the ADEA when the dispute concerns an issue of fact — in this case
whether or not the employee's termination was due to age. 22
In Runyan, National Cash Register Corporation (NCR) hired Richard Runyan, an
experienced 53 year-old labor lawyer, as Assistant General Counse1. 25 Approximately six
years later, James E. Rambo, NCR's General Counsel, informed Runyan that his em-
ployment at NCR would be terminated within three months." Runyan told Rambo that
he felt his termination was related to age discrimination." Runyan and representatives
dispute whose resolution turns on an issue of law, such as the scope of the Act's coverage. See, e.g.,
Gangi, 328 U.S. at 114 (scope of Act's coverage at issue in FLSA dispute).
L'Gatigi, 328 U.S. at 115 n.10 (citing Strand, 51 F. Supp. at 904-05).
18 Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 582, 16 FEP Cases at 887-88.
' 7 See, e.g., Pilau v. University of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 468, 32 FEP Cases 508, 509 (8th Cir.
1983) (concluding that dear and unambiguous waiver of Title VII claim signed with advice of
counsel is valid); Strozier v. General Motors Corp., 635 F.2d 424, 426, 24 FEP Cases 1370, 1372
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (per curiam) (holding that voluntary settlement of Title VII claim negotiated
with aid of counsel is valid). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 3G, 52 & n.15, 7
FEP Cases 81, 87 & n.15 (1974) ("presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under
Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement").
ui See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52 n.I5, 7 FEP Cases at 87 n.15 ("In determining the effectiveness
of any [Title VIII waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee's consent
to the settlement was voluntary and knowing."). See also Pilau, 710 F.2d at 467, 32 FE? Cases at
509; Strozier, 635 F.2d at 426, 24 FEP Cases at 1372.
19 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a proposal that would allow
private settlements of ADEA claims if the waiver is executed knowingly and voluntarily. See Draft
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 141 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6, A-7 ( July 23, 1985) for EEOC
proposed amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16 authorizing private settlements of ADEA claims, using
the Title VII "knowing and voluntary" standard.
" See Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
21 See id. at 1040, 40 FEP Cases at 808.
22 Id. at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
25 Id. at 1040, 40 FEP Cases at 808.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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of NCR subsequently entered into several discussions which resulted in the parties
executing a one year consulting agreement." Approximately six months later, Runyan
asked Rambo to secure an extension of the agreement and an increase in compensation
from NCR." After discussions with other NCR officials, Rambo informed Runyan that
the agreement would not be extended, but that NCR would increase Runyan's compen-
sation if Runyan would execute a release of all claims he had or might have against NCR
relating to his employment, his termination, or both." Runyan agreed and NCR entered
into a written amendment to the consulting agreement which increased Runyan's guar-
anteed compensation. 29 In return, Runyan signed an "Accord & Satisfaction, Release
and Discharge" by which he waived all claims he had or might have against NCR "arising
[from his] employment and/or the termination of any employment" with NCR. 39
 The
consulting agreement expired six months later and Runyan's employment ended. 31
Approximately six months after his termination, Runyan filed a charge of age discrim-
ination with the Secretary of Labor, and six months after that, he commenced an , ADEA
action in district court."
The district court ("Runyan I") applied a Title VII analysis" and held that Runyan
had executed the release "knowingly and voluntarily," that the release was not prospec-
tive,'' and that it was thus valid to bar Runyan's claim." On appeal, a panel of the Sixth
55 Id.
2' Id.
25 Id.
29 Id. at 1040-41, 40 FEP Cases at 808-09.
"Id. at 1041, 40 FEP Cases at 808-09. The full text of Runyan's release reads as follows:
In consideration of the "Amendment to Consulting Agreement" executed by NCR
on November 25, 1977, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and which I acknowl-
edge to be in full accord and satisfaction of any and all claims I may have against NCR
arising out of the course of my employment and/or the termination of any employment
and in further consideration of the said "Amendment to Consulting Agreement," I,
Richard V. Runyan, hereby release and forever discharge NCR, its successors, assigns,
transferees, officers, employees, representatives and agents from all manner of action
and actions, cause and causes of action, suits,.debts, contracts, controversies, agree-
ments, promises, damages, and demands whatsoever in law or in equity, which against
NCR, I, Richard V. Runyan, ever had, now have, or which I hereafter can, shall or
may, for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the
beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents, save and except the
aforementioned "Amendment to Consulting Agreement" of November 25, 1977, and
the underlying "Consulting Agreement of June 1, 1977."
I have read this release and understand all of its terms. I execute it voluntarily
and with full knowledge of its significance.
Id.
1, Id. at 1041, 40 FEP Cases at 809.
34 Id.
33 Runyan I, 573 F. Supp. at 1462, 33 FEP Cases at 328. Under a Title VII analysis, a valid
release must be voluntarily and knowingly executed. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52 & n.15, 7 FEP
Cases at 87 & n.15. See also infra note 103 for cases discussing waiver under Title VII.
35 A prospective waiver of rights would lead to the same circumvention of congressional intent
as a waiver of legal issues under the FLSA. An employer could condition the receipt of benefits,
including employment, on an employee's execution of a release of all prospective Title VII or
ADEA claims, thus negating the purposes of the Acts. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 7 FEP Cases
at 86.
35 Runyan 1, 573 F. Supp. at 1458, 1462, 33 FEP Cases at 325, 328. The district court noted
that under the FLSA there can be no waiver when there is no dispute as to the employer's liability.
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Circuit ("Runyan II") applied a narrow FLSA analysis" and reversed," holding that
ADEA rights may not be waived without EEOC supervision." The panel decision rejected
the district court's application of Title VII precedent, finding that FLSA precedent
controlled. 39 Furthermore, the panel's analysis of Supreme Court FLSA precedent ap-
peared to conclude that all waivers of claims arising under the FLSA are invalid, thus
mandating reversal of the lower court. 4° On rehearing, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane ("Runyan III"), reversed the panel's earlier decision, holding
that a release of a bona fide factual dispute under the ADEA executed without EEOC
supervision was valid as a matter of law. 4 '
The Runyan III court began its analysis by reviewing the history of the ADEA and
the FLSA, concluding that the FLSA's judicial construction concerning waiver was ap-
plicable to the ADEA. 42 The court first examined the FLSA, finding no language in the
Act's text concerning an employee's ability to release his or her right to wages or
damages.'" The court then examined the Supreme Court's decisions in Brooklyn Savings
Bank v. O'Neil" and Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi45 concerning the release of FLSA rights.°
The Runyan III court noted that, in O'Neil and Gangi, the Supreme Court held that
under most circumstances an employee may not waive his or her rights under the ELSA.47
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, the first case to raise the issue of the validity of an
employee's waiver of FLSA rights, the Court held that, absent a bona fide dispute, a
waiver or release of an employer's liability under the FLSA was contrary to the statute's
policy and would therefore not bar an employee's subsequent claim." The O'Neil Court
left open the question of whether a waiver or release could be valid where there existed
a bona fide dispute. 19 In Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, the Court partially answered this question,
concluding that for reasons similar to those posited in O'Neil, an employee could not
Id. at 1460, 33 FEP Cases at 326-27 (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 108; O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 697). The
court concluded, however, that it had seen no authority holding invalid a release of an employment
discrimination or FLSA claim when a bona fide dispute exists as to the employer's liability. Id. at
1461, 33 FEP Cases at 327.
56 Under an FLSA analysis, an employee generally may not waive his or her claims. See, e.g.,
Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116; O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 704. See also infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion of waiver under the FLSA.
37 Runyan II, No. 83-3862, 37 FEP Cases at 1091.
33 Id. at 1090. It appears that the majority of the panel thought that any waiver of FLSA claims
would be invalid. Id. at 1088-89. This opinion did not cite or mention Strand.
39 See id. at 1087-91.
40 Id. at 1090-91. The dissenting opinion, however, distinguished settlements of disputes con-
cerning legal issues from settlements of fact-based claims in FLSA cases, citing Strand fur the
proposition that bona fide disputes over factual issues are amenable to settlements under the FLSA.
Id. at 1091 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (citing Strand, 51 F. Supp. at 904-05). Judge Wellford found
the Strand exception applicable to the ADEA in general and Runyan in particular. Id. at 1091-92
(Wellford, J., dissenting).
41 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
42 See id. at 1042-44, 40 FEP Cases at 809-11.
43 Id. at 1041, 40 FEP Cases at 809.
44 Brooklyn Savings Bank v, O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
43 Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
46 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1041-43, 40 FEP Cases at 809-10.
47 Id. (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116; O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 704).
"O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 707.
45 1d. at 714.
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bargain away his or her rights under the FLSA, even in a settlement resulting from a
bona fide dispute over the scope of the.FLSA's coverage." The Runyan III court observed
that the Gangi Court, however, did not specifically address the question of whether an
issue of fact under the FLSA, rather than an issue of law such as coverage, could be
resolved by agreement." The Runyan III court, however, noted that the Gangi Court
cited with approval Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co." According to the Runyan III
court, Strand stands for the proposition that although waivers of FLSA rights. in bona
fide legal disputes are ineffective, compromises and settlements in bona fide disputes
over factual claims may be effective."
In sum, based on this precedent, the Runyan III court concluded that while the
Supreme Court had held invalid employee waivers of liquidated damages, or the right
to wages or liquidated damages when the dispute concerned the legal question of the
scope of the Act's coverage," the Supreme Court's decisions did not address the validity
of an employee's release of an FLSA claim when there is a bona fide dispute over a
matter of fact — in this case whether NCR released Runyan because of his age." The
Runyan III court noted the Gangi Court's approving citation of Strand,56 and accordingly
relied on Strand and the Gangi Court's approving citation to hold that a waiver of FLSA
rights in a fact-based dispute is valid."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit then turned to the language of the
ADEA, finding that, like the ELSA, the text of the Act contains no mention of whether
an employee may waive his or her rights." Although acknowledging that the ADEA
incorporates the FLSA's enforcement standards," the court stated that the purposes
behind Congress's enactment of the ADEA and its enactment of the FLSA were differ-
ent.60 Relying on language from the Gangi opinion, the court found that Congress
enacted the FLSA to protect the lowest paid segment of society by providing a minimum
50 Gangi, 328 U.S. at 114.
" Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1042-43, 40 FEP Cases at 810 (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 114-15).
" Id. at 1043, 40 FEP Cases at 810 (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 115 n.10 (citing Strand v. Garden
Valley Tel. Co., 51 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (D. Minn. 1943))).
"Id. (citing Strand, 51 F. Supp. at 904-05). Issues of law are to be resolved by a judge, while
in FLSA cases, issues of fact may be resolved by a jury. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 585, 16 FEP Cases
at 889. In Strand, the court noted that an employee's right to damages under the FLSA is mandatory;
the courts may exercise no discretion in awarding damages, and parties may not waive their rights
to them. 51 F. Supp. at 904. Otherwise, stated the court, the intent of Congress would be defeated.
Id. On the other hand, the court found that parties may resolve a factual dispute, such as the
number of hours worked. Id. at 904-05. Although the Strand court did not explicitly so state, the
implication is that such a settlement of a factual issue, if executed clearly and with a full under-
standing of the dispute and the effects of the agreement, would not undermine the purposes of
the FLSA. See generally id.
54
 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1042, 40 FEP Cases at 809-10.
" Id. at 1043-44, 40 FEP Cases at 810-11.
" Id. at 1043, 40 FEP Cases at 810 (citing Strand, 51 F. Supp. at 898).
57 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1043, 40 FEP Cases at 810 (citing Strand, 51 F. Supp. at 904-05). See
also Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 47 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Weiss v. Testrite Instrument Co., 272
A.D. 696, 74 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1947); Cassese v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 344, 46 N.Y.S.2d
624 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943) (all allowing waiver of fact-based FLSA claims).
" Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1043, 40 FEP Cases at 810.
59 Id.
59 Id,
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wage." In contrast, the court found that Congress enacted the ADEA to protect a
different segment of society whose members are often affluent and easily able to obtain
legal counsel." The court concluded its comparison of the FLSA and ADEA by stating
that an unofficially sanctioned practice of recognizing settlements of ADEA disputes
negotiated in good faith had developed.° Thus, although it noted that the two Acts
have different underlying purposes, the Runyan III court determined that the ADEA
incorporates the FLSA's enforcement provisions and therefore allows waiver of a fact-
based claim.
The Runyan III court then applied its analysis concerning waiver of FLSA and
ADEA claims to the particular facts of Runyan's claim, finding that the dispute between
Runyan and NCR was over a matter of fact — whether or not Runyan's discharge was
due to his age."' The court found that Runyan's case fell within the Strand exception to
the Supreme Court's limitation on waivers of FLSA claims which allows waivers of fact-
based FLSA claims. 65 Accordingly, the court held that the release of an ADEA claim in
a bona fide factual dispute "of this type under these circumstances," unsupervised by
the EEOC, is valid."" Because it found that Runyan III turned on a bona fide dispute of
fact, the court upheld the validity of the release."'
The Runyan III court qualified its decision by noting the circumstances surrounding
the case. The court found that Runyan was a well-paid, well-educated labor lawyer who,
the court suggested, tried to take advantage of NCR. 68 The court found that the release
was "knowingly and deliberately executed" by an attorney thoroughly familiar with this
area of the law." These factors, the court noted, indicated that Runyan did not need
the protections that the FLSA and Supreme Court FLSA precedent provide for under-
paid, and potentially under-educated people.'"
The final section of the Runyan III court's analysis addressed the issue of waiver in
ADEA cases generally. The court stated that the judiciary should not allow employers
to take advantage of their superior bargaining position to circumvent policies of the
ADEA. 71 The court stressed the importance of good faith in such agreements and stated
that courts should encourage amicable settlements of disputes where both parties are
dealing at arm's length, 72 and where overreaching or exploitation are not inherent in
the case at hand. 73 The court also noted that a recently proposed EEOC rule encourages
voluntary settlements of disputes arising under the ADEA because voluntary settlements,
the EEOC has determined, are consistent with congressional intent. 74 Furthermore,
61 Id. (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116).
62 Id.
65 Id.
64 Id. at 1044, 40 FEY Cases at 811.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1044-45, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
72 Id. at 1045, 40 FEP Cases at 811 (citing Gangi, 328 U.S. at 121-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
78 Id. at 1045, 40 FEP Cases at 811-12.
24 Id, at 1045, 40 FEP Cases at 812 (citing Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 141 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6, A.7 ( July 23, 1985)). .
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refusing to apply a bright-line test that would 'require a recitation of the ADEA rights
waived, the court stated that courts should apply ordinary contract principles to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff's waiver of an ADEA claim was knowing and voluntary."
The dissent in Runyan III argued that the majority's distinction between persons the
ADEA was intended to protect and persons the FLSA was intended to protect avoided
the fundamental issue: that of an employee's disadvantageous bargaining position rela-
tive to the employer. 76 The dissent found that Congress intended the ADEA to equalize
the parties' bargaining positions by incorporating the FLSA's enforcement procedures."
By allowing employees to waive their ADEA claims when the dispute is one of fact, the
dissent argued, the majority was diminishing older employees' statutory protections 78
The dissent admitted that Runyan presented an unsympathetic plaintiff, 79 but argued
that the precedent could have a negative impact on other workers less sophisticated in
legal matters." The dissent noted that the ADEA was enacted to protect a broad class
of persons, not just attorneys. 81 The dissenting opinion concluded by stating that, at a
minimum, a valid waiver of rights under the ADEA should expressly mention what
rights are to be waived." Noting that Runyan's broadly worded waiver made no mention
of age discrimination claims, the dissent contended that the ADEA could not afford any
of its intended protection to employees if the court allowed waiver of its provisions
through such a broad, nonspecific agreement."
In summary, the Sixth Circuit found that an employee may "knowingly and delib-
erately" execute a release of a fact-based claim arising under the ADEA.64 The Runyan
III court, in stressing that the judiciary must not allow employers to take advantage of
their employees," stated that the determination of the validity of an ADEA settlement
and release should be governed by contract principles in order to ensure that an em-
ployee's waiver of ADEA claims was knowing and voluntary and that the settlement of
differences was amicable and honest." The dissent, however, disputed the majority's
holding, stating that it lacked fidelity to Congress's intent." That intent, argued the
dissent, was to protect older workers by equalizing their ability to bargain with employ-
ers.66 By allowing releases of claims based on factual issues, the dissent contended, the
court reduced the congressionally mandated protection of ADEA claimants."
Runyan III presented the Sixth Circuit with two difficult issues to resolve: whether
an employee may waive a fact-based ADEA claim, and if so, what standard should the
court apply to determine whether such a waiver was validly executed. The Runyan III
court was justified in determining that employees may waive fact-based ADEA claims.
"Id. at 1044 n.10, 40 FE? Cases at 811 n.10.
76 Id. at 1046, 40 FEP Cases at 812 (Engel, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 1046, 40 FE? Cases at 813 (Engel, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
82 Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
8, Id. (Engel, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
85 1d. at 1044-45, 40 FE? Cases at 811.
86 M. at 1044 n.10, 1045, 40 FEP Cases at 811 & n.10.
87 Id. at 1045, 40 FE? Cases at 812 (Engel, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 1046, 40 FEP Cases at 812 (Engel, J., dissenting).
89 1d. at 1046, 40 FEP Cases at 812-13 (Engel, J., dissenting).
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The court did not, however, articulate a clear standard for determining when such a
waiver is valid.
The Runyan III court correctly determined that an employee may waive a fact-based
ADEA claim. 9° The Sixth Circuit correctly distinguished the Supreme Court's FLSA
decisions which refuse to allow waivers of claims where coverage — a question of law —
was disputed,9 ' from Runyan III, where a factual issue was in dispute." Although finding
that the ADEA must be construed consistently with the FLSA,95 the Runyan III court
clearly demonstrated that the Supreme Court has left open the issue of whether fact-
based FLSA claims may be waived." The court then convincingly concluded that waiver
of fact-based claims is consistent with the fundamental purposes of the ADEA. 95
When an employee with a bona fide ADEA complaint waives his or her claims
arising under the Act, the purposes of the Act are not undermined, as long as such a
waiver is fact-based and not prospective. 96 The Act's provisions remain in force in that
case, because the only dispute is one of fact. Employers could thus evade the Act's
mandate only if they conditioned an employee's hiring or other benefits on a prospective
waiver of any potential fact-based ADEA claim. In addition, the claimant's choice to
forego the judicial options available may save him or her an often lengthy wait for a
trial, the expense of litigation, and the difficulty of proving issues of fact. Indeed,
settlement may result in an immediate resolution of the dispute which the claimant finds
satisfactory. Therefore, allowing private settlements of fact-based ADEA claims may
encourage employees to act as private attorneys general, and consequently may reinforce
the provisions of the Act. Thus, the Runyan III court's upholding the validity of Runyan's
waiver is consistent both with prior Supreme Court precedent and with the purposes of
the ADEA.
Although the Runyan III court amply supported its conclusion that an employee
may waive a fact-based ADEA claim, the opinion is deficient in that the court did not
mandate a clear test for determining when such waivers have been validly executed. The
Runyan III court did riot explicitly articulate a standard for determining when the
execution of a waiver is valid; it found, however, that Runyan had knowingly and
deliberately executed the release. 97 This standard stands at the heart of Runyan III. The
waiver which Runyan executed was broadly worded and nonspecific." The dissent
objected to upholding the validity of such a waiver, arguing that a minimum requirement
of a valid waiver should be a recitation of the rights to be waived." The majority,
however, refused to mandate such a bright-line test."' The court's opinion, however,
9° Id. at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
"I Id. at 1041-43, 40 FEP Cases at 809-10.
92 Id. at 1043, 40 FEP Cases at 810.
9, Id. at 1042-44, 40 FEP Cases at 809-11.
9, Id, at 1044-45, 40 FEP Cases at 811-12.
95 Id. at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
"See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 7 FEP Cases at 86. A prospective waiver of rights would lead
to the same circumvention of congressional intent as a waiver of legal issues under the FLSA. An
employer could condition the receipt of benefits, including employment, on an employee's execution
of a release of all prospective Title VII or ADEA claims, thus negating the purposes of the Acts,
97 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
" See supra note 30 for the text of Runyan's release.
99 Runyan III, 787 F.2d at 1046, 40 FEP Cases at 813 (Engel, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 1044 n.10, 40 FEP Cases at 811 n.10.
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made clear the importance of good faith and arm's-length bargaining between the parties
to such an agreement.'°' The release, concluded the court, was knowingly and deliber-
ately executed and therefore valid. 1 °2
The Sixth Circuit's knowing and deliberately executed standard is similar to the
standard courts use under Title VII.' 03
 The Runyan III court correctly noted that al-
though the ADEA was not incorporated into Title VII,'" both statutes were enacted to
prevent certain types of discrimination. 1 " By focusing on the anti-discriminatory aspect
of the ADEA, the court implicitly raised the issue of the applicability of the judicial
construction of the validity of waivers under Title VI1.' 0° Courts use a "knowing and
voluntary" standard for judging the validity of a waiver under Title VII. 107 Therefore,
because the purposes of Title VII and the ADEA are similar, a knowing and voluntary
standard for waiver of an ADEA claim is appropriate.
Requiring that releases be knowingly and voluntarily executed strikes the correct
balance between the employee's need for the ADEA's protection and the utility of an
alternate means of resolving these disputes. At least one court has already relied on this
standard to find invalid a release executed under circumstances different from Run-
yan's.'°8
 Thus, a knowing and voluntary standard is flexible enough to allow courts to
effectuate the purposes of the Act in individual cases. Furthermore, the EEOC proposed,
in response to Runyan II, that knowing and voluntary waivers of ADEA rights executed
without EEOC supervision be allowed. 100 This proposed rule relied on the ADEA's goals
both of encouraging employers and workers to find solutions to the problems created
by age in employment and of encouraging prompt settlement of ADEA claims.n° The
EEOC proposed that courts apply the knowing and voluntary standarcIto ADEA waivers
' 1" Id. at 1044-45 & 1044 n.10, 40 FEP Cases at 811-12 & 811 n.10.
Id. at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
1 " See, e.g., Pilon v. University of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 468, 32 FEP Cases 508, 509 (8th Cir.
1983) (concluding that clear and unambiguous waiver of Title VII claim signed with advice of
counsel is valid); Strozier v. General Motors Corp., 635 F.2d 424, 426, 24 FEP Cases 1370, 1372
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (per curiam) (holding that voluntary settlement of Title VII claim negotiated
with aid of counsel is valid). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 & n.15, 7
FEP Cases 81, 87 & n.15 (1974) ("presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under
Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement").
'" Title VII protects workers only from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2.
I" See Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756, 19 FEP Cases at 1169.
I " Title VII prohibits discriminatory practices in employment (42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2 et seq.),
while the FLSA establishes minimum wage and hour standards. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116. See also
Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756, 19 FEP Cases at 1169 ("the ADEA and Title VII share a common
purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace ... ").
' 07 See supra note 103.
106
	
Valenti v. International Mill Serv., Inc„ 634 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (distinguishing
plaintiff in Valenti from plaintiff in Runyan II; jury finding that release of ADEA claim not knowingly
or voluntarily executed, thus judge found waiver invalid); Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
622 F. Supp. 1096, 1105-06, 36 FEP Cases 1333, 1341 (N.D. III. 1984) (distinguishing Runyan II
on basis of Runyan's legal expertise; finding that settlement of ADEA claim must be knowing and
voluntary).
100 See Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 141 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6, A-7 ( July 23,
1985) for EEOC proposed amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16 authorizing private settlements of
ADEA claims, using the Title VII "knowing and voluntary" standard.
10 See id.
December 1987]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 241
as well as Title VII waivers.'" This standard has the added advantage of incorporating
the judicially created Title VII standard for a validly executed waiver, making a body of
prior caselaw apposite to ADEA actions." 2
In summary, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined in Runyan v. NCR Corp.
that employee waivers of fact-based ADEA claims are valid under certain circum-
stances." 5 Although the Runyan III court did not articulate a test for determining when
such waivers have been validly executed, the court's language suggests that the "knowing
and voluntary" standard applied to Title VII waivers might be apposite.'" Courts should
adopt this standard; it effectively balances an employee's need for the ADEA's protection
with the fundamental purposes of the Act. Thus, Runyan III should not be read broadly
for the proposition that any release of an ADEA claim unsupervised by the EEOC is
valid. Rather, it should be read to articulate a strict standard requiring that for waiver
of a fact-based ADEA claim to be valid, an employee must execute the release knowingly
and voluntarily." 5
C. *Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under Age Discrimination in Employment Act by Federal
Employee Who Prevails at Administrative Level: Palmer v. General Services
Administration'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 2 is a hybrid statute. Its sub-
stantive provisions are patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 while
its remedial provisions are patterned after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 4 Be-
cause the ADEA draws from these two distinct statutes, both courts and practitioners
have found the ADEA "a model of imprecision" concerning the exact remedies available
to the plaintiff who prevails with an age discrimination claim.'
i" See id. (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44, 52 n. 15, 7 FEP Cases 84, 88 n.15; Carson v. American
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14, 21 FEP Cases 1, 4 n.14 (1981)).
" 2 For ADEA cases applying the Title VII standard, see, e.g., Lancaster v. Buekle Buick Honda
Co., 809 F.2d 539, 540-41, 42 FEP Cases 1472, 1472-73 (8th Cir. 1987); Bernstein, 622 F. Supp. at
1105-06. For Title VII cases applying the knowing and voluntary standard, see Film 710 F.2d at
468, 32 FEP Cases at 509; Strozier, 635 F.2d at 426, 24 FEP Cases at 1372; Alexander, 415 U.S. at
51-52 & 52 n.I5, 7 FEP Cases at 86-87 & 87 n.15.
is Runyan Ill, 787 F.2d at 1044, 40 FEP Cases at 811.
LI4 Id.
113 Other cases have cited Runyan III for the same proposition. See, e.g., Lancaster, 809 F.2d at
540-41, 42 FEP Cases at 1472-73 (citing Runyan 111 for proposition that plaintiff's knowing and
voluntary waiver of fact-based ADEA claims valid); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026 r
1033, 42 FEP Cases 229, 234 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Runyan III for the proposition that plaintiff's
settlement of factual disputes arising under the ADEA is consistent with Act's purposes and policies);
DiMartitto v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 n.3, 1248 (D. Conn. 1986) (distinguishing
vacated Runyan 11 opinion to find that ADEA claims may be settled by knowing and voluntary
waiver). See also supra note 108,
* By Gretchen M. Van Ness, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Palmer v. General Servs. Admin., 787 F.2d 300,.40 FEP Cases 630 (8th Cir. 1986).
2 29 U.S.C. §1621-634 (1982).
42 U.S.C. §1 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
4 29 U.S.C. §1201-219 (1982).
Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 955, 29 FEP Cases 1373, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For a
general discussion of the problem of remedies under the ADEA, see Marion, Legal and Equitable
Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 Mo. L. REV. 298 (1986); Nosier & Wing,
Remedies Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 469 (1985).
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The fact that the ADEA initially applied only to private sector employees further
complicates the question of ADEA remedies. 6 Congress amended the ADEA to cover
federal employees by adding a separate section to the statute in 1974. 7 Because the
wording of the added section's remedial provision differs from that part of the ADEA
which applies to private sector employees, many courts have concluded that it establishes
a separate remedial scheme for federal employees. 6 The apparent distinction between
court action and administrative proceedings under the FLSA further complicates the
issue of ADEA remedies. Under the FLSA, attorneys' fees are recoverable in the former
but not in the latter. 9
As a result of the ADEA's kinship with both the FLSA and Title VII, and the
ADEA's separate handling of private sector and federal employees, an inconsistent body
of case law has developed concerning the recovery of attorneys' fees under the Act. Most
courts have permitted the award of attorneys' fees to private sector employees who have
prevailed under the ADEA in court,' 9 some courts have permitted private sector em-
ployees to recover attorneys' fees at the administrative level," and at least one court has
permitted a federal employee to recover attorneys' fees after prevailing in federal district
court.' 1 Atsthe administrative level, however, successful federal complainants have been
unable to recover attorneys' fees under the ADEA.' 3
During the Survey year, in Palmer v. General Services Administration," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in a two-to-one opinion, ruled that a federal
employee who has prevailed at the administrative level with an ADEA claim may not
recover attorneys' fees.i 5 The majority opinion 16 identified two barriers preventing the
plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees: the doctrine of sovereign immunity," and the
"American Rule" of attorneys' fees.' 8 First, according to the court, under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity the federal government is liable only when it has consented to
6 Palmer v. General Servs. Admin., 787 F.2d 300, 301, 40 FEP Cases 630, 631 (8th Cir. 1986).
7
 Marion, supra note 5, at 347 n.305.
6 Id. at 347.
9 Nosier & Wing, supra note 5, at 484.
11' Id.
Marion, supra note 5, at 347-48.
12 DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037, 25 FEP Cases 393 (C.D. III. 1980).
13 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently ruled that federal
employees who prevail under the ADEA at the administrative level cannot recover attorneys' fees.
Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 29 FEP Cases 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
" 787 F.2d 300, 40 FEP Cases 630 (8th Cir. 1986).
' 5 /d,
'6 Judge Fagg wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judge Bowman. Judge Heaney
dissented.
19 787 F.2d at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 630.
19 M. at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 630-31. Throughout the history of American law, each party to
a law suit traditionally paid the costs associated with his or her representation. 6 J. MOORE, W.
TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PitAcricx 11 54.78 (2d ed. 1985). Over the years, courts
have recognized three exceptions to what is known as the "American Rule" of not awarding
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party: (1) when a valid contractual provision exists between the
litigating parties for the award of attorneys' fees, id. at 9 54.78[2]; (2) when the court may exercise
its equitable power to award attorneys' fees in addition to regular statutory costs in order to
"vindicate important public rights," or when the plaintiff has acted as a "private attorney general,"
id. at Q 54.78[3], at 497; and (3) when a valid statutory provision authorizes the award of attorneys'
fees, id. at 9 54.78[4]. The second two exceptions are at issue in Palmer.
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suit through a statute which unequivocally waives immunity) 9 Such a statute, the court
stated, must be "strictly and narrowly construed" in order to limit the government's
liability.'" The second barrier to recovery and a principle underscoring the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, in the court's view, is the American Rule concerning attorneys'
fees.21 Given the established principles of sovereign immunity and the American Rule
that each party to a lawsuit pays its own attorneys' fees, the court concluded that even
when a federal statute explicitly waives sovereign immunity, this waiver should not be
interpreted to include the award of attorneys' fees unless Congress has clearly indicated
that it should. 22
In Palmer v. General Services Administration, after successfully pursuing an age dis-
crimination claim at the administrative level, Alfred Palmer filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri to recover his attorneys' fees. 23 An
internal administrative panel at the General Services Administration (GSA) found merit
in Palmer's claim that he had been fired because of his age in violation of the ADEA, 24
The GSA panel awarded Palmer a retroactive promotion and back pay but did not award
attorneys' fees and costs." Consequently, Palmer filed suit in federal district court seeking
recovery of his attorneys' fees." The district court dismissed Palmer's complaint and, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 27
The Eighth Circuit first examined the plain language and the legislative history of
the ADEA to discover whether it manifests a clear indication of congressional intent
concerning the award of attorneys' fees. 28 The court noted that when Congress amended
the ADEA to include federal employees, it did not simply add the term "federal em-
ployees" to the existing statute. 29 Instead, the court observed, Congress enacted an
entirely new section which applies only to federal employees. ," Title 29, section 633a of
the United States Code contains a brief remedial provision authorizing the court to
award to federal employees suing in federal court "such legal and equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes" of the Act. 31 The Palmer court noted that neither the language
of this section nor its legislative history contains any reference to attorneys' fees." The
court concluded, therefore, that this section does not authorize the award of attorneys'
19 Palmer, 747 F.2d at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 630 (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian, 435 U.S. 156,
160, 26 FEP Cases 65, 67 (1981) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980))).
2° Id. (citing Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F,2d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane)).
21 Id. at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 631.
22 Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1977)).
29 Court Says Federal Age Bias Claimant is not Entitled to Recover Legal Costs, 24 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 14, 1986).
24 787 F.2d at 300, 40 FEP Cases at 630,
25 Id .
" Id.
29 Id. at 302, 40 FEP Cases at 632.
2, Id. at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 631.
" Id.
919 Id. The section added by Congress to extend ADEA coverage to federal employees is codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982).
91 Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1982). The section reads,
in its entirety: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal and equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
chapter." Id.
32 787 F.2d at 301, 40 FEP Cases at 631.
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fees to federal employees who have prevailed under the ADEA at the administrative
leve1.3 '
The court then examined the manner in which other federal antidiscrimination
statutes address attorneys' fees. As originally enacted, the ADEA authorized the award
of attorneys' fees to private sector employees in language that is very different than
section 633a(c), the court noted 94 Title VII, according to the court, also specifically
authorizes attorneys' fees for both private sector and federal employees." The court
found Title VII instructive because Title VII, like the ADEA, initially applied only to
private sector employees." When Congress amended Title VII to include federal em-
ployees, the court observed, it specifically authorized attorneys' fees in addition to in-
serting broad remedial language similar to that found in section 633a(c). 37 The court
found Congress's failure to do the same with the ADEA conclusive evidence that it
intended to preclude the recovery of attorneys' fees by federal employees.'
The court concluded its analysis by addressing Palmer's argument that the award
of attorneys' fees would effectuate the purposes of the ADEA and should, therefore, be
permitted under the Act." The court found that this broad reading of the statutory
language conflicted with the United States Supreme Court's 1975 ruling in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 4° The Alyeska Pipeline ruling, the court stated, prohibits
the award of attorneys' fees against the federal government unless expressly authorized
by statute:" Because only public policy considerations, rather than federal law, would
support the award of attorneys' fees to Palmer, the court concluded that Alyeska Pipeline
prohibits the award. 42 The court conceded that Palmer's public policy arguments could
justify such an award, but concluded that the legislature and not the judiciary should
address these arguments." Because the court found nothing in the ADEA which specif-
ically provides for the award of attorneys' fees to a federal employee who prevails at the
administrative level, it dismissed the plaintiff's suit.''
" Id.
44 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Section 626(b) incorporates by reference 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), that
part of the Fair Labor Standards Act which expressly authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees to
a prevailing plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) provides for the award of attorneys' fees to private sector
employees, while § 2000e-16(d) provides that federal employees shall have the same remedies as
private sector employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1982).
36 787 F.2d at 302, 40 FEP Cases at 631.
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides for the award of any "equitable relief" a court deems
appropriate and does not mention attorneys' fees. See supra note 31 for the text of section 633a(c).
40 787 F.2d at 302, 40 FEP Cases at 631.
59 Id. at 302, 40 FE? Cases at 631-32.
4" 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
" 787 F.2d at 302, 40 FEP Cases at 632. The Palmer court stated:
[I]t is for Congress, by 'specific and explicit' statutory provisions . . . to determine 'the
circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discre-
tion [to be exercised by] the courts in making those awards.' ... Thus, absent such
authorization, this court has no authority to award fees, and each party will be required
to pay its own attorneys' fees.
Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 263).
42 Id.
Id.
44 Id.
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Dissenting from the majority's interpretation of section 633a(c), Judge Heaney
argued that the court's holding unfairly limits the remedies available to the federal
employee who pursues an age discrimination complaint before an administrative body. 45
Judge Heaney asserted that Congress intended to give the victims of age discrimination
the same remedies it gave victims of race or sex discrimination. 46 A central policy of
statutes prohibiting race and sex discrimination, Judge Heaney emphasized, is to "make
whole" the person who has suffered discrimination.' The award of attorneys' fees
furthers this policy, in Judge Heaney's view 48 Since the ADEA is patterned after Title
VII, Judge Heaney reasoned, it should be interpreted similarly to permit the recovery
of attorneys' fees at the administrative level.°
Judge Heaney also disagreed with the distinction the majority drew between judicial
and administrative Proceedings." Judge Heaney found nothing in the language of
section 633a(c) to support the award of attorneys' fees when a complainant has prevailed
in court and to prohibit such an award when a complainant has prevailed at the admin-
istrative leve1.5 ' Judge Heaney warned that this holding will discourage age discrimina-
tion claimants from pursuing administrative remedies and thus compromise a meaning-
ful part of the ADEA enforcement scheme. 52
In summary, the Palmer majority cited the American Rule of attorneys' fees and
read the Alyeska Pipeline holding as prohibiting the award of any attorneys' fees against
the federal government absent an explicit statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. The
majority found no such waiver in the ADEA and, as a result, denied Palmer's request
for attorneys' fees. The dissent viewed the ADEA as more similar to Title VII and,
because it found attorneys' fees permissible under that statute's "make whole" philosophy,
argued that attorneys' fees are also permissible under the ADEA. The dissent also argued
that the majority's opinion will discourage litigants from pursuing administrative reme-
dies under the ADEA and argued, therefore, that Palmer was entitled to recover his
attorneys' fees and costs.
In Palmer v. General Services Administration, the Eighth Circuit invoked a restrictive
reading of the ADEA's remedial provisions.55 In holding that a successful ADEA com-
plainant cannot recover attorneys' fees from the federal government when he or she
has prevailed at the administrative level, the court has drawn a bright line that will help
reduce some of the unpredictability concerning remedies that accompanied age discrim-
ination claims before Palmer. The court achieved this predictability, however, at some
cost to the age discrimination victim.
One commentator who has explored the analytical difficulties caused by the broad
language of the ADEA's section 633a(c) points out that Congress has provided for the
"Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
46 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
47 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 303, 40 FEP Cases at 632 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 446 F.
Supp. 530, 533 (D.D.C. 1978)).
4° Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
5° Id. at 303, 40 FEP Cases at 632-33. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
51 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 303, 40 FEP Cases at 632 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
53 The Eighth Circuit thus joins the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
holding that attorneys' fees are not recoverable by federal employees who prevail at the adminis-
trative level under the ADEA. Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 29 FEP Cases 1373 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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recovery of attorneys' fees under other employment discrimination statutes." This com-
mentator believes that Congress's failure to expressly provide for the award of attorneys'
fees to federal employees under the ADEA is most likely the result of oversight or the
belief that the award was included in the statute's broad remedial language." The
suggestion that Congress's failure to provide for attorneys' fees may simply be an over-
sight finds some support in the legislative history of the 1974 amendment that extended
ADEA coverage to federal employees. The amendment was a small part of the massive
Fair Labor Standards Act and it received a scant two pages of explanation within a
legislative record of over fifty pages." Nothing in the record indicates that Congress
considered age discrimination against federal employees any less serious than age, race
or sex discrimination against private sector employees, or that it intended to establish a
less complete remedial scheme for the federal age discrimination victims'
In addition to the lack of evidence in the legislative record, it ,is important to note
that Congress amended the ADEA to cover federal employees at a time when the legal
system looked more favorably upon the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
Before Alyeska Pipeline was decided in 1975, courts broadly interpreted the "private
attorney general" exception to the American Rule on attorneys' fees." Courts frequently
cited the private attorney general exception to support awards which would "vindicate
important public rights,"" such as rooting out discrimination in the employment setting.
The general practice of awarding attorneys' fees in employment discrimination cases,
where the private citizen acts as a private attorney general to enforce federal law, formed
the background in which the AREA was amended to extend to federal employees in
1974. Congressional silence on the issue of attorneys' fees may simply reflect a pre-
Alyeska Pipeline belief that courts would consider attorneys' fees part of the "legal or
equitable relief" necessary to "effectuate the purposes" of the ADEA. 65 Congress may
not have considered it necessary to spell out what was, at that time, the common practice
of awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff in employment discrimination
cases 6'
Palmer v. General Services Administration makes it clear that the remedy of attorneys'
fees is not available to federal employees who prevail under the ADEA at the adminis-
trative level. The case provides a bright line interpretation of section 633a(c) that will
make ADEA remedies more predictable, but the bright line chosen by the court makes
the ADEA a less powerful tool than the other employment discrimination statutes.
Although the ADEA, unlike Title VII, does not require that a complainant exhaust all
available administrative remedies before filing suit in federal district court,62 the Palmer
58 M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION 741 (1982).
55 Id.
56 H.R. REP. No. 313, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2811, 2849-50.
"M. The report states, "The committee expects that expanded coverage under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Law will remove discriminatory barriers against employment of
older workers in government jobs at the Federal and local government levels as it has and continues
to do in private employment." Id.
58 61 MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE Q 54-78[3], at 498 n.19.
59 Id. at 4 54.78[3], at 497.
6° 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1982).
6' See supra note 58,
64 Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 964, 29 FEP Cases 1373, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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holding may discourage federal employees from pursuing age discrimination complaints
because they will be unable to recover attorneys' fees if successful at the administrative
level.
More importantly, the Palmer holding establishes two anomalous remedial schemes
within the ADEA. One scheme permits the recovery of attorneys' fees for the private
sector employee, prevails at either the administrative level or in court, and a second
permits federal employees to recover attorneys' fees only if they prevail in court. Nothing
in the legislative record indicates that Congress intended to provide federal employees
with fewer remedies than private sector employees under the ADEA. In his dissent,
Judge Heaney correctly argued that the purpose of the various employment discrimi-
nation statutes is to "make whole" the discrimination victim. The Palmer ruling may
defeat this goal for federal ADEA claimants. Federal ADEA claimants who are successful
in court will be "made whole" through the award of attorneys' fees, while those who
pursue their claims at the administrative level must bear the often prohibitive cost of
representation. In view of Palmer's restrictive reading of the ADEA, Congress should
take this opportunity to amend the Act to provide expressly for the award of attorneys'
fees to successful complainants such as Alfred Palmer.
D. *Age Discrimination Under New York Civil Service Law, Section 58(1)(a): Doyle v.
Suffolk County.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)2 prohibits employment dis-
crimination based on age unless age represents a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) which is reasonably necessary to the "normal operation of the particular busi-
ness" or the age requirement for hiring is "based on reasonable factors other than age."'
The ADEA protects only those employees between the ages of forty and seventy.' The
purpose of this law is to ensure that the hiring of older workers is based on their ability
to perform their duties rather than on their age.'
* By Michael J. Southwick, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
786 F.2d 523, 40 FEP Cases 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 98 (1986).
I 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-34 (1982), Actions under the ADEA are restricted to individuals between
the ages of forty and seventy. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). This section of the ADEA provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
(1)to take any action ... where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.
Id. The ADEA also does not make unlawful any seniority systems or employee benefit plans such
as retirement, pension or insurance plans, provided that such systems or plans are not merely
intended to avoid the other requirements of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2). Additionally, it is not
unlawful, under the ADEA, to discharge or discipline an otherwise protected employee for good
cause. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 631. Additionally, the ADEA only applies to employers with more than twenty
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
5 S. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, p.2214. The
announced purpose of the ADEA is •
to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
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In addition to the ADEA, the equal protection clause of the Constitution also
prohibits unreasonable discrimination.' In age discrimination cases, courts have applied
the rational relation test in deciding whether a particular provision is constitutional. 7
Under the rational relation test, a provision is constitutional provided it is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.'
Despite the prohibitions of the ADEA and the equal protection clause, New York
has retained a statute which restricts access to its police force strictly on the basis of age.
New York Civil Service Law, section 58(1)(a) (section 58) prohibits the hiring of applicants
seeking to join the New York police force who are over the age of twenty-nine.' In the
1985 case of Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 1 ° the Second Circuit relied on the ADEA and
affirmed the district court's invalidation of section 58 to the extent that it prohibited the
hiring of individuals between the ages of forty and seventy." In finding that being below
the age of forty was not a BFOQ for a police officer, the Hahn court upheld the district
court's decision against the City of Buffalo. 12
 This opinion failed, however, to explain
6 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § I. The equal protection clause provides that "No state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
7 See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
8
 Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 528, 40 FEP Cases 598, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 107
S.Ct. 98 (1986)(quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 12 FEP
Cases 1569, 1571 (1976)).
° N.Y. Dv. SERV. LAW § 58(1)(a) (McKinney 1983). This provision states:
... no person shall be eligible for provisional or permanent appointment in the
competitive class of the civil service as a police officer ... unless he shall satisfy the
following basic requirements ...
(a) he is not less than twenty nor more than twenty-nine years of age.
Id. This maximum age restriction on hiring is subject to two exceptions. First, an applicant is entitled
to a credit of up to six years for military duty or terminal leave, thus extending eligibility for
appointment as far as his or her thirty-fifth birthday. Id. Second, upon recommendation by a
municipal commission, eligibility may be extended to an applicant's thirty-fifth birthday if the force
requires additional recruits because of a "serious shortage of police officers." Id. § 58(1)(d)(1-a).
'° 770 F.2d 12, 38 FEP Cases 1069 (2d Cir. 1985).
" Id. at 14,16, 38 FEP Cases at 1071, 1072. In determining the issue of BFOQ, the Hahn court
relied on the test laid out in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. Id. at 14, 38 FEP Cases at 1071
(citing Tamiami, 531 F.2d 224, 236, 12 FEP Cases 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976)). Under this test, in
order to prove that the discriminatory factor of age was a BFOQ, an employer must show:
(1) that the job disqualifications are reasonably necessary to the essential operation of
the business and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all of the persons within the class protected by the ADEA would be unable to perform
the job effectively and safely or that it is impossible or impracticable to determine job
fitness on an individualized basis.
Hahn, 770 F.2d at 14, 38 FEP Cases at 1071. The Hahn court noted that the district court found,
in light of all the evidence, that there was no indication that those people over the age of forty
could not perform their duties as well as those in the group between twenty and twenty-nine or
that hiring police officers from this older group would create an "unacceptable risk to the public."
Id. at 14, 38 FEP Cases at 1071 (citing Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 949, 36 FEP
Cases 379, 390 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). Compare Tamiami, 531 F.2d 224, 12 FEP Cases 1233 (5th Cir.
1976)(being under forty held to be a BFOQ for position of inner city bus driver) with Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 3 FEP Cases 337 (5th Cir. 1971)(being female held
not to be a BFOQ for position of airline cabin attendant) and Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 1 FEP Cases 656 (5th Cir. 1969)(being male held not to be BFOQ
for position requiring occasional strenuous activity).
17 Hahn, 770 F.2d at 14, 16, 38 FEP,Cases at 1071, 1072.
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the status of the surviving portion of section 58, that is, the restriction on hiring applicants
between the ages of twenty-nine and forty."
During the Survey year, in Doyle v. Suffolk County, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the surviving portion of section 58 was severable from
the partially invalidated portion," and upheld the validity of section 58 as it applies to
applicants to the police force between the ages of twenty-nine and forty on both statutory
and constitutional grounds." On the statutory claim, the court maintained that the
previous ruling in Hahn did not abrogate the legislative intent to set a maximum age
limit of twenty-nine for applicants to the force. 16 Furthermore, the Second Circuit found
that the surviving portion of section 58(1)(a) did not violate the equal protection clause
of the constitution.° Thus, in upholding section 58(1)(a), the Second Circuit was able to
reach a solution which followed the rule handed down in Hahn and also gave effect to
the New York legislature's intent to restrict the hiring of police officers over the age of
twenty-nine. In addition, notwithstanding this anomalous result which permits the hiring
of police officers between the ages of forty and seventy but excludes applicants between
twenty-nine and forty, the court upheld section 58 against the equal protection chal-
lenge. 1 B
The Doyle case represents a simultaneous hearing of two related but unconsolidated
appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York." In
both cases, plaintiffs challenged section 58 under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.20 The first case, Doyle v. Suffolk County, involved six persons who
had passed the civil service exam in Suffolk County but were denied consideration
because each had become twenty-nine years of age." The district court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 22 holding that section
58(1)(a) did not violate the Constitution because it was rationally related to the state
's See Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 526, 40 FEP Cases 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1985). The
confusing language in Hahn reads as follows: "We conclude that the judgment [of the district court]
was intended to invalidate section 58(1)(a) throughout New York State." Hahn, 770 F.2d at 14, 38
FEP Cases at 1071. In expanding the geographic scope of its holding, however, the Hahn court
failed to explain that the age group affected by the decision was limited to those in the forty to
seventy group. See id. The court in Hahn did not pass on the validity of section 58(1)(a) as it applies
to those applicants between thirty and thirty-nine because in that case, the City of Buffalo agreed
not to refuse appointments to those applicants in that age group. Id. at 14 n.2, 38 FEP Cases at
1071 n.2. The Doyle court concluded that this agreement by the City of Buffalo, although only
specifically applying to those between thirty and thirty-nine, was intended to "fill the gap" between
those protected by the ADEA and those excluded by the New York law and thus applied to
applicants between twenty-nine and forty. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 525 n.l, 40 FEP Cases at 599 n.l.
14 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 90 FE? Cases at 602.
15 See id. at 528, 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602, 603.
16 Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
1 7 Id. at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03. Under the rational relation test such a restriction
was reasonably related to the legitimate state interest of maintaining a capable police force. Id. at
529, 40 FEP Cases at 603.
nud .
19 Doyle v. Suffolk County, Docket No. 85-7782 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Hettinger v. Nassau County
Civil Serv. Comm'r, Docket No. 85-7820 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
20 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 525-26, 40 FEP Cases at 600.
21 /d. at 525, 40 FEP Cases at 599-600 (discussing Doyle v. Suffolk County, Docket No. 85— ,
7782),
22 FED. R. Crv. P. I2(b)(6).
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interest of maintaining a police force which was physically able and capable of being
trained."
In the second case, Hettinger v. Nassau County Civil Stroke Commission, the district
court also rejected the equal protection challenge of two applicants who passed the civil
service exam for police officers but were subsequently informed of their ineligibility
when they became twenty-nine." In this case, however, the court interpreted Hahn as
invalidating section 58 in its entirety." This interpretation was possible because the Hahn
court stated that section 58 was invalid throughout New York state.26
The question on appeal for the Second Circuit was two-fold. First, the court had to
decide the impact of the partial invalidation of section 58 that was handed down in
Hahn." Second, the Second Circuit was required to reconsider the constitutional claim
in order to determine whether section 58, insofar as it only applies to applicants between
twenty-nine and forty, remained rationally related to the legitimate goal of maintaining
a capable police force. 28
In deciding the first issue, the Second Circuit rejected the trial court's opinion in
Hettinger that Hahn invalidated section 58 in its entirety." The Hahn court's expansion
of geographic scope, the Doyle court explained, was not intended to expand the age-group
scope of the Hahn judgment which was restricted by the terms of the ADEA.so Therefore,
the Doyle court explained, Hahn only invalidated section 58 as it applies to those applicants
between forty and seventy.''
The Second Circuit next examined whether the surviving portion of section 58 was
severable from that portion invalidated in Hahn." The court looked to past partial
invalidation cases and reasoned that it had one of two choices." Either it could invalidate
the entire provision or it could maintain it insofar as it applies to those between the
ages of twenty-nine and forty." In holding that the latter course was appropri-
23 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 525, 40 FEP Cases at 600. Having disposed of the federal claim, the district
court refused to extend pendent claim jurisdiction over the state law claims also advanced by
plaintiffs. Id.
28 Id. at 526, 40 FEP Cases at 600 (discussing Hettinger v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n,
85-7820).
28 Id. at 526, 40 FEP Cases at 600.
°6 See Hahn, 770 F.2d at 14,'38 FEP Cases at 1071.
" Doyle, 786 F.2d at 526, 40 FEP Cases at 600.
28 See id. at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03.
" Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
"Id. at 526, 40 FEP Cases at 600.
" See id. The district court in Hettinger entered an order admitting plaintiffs who had turned
twenty-nine to the entering class at the police academy. See Doyle, 786 F.2d at 526, 40 FEP Cases at
600. This order was stayed pending this appeal. See id.
" Id. at 526-27, 40 FEP Cases at 600-01.
" See id. at 526-27, 40 FEP Cases at 601.
" Id. The Doyle court reasoned that the issue of determining legislative intent when a single
provision is partially invalidated can arise in one of two contexts. Id. at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601.
First, a court may find a provision underindusive, in which case the court must decide whether the
legislature would have preferred to repeal the statute entirely or extend it to apply to the "imper-
missibly excluded class." Id. at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601 (citing Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 266, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1985)(invalidating New York provision limiting bonus
points on civil service exams to New York resident veterans only and extending bonus points to all
veterans); People v. Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1020 (1985) (invalidating exemption for married men and females from state rape and sodomy
laws and extending criminal statute to both formerly excluded classes)).
Alternatively, a court may find a statutory provision overinclusive in which case the court must
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ate," the court considered what result the New York legislature would have preferred
if it had foreseen the partial invalidation." The court maintained that the legislature's
preference with regard to section 58 would be to prohibit the hiring of applicants over
the age of twenty-nine." Therefore, reasoned the court, the legislature would want this
policy to be given effect as far as the federal law allows."
The Second Circuit reasoned that the decision as to whether section 58 should
survive to the extent that it still prohibits the hiring of applicants between twenty-nine
and forty" depended upon the intent of the legislature.d° The court began its analysis
of the legislative intent by presuming that the New York legislature would prefer any
provision surviving partial invalidation to remain in effect. 4 ' In New York, the court
stated, this presumption is supported by the broad severability provision embodied in
the Civil Service Laws. 42 Thus, the court stated, New York apparently evinced a pref-
erence for retaining the surviving portion of a provision even following the invalidation
of the remainder of that same section. 43
The Second Circuit pointed out that the New York legislature, in adopting section
58, made a clear decision that applicants over the age of twenty-nine should not be
considered for positions on the police force." Despite the holding in Hahn, the court
determine, again, whether a foresighted legislature would prefer that there be no statute or that
the law apply to everyone except for the "impermissibly included class." Doyle, 786 F.2d at 527, 40
FEP Cases at 601 (citing Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington,
552 F,2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)). The Doyle court
found section 58 to be overinclusive. Id. at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601.
" Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
56 Id. at 527-28, 40 FEP Cases at 601-02.
37 Id. at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
38 See id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602,
Id. at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601. If the court had determined that the decision to deny
consideration of the applicants was merely the implementation of the counties' own policy then the
court could have completely avoided the statutory interpretation issue. The court found that the
county decision was indeed statute-based because each county admitted at oral argument that it
had indeed relied on the statute in making its decision. Id. at 526, 40 FEP Cases at 600.
40 Id. at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601. Courts often analyze legislative intent in situations involving
partial invalidation. See People ex. rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 60, 129
N.E. 202, 207 (1920). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976); Yakima Indian Nation, 552
F.2d at 1336; Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 171, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218. The Second Circuit
noted, however, that the analysis in Doyle would not be the "traditional intent analysis" as to how
the legislature intended its statute to be interpreted in a given fact situation. Rather, the court
pointed out that it must decide what the legislature would have intended for its statute had it
foreseen the partial invalidation. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 527, 40 FEP Cases at 601. Thus, if the surviving
portion of the statute is relatively minor in light of the overall intent of the original statutory
scheme, it is likely that the legislature would prefer total invalidation and an opportunity to
readdress the entire issue through an alternative statute. Id.
41 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 601.
42 Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 601-02. N.Y. CP/. SERV, LAW 186 (McKinney 1983) provides in
pertinent part:
If any clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part of this act shall be adjudged
by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect,
impair or invalidate the remainder thereof
Although section 186 appears to apply only to the invalidation of an entire provision within a
larger statutory framework, the principles of severability would seem to apply with equal force to
situations, like in Doyle, where only a part of one provision is invalidated. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 40
FEP Cases at 601-02.
43 Id.
41
 Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
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explained, it is unlikely that the legislature would elect to remove all age restrictions
from the hiring practices of the police departments around the state." Indeed, the court
continued, such an abandonment of policy would enable citizens over the age of seventy
to be considered for these positions." The court thus concluded that because the state
retains a strong policy of maximum age requirements in the area of law enforcement, it
is likely that the legislature would want to maintain the restriction on hiring applicants
between the ages of twenty-nine and forty. 47 In deferring to the legislature, the court
admitted that this outcome was somewhat anomalous because it permitted the hiring of
applicants between the ages of forty and seventy but excluded the applications of those
between twenty-nine and forty." Notwithstanding this anomaly, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that this outcome was required because of the legislature's desire to restrict
application to the police force to individuals younger than twenty-nine as modified by
the 1985 Hahn decision."
The Second Circuit next turned its attention to the equal protection issue." The
question before the court was whether New York could constitutionally deny appoint-
ment to applicants twenty-nine to forty and those seventy and older while permitting
the appointment of those applicants between the ages of forty and seventy." The court
applied the rational relation test and determined that the surviving portion of section
58 was rationally related to the legitimate state objective of maintaining a capable police
force."
The state interest behind section 58, according to the court, is the need to hire
police officers who are "physically able to discharge their duties."" The Second Circuit
held that such an interest was obviously legitimate and that the twenty-nine year-old
cutoff was at least rationally related to advancing that interests , The court reasoned that
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. Thus the court found that the legislature would have intended section 58(1)(a) to apply
"to the greatest extent possible" if it had foreseen the invalidation of the section's application to
those between forty and seventy years of age. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
40 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 603.
"Id. The root of this anomaly is simply that the ADEA, under which Hahn was decided, only
protects individuals between the ages of forty and seventy. The court concluded that although the
resulting age classifications were anomalous the restriction continued to serve a legitimate state
interest. Thus, despite the anomaly, section 58, as modified by the partial invalidation, was still
constitutional. Id.
5° Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
" Id.
52 See id. at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03. Plaintiffs in Doyle also argued that the military
and recruitment emergency exceptions to section 58(I)(a) indicate the irrationality of the exclusion
of twenty-nine to forty year old applicants. See supra note 7. The court rejected this argument
pointing out that such minor adjustments to the rule do not detract from the overall rationality of
the statute. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
55 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602.
54 Id. at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602. The court found that it was reasonable for the state
legislature to conclude that an individual's physical capacity to perform police activities declines
after the individual reaches the age of twenty-nine. Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602. There is a
discrepancy between this conclusion and that reached in Hahn where the court affirmed the district
court's finding that being below the age of forty does not represent a BFOQ. See Hahn, 770 F.2d
at 16, 38 FEP Cases at 1072. The explanation for this inconsistency is that the BFOQ standard is a
much stricter test than the rational relation inquiry required under the equal protection analysis.
Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602. Thus, while it seems odd that a thirty year old may be
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although many people between the ages of twenty-nine and forty could probably perform
the duties of a police officer, the conclusion that on average the younger group (20 to
29 year-olds) would yield a higher percentage of viable candidates was not irrational."
Finally, the Second Circuit considered whether the holding in Hahn permitting
consideration of applicants between forty and seventy made the exclusion of candidates
between twenty-nine and forty irrational. 56 The court rejected this argument on the
ground that most applicants over the age of twenty-nine would fall in the twenty-nine
to forty group." Therefore, if the legislature had foreseen this anomalous result, the
court concluded that it still would have been rational in maintaining the exclusion of
applicants between twenty-nine and forty." The court noted that the state would con-
serve its scarce resources if it only had to conduct individualized testing on the relatively
small group of forty to seventy year old applicants rather than the much larger twenty-
nine to forty group.59 Accordingly, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
the surviving portion of section 58 under the rational relation standard."
In analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion in Doyle, several issues arise. The first, and
perhaps most obvious point to be made concerns the unusual outcome of the case.
Whereas the Hahn court found that being below the age of forty does not constitute a
denied appointment while a sixty-nine year old is granted a job, the tests employed by the court
support this result.
The court reasoned that the rational relation test was the proper standard to apply in cases
"prohibiting the commencement of employment because of age." Id. at 528, 40 FEP Cases at 602
(citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 12 HP Cases 1569, 1571
(1976)). The rational relation test requires only that the classification made by the state is "rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest." Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 12 FEP Cases at 1571.
See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 19 FEP Cases I, 3 (1979). Although courts have applied
this standard in cases involving statutes terminating employment because of age, the Doyle court
concluded that it is also the correct standard to apply to statutes denying employment because of
age. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528, 40 FE? Cases at 602.
55 Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602, The court concluded, in light of the limited
resources available in the state, that the most cost effective plan was to only conduct physical testing
"among the group most likely to yield qualified candidates." Id. A state is not acting irrationally if'
the purpose of its law is to avoid the burdensome costs of conducting individualized testing. See
Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d at 227-28, 12 FEP Cases at 1234; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5, 1 FEY
Cases at 660 n.5. The decision that the qualified candidates would be below the age of twenty-nine,
the court reasoned, was not irrational. Rather, the provision would serve the legitimate state interest
of maintaining a physically capable police force. Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602. The
court pointed out that in cases such as this, where line drawing is difficult to begin with, "perfection
is by no means required." Id. (quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376,
385 (1960)). The court reasoned that by limiting selection to the younger group, the state was
insuring that those applicants selected would be part of the force for a reasonable number of years,
thereby increasing the effectiveness and experience of the force as a whole. Id. at 529, 40 FEP
Cases at 602.
5° Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03.
57 Id. at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 603.
58 Id. at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03 (citing Lamb v. Scripps College, 627 F.2d 1015, 24 FEP
Cases 1010 (9th Cir. 1980)(upholding mandatory retirement for tenured professors between 65
and 70 but not younger than 65 or older than 70)),
5° Id. at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 603. It should be noted that by limiting the testing pool to only
applicants in the smaller group of forty to seventy year olds, New York is not jeopardizing the
strength or ability of its police force. The pool of applicants between twenty and twenty-nine should
be able to provide adequate recruits for the force especially in light of the emergency provision
enabling the municipality to expand the size of its applicant pool in cases of serious shortages. See
N,Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 58( I)(d)(1-a).
6° Doyle, 786 F.2d at 529, 40 FEP Cases at 603.
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BFOQ, the Doyle court found itself in the unenviable position of holding that the state
is permitted to discriminate in employment based on age as long as the applicant is
between the ages of twenty-nine and forty. This unlikely result was reached simply
because the ADEA, under which Hahn was decided, protects only those individuals
between the ages of forty and seventy. 61 Congress made the conscious choice to restrict
the application of the ADEA to those between forty and seventy. 62 Thus those below the
age of forty cannot successfully claim that they have been deprived of the right to have
their employers make decisions based on their ability rather than on their age because
they never had that right in the first place.
The anomalous result in Doyle, which permits New York to discriminate against
applicants who are between the ages of twenty-nine and forty but forbids the exclusion
of those between forty and seventy, is not a shortcoming in the Second Circuit's opinion.
In its careful consideration of the legislative intent behind section 58, the court abided
by appropriate separation of powers principles. Rather than striking down the provision
in its entirety, an act which would have been tantamount to making law, the court adhered
to its role as interpreter of the laws and devised a solution which was, in its reasoned
discretion, not only just but also appropriately deferential to the legislature.63
A second noteworthy aspect of the Doyle decision concerns the Second Circuit's
constitutional analysis of the age discrimination in employment issue. In the past, the
courts have consistently upheld employment statutes which tend to discriminate based
on age as long as the provision is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As the
Doyle court correctly pointed out, the monetary savings to the state, if it restricted its
consideration to only those candidates younger than twenty-nine and between forty and
seventy, alone support a finding that the law is at least rationally related to the legitimate
objective of maintaining a capable police force. Because the number of applicants to the
force in the twenty-nine to forty group is greater than that in the forty to seventy group,
it was not irrational for the legislature to conclude that limiting testing to those in the
older group would better advance the state's interest.
It also seems unlikely that a stricter level of scrutiny will be required in employment
discrimination cases based on age. Strict scrutiny is appropriate only where a funda-
mental right64 or discrimination against a "suspect class" is involved. 65 There is no support
for the contention that the right to employment is, or should be considered, per se
fundamenta1.66 Similarly, the class of applicants in Doyle between the ages of twenty-nine
and forty is not a suspect class according to the Supreme Court's definition of that term
over the past fifty years.67 It is difficult to argue that this group suffers from the same
81 29 U.S.C. § 631.
62
 Id.
65 See Yakima Indian Nation, 552 F.2d at 1336.
64 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 12 FEP Cases at 1571 (citing San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. I, 16 (1973)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
65 See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 n.4, 12 FEP Cases at 1571 n.4 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964)).
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 12 FEP Cases at 1571. In Murgia, the Supreme Court expressly
held that " ... we have expressly held that a standard less than strict scrutiny 'has consistently been
applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities.'" (quoting Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
" Historically, a suspect class has been defined as one which is "saddled with such disabilities,
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purposeful discrimination and historical inability to protect itself through the political
process that those discriminated against on the basis of, for example, race once did. In
light of the historical interpretation of suspect classification, the Doyle court was correct
in applying the rational relationship standard and properly upheld the surviving portion
of section 58 against the constitutional challenge. 613
Finally, an impact that the Doyle decision will have on the practice of labor law
revolves around the partial invalidation issue. In the future, practitioners in this area
should be aware that invalidation of one portion of an employment statute will not
require the courts, at least in New York, to subsequently invalidate the entire statute.
Rather, in these situations, the court will examine the legislative intent behind the
statutory scheme and decide whether or not a foresighted legislature would prefer total
or partial invalidation.
In conclusion, the Second Circuit in Doyle held that New York is permitted to exclude
applicants to its police force who are between the ages of twenty-nine and forty. At the
same time the court upheld its 1985 decision in Hahn to the extent that it prohibited
age discrimination against applicants to the force who are between forty and seventy.
The Doyle case represents an attempt by the Second Circuit to give effect to the legislative
intent behind section 58 despite partial invalidation of that intent in the prior Hahn
decision. Notwithstanding the anomalous result reached in Doyle, the conclusion of the
court seems to be in line with prior case law as well as statutory interpretation through
legislative intent analysis. Finally, the court dealt with the equal protection issue and, in
finding the state law to be constitutional, reaffirmed that the proper standard of judicial
scrutiny in age discrimination cases is the rational relation test.
V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. *Public Sector Voluntary Affirmative Action: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education'
The equal protection clause of the Constitution generally prohibits all governmental
employers from participating in invidious racial discrimination in the hiring and pro-
motion of employees. 2 Courts also have interpreted the equal protection clause to man-
date that public employers adhere to strict requirements when they seek to implement
voluntary affirmative action programs involving racial classifications which benefit mem-
bers of groups historically the victims of discrimination. 3 This type of discrimination
which benefits historically victimized groups is typically termed "benign." Although the
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938)(suspect classification involves a "discrete and insular minority").
" Doyle, 786 F.2d at 528-29, 40 FEP Cases at 602-03.
* By William T. Matlack, Staff Member, Bos-roN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 106 S. Ct. 1842, 40 FEP Cases 1320 (1986).
2 See generally J, NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §1 14.8-14.9 (3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
5 See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72, 17 FEN Cases 1000,
1004 (1978) (Court ordered plantiff's admission to medical school because state purposes insuffi-
cient and racial quota in admissions overbroad to sustain University's affirmative action program).
See id. at 358-61, 17 FEP Cases at 1036-37.
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Supreme Court has not agreed upon a .consistent standard of review,s it appears that
affirmative action plans based on racial preferences must arise from a compelling gov-
ernmental purpose,s and must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that purpose.'
Courts have found employment affirmative action plans valid under the Constitution
when they are both implemented to remedy the effects of the employer's past invidious
racial discrimination and do not severely harm the interests of nonminority employees.s
Several Supreme Court decisions in the last ten years have attempted to identify the
constitutional parameters of affirmative action. 9 Nonetheless, the Court's opinions have
not offered a unified method of analysis."' Among the standards articulated by the
Court, that of Justice Powell arguably has exerted the strongest influence.' Justice Powell
reasons that there is no difference in the standard of review of invidious racial discrim-
5 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) (plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
17 FEP Cases 1000 (plurality opinion).
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91, 17 FEP Cases
at 1010-11 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480; see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320, 17 FEP Cases at 1022 (opinion of Powell,
J.).
8 See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 897-98, 31 FEP Cases 465, 479 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 33 FEP Cases 1084 (1984).
9 See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 17 FEP Cases 1000.
10 See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 17 FEP Cases 1000. The issue has fragmented the Supreme Court,
and each of several shifting coalitions have developed related but independent standards of review.
These various standards were first articulated in the several opinions of the Bakke decision. Id.
Although all members of the Court apply a two-prong purpose and means test in cases involving
racial classifications, disagreement arose over the proper standards within this analysis. Justice
Powell would apply strict scrutiny for any racial classification. Thus a valid affirmative action plan
must be enacted pursuant to a compelling governmental purpose and be narrowly tailored to
achieve that purpose. Id. at 305-06, 17 FEP Cases 1017.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would permit states to use race-conscious
remedies "where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product of past discrimina-
tion." Id. at 366, 17 FE? Cases at 1039. In response to Justice Powell's requirement that affirmative
action be supported by a compelling state interest, and narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
interest, these four Justices would require that benign racial classifications serve important govern-
mental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id. at 359, 17
FEP Cases at 1036. In addition, these four Justices would require an independent inquiry into
whether the preference "stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is reasonably
used in light of the program's objectives." Id. at 373-74, 17 FEP Cases at 1042-43.
Moreover, prior to 1986, the Court had not addressed the specific issues of voluntary affirmative
action in governmental employment decisions. Consequently, lower court decisions on this issue
have been inconsistent, with various courts following one of the several standards offered by the
different Supreme Court Justices - .or creating their own standard. Compare Baker v. City of
Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 991, 24 FEP Cases 1728, 1779 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff 'd sub. corn. Bratton
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 31 FEP Cases 465 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703, 33
FEP Cases 1084 (1984) (court applied the standard set out in the Tide VII case of Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)) with Bratton, 704 F.2d at 886-87, 31 FEP Cases at 470 (applying Justice
Brennan's approach as set forth in the Bakke dissent but also requiring sufficient findings by a
competent body). See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 977, 28 FEP Cases 1627, 1667-68
(1st Cir. 1982) (court created its own standard drawing upon reasonableness test and the factors
set out in Weber).
" Justice Powell was the "swing" vote in Bakke, see 438 U.S. at 271-72, 17 FEP Cases at 1004,
he wrote a lengthy concurrence in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 495-517, applying his standard to the case,
and his standard is the basis of the Court's plurality in Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1844-52, 40 FEP
Cases 1320, 1322-28 (1986).
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ination and the "benign" discrimination contained in affirmative action plans.'' He
therefore applies the two-prong "strict scrutiny" standard traditionally applied to racial
classifications." Under justice Powell's approach, a governmental body must demonstrate
both that a compelling purpose exists for the racial preference, and that the preference
is narrowly tailored or is the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling purpose. 14
Pursuant to this standard, a plurality of the Court has held that the goal of classroom
diversity justifies affirmative action in academic admissions." Several lower courts have
also held that a public employer may use racial preferences to correct the employer's
own prior invidious discrimination."
During the Survey year, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a plurality of the
Supreme Court ruled that providing classroom role models in order to remedy societal
discrimination is not a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify affirmative action."
Four Justices also agreed that a collectively bargained racial layoff preference is an
unconstitutional means of achieving even a compelling governmental purpose." In
addition, the Court considered a test for determining the constitutionality of voluntary
affirmative action plans. 19 Despite disagreement on this test and, in particular, on the
requisite specificity of findings of prior discrimination necessary to uphold a remedial
affirmative action plan," five Justices held that..the affirmative action plan in Wygant
violated the equal protection clause. 21 Thus, after Wygant, public employers may not
enact affirmative action plans which include a racial layoff preference to remedy societal
discrimination. Wygant reaffirms, however, that public employers may use limited racial
preferences to correct their own past discrimination. 22
In Wygant, the school board of Jackson, Michigan and the teachers' union had
negotiated an affirmative action plan as part of their collective bargaining agreement. 25
In order to maintain the percentage of minority faculty members attained by hiring
preferences, Article XII of the contract protected minority teachers from layoffs in a
12 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846, 40 FEP Cases at 1324 (1986); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291-99, 17
FEP Cases at 1011:.-14.
15 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, 17 FEP Cases at 1014; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496-99. See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6 (1978).
' 4 See id.
15 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20, 17 FEP Cases at 1022.
15 See supra note 10.
12 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848, 40 FEP Cases 1320, 1325 (1986).
15 1d. at 1852, 40 FEP Cases at 1328. Justice White concurred in this part of the judgment. Id.
at 1857, 40 FEP Cases at 1332 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
151 1d. at 1848-49, 40 FEP Cases at 1325; id. at 1854-56, 40 FEP Cases 1330-31 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1863, 40 FEP Cases at 1336-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 Id.
21 Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger found that the plan violated both parts
of the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 1848, 1852, 40 FEP Cases at 1325, 1328. Justice O'Connor found
only that the plan was not adopted pursuant to a sufficiently compelling purpose. Id. at 1857, 40
FEP Cases at 1332 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White found only that the
plan was unconstitutionally broad in its operation. Id. at 1857-58, 40 FEP Cases at 1332-33 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment). Thus only four Justices found the plan unconstitutional on either
part of the two part standard, but five Justices ruled the plan unconstitutional.
sp Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848, 40 FEP Cases at 1325; see also id. at 1863, 40 FEE' Cases at 1336-
37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1844-45, 40 FEP Gases at 1322.
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greater proportion than their percentage in the workplace." Article XII specifically
provided that teachers would be laid off in reverse seniority "except that at no time will
there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage
of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." 25 Pursuant to this provision,
when layoffs became necessary some white teachers were laid off before black teachers
with less seniority. 26
In 1972 the union and the school board negotiated the layoff provision in Article
XII after a series of events led to a violent escalation of racial tensions in Jackson
schools. 27 In 1969 minority representation on the faculty was 3.9%. 26
 The NAACP filed
a complaint with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission claiming, in part, that the board
discriminated in the hiring of minority teachers. The Commission investigated and
concluded that the NAACP's allegations had merit."
Rather than contest these claims, and require the Commission to make formal
findings of the board's racial discrimination, the school board sought settlement and
agreed to numerous remedial measures including an affirmative action program for
hiring minority teachers." As a result, by 1971 the percentage of minority teachers
reached 8.8%.31
 In that year, however, layoffs became necessary. Since the collective
bargaining agreement provided for layoffs in order of reverse seniority, most of the
minority teachers hired pursuant to the affirmative action program were laid off, "lit-
erally wip[ingJ out all the gain made toward achieving racial balance." 32 At the same
time, racial tensions in the schools rose to violent levels. In early 1972 the school board
decided to respond to these tensions by fully integrating the Jackson school system,
including its faculty." The board recognized that integration of its faculty would require
a modification of the seniority system to prevent economic fluctuations from eviscerating
the results of a hiring program. 34 Thus, the school board and the teachers' union
negotiated for Article XII of the collective bargaining agreement which modified the
schools' reverse seniority layoff practice."
Nonetheless, when layoffs were again necessary in 1974, the school board violated
Article XII by laying off minority teachers before tenured white teachers." The union
and two minority teachers who had been laid off brought suit against the board in
federal court claiming that the board's failure to honor the provision violated the equal
24
 Id.
22 Id. at 1845, 40 FEP Cases at 1322.
26 Id. at 1845, 40 FEP Cases at 1322-23.
2' Id. at 1859, 40 FEP Cases at 1334 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 1859, 40 FEP Cases at 1333 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 1859, 40 FEP Cases at 1554 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
S' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35 1d. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The school board and the teachers' union negotiated Article
XII of the collective bargaining agreement at some length. The teachers' union initially favored
straight seniority and the board a temporary freeze on minority layoffs. Justice Marshall noted in
dissent that "one union leader characterized the development of the layoff compromise as the most
difficult balancing of the equities that he had ever encountered." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 1845, 40 FEP Cases at 1322-23.
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protection clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." In response, the board
denied any prior discrimination." The district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction because of insufficient evidence of prior discrimination by the school board,
and because the plaintiffs had failed to fulfill the jurisdictional prerequisites of Title
VII.39
The union then brought suit in state court raising similar claims. The state court
found for the plaintiffs, ruling that the board breached the contract with the union.1 9
The state court rejected the board's argument that the layoff provision constituted
discrimination against white teachers in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 11 In
holding that the layoff provision did not impermissibly discriminate against white teach-
ers, however, the court did not accept the plaintiffs' position that the provision was
necessary to remedy the school board's prior hiring discrimination against minorities.
The court stated that the plaintiffs had not established that the board discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The court found instead that the under rep-
resentation of minorities on the faculty was the result of societal racial discrimination. 42
Thus, the state court found no history of overt racial discrimination by the school board
but nonetheless held that the layoff provision was a permissible attempt to remedy the
effects of societal discrimination.°
After this ruling by the state court, the board followed the layoff provision. Con-
sequently, in the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, minority teachers were re-
tained white white teachers with greater seniority were laid off.'" Several displaced white
teachers thereafter brought suit in federal court claiming violations of the equal protec-
tion clause, Title VII, and other state and federal statutes. On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. 15 The court found that the
board need not ground the racial preferences embodied in the layoff provision on a
prior finding of discrimination. 16 Rather, the lower court concluded that preferences
were permissible under the equal protection clause as an effort to remedy societal
discrimination by providing role models for minority students.° The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same grounds." The plaintiffs then petitioned for
a writ of certiorari, solely on their equal protection claim, which the Supreme Court
granted.
The Supreme Court reversed the tower courts, striking down the layoff provision
as violative of the equal protection clause. 49 Justice Powell wrote for a plurality of the
Court. He applied the strict scrutiny standard, reiterating his position that "the level of
57 Id. at 1845, 40 FEP Cases at 1323. The plaintiffs also sought pendant jurisdiction over state
law contract claims.
" Id.
" Id.
4° Id.
41 Id.
4s Id.
4, Id.
44 Id. at 1845-46, 40 FEP Cases at 1323.
45 Id. at 1846, 40 FEP Cases at 1323.
4° Id.
47 Id .
4, Id.
19
 Id.
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scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a
group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination."" Justice
Powell therefore applied a two-prong standard of review. First, he stated, the racial
classification must be justified by a compelling governmental purpose, and second, the
means adopted by the state to bring about that purpose must be narrowly tailored to its
achievements' Justice Powell found that the layoff provision failed both prongs of the
test. Two Justices joined in his opinion. Justice O'Connor, however, agreed only that the
stated purpose was insufficient to justify a racial preference, and Justice White agreed
only with the second part of the plurality's opinion, that the means were unconstitution-
ally broad. 52 Thus a plurality of five Justices held that the plan was unconstitutional."
Justice Powell stated that societal discrimination alone is not sufficiently compelling
to support a racial classification." For a court to find an affirmative action plan valid,
the Justice maintained, the public employer must make some showing of its prior
discrimination." Only an effort to remedy the employer's own past discrimination, he
stated, is sufficiently compelling to permit the racial classifications of affirmative action."
Justice Powell rejected the role model theory accepted by the lower courts, reasoning
that it "has no logical stopping point." 57 Because there is no relation between the role
model theory and the harm caused by prior hiring discrimination, Justice Powell main-
tained that an affirmative action plan based on the role model theory might continue to
operate long past the point of a legitimate remedial purpose." Justice Powell therefore
concluded that despite the incontrovertible fact that there has been discrimination in
America, "societal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive" to justify discrimi-
natory legal remedies which harm innocent people.s4 Thus, Justice Powell's approach
requires the employer to make particularized findings of its own past hiring discrimi-
nation before enacting an affirmative action plan.
Although the Court agreed with Justice Powell that the correction of past or present
racial discrimination warrants the remedial use of a narrowly constructed affirmative
action plan, the Justices did not agree on the evidentiary standard necessary to justify
remedial affirmative action. Both the plurality and the dissent rejected the petitioner's
argument that an affirmative action plan could only be valid if there was an explicit
admission or full judicial finding of actionable racial discrimination by the employer. 6°
Justice Powell rejected the petitioner's argument and reasoned that in order for a court
to uphold an affirmative action plan as responsive to a sufficiently compelling govern-
mental purpose, the court must make the factual determination that the employer had
a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary."'
" Id. at 1846, 40 FEP Cases at 1324.
51 Id.
52
 See supra note 21.
53 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846, 40 FEP Cases at 1324.
54 Id. at 1847, 40 FEP Cases at 1324.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1848, 40 FEP Cases at 1325.
57 Id. at 1847, 40 FEP Cases at 1324.
58 Id. at 1847-48, 40 FEP Cases at 1324-25.
59 Id. at 1898, 40 FEP Cases at 1325.
" Id.
61 See supra note 21. The Solicitor General had also argued as amicus that the employer must
be fully adjudged guilty of prior discrimination before the Constitution permits affirmative action.
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Applying his "strong basis in evidence" standard, Justice Powell found that the the
board had presented no evidence of its prior discrimination, and that the several cases
below had determined that any statistical disparity between the percentage of minority
teachers and the relevant labor market was the result of "general societal discrimination,"
not of discrimination by the school board. 62 In its pleadings and arguments before the
Supreme Court, the board submitted extensive extra-record documentation of its past
discriminatory hiring practices and claimed that because of the complex litigation history
surrounding the layoff provision it had not previously been in its interest to prove its
own prior hiring discrimination.° Justice Powell rejected as untimely the board's de novo
attempts to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient evidence to prove the board's past
discrimination.64
Justice Powell and three other justices further found that the layoff provision was
not a constitutional means of achieving even a compelling governmental purpose.°
Justice Powell distinguished cases involving hiring goals by stating that the burden borne
by innocent individuals in the hiring cases is diffused among society generally, whereas
in cases involving layoffs paAicular individuals lose their jobs.'''' The Justice concluded,
therefore, that denial of a future employment opportunity is not as heavy a burden as
the loss of an existing job.'" Thus, four Justices consider that laying off nonminority
employees to remedy their employer's discrimination imposes too heavy a burden on
the employees, and that any affirmative action plan which includes a racial preference
in layoffs is unconstitutionally broad." Rather, employers should use the less intrusive
means of hiring goals to remedy employment discrimination."
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment and followed Justice Powell's use of
the two-prong strict scrutiny standard." She agreed that the role model theory of
remedying societal discrimination was not compelling, but did not agree with Justice
Powell that layoff provisions are inherently unconstitutional as overbroad. 7 ' In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor stressed public employers' need for an opportunity to
remedy their prior racial discrimination voluntarily without incurring subsequent liability
to non minorities affected by affirmative action plans." She agreed that to require em-
ployers to make full admissions or be adjudicated guilty of past discrimination before
they may constitutionally implement affirmative action would destroy public employers'
incentive to fulfill voluntarily their civil rights duties." This, the Justice reasoned, would
"clearly be at odds with this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on the value of
See Wyganl 106 S. Ct. at 1862, 40 FEN Cases at 1336. Seven members of the Court explicitly rejected
the Justice Department's position.
62 Wygani, 106 S. Ct. at 1849, 40 FEP Cases at 1325-26.
63 Id. at 1858, 40 FEP Cases at 1333 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
04 Id. at 1849, 40 FEN Cases at 1326.
65 Id.; id. at 1857-58, 40 FEP Cases at 1332-33 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
68 Id. at 1851-52, 40 FE? Cases at 1327.
67 Id. at 1852, 40 FEP Cases at 1327.
6° Id. at 1852, 40 FEN Cases at 1328; id. at 1857-58, 40 FEN Cases at 1332-33 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
66 Id. at 1852, 40 FEN Cases at 1328.
70 Id. at 1853, 40 FEN Cases at 1329 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
7 L Id. at 1857, 40 FEP Cases 1332 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 1856, 40 FEP Cases at 1331-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
"Id. at 1855, 40 FEP Cases at 1330 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law."' For this reason, Justice O'Connor
agreed with the plurality that the proper standard for establishing prior discrimination
as the basis of affirmative action is a 'firm basis" in evidence. 75
The dissent joined the plurality on the issue of the findings of prior discrimination
necessary to justify an affirmative action plan, on much the same reasoning as that given
by Justice O'Connor. 76 The dissent did not agree, however, on the principle issues
governing the disposition of the case. Three Justices, led by Justice Marshall, would not
have heard the case at al1. 77 Due to the procedural history of the layoff provision,
especially the fact that the minority teachers had no opportunity to present facts sup-
porting their discrimination claims against the board because the case was appealed after
a victory on summary judgment, the dissent would have remanded the case to the district
court for further fact finding on the issue of the board's discrimination. 78
Although arguing that the facts were insufficient to support an opinion, Justice
Marshall nonetheless explained why the dissent would have upheld the affirmative action
plan. The dissent argued for the application of the intermediate standard of review for
affirmative action first articulated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakhe.79
Specifically, the dissent maintained that the "remedial use of race is permissible if it
serves 'important governmental objectives' and is 'substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.''B0 These Justices reasoned that strict scrutiny was inappropriate
because whites have none of the immutable characteristics of a suspect class and because
the remedial racial classification did not impinge upon a fundamental right.si
Drawing upon the extra-record materials submitted to the Court, the dissent argued
that it was unnecessary to rely upon the purpose of remedying societal discrimination
pled below." Rather, the dissent reasoned that the history of efforts to integrate the
Jackson schools, with its attendant violence, the finding of the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission that the board had discriminated in hiring, and statistical evidence of under
representation of minorities on the faculty were sufficient to define the board's purpose
as the correction of its own prior discrimination." In addition, the dissent continued,
the board sought the preservation of the faculty integration achieved in the early 1970s
in order to attain stability and educational quality in the schools. 64 Both these purposes,
74 Id. at 1855-56, 40 FEP Cases at 1330-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). She
argued that it would undermine "the States' constitutional duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate
the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination." Id. at 1856, 40 FEP Cases at 1331
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
"Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
76 Id. at 1863, 40 FEP Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1858, 40 FEP Cases at 1333 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 1861, 40 FEP Cases at 1335 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50 Id, (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359, 17 FEP Cases at 1036).
"' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1863, 40 FEP Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall does not make this point clearly. Rather,
one may infer it from his reasoning. Justice Powell noted this lack of clarity and interpreted Justice
Marshall's statement to mean either that Justice Marshall felt the board must offer sufficient
evidence of its own prior discrimination, which Justice Powell found lacking, or that Justice Marshall
was satisfied with the remedying of societal discrimination as a constitutionally permissible purpose,
in which case further evidence of the board's own discrimination was unnecessary. Id. at 1849 n.5,
40 FEP Cases at 1326 n.5.
84 Id. at 1863, 40 FEP Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall posits the purpose
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the dissent argued, were sufficiently important to justify the use of remedial racial
classifications."
Coming to the second prong of the intermediate standard of review, the dissent
strongly disagreed with the plurality's analysis of the layoff provision as too intrusive
and overbroad. Justice Marshall characterized as untenable Justice Powell's finding that
preferential layoff protection is not permissible in the face of massive layoffs because,
according to Justice Powell, hiring policies serve the same purpose at a lesser cost."
Justice Marshall stated that "[a]s a matter of logic as well as fact, a hiring policy achieves
no purpose at all if it is eviscerated by layoffs."" In addition, Justice Marshall drew upon
evidence that the lack of some layoff protection would have crippled the board's efforts
at recruiting minority teachers to conclude that the plan was sufficiently narrowly tailored
to achieve the purpose of integrating the faculty." Justice Marshall further rebutted
Justice Powell's conclusion that race-conscious layoff plans are always unconstitutional
by noting that Article XII itself did not require teachers to be laid off. Rather, economic
forces caused the school board to lay off teachers. Although those displaced are severely
harmed through no fault of their own, Justice Marshall maintained that this is not in
itself a constitutional violation." The Justice pointed out that any per se constitutional
somewhat more broadly than that pled by the school board. He stated the board's interest in
integrating the faculty as "diversity and stability for the benefit of all students." Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Prior to review by the Supreme Court the board had characterized its purpose as
remedying societal discrimination by providing role models for minority students, not as benefiting
all students by retaining a racially diverse faculty. Justice O'Connor noted that this would have
presented a different question. Id. at 1854 n.*, FEP Cases at 1330 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
85 Id. at 1863, 40 FEP Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
86 Id. at 1864, 40 FEP Cases at 1337-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1864, 40 FEP Cases at 1338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1864, 40 FEP Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
g9 id. at 1864, 40 FEP Cases at 1338 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall distinguished
the Title VII case of Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), on the grounds that the layoff
protection afforded minority employees in Stotts was the result of a court order, while the layoff
provision in Wygant was collectively bargained and agreed to by both the school board and the
union. Justice Marshall placed considerable weight on the fact that the provision was voluntary. Id.
at 1860, 40 FEP Cases at 1334-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He stated:
the perceived dangers of affirmative action misused, therefore, are naturally averted
by the bilateral process of negotiation, agreement, and ratification. The best evidence
that Article XII is a narrow means to serve important interests is that representatives
of all affected persons, starting from diametrically opposed perspectives, have agreed
to it — not once, but six times since 1972.
Id. at 1866, 40 FEP Cases at 1339 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The result was a narrow provision,
Justice Marshall argued, because "it allocates the impact of an unavoidable burden proportionately
between two racial groups." Id. at 1865, 40 FEP Cases at 1338-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell responded to this argument. He characterized Justice Marshall's view of the case
as "not in terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens 'between two
racial groups.'" Id. at 1850 n.8, 40 FEP Cases at 1327 n.8. The petitioners, Justice Powell continued,
are not a group but individual teachers win') claim that they lost their jobs because of their race.
"That claim," he maintained, "cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues .... The
Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc grants within discrete
racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away peti-
tioners' rights." Id.
While Justice Powell's view is likely to prevail in the way the majority articulates the reverse
discrimination claims of white individuals affected by affirmative action, Justice Marshall's argument
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prohibition against layoff protection is the equivalent of ruling that the practice of basing
layoffs on seniority is so fundamental that the constitution prohibits its modification. 90
Justice Marshall concluded that this proposition is inconsistent with established precedent
allowing modification of seniority to achieve other public policies."
The most important principle of Wygant is in its dicta. Seven members of the Court
firmly and specifically rejected the argument that an affirmative action plan is only
constitutionally valid if supported by an antecedent or contemporaneous judicial finding
of previous discrimination, or a full admission by the employer. 92 Nonminority employees
or applicants will therefore not succeed in claiming that an affirmative action plan which
lacks a judicial finding of discrimination violates the equal protection clause. After
Wygant, a public employer still must make a convincing showing that its past discrimi-
nation requires remedial racial preferences, but that showing need not rise to the level
of independent liability." Although the Wygant Court struck down the affirmative action
plan in question, the Court's indication that it will not require full judicial findings of
discrimination to uphold affirmative action is an important reaffirmance of the Court's
general support for remedial affirmative action.
On the specific facts of the case, 94 the only holding which emerged from the plurality
is that racial preferences in layoffs implemented to provide role models for minority
students, and thereby remedy societal discrimination, are unconstitutional." An insuf-
ficient number of Justices agreed to strike down explicitly either the purpose or the
means involved in the affirmative action plan. Nonetheless, the Court offered a strong
more accurately reflects the reality of affirmative action. Justice Powell's polemics notwithstanding,
it is difficult to see how affirmative action is ever anything other than a group "bloc grant" of
constitutional proportion. By definition, affirmative action is a benefit granted to various individuals
on the basis of their membership in a group. Affirmative action is not make whole relief to
identifiable victims of discrimination. Rather, it is the reapportionment of some benefit from the
members of one group, who may never have been guilty of discrimination, to the members of
another group, who may never have been harmed, simply because most members of the latter
group have been harmed at one time or another. When the Court holds that remedial affirmative
action is valid, it is simply because the previous group harm perpetrated by a particular institution
is perceived to warrant a group remedy. See generally, 0. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
99 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1864, 40 FEP Cases at 1338.
Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976) (court may displace
innocent workers by granting retroactive seniority to victims of employment discrimination)).
93 See supra, note 22.
93 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1848, 40 FEP Cases at 1325.
In large measure Wygant itself was decided by what the Justices took from the complex and
curiously pled cases below. The plurality restricted itself to the record presented, while the dissent
disagreed largely on facts and claims not officially before the Court. Thus, much of the reasoning
by Justices Powell and Marshall either fails to intersect in an agreed upon record of operative facts,
or is parallel and differs in outcome only because of the evidence adduced. For example, Justice
Powell did not accept the board's argument that its purpose was at least in part to remedy its own
past hiring discrimination, nor did he accept the extra-record evidence to that effect, while Justice
Marshall did both and consequently argued that the board passed the plurality's own standard for
articulating a compelling state purpose.
In light of the fact that Justice Powell failed to win a majority for the proposition that layoff
protection is per se unconstitutional, there is a strong argument that the Court could have avoided
the ensuing fragmented plurality by remanding the case for clarification of the board's past hiring
discrimination.
" See supra notes 17-18.
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indication that public employers must link affirmative action closely to their own prior
discrimination. 96 Furthermore, justice Powell reiterated his position that societal discrim-
ination is too amorphous a concept to support affirmative action." Wygant therefore
strongly suggests, but does not hold, that societal discrimination is insufficient to justify
racial remedies.
The strange combination of the school board's limited goal of role models for
minority students and its broad purpose of correcting "societal" discrimination prevented
the Court from addressing the more difficult question of whether goals other than the
remedying of an employer's own past discrimination could be compelling justification
for racial hiring preferences. For example, Wygant does not address the question of
whether a school may hire minorities in order to gain a diverse faculty for the educational
benefit of all students. Such a purpose, however, seems to parallel the motives approved
in Bakke where the Court found that affirmative action in school admissions to achieve
a diverse student body is a compelling governmental goal. 99 Although the dissent stated
that it would uphold such a purpose, 99 there is no indication how the Wygant plurality
would view such a question.
Nor does the Wygant plurality specifically hold that layoff protection is an imper-
missible means of achieving a compelling goal.' 96 The logic of the four Justices who so
ruled appears to rest on the Court's reluctance to alter seniority expectations in civil
rights cases. Justice Powell cites Firefighters v. Stotts in support of his belief that affirmative
action involving layoffs is simply too onerous under any circumstances.'" The Justice's
per se rejection of layoff protection would mean that for the foreseeable future affirmative
action is only a fair weather option. When jobs are scarce, the correction of past invidious
racial discrimination not directly linked to individual victims must simply wait for the
economy to improve.
The proposition that layoff protection is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, or is not
the least restrictive available means to achieve even the compelling redress of prior
discrimination, is also theoretically unsound. As Justice Marshall points out, in the face
of layoffs, racial layoff protection is the narrowest means available to achieve the goal
of correcting past discrimination.'" Only if Justice Powell's compelling governmental
interest in correcting past discrimination is understood as contingent upon a sustained
period of economic stability can thejustice correctly reason that layoff protection is not
the least restrictive means available to remedy past discrimination. Justice Powell's rea-
soning is more appropriately stated, therefore, as finding that the correction of past
discrimination, otherwise compelling, is not compelling enough when the cost to achieve
that purpose is the modification of a layoff order. If layoffs are inevitable, integration is.
impossible for any reason without racial layoff protection. Nonetheless, after Wygant,
public employers would be ill advised to include such a provision in an affirmative action
plan.
96 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848, 40 FEP Cases at 1325.
97 See id.
98 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15, 17 FEP Cases at 1020.
" Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1863, 40 FE-13 Cases at 1337 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 1857, 40 FEP Cases at 1332 ( Justice O'Connor did not concur on this point).
101 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1851, 40 FEP Cases at 1327. See supra note 89 for a brief discussion
of Stotts.
102 /d. at 1865, 40 FEP Cases at 1339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Wygant contains two implications which are of direct relevance to public employers
and unions. First, seven members of the Court explicitly reject the requirement that an
employer reduce findings of its prior discrimination to a legal certainty, before the
Constitution will permit remedial affirmative action. Second, the plurality finds that a
collectively bargained contract between a union and an employer does not supplant or
restrict the constitutional claims of individual employees. If the individual can prove a
constitutional harm from the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court will strike that part of the contract.
In sum, Wygant demonstrates the continued factionalization of the Supreme Court
in defining the constitutional parameters of affirmative action. The case holds only that
a school board may not use racial preferences in layoffs for the purpose of retaining
faculty role models for minority students and thereby correcting societal discrimination.
Wygant strongly suggests, however, that any purpose defined as the correction of societal
discrimination will be constitutionally insufficient. Furthermore, Wygant strongly suggests
that at least four Justices are likely to find racial protection in layoffs an unconstitutionally
intrusive means for any purpose. After Wygant, public employers must implement affir-
mative action plans when the economy is stable or expanding, and, if their plans are
challenged, they must prepare convincing evidence of their prior discrimination.
B. *Supreme Court Endorses Court -Ordered Affirmative Action for Non - Victims: Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC'
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits courts to order an employer
or a labor union found guilty of discrimination to take affirmative action to correct that
unlawful practice. 2 Such affirmative action, the statute provides, may include, but is not
limited to, ordering the reinstatement or hiring of employees or the admission of
individuals to a unions The final sentence of section 706(g) indicates that no court shall
order the admission, hiring, reinstatement or promotion of an individual who was
refused admission or advancement, suspended or fired, for any reason other than a
discriminatory one.'
* By Kathleen E. McGrath, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REinEw,
1 106 S. Ct. 3019, 41 FEP Cases 107 (1986).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Section 706(g) provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate .. No order of the court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him
of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended or expelled, or
was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin in violation of ... this title.
Id.
3 Id.
7 Id.
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While the statute expressly permits courts to order affirmative action, 5 it does not
specify under what circumstances a court may order it. The United States Department
of Justice, after the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 6 began to interpret section 706(g) as allowing courts to order affirmative action
only when the plan benefits individuals who are proven victims of specific discriminatory
acts.? In Stotts, a federal court ordered city officials to ignore the city's established seniority
system for determining which workers to lay off. 8 Thus, city officials laid off white
firefighters with greater seniority than some minority firefighters. 9 The city had hired
the minority firefighters as part of an affirmative action plan to achieve approximately
the same racial composition in the force as in the county."' The city did not admit to
any practice of discrimination in agreeing to the consent decree, which was the basis of
its affirmative action plan." The Supreme Court overturned the court order and held
that federal courts could disrupt a bona fide seniority system only to benefit individuals
who are proven victims of discrimination."
The Justice Department argued for a broad interpretation of Stotts, 18 and in amicus
briefs, asserted that any affirmative action plan that benefits individuals who are not
proven victims of discrimination violates Title VII." Seven courts of appeal refused to
accept Stotts as an absolute bar to court-ordered affirmative action that aids non-victims
before the Supreme Court considered the issue.' 5
During the Survey year, in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association
v. EE0C, 16 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the Justice Department's
reading of Stotts and section 706(g) of Title VII," and held that courts may, in certain
circumstances, order employers or unions to take affirmative action that benefits those
who are not proven victims of discrimination. 18 In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court deter-
mined that a union's egregious and continuous discrimination in defiance of earlier court
orders justified the imposition of affirmative action in the form of a short-term mem-
bership goal for minority group members.' 9 A plurality distinguished the Stotts case by
5 1d.
6 467 U.S. 561, 34 FEP Cases 1702 (1984).
7 Beck, The Supreme Court Decisions of the 1985-86 Term, 3 THE LAB. LAW. 55, 56 (Winter 1987).
8 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 566-67, 34 FEP Cases at 1706.
g Id. at 567, 34 FEP Cases at 1706.
10 1d. at 565, 34 FEP Cases at 1705.
"Id.
12 1d. at 583, 580, 34 FEP Cases at 1712, 1711.
" See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3049,
41 FEP Cases 107, 127 (1986).
I , Id. See also Beck, supra note 7, at 56.
15 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 36 FEP Cases 153 (6th Cir. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 40 FEP Cases 1321 (1986); Deveraux v. Geary, 596 F. Supp.
1481, 36 FEP Cases 415 (D. Mass. 1984), aff 'd, 765 F.2d 264, 38 FEP Cases 23 (1st Cir. 1985); EEOC
v. Local 638 & Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 36 FEP Cases 1466 (2d
Cir. 1985); Pennsylvania v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 770 F.2d 1068, 38 FEP Cases
673 (3d Cir. 1985); Diaz v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752• F.2d 817, 36 FEP Cases 1742
(9th Cir. 1985); Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 37 FEP Cases 1186 (11th Cir. 1985); Crann v. City of
Madison, 738 F.2d 786, 35 FEP Cases 296 (7th Cir. 1984).
16 106 S. Ct. 3019, 41 FEP Cases 107 (1986).
12 Id. at 3050, 41 FEP Cases at 128.
12 1d. at 3054, 41 FEP Cases at 131.
' 9 1d. at 3050-51, 41 FEP Cases at 129.
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differentiating between retroactive "make whole" relief and prospective affirmative ac-
tion relief, concluding that only the former is limited to proven victims of discrimina-
tion.2°
The Sheet Metal Workers case presented two major issues: the correct interpretation
of section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the appropriate
standard of constitutional review for remedies sanctioned by section 706(g). 21 Six mem-
bers of the Court agreed that under section 706(g) a district court may order race-
conscious relief that benefits individuals who are not proven victims of discrimination. 22
Five of those six justices held that a membership goal which benefits non-victims is
permissible under Title VII; Justice White concluded, however, that a specific member-
ship goal for protected class members represents an impermissible quota." In addition,
while they could not agree on the correct standard of constitutional review, five justices
concluded that the remedy in Sheet Metal Workers passed the strictest standard of consti-
tutional scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest
in ending unlawful discrimination. 24
In Sheet Metal Workers, a federal district court issued contempt citations against a
union based on the union's failure to implement court-ordered remedies imposed after
a 1975 trial found the union guilty of discriminating against non-whites in recruitment,
selection, training and admission." The union appealed the contempt finding, as well
as the court's order that the union meet a 29.23 percent non-white membership goal by
August 31, 1987. 26 It also challenged the court's order to set up a fund, financed by a
$150,000 contempt fine, to seek out non-white union members through a variety of
measures. 27 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
to Id. at 3049, 41 FEP Cases at 128. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens.
21 Id. at 3024, 3052, 41 FEP Casei at 109, 130.
22 1d. at 3059, 41 FEP Cases at 131, The six justices were the plurality of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, Justice Powell, and Justice White.
22 Id. at 3062, 41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
24 See id. at 3052-53, 3054-55, 41 FEP Cases at 130-31, 132.
22 See id. at 3028, 3029, 41 FEP Cases at 112, 113. The Court described the district court's 1975
trial findings: (I) the union required applicants to take an entrance examination and to prove they
had a high school diploma, although neither requirement was related to job performance and each
had a discriminatory impact on non-whites; (2) the union restricted the size of its membership in
order to deny access to non-whites and responded to increased demands for its services by issuing
temporary work permits to whites; (3) the union selectively organized non-union sheet metal shops
with few, if any, minority employees; and (4) the union discriminated in favor of white applicants
seeking transfer from sister locals. See id. at 3026-27, 41 FEP Cases at 110-11.
After it made these findings, the district court imposed an affirmative action program requiring
the union:
to offer annual, non-discriminatory journeyman and apprentice examinations, select
members according to a white-nonwhite ratio to be negotiated by the parties, conduct
extensive recruitment and publicity campaigns aimed at minorities, secure the admin-
istrator's consent before issuing temporary work permits, and maintain detailed mem-
bership records, including separate records for whites and non-whites.
Id. at 3027, 41 FEP Cases at 11 1.
26 1d. at 3031, 41 FEP Cases at 113-14.
47 1d. at 3030, 41 FEP Cases at 113. Among the uses of the fund were paying for non-white
union members to serve as liaisons to vocational and technical schools with sheet metal programs,
creating part-time and summer sheet metal jobs for qualified non-white youths, extending financial
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district court's contempt citation and its orders regarding the membership goal and the
fund.2" The union then sought review by the United States Supreme Court.
In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the union, joined by the Solicitor
General representing the Justice Department, charged that the membership goal and
the fund exceeded the scope of Title VII. The union argued that the district court
misread Title VII by granting a race-conscious preference to individuals who are not
proven victims of discriminatory action." The union further contended that the mem-
bership goal and the fund were unconstitutional because they violated the equal protec-
tion component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment."
Six members of the Court held that Title VII does not prohibit courts from ordering
race-conscious relief that aids individuals who are not proven victims of discrimination,
particularly when the discrimination has been egregious. 31 Four of these six justices,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, issued a plurality opinion concluding
that the plain meaning of the statute, its broad underlying purpose, and the intent of
Congress as demonstrated in the legislative history of Title VII support this interpre-
tation. 32
assistance to needy apprentices, paying for counseling and tutorial services to non-white apprentices
and providing financial support to employers for job training. Id.
2 " Id. at 3030, 41 HP Cases at 113. The Second Circuit upheld the district court's contempt
remedies, including the fund order and the affirmative action plan, with two modifications. Id. at
3031, 41 PEP Cases at 114. It set aside the requirement that one minority apprentice be named for
each white apprentice and clarified the district court's instructions on developing non-discriminatory
selection procedures. Id.
29 Id. at 3031, 41 FEP Cases at 114.
5" Id. In addition to its Title VII and constitutional claims regarding the membership goal and
the fund, the union charged that the membership goal was based on incorrect statistical evidence,
that the civil contempt remedies were criminal in nature and were imposed without due process,
and that the appointment of an administrator to supervise membership practices interfered with
(he union's rights to self-governance. Id. The Court rejected each of these arguments. Id. at 3054,
41 PEP Cases at 131.
51 Id. at 3050, 3059, 41 FEP Cases at 128-29, 131.
32 See id. at 3034-47, 41 FEP Cases at 109-30. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment and
joined the plurality opinion except for its analysis of the legislative history of Title VII and its
constitutional reasoning. Id. at 3054, 41 FEP Cases at 132 (Powell, J., concurring in part). He
indicated that he had some doubts about the opinion's interpretation of the legislative history of
Title VII. Id. (Powell, j., concurring in part). He concluded, however, that neither the legislative
history nor the plain language of the statute clearly supported the Justice Department's view that
courts order remedies only for pi -oven victims of discrimination. Id. (Powell, j., concurring in part).
Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality that the district court had used statistical evidence
properly, that its civil contempt sanctions were not criminal in nature, and that its orders did not
usurp the union's right to self-governance. Id. at 3057, 41 PEP Cases at 134 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). She dissented in the judgment, however, because she contended that section
703(j) and section 706(g) must be read together to interpret the statute correctly, and that such a
reading prohibits courts from ordering relief of the type in this case. Id. al 2058, 41 FEP Cases at
134-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White agreed with the plurality and
Justice Powell that Title VII permits courts to order race-conscious relief that benefits non-victims,
but dissented in the judgment because he considered the goal in this case to be a quota. Id. at 3062,
41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist and Chief justice Burger joined in a
dissent, arguing that Title VII does not permit courts to order relief for non-victims. Id. at 3063,
41 PEP Cases at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in their plurality opinion, started
the analysis of section 706(g) of Title VII by examining the plain language of the statute."
The plurality concluded that this section of the statute clearly expresses congressional
intent to give district courts broad powers to award equitable relief in employment
discrimination cases.." The plurality further stated that the last sentence of section 706(g),
which states that no court order shall require admission or reinstatement of anyone
excluded for a reason other than a discriminatory one, meant only that a court could
not order a union or an employer to accept an unqualified person." The plurality then
applied this interpretation of the statute to the facts and concluded that the affirmative
action agreement in Sheet Metal Workers did not force the union to accept unqualified
individuals."
Next, the plurality found that the broad purposes underlying Title VII support the
conclusion that section 706(g) allows individuals who are not proven victims of discrim-
ination to obtain relief. 37 The broad purpose behind Title VII, the plurality asserted,
was the fostering of equal employment opportunities for whites and non-whites." Courts
often cannot carry out this purpose effectively, the plurality reasoned, unless they have
the power to require an employer or union to take affirmative steps." For example, the
plurality stated, if an employer or a labor union had practiced discrimination over a
long period of time, an injunction reiterating the statute's prohibition against discrimi-
nation would probably be pointless." An injunction in those circumstances, the plurality
contended, could result in endless enforcement litigation.4 1
In addition, the plurality noted, affirmative steps may be justified to dispel a union's
or an employer's reputation for discrimination among qualified potential applicants. 42
The plurality further reasoned that a court may find that ordering interim hiring or
promotional goals is the only workable approach when the development of non-discrim-
inatory hiring procedures or tests is pending. 43 Without an interim goal, the plurality
stated, a court would be faced with choosing between a temporary freeze on hiring or
the continued use of discriminatory practices."
" See id. at 3035, 41 FEP Cases at 117. For the text of section 706(g), see supra note 2.
" Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3035, 41 FEP Cases at 117.
55 Id.
58 Id.
31 Id. . Referring to remarks of Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the statute's sponsors, the
plurality stated that Congress was aware that minority workers suffered from "pervasive and
systematic" discrimination when it adopted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 3035-36, 41
FEP Cases at 117.
" Id, at 3035-36, 41 FEP Cases at 117.
" Id. at 3036, 41 FEP Cases at 118.
40 Id.
42 Id,
4' Id. at 3037, 41 FEP Cases at 118-19.
44 Id. The plurality noted that the Supreme Court previously had supported racial preferences
to address past discrimination. Id. In the 1980 case of Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court upheld a
federal statute that allotted ten percent of federal public works construction funds for businesses
run by minorities. 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980). The plurality opinion also noted that the United States
Courts of Appeals have unanimously agreed that racial preferences may be appropriate to remedy
past discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3037 and n.28, 41 FEP Cases at 119 and
n.28. The plurality's footnote lists twenty-six Title VII cases that support the point, including at
least one case from each circuit court. Id.
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The plurality next considered its interpretation that section 706(g) provides affir-
mative relief to non-victims in light of its legislative history.45 The plurality analyzed the
statements of legislators and reasoned that the bill's supporters were concerned with
assuring opponents that Title VII would not force employers or labor unions to adopt
quotas to avoid unlawful discrimination charges.° As support for their interpretation,
the plurality pointed to the bill sponsor's insertion of another section, section 703(j), into
the statute. 47 Section 703(j) indicates that nothing in Title VII should be interpreted to
require employers or unions to maintain a work force that reflects the racial, religious,
ethnic or gender distribution of the community.° It is clear, the plurality maintained,
that the bill's supporters added section 703(j) to emphasize that the existence of a racially
imbalanced work force alone would not violate Title V11. 49
•	 The plurality stressed that while Congress rejected the use of racial quotas merely
to correct a racial imbalance in the workforce, the legislators did not consider the
imposition of racial quotas or preferences as a remedy for past discrimination. 50 The
interpretative question, the plurality noted, is whether Congress intended to prohibit
courts from ordering racial preferences or goals to redress past discrimination. 5 ' Because
Congress expressly gave the courts broad equitable powers to devise remedies and did
not expressly prohibit courts from ordering race-conscious remedies, the plurality rea-
soned that Congress did not intend to limit the federal courts' remedial powers.52
45 1d. at 3038, 41 FEP Cases at 119.
46 See id. at 3038-44, 41 FEP Cases at 119-24.
47 Id. at 3038, 41 FEP Cases at 119.
* 6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982). Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer, referred to or classified for employment by any employment agency or
labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization,
or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area. •
Id.
49 Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3038, 41 FEP Cases at 120.
5° See id. at 3044, 41 FEP Cases at 124.
5t Id.
52 1d. For additional support for this view of the scope of the district courts' remedial powers,
the plurality pointed to the contemporaneous policies of the Justice Department and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the two agencies charged with enforcing Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 3044-45, 41 FEP Cases at 124. In a footnote, the plurality observed
that the Justice Department had now abandoned its earlier support for court-ordered affirmative
action. See id, at 3045 n,38, 41 FEP Cases at 124 n.38. The quoted portion of the Solicitor General's
brief in the 1979 case of United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), as set out in
the footnote, follows:
To be sure, there was considerable concern that the Act would be construed to require
the use of quota systems to establish and maintain racial balance in employers' work
forces. [citations omitted]. The sponsor of the bill repeatedly assured its opponents
that this was not the intent and would not be the effect of the statute. [citations
omitted]. But these assurances did not suggest restrictions on remedies that could be
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The plurality, moreover, contended that the legislative history of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 (the EEOA) supports its interpretation of the courts'
remedial powers under Title VII." The EEOA amended Title VII in several ways, the
plurality noted, including the addition of language to section 706(g) that stressed the
broad equitable powers of the courts to order affirmative action." According to the
plurality, during the debate over the EEOA, the Senate considered and rejected an
amendment that would have broadened Title VII's prohibition against quotas." The
amendment would have banned the use of variable percentages, goals and ranges, which
courts and federal agencies had used when ordering relief for past discrimination." The
Senate turned down that amendment by a two-to-one vote, the plurality noted, and also
rejected a proposed amendment to limit the executive branch's power to impose race-
conscious remedies." Because Congress decided to broaden the equitable powers of the
courts, and refused to narrow the definition and use of race-conscious remedies, the
plurality concluded that Congress intended courts to have the ability to order such
remedies, if they are needed to correct past discrimination."
In its final section construing the meaning of Title VII, the plurality opinion con-
sidered whether the Court's language in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts"
restricted the power of courts to order race-conscious relief to individuals who are not
proven victims of discrimination." The plurality'quoted language from Stotts in which
the Court stated that the policy behind section 706(g) "is to provide 'make-whole' relief
only to those who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination." 6' The plurality,
however, distinguished the Stotts language by explaining that "make-whole" relief and
affirmative action relief serve different purposes." Make-whole relief, the plurality
noted, can include competitive seniority, backpay or promotion to restore those who are
ordered after a finding of discrimination. Instead, they made it clear that the statute
would not impose a duty on employers to establish racially balanced work forces and
that it would not require or even permit employers to establish racial quotas for
employment in the absence of discrimination of the kind prohibited by the Act.
[citations omitted].
Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Weber, O.T. 1978 Nos. 432, 935 and 436, pp. 29-30.
The brief concludes that "the last sentence of Section 706(g) simply state[s] that a court could not
order relief under the authority of the Act if employers took action against employees or applicants
on grounds other than those prohibited by the Act." Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3045 n.38,
41 FEP Cases at 124 n.38.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e- l to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13-2000e-17. See Sheet
Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3045-46, 41 FEP Cases at 125-26.
55 Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3045, 41 FE? Cases at 125.
55 Id. at 3095, 3046, 41 FEP Cases at 125, 126.
"6 See id. at 3095-47, 41 FEP Cases at 125-26. Opponents of the amendment argued that it
would "deprive even the courts of any power to remedy clearly proven cases of discrimination." Id.
at 3046, 41 FEP Cases at 125 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1676 (remarks of Senator Javits)).
" Id. at 3046, 41 FE? Cases at 125. A second proposed amendment would have extended the
reach of section 703(j)'s prohibition of quotas to executive branch orders. Id. It was defeated by a
large margin. Id.
" Id. at 3047, 41 FEP Cases at 126.
59 467 U.S. 561 (1984). For a discussion of Stotts, see supra text accompanying notes 6-14.
60 Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3048, 41 FEP Cases at 127.
61 Id. at 3049, 41 FEP Cases at 127 (quoting Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80, 34 FEP Cases 1702,
1711 (1984)).
"See id. at 3049, 41 FEP Cases at 127-28.
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actual victims of discrimination.° The purpose of affirmative action, the plurality stated,
is not to make identified victims whole, but to break a pattern of discrimination affecting
an entire class of people." The Stotts limitation on a court's authority to order individual
make-whole relief does not, the plurality contended, affect a court's power to order
class-wide affirmative action.°
While six justices interpreted Title VII as permitting the district court to order the
Sheet Metal Workers Union to establish a membership goal and a fund, only five of
those justices reached the question of the constitutionality of the district court's action."
These five justices agreed that the court's action was constitutional under the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause. 67 Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, the same four justices that interpreted Title VII at
length in the plurality opinion, concluded that the remedy in Sheet Mei& Workers was
constitutional. Justice Powell agreed the district court acted constitutionally, but wrote
separately to set out his standard for constitutional review."
The plurality noted that the justices in favor of upholding the constitutionality of
the remedy could not agree on the proper standard of review under the equal protection
clause for evaluating race-conscious remedies. 69 The source of the disagreement, the
plurality explained, was how rigorous the standard of review must be. 70 Without settling
on a standard, the plurality concluded that the remedies ordered in this case would meet
the strictest possible scrutiny because they were narrowly tailored to carry out the
compelling state interest in eradicating past discrimination. 71
Applying this strict scrutiny standard to the union, the plurality determined that
the union's egregious violation of Title VII, coupled with its resistance to correcting
those violations, justified the use of race-conscious remedies:72 The plurality considered
the membership goal and the fund for attracting minority candidates to be narrowly
tailored remedies because they have a marginal impact on the interests of .white work-
ers." The plurality reasoned that the district court's orders did not harm existing workers
and that, while the orders may affect future applicants, they did not create an absolute
bar to admission by whites. 74
In his opinion concurring in part, Justice Powell argued that the Court should apply
its strictest standard of constitutional review to the use of race-conscious remedies. The
remedies, according to Justice Powell, should be narrowly tailored to justify a compelling
65 Id. at 3049, 41 FEP Cases at 128.
" Id.
65 Id. Justice Powell, in his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, distin-
guished Stotts by contending that the Court never reached the question whether Title VII might
ever permit a court to order a remedy that benefits those who are not proven victims of discrimi-
nation. Id. at 3054, 41 FEP Cases at 132 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
" Id. at 3054, 41 FEP Cases at 131-32. Justice White did not reach the constitutional issue
because he found the district court's remedy to be an impermissible quota. Id. at 3062-63, 41 FEP
Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 3054, 41 FEP Cases at 132 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
66 Id. at 3052-53, 41 FEP Cases at 130-31.
70 Id,
71 Id. at 3053, 42 FEP Cases at 130-31.
'2 See id. at 3053, 41 FEP Cases at 131,
75 See id.
1, Id.
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state interest." Justice Powell reasoned that the district court, in ordering a fund to
attract minority candidates and counter the recalcitrance of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Union, furthered two compelling state interests." The compelling state interests, Justice
Powell stated, were the governmental interest in eliminating unlawful discrimination,
and the societal interest in seeing court judgments obeyed. 77 Justice Powell concluded
both were served by enforcing the court's fund order."
The 29.23 percent minority membership goal, however, raised a different question,
Justice Powell stated." Racial goals, Justice Powell contended, should be evaluated using
five factors he established in his concurrence in the 1980 case of Fullilove v. Klutznick.B0
The five factors are: the efficacy of alternative remedies; the planned duration of the
remedy; the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed
and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant work force; the availability
of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and the effect of the remedy
on innocent parties."
The waiver provision, Justice Powell explained, could be met more generally by the
existence of flexibility in a race-conscious goal." Because the district court based its
contempt finding on the union's unwillingness to take steps to end discriminatory prac-
tices, and not on the union's failure to meet the membership goal, Justice Powell con-
cluded that the goal fit his flexibility requirement." Justice Powell noted that the district
court had given the union three time extensions to meet the membership goal, which
demonstrated the goal's flexibility."
Justice Powell also applied the remaining four factors to the Sheet Metal Workers'
membership goal and found it acceptable.H 5 Justice Powell emphasized that the district
court's orders did not appear to harm whites directly." With Justice Powell's deciding
vote, the Court declared the district court's action constitutional.
justice White, in his dissenting opinion, never reached the question of constitution-
ality.a7 He concluded that Title VII could be interpreted to permit courts to order
affirmative action remedies that benefitted those who are not actual victims of discrim-
ination." The membership goal ordered in this case, however, did not fit within per-
missible affirmative action remedies, Justice White reasoned." Justice White concluded
that the goal was actually an impermissible quota because the district court held the
union in contempt for failing to meet it, despite mitigating circumstances." Because
Title VII expressly forbids quotas, Justice White dissented in the judgment."
75 See id. at 3054-55, 41 FEP Cases at 132 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
7 " See id. at 3055, 41 FEP Cases at 132 (Powell, J„ concurring in part).
77 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
7" Id. at 3055, 41 FEP Cases at 132-33 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
"Id. at 3055, 41 FEP Cases at 133 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
"0 See id. (Powell, J., concurring iri part). Justice Powell first articulated these factors in his
opinion in Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
81
 Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3055, 41 FEP Cases at 133 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
82 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
82 Id, at 3056, 41 FEP Cases at 133 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
" Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
85 1d. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
• 86 Id. at 3056, 41 FEP Cases at 134 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
"7 See id. at 3062-63, 41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 3062, 41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
89 See id. at 3062-63, 41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
"0 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 3062, 41 FEP Cases at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor, who concurred in ,part and dissented in part, agreed that the goal
was an impermissible quota. 92 Because the union must meet the goal on pain of sanction,
regardless of economic circumstances or the availability of qualified minority candidates,
the goal was actually a quota, Justice O'Connor reasoned. 93 A permissible goal, Justice
O'Connor asserted, should require only that the employer or labor union make a good
faith effort to come within a range of the numerical goal." The goal in Sheet Metal
Workers, Justice O'Connor contended, was achieving racial balance between the union's
membership and the workforce at large, and thus was the sort of racial balancing courts
are forbidden to do by section 703(j) of Title VII. 9 9
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the judgment in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Warren Burger. 96 Justice Rehnquist relied on Stotts to support his view that section 706(g)
of Title VII does not permit a court to order a remedy that helps those who are not
proven victims of discrimination. 97 He did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of
the court's action."
The result in Sheet Metal Workers repudiates the Justice Department's reading of
Stotts that courts may never order affirmative relief that benefits those who are not
proven, actual victims of discrimination. 99 The plurality also made clear, however, that
district courts should order relief that benefits non-victims only when necessary to
enforce Title VII effectively.") In a majority of cases, the plurality stated, a court's order
to stop a particular discriminatory practice will be adequate to enforce Title VII effec-
tively. 1O' Affirmative measures such as membership or hiring goals are necessary, the
plurality indicated, only when discrimination has been particularly egregious or persis-
tent. 192
The Court was justified in its interpretation that Title VII may be used to benefit
those who are not proven victims of discrimination. Remedies such as those ordered in
Sheet Metal Workers are essential to break up patterns of discrimination that make it
difficult to prove an individual is the victim of specific discriminatory conduct. Further-
more, the Court approved a plan that struck a fair balance between the benefit to
protected class members and the burden to non-minority members. The fact that seven
circuit courts of appeal were unanimous in endorsing a broader view of Title VII than
the Justice Department advocated adds to the credibility of the result.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Stotts and Sheet Metal Workers reflect a distinction
between non-minorities who hold jobs and non-minorities who seek jobs.'" Where a
proposed remedy would disrupt an established seniority system and cause innocent non-
minorities to lose jobs, the Court held in Stotts that such a remedy may only benefit a
proven victim of discrimination, 104 If the remedy only delays or diminishes, without
92 Id. at 3057, 41 FEP Cases at 134 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
99 Id. at 3060, 41 FEP Cases at 136 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
" See id, at 3060, 41 FEP Cases at 135-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
99 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
99 Id. at 3063, 41 FEP Cases at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 3049, 41 FEP Cases at 128.
'op Id. at 3050, 41 FEP Cases at 128-29.
101 Id.
192 Id, at 3050, 41 FEE' Cases at 129.
03 Berke, The Stotts Dilemma: Will Wygant Resolve It?, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 635, 653 (1986).
1 '4 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 565, 34 FEP Cases at 1705.
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destroying, the chances of non-minorities to get a job or become a union member, as in
Sheet Metal Workers, the Court will approve a remedy that benefits non-victims.'"
Another relevent distinction between Stotts and Sheet Metal Workers is that in the
former, the affirmative action plan was based on a consent decree and there was no
finding of discriminatory conduct, while in the latter, the court found the union guilty
of discrimination and "foot-dragging" in correcting the problem. Thus in analyzing
whether a court is likely to sustain a proposed remedy, one should examine both whether
the parties based the affirmative action plan on a consent decree or a finding of specific
discrimination, and whether the remedy will impact heavily on non-minorities.' 06
 Under
Stotts, if a consent decree is the only basis for an affirmative action plan, the plan cannot
result in non-minority employees losing their jobs. Under Sheet Metal Workers, a specific
finding of discriminatory conduct against a union, coupled with the union's reluctance
to undo the effects of its discrimination, will support an affirmative action plan that
benefits non-victims but does not cause whites to lose their jobs. The case leaves open
the question whether a finding of specific discriminatory conduct is enough or if there
must also be "foot-dragging" to justify affirmative action.
Once a court has resolved the threshold issue of whether affirmative action is
necessary to enforce Title VII, the plurality indicates the next step is devising a remedy
that fits the violation.'" Courts should balance the past harm of the defendant's discrim-
ination, the plurality states, with the potential impact of the remedy to ensure that the
remedy is not overly broad.'" Just what remedies will fit that balance remains for future
decisions to resolve.
Another question left open by Sheet Metal Workers is the appropriate standard for
determining whether a remedy violates the equal protection clause. The five justices who
found the remedy in Sheet Metal Workers to be constitutional could not agree on how
rigorous the standard of review should be.'" Until a standard is established, one can be
sure only that a remedy which meets the strictest scrutiny will pass muster.
VI. SECTION 1983
A. *Race Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Includes Members of Ethnically and Physiognomically
Distinct Groups: Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College'
Congress enacted section 1981 of the United States Code to eliminate discrimination
against any person under the auspices of federal or state law. 2 Although the statute itself
does not mention race,' the United States Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as
'" Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052, 41 FEP Cases at 131.
1°6
 Berke, supra note 103, at 653-54.
Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050, 41 FEP Cases at 129.
meld.
Id. at 3052-53, 41 FEP Cases at 130-31.
* By Lisa K. Snow, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
784 F.2d 505, 40 FE? Cases 397 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 43 FEP Cases 1305
(1987).
:See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
3 1d. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
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applying only to racial discrimination.' While it is clear that a black person, or a white
person,5 can bring a discrimination action under section 1981, the Supreme Court has
not yet defined how far the term "race" reaches in allowing those not clearly black or
white to bring a section 1981 suit. 6
Because only racial discrimination is cognizable under section 1981, definitional
problems arise in determining whether a claimed "race" is actually a distinguishable race,
or simply a person's national origin.? Some courts and parties to section 1981 actions
have attempted to distinguish race from national origin by employing scientific, taxon-
omical definitionss that seek to classify persons by race according to unique, immutable
characteristics.9 Many courts, however, have determined that a scientific distinction be-
tween race and national origin is futile, and have further concluded that there is consid-
erable, if not complete, overlap between the two terms. 1 ° As one federal district court
explained, taxonomical definitions are subjective classifications that exist only in the
human mind, not in the objective universe.' I Thus, one classification scheme may identify
50 distinct races, while another could conclude that there are only thirty races. 12 Because
of the arbitrary nature of scientific classification systems, many courts have rejected racial
distinctions based on taxonornical 'definitions."
Courts that reject the scientific classification approach instead use judicially created
racial classifications under section 1981 to distinguish between groups that are commonly
perceived as "non-white,"'' that have traditionally experienced discrimination,' 5 that are
not part of the "favored class," 16 or that are part of a group distinct from "white
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . .
Id. See also Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970, 19 FEP Cases 191, 192 (10th
Cir. 1979) ("section 1981 makes no mention of race, national origin, or alienage").
4 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp, Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287, 12 FEP Cases 1577, 1582 (1976).
Section 1981 is distinguishable from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because Title VII
includes actions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
5 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-89, 12 FEP Cases at 1582-83. In McDonald, the Court found that
because section 1981 applies to "all persons," it includes white persons. Id. at 287, 12 FEP Cases at
1582 (emphasis in original). The broad language of the bill, the Court explained, after examining
the legislative history, was not limited to aiding emancipated Negroes. Id. at 289, 12 FEP Cases at
1583. See also Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 , F. Supp. 550, 556, 29 FEP Cases 1494, 1498-99 (E.D.
Cal. 1982).
6 See Ortiz, 547 F. Supp, at 556, 29 FEP Cases at 1498.
7 Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 559, 29 FEP Cases at 1500 (quoting Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g,
Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1299 n.1, 19 FEP Cases 1661, 1662 11.1 (9th Cir. 1979)); Aponte v. National
Steel Serv. Clr., 500 F. Supp. 198, 202, 24 FEP Cases 609, 611-12 (N.D. 111. 1980).
a Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 565, 29 FEP Cases at 1505-06. Taxonomic classifications seek scientifi-
cally to organize plants and animals into orderly classifications according to their presumed natural
relationships. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1186 (150th anniv. ed, 1981).
9 See Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 565, 29 FEY Cases at 1505.
E.g,, Baliker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (N.D. 111. 1983); Ortiz, 547 F.
Supp. at 562, 29 FEP Cases at 1503; Aponte, 500 F. Supp. at 202, 24 FEP Cases at 612; LaFore v.
Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 825, 19 FEP Cases 189, 190 (D. Colo. 1978).
" Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 565, 29 FE? Cases at 1505.
12 See id. at 565-66, '29 FEP Cases at 1506 (quoting C.S. COON, S. GARIY, J. BIRDSELL, RACES: A
STUDY OF THE. PROBLEMS OF RACE FORMATION IN MAN 140 (1950)).
13 See, e.g., Banker, 579 F. Supp. at 1186; Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 566, 29 FEP Cases at 1506-07.
14 Aponte, 500 F. Supp. at 202-03, 24 FEP Cases at 612.
15
 Banker, 579 F. Supp. at. 1185-86.
'" LaFore, 448 F. Supp. at 826, 19 FEP Cases at 191.
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citizens.'" Using these criteria, courts have determined that Mexican-Americans, 18
Puerto Ricans,' 9 and Indians," for example, belong to distinct races, and consequently
have extended section 1981 rights to these groups. Thus, there is disagreement among
the courts over what makes a particular group a race, or even if a racial classification,
as distinct from classification based on national origin, is appropriate under section 1981.
During the Survey year, in M-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that race discrimination prohibited under section 1981 included dis-
crimination against a member of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive group."
Using this definition of race, the Third Circuit concluded that an ethnic Arab may rely
on section 1981 to remedy racial discrimination against him or her. 22 By defining race
under the statute, the Third Circuit has attempted to clarify the boundaries of who may
sue under the statute." Subsequent to the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Third Circuit's definition of race."
In Al-Khazraji, the plaintiff, an Iraqi-born college professor, alleged that the defen-
dant college denied him tenure because of his Iraqi background and Muslim faith. 25 Al-
Khazraji applied for tenure at Saint Francis College in January 1978, but the college
Tenure Committee recommended to the Board of Vustees in February that tenure not
be granted. 26 On October 30, 1980, after unsuccessfully seeking a reconsideration of his
tenure proposal through college channels and exhausting state civil rights complaint
" Manzanares, 593 F.2d at 971, 19 FEP Cases at 193.
113 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g, Inc., 597 F.2d 129$, 1300, 19 FEP Cases 1661,
1662 (9th Cir. 1979) (Mexican-American basing discrimination on brown skin); Manzanares, 593
F.2d at 972, 19 FEP Cases at 193 (spanish surnamed persons); LaFore, 448 F. Supp. at 825-26, 19
FEP Cases at 190-91 (same).
19 Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 568, 29 FEP Cases at 1508.
20 Banker, 579 F. Supp. at 1184; Baruah v. Young, 536 F. Supp. 356, 363 (D. Md. 1982). But
see Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp, 786, 787, 14 FEP Cases 504, 505 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (Slavic person denied section 1981 protection); Kurylas v. United States Dept. of Agric., 373
. F. Supp. 1072, 1073, 1075-76, 7 FEP Cases 207, 208, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Polish person denied
section 1981 protection).
21
 Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 514, 517, 40 FEP Cases 397, 404, 405-
06 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 43 FEP Cases 1305 (1987). The court does not explicitly
define what it means by "ethnically or physiognomically distinct." See id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at
406. The dictionary defines "ethnic" as of or relating to races or large groups classed according to
common traits and customs. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 389 (150th anniv, ed. 1981).
"Physiognomic" is defined as of or relating to judging character by the features, nature, physique,
or appearance. Id. at 859. It seems unlikely that the Third Circuit meant to distinguish members
of races according to their inner characters. The court must have meant "physiognomic" to refer
to classifying by distinctive physical features. •
"/11-Khazraii, 784 F.2d at 514, 40 FEP Cases at 404. The court also held that the individual
members of a tenure committee may be held personally liable for any intentional infringement of
section 1981 rights. Id, at 518, 40 FEP Cases at 407.
" See id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406.
"Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2028, 43 FEP Cases 1305, 1308-09
(1987). The Court emphasized, however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify
for section 1981 protection. Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
25
 Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 506, 40 FEP Cases at 397.
26
 Id. at 507, 40 FEP Cases at 398.
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procedures,'' Al-Khazraji filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania."
Al-Khazraji based his first pro se complaint on the college's alleged violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 After obtaining counsel and filing amended
complaints, Al-Khazraji additionally alleged violations of Title 42, sections 1981, 1983,
1985(3), and 1986, as well as violations of state laws." Al-Khazraji based the federal
claims of discrimination on his Arabian race, Iraqi national origin, and Muslim religion.''
During 1981, the district court judge dismissed the section 1986, Title VII, and
section 1985(3) claims as untimely." In 1984, the district court also granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the remaining sections 1981 and 1983, and state law
claims." The district court ruled that Al-Khazraji's claim of discrimination on the basis
of being Arab was not cognizable under section 1981. 54
On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that only Al-Khazraji's section 1981 and
pendant state law claims survived procedurally." Reasoning that "race" at least included
membership in an ethnically or physiognomically distinct group, the Third Circuit held
that Al-Khazraji's claim made out a prima facie case under section 1981." Thus, the
Third Circuit determined that ethnic Arabs could maintain a section 1981 discrimination
action."
" Id. By the following September, Al-Khazraji contacted the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission (PHRC) to inquire about his civil rights. Id. The PHRC could do nothing because Al-
Khazraji had signed a one year non-renewable employment contract with the college after the
tenure denial the previous spring; the commission could only take action if the termination of
employment had already taken place. Id. He could not file charges until the employment contract
terminated in May, 1979. Id.
Despite faculty support for Al-Khazraji's tenure, the tenure committee in February, 1979 again
refused to reconsider its decision. Id. Within a month after his employment with the college ended
in May, 1979, Al-Khazraji filed a complaint with the PHRC which was deemed a simultaneous filing
with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). Id. Nearly a year later, the P1-(RC
complaint was dismissed, and a few months later, the EEOC issued Al-Khazraji a right to sue letter.
Id. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 398.
29 Id. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 398.
22 Id. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 398-99.
"Id. at 508, 40 FE? Cases at 399. Al-Khazraji alleged under state law that the individual tenure
committee members had violated his rights under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Id. He
also brought state law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
1 ' Id. at 508 n.4, 40 FEP Cases at 399 n.4.
"Id. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 399.
11 Id. at 509, 40 FEP Cases at 399.
"Id. The judge dismissed the section 1983 action for lack of state action. Id.
"Id. at 509-14, 40 FEP Cases at 399-404. The court found that Al-Khazraji's section 1981
claim was not barred by res judicata, id. at 509-10, 40 FEP Cases at 399-400, nor the applicable
statute of limitations. Id. at 511-14, 40 FEP Cases at 401-04. Al-Khazraji's other federal claims, the
court determined, were appropriately dismissed. See id. at 510-11, 40 FE? Cases at 400-01. Because
the federal section 1981 claim remained, the court found that Al-Khazraji's pendent state law claims
survived as well. Id. at 518, 40 FE? Cases at 407. On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
on the narrow questions of statute of limitations and an ethnic Arab's ability to sue under section
1981. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2025, 43 FEP Cases at 1306. Like the Third Circuit, the
Court determined that Al-Khazraji's claim was not time barred. Id.
39 Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 405-06.
32 Id. at 514, 40 FEP Cases at 404.
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The Third Circuit reached its decision on the section 1981 claim by examining the
possible definitions of race under the statute. 38 The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has never explicitly defined race although the COurt frequently has used
the term. 39 The court rejected the defendant's proposed taxonomical definition of race
which, if applied, would have prevented Al-Khazraji from suing under the statute
because Arabs are not taxonomically a distinct race from other Caucasians 40 The court
reached this result because the Supreme Court has extended section 1981 protection to
taxonomical members of the white/caucasian race."
The court next turned to the legislative history of section 1981 for guidance in
formulating a definition of race under the statute." After reviewing the relevant history
of section 1981,45
 the court concluded that Congress did not intend to limit section 1981
to an anthropologically defined group. 44 The court noted that there is in fact no precise
definition of race." Instead, the court believed that Congress intended to ensure that
all people are treated equally, without regard to color or race." The conception of race
intended by Congress, the court maintained, is broad enough to at least include mem-
bership in an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive group."
The court noted that some courts have had difficulty distinguishing the concept of
race from national origin because of the arbitrary dividing line of taxonomical definitions
of race." Despite this, the Third Circuit expressly refused to address claims based on
national origin discrimination under section 1981, 49 and maintained that courts must
still attempt to differentiate between cognizable racial discrimination claims and non-
cognizable national origin-based discrimination claims." The court concluded that its
" Id. at 514-17, 40 FEP Cases at 404-06.
"Id. at 515 n.12, 40 FEP Cases at 404 n.12. Subsequent to the Survey year, the Supreme Court
approved this definition of race. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
4° See Al-Khairaji, 784 F.2d at 514, 40 FEP Cases at 404. See supra note 8 for a definition of
"taxonomic."
4 ' Id. at 514-15, 40 FEP Cases at 404. The Supreme Court, in its decision in Saint Francis
College, noted that the Third Circuit properly rejected the college's taxonomicai argument. 107 S.
Ct. at 2026, 43 FEP Cases at 1307.
45 Id. at 515, 40 FEP Cases at 404.
45 Id. at 515-16, 40 FEP Cases at 404-05.
44 Id. at 516, 40 FEP Cases at 405.
Id. at 516 & n.13, 40 FEP Cases at 405 & n.13.
46 Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 405.
47 Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 405-06. On appeal, the Supreme Court also extensively examined
the legislative history of section 1981. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026-28, 43 FEP Cases at
1307-08. It concluded that the enacting Congress did not intend to limit section 1981 to scientifically
defined groups. Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308. The Court noted that at the time section 1981
was enacted, such ethnic groups as Scandanavians, Chinese, Mexicans, and Anglo-Saxons, were
considered separate races. Id. at 2027, 43 FEP Cases at 1307-08. Based on this history, the Court
concluded that Congress intended section 1981 to forbid discrimination against "identifiable classes
of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics." Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308. The Court thus maintained that the Third
Circuit was "quite right" in holding that section 1981 at a minimum includes discrimination against
a member of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive group. Id.
4 ' Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406.
" Id. at 514 n.11, 40 FEP Cases at 404 n.11.
" Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406. In the Supreme Court decision in Saint Francis College, Justice
Brennan, in his concurrence, emphasized that the line between "ancestry or ethnic characteristics"
and "place or nation of origin" is not a bright one. 107 S. Ct. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1309
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standard for dividing out cognizable claims — membership in an ethnically or physiog-
nomically distinct group — was consistent with legislative intent." In applying this
standard to the present case, the court found that an ethnic Arab fits under its definition
of race;52 the court was not willing to maintain that Arabs could not be victims of racial
prejudice because "prejudice is as irrational as is the selection of groups against whom
it is directed." 5' Therefore, the court held that Al-Khazraji should be given the oppor-
tunity to prove discrimination under section 1981. 54
Although the concurring judge, Judge Adams, questioned the majority's interpre-
tation of the legislative history, he stated that he felt constrained to join in the holding
that an Arab may sue under section 1981." Judge Adams believed that Congress in-
tended section 1981 to apply only to discrimination against blacks." He admitted, how-
ever, that a few Congressmen may have expressed the broader interpretation of the
statute reached by the majority. 57 Judge Adams agreed that a taxonomical definition of
race would be inappropriate because it is too narrow." Nevertheless, the majority's
definition of race, he continued, implicitly extends section 1981 coverage to groups
distinguishable by national origin because virtually any nationality can be seen as ethn-
ically and physiognomically distinct."
While recognizing that stopping invidious discrimination in any form is salutory, 00
Judge Adams contended that making, definitional distinctions is the province of the
legislature not the courts. 61 He recognized that although the majority is, in his view,
misinterpreting the statute's legislative history, the majority's interpretation of section
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's interpretation of the majority opinion was, however,
that discrimination based on "birth place alone" is not cognizable under section 1981. Id. at 2029, 43
FE? Cases at 1309 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
51 Id, at 516-17, 40 FEP Cases at 405-06.
55 fd. at 517-18, 40 FEY Cases at 406.
" Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406.
54 Id. at 518, 40 FE? Cases at 406. The court also held that the individual members of the
Tenure Committee could be liable under section 1981. Id. at 518, 40 FEP Cases at 407. The court
analogized the federal civil rights remedy of section 1981 to a tort remedy. Id. at 518, 40 FEP Cases
at 406. Under tort law, the court stated, an injured third party may sue an individual, including a
director, officer, or agent of a corporation for the individual's torts whether acting individually or
on behalf of the corporation. Id. Moreover, the court stated that directors, officers, and employees
of a corporation may be personally liable for intentional discrimination under section 1981 regard.
less of the corporation's liability. Id. at 518, 40 FEY Cases at 407. Thus, the court concluded that if
the Tenure Committee members were personally involved in intentional infringement of Al-Khazra-
ji's section 1981 rights, then they may be held liable. Id.
In addition, the court concluded that the individual defendants could be found liable under
the pendent Pennsylvania Human Rights Act claim. Id. at 518-19, 40 FE? Cases at 407. The court
also found that the individual defendants were not liable on a breach of contract theory for lack of
privity between the plaintiff and these defendants. Id. Finally, the court found that the individuals
could be liable on an intentional infliction of emotional distress theory because privity is not required
to bring this claim. Id. at 519, 40 FEP Cases at 407.
"1d. at 519, 40 FE? Cases at 407 (Adams, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 519, 40 FEP Cases at 408 (Adams, J., concurring).
57 Id.
55 Id. at 520, 40 FEP Cases at 408 (Adams, J., concurring).
59 Id .
6(' Id.
61 Id. at 520, 40 FEP Cases at 408-09 (Adams, J., concurring).
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1981 was consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of the statute. 62 Given that
some definition of race must be formulated, judge Adams reservedly concluded that the
majority's approach was more sensible than formulating a scientific, though arbitrary,
definition of race." Thus, he concurred in the holding that Al-Khazraji may sue under
section 1981.6'
The definition of "race" proposed by the majority correctly is not confined to a
strict, arbitrary, technical definition of race. In its broadness, the definition recognizes
the more realistic possibility that someone may be discriminated against because of ethnic
or physiognomical differences . 65 The language of the definition is unclear, however,
because it fails to recognize explicitly that race cannot clearly be distinguished from
national origin."
By formulating a definition of .race that includes ethnically and physiognomically
distinct groups, the Al-Khazniji court provides no guidance to aid courts in distinguishing
between race and national origin. In its opinion, the court claims that it is not passing
on the issue of the cognizability of a claim based on national origin under section 1981. 67
As the concurring opinion points out, however, the majority's definition includes virtually
every nationality because almost any nationality can be viewed as ethnically distinct."
Also, despite explicitly rejecting a taxonomical definition of race, the majority neverthe-
less seems to adopt a partial taxonomical definition by including physiognomical distinc-
tions in its definition of race. 69 While it is arguably impossible to formulate a definition
of race that does not account for nationality, by explicitly refusing to include national
origin within its classification, and then announcing a racial classification system that
includes virtually any national origin, the majority has left the imprecise boundary
between "race" and "national origin" obscure.
Courts that reject the strict race requirement achieve a more sensible resolution to
the question of who may sue under section 1981. 76 These courts, in their formulations
of "race," compare the treatment accorded the complainant with the treatment commonly
accorded the favored class in society. 71 If a person is part of a group that has traditionally
experienced discrimination, whether because of national origin, or skin color, or what-
62 Id. at 519, 40 FEP Cases at 407 (Adams, J., concurring).
67 1d. at 520, 40 FEP Cases at 408 (Adams, J., concurring).
64 Id, at 520, 40 FEP Cases at 409 (Adams, J., concurring).
65 Id, at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406.
66 See id. at 514 n.11 & 517, 40 FEP Cases at 404 n.11 & 406.
67 Id. at 514 n.11, 40 FEP Cases at 404 n.11.
66 Id. at 520, 40 FEP Cases at 908 (Adams, J., concurring).
69 See id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406. The Supreme Court majority opinion does little to clarify
the Third Circuit's definition because it expressly approves the Third Circuit's language. Saint
Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308. The Court does emphasize, however, that
a distinctive physiognomy is not the essential factor for section 1981 protection. Id. The Supreme
Court stated that, on remand, Al-Khazraji must prove he was the victim of intentional discrimination
based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin,
or his religion. Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308-09. See supra notes 8 and 21 for definitions of
"taxonomic" and "physiognomic" respectively.
7° See, e.g., Banker, 579 F. Supp. at 1185; Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 566, 29 FEP Cases at 1506-07;
Aponte, 500 F. Supp. at 202, 24 FEP Cases at 612; LaFore, 448 F. Supp. at 825-26, 19 FEP Cases at
190-91.
See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. See also Manzanares, 593 F.2d at 970, 19 FEP
Cases at 192 ("The measure is group to group ....").
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ever irrational basis, that person has a cognizable claim under section 1981.72 A flexible
definition of who may sue under section 1981 that is based on past overt discrimination
reflects the historical fluctuations in favored, and disfavored, groups."
Moreover, a flexible, comparative definition of who may sue under section 1981 is
not inconsistent with the language of the statute. 74 Even though the Supreme Court has
interpreted the statute to allow only racial discrimination," the statute itself declares that
discrimination against "all persons" is invalid. 76 A comparative definition reflects the
reality that discrimination occurs against all groups of people, whether black, white, or
somewhere in between. 77
In summary, the Third Circuit, in Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, held that an
ethnic Arab has a cognizable claim of racial discrimination under section 1981 of the
United States Code. The Third Circuit attempted to clarify the definition of "race"
under section 1981 by concluding that race must at least include a member of an
ethnically or physiognomically distinct group. While this broad definition implicitly
recognizes that no clear distinction exists between "race" and "national origin," by failing
to explicitly recognize this fact, the court only further confuses the definition of who
may sue under section 1981.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. *Constitutionality of Political Patronage Hiring Systems: Avery v. Jennings'
The first amendment protects an individual's right to expression free from govern-
mental interference,2 particularly expression concerning political affairs.' Because ad-
vocacy of a political viewpoint is more effective when undertaken by a group' the
Supreme Court has extended the first amendment to guarantee freedom of political
association.5 A state may not abridge an individual's freedom of political association
unless the state demonstrates both that a compelling governmental interest exists, 6 and
that the means used to achieve the interest are no more restrictive than necessary.?
In the 1976 case of Elrod v. Burns, the Supreme Court held that dismissal of various
public employees because of their political affiliation violated the first amendment. 8 In
72 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
73 See Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 567, 29 FEP Cases at 1507.
74 Id. at 564, 29 FEP Cases at 1505.
75 See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287, 12 FEP Cases at 1582.
76 See supra note 3 for the text of section 1981.
77 See Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 567, 29 FEP Cases at 1507.
* By Mark David Lurie, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276 (1986).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
* See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
6 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975).
Kusper v. Pontikes, 919 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973).
8 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Elrod is discussed in Casenote, Constitutional Law —
Freedom of Speech and Association — Government Employees — Elrod v. Burns, 18 B.C. INDUS, 8c COM.
L. Rev. 782 (1977) [hereinafter Boston College Casenotel; Casenote, The Unconstitutionality of Pa-
tronage Dismissals of Public Employees: Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 397 (1976), 9 CONN. L. REV. 678
(1977); Casenote, Elrod v. Burns; Chipping at the Iceberg of Political Patronage, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
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Elrod, a newly elected Democratic sheriff dismissed the chief deputy of the Process
Division, as well as a bailiff, a process server, and an office worker solely because they
were not members of the Democratic party. 9 The Elrod plurality' held that the dismissals
violated the employees' first amendment right to freedom of political association because,
in order to keep their jobs, the employees were required either to pledge allegience to
the Democratic party or to contribute to the party's strength." The Court reasoned that
these requirements would force the employees to compromise their true political be-
liefs." In addition, Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, noted that by dismissing
employees on the basis of political affiliation, the government imposed an unconstitu-
tional restriction on the receipt of a public benefit." For these reasons, the Court held
that dismissal based on political affiliation violates the first amendment rights of public
employees.
In addition, the Elrod plurality held that the government did not demonstrate a
compelling state interest in Favor of patronage dismissals." The Court reasoned that the
interest involved must be governmental, not partisan." Consequently, it rejected the
argument that employees of one political party will subvert the efforts of the adminis-
tration of another party, stating that mere difference of political persuasion does not
necessarily motivate poor conduct. 1 6 The Elrod defendants also argued that patronage
increases efficiency and accountability by motivating employees of an incumbent to
perform well in order to ensure both that their party is re-elected, and that they retain
continued employment." The Court, however, dismissed this argument because it noted
that less restrictive means are available to guarantee efficiency and accountability." Thus,
the plurality held that patronage diiinissals are unconstitutional."
Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, refused to join the plurality's "wide-ranging
opinion."29 According to the concurrence, the Court did not need to decide whether the
entire patronage system was unconstitutional, only whether a government employer
constitutionally may dismiss nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employees solely
REV. 225 (1977); Comment, Patronage and the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 CoLum. L.
REV. 468 (1978) [hereinafter Columbia Comment]; Comment, Patronage Dismissals and Compelling
State Interests: Can the Policymaking1Nonpolkyinaking Distinction Withstand Strict Scrutiny?, 1978 S. ILL.
L.J. 278.
g Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350-51.
10 There was no majority opinion in Elrod. justices White and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's
opinion. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 349. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stewart's concurrence. Id. at 374.
Justices Burger, Rehnquist and Powell dissented. Id. at 375,376. Justice Stevens did not participate
in the decision of the case.
" Id. at 355.
12 Id.
18
 Id. at 358-59.
14 Id. at 360-72.
15 Id. at 362.
16 1d. at 365.
Id. at 366.
18 Id. In addition, the Court observed, the employees were not dismissed because of concern
for efficiency and accountability. On the contrary, they were reinstated after obtaining Democratic
sponsorship. Id. at 364 n.18.
18 Id. at 373.
53 Id. at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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because of their political beliefs and associations." Because the employees in Elrod did
not decide policy or occupy a confidential position, Justice Stewart concurred with the
result.
Because the Elrod decision failed to produce a majority opinion,22 at least two
questions remained open. First, Elrod left unanswered the question, raised by Justice
Stewart's concurrence, whether dismissal of a policymaking, confidential employee may
be based solely on political affiliation. Second, Elrod failed to address whether a refusal
to hire an applicant because of political association would violate the Constitution.
The Supreme Court addressed the first question in Branti v. Finkel." In Branti, a
Democratic public defender attempted to discharge two Republican assistant public
defenders solely because the assistants were Republicans. 24 A majority of the Court held
that, although the employees occupied a confidential position, they could not be dis-
missed solely on grounds of political association." Instead, the Court decided, dismissal
based on party affiliation is permissible only where party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for effective performance." Thus, the Branti Court reasoned, because the
public defender's office is concerned with needs of individual clients, and not with
partisan political interests, party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for effective
performance by an assistant public defender." In summary, following Brawl', a dismissal
based on political association is unconstitutional except where party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for job performance.
The Branti Court, however, left open the question whether political affiliation is an
appropriate criterion in hiring, rather than dismissal, decisions." During the Survey year,
in Avery v. Jennings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the first
amendment prohibits official hiring policies where party affiliation is the sole criterion,
it nonetheless allows elected officials to weigh party affiliation among other factors. 29 In
21 Id, at 374-75 (Stewart, J., concurring),
22 See supra note 10.
22 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Branti decision has generated considerable scholarly literature. See,
e.g., Meier, Ode to Patronage: A Critical Analysis of Two Recent Supreme Court Opinions, 41 Pus. ADMIN.
REV. 558 (1981); Note, Constitutional Law: The Impact of Branti v. Finkel on Political Patronage
Employment, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1981) [hereinafter Oklahoma Note]; Casenote, Patronage Dismissals
Under a First Amendment Analysis: The Aftermath of Branti v. Finkel, 25 ST. Louts U.L.J. 189 (198 1);
Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. Cm, L. REV. 181
(1982) [hereinafter Chicago Comment].
24 Branti, 445 U.S. at 508-09.
22 Id. at 518-19.
25 1d. at 518.
" Id. at 519.
29
	 at 513 n.7 ("In light of the limited nature of the question presented, we have no occasion
to address petitioner's argument that there is a compelling governmental interest in maintaining a
political sponsorship system for filling vacancies in the public defender's office."). At least one court,
however, has stated in dicta that no distinction exists between hiring and firing practices. See Aufiero
v. Clarke, 489 F. Supp. 650, 654 (D. Mass. 1980) ("Clearly, the inducement to suppress one's political
philosophy and choice of party affiliation operates equally forcefully on the person who seeks a job
or promotion as it does on one who desires to retain one.") (citations omitted).
In addition, several commentators have suggested that Elrod and Brand extend to hiring
decisions. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 23 at 560; Oklahoma Note, supra note 23, at 106; Boston
College Casenote, supra note 8, at 800-01; Chicago Comment, supra note 23, at 200-02; Columbia
Comment, supra note 8, at 475-76.
29 Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Avery II].
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Avery, a Democratic plaintiff applied unsuccessfully to three Republican officials for a
clerical job. 3° No job vacancies existed when the plaintiff applied." Indeed, no vacancies
ever occurred in one of the defendant's offices, but additional people were hired when
the workload became too heavy." Generally, as people were needed, the officials hired
friends, relatives, acquaintances, or people connected to political allies." As a result, the
overwhelming majority of employees were Republicans." Furthermore, although the
defendants did not refuse to hire Democrats," and did not inquire into an applicant's
party affiliations 36 the defendants stated that they preferred to hire Republicans both
because they assumed Republicans would work harder to get them re-elected," and
because "it just works better when people have the same philosophy." 3° Consequently,
the defendants did not even consider the plaintiff's application because she was not
connected with the defendants' network of friends and allies."
Based on these facts, and the Elrod and Branti prohibition against employment
dismissals based on political affiliation, both the plaintiff and the defendants filed motions
for summary judgment. 4° The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, but granted
the defendants' summary judgment motion.'" In arriving at this decision, the court
maintained that Elrod" and Branti" do not extend to include cases involving any em-
ployment decisions other than dismissals. 44 The court also held that the plaintiff failed
to show that her party affiliation was a substantial factor in her failure to obtain a job,
because the defendants did not even inquire into her party affiliation. 45
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. 46 The court distin-
guished between the infringement on the plaintiff's freedom of association caused by
"normal" and "informal" political hirings which rely on personal and political connec-
tions, and infringements to freedom of association caused by a patronage system which
makes decisions based solely on party affiliation, such as in Elrod and Branti." Because
the plaintiff in Avery was not deprived of a job with the defendants solely because of her
party affiliation, the court held that any burden on the plaintiff's freedom of association
3° Id.
51
 Avery v. Jennings, 604 F. Supp. 1356,1358 (S.D. Ohio 1985) [hereinafter Avery O.
52 Id.
" Avery II, 786 F.2d at 234 & n.l.
54 Id. at 235. In one of the defendant's office, only two of the 210 people hired were Democrats.
Id. Another defendant hired 62 people, five of whom were Democrats. Id. The third defendant
hired 160 employees, including only three Democrats. Id.
55 Id. at 234-35.
56 /d. at 235.
57 Id.
55 Id.
" Id, at 234. One of the defendants, however, was out of state when the plaintiff mailed her
application letter, and did not see it until after the plaintiff filed suit. Avery 1, 604 F. Supp. at 1359.
4° Avery I, 604 F. Supp. at 1357.
4 ' Id. at 1365.
42 See supra, notes 8-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of Elrod.
43 See supra, notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Branti.
" Avery 1, 604 F. Supp. at 1362.
" Id. at 1364.
46 Avery 11, 786 F.2d at 237.
47 Id.
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was an incidental consequence of other government interests, and did not amount to a
constitutional deprivation. 46
The Avery court then reasoned that the government interests in the system were
legitimate. First, the court remarked, unlike dismissals based solely on party affiliation,
the hiring system in Avery had multiple purposes, including finding good employees,
preserving personal and political connections and creating office harmony and cooper-
ation. 49 In addition to having different purposes, the court also stated that the two
systems led to different results; according to the Avery court, an informal hiring system
enhances the office holder's performance and popularity." In contrast, a hiring system
based solely on party affilition draws attention to ideological differences and punishes
those who disagree with the employer." Balancing the harm to the plaintiff against the
officials' interests, the court found that the Avery hiring system did not offend the
Constitution. 52
In addition, the Avery court noted the practical difficulties involved in judicial scru-
tiny of patronage hiring systems. Because employment decisions take numerous factors
into account, the court observed, judicial review of these decisions would involve the
courts in complex and subjective hiring practices." Moreover, the court predicted, in-
validation of informal hiring networks would lead to a massive civil service system,
overseen by the courts. 54 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that patronage hiring systems are
constitutional as long as political affiliation is not the sole criterion for judging job
applicants.
The Avery decision departs from the spirit and reasoning of Elrod and Branti. First,
the Avery court seems to limit the meaning of "political association" to party affiliation.
In addition, the court fails to distinguish between government and partisan interests.
Finally, the Avery test is concerned with the procedure for filling a position rather than
the nature of the position.
The Avery court observed that the plaintiff was denied public employment, not
because she was a registered Democrat, but because she was not a personal or political
ally of the officials." The court's distinction between affiliation to a party and association
with an elected official is open to criticism. If only political allies may receive public
employment, then people who desire public employment will be forced to support
actively the candidates they consider most likely to be elected, and not necessarily the
ones who are closest to the individual's political ideology. Consequently, a patronage
hiring system may force individuals to contribute to a candidate, or obtain a sponsor, in
compromise of their true political beliefs." Thus, requiring an individual to maintain a
political association with an employer leads to the same constitutional infringement as
*, Id. at 236.
45 Id. at 237.
55 Id.
5 ' Id.
52 Id.
55 Id.
" Id.
55 Id. at 236.
55 See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355-56 (requirement that individual work for candidate or obtain a
sponsor in order to retain job leads to compromise of belief }. See also The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 HARV. L REV. 56, 195 (1976).
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requiring a specific party affiliation. To be consistent with Elrod, the Avery court, there-
fore, should have held that requiring an individual to associate with a political candidate
is as burdensome as requiring affiliation with a specific party, and should have balanced
this infringement against the alleged governmental interests."
In addition, the Avery court held that certain interests were legitimate, even though
the Elrod and Branti Courts dismissed those same interests as invalid. As the Elrod Court
emphasized, "care must be taken not to confuse the interests of partisan organizations
with governmental interests." 58 The Avery court, however, held that the need of elected
officials to hire employees who are aware of the political needs of their employers is a
legitimate need. 58 Additionally, the Avery court identified the maintenance of political
relations, 6° and the enhancement of the official's political appeal 8 1 as legitimate govern-
ment concerns. These concerns, however, clearly are partisan interests.
Moreover, although the Avery court held that one purpose of the patronage system
is to find good employees, 62 the Supreme Court in Elrod noted that patronage appoint-
ments are often made in exchange for the delivery of votes, and not because the employee
is competent." Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Avery accepted the defendant's conten-
tion that shared philosophy leads to greater efficiency," even though the Supreme Court
noted that political homogeneity does not insure greater efficiency." In conclusion, the
alleged interests in Avery are either partisan, or have been rejected specifically by the
Supreme Court.
In summary, the employee is coerced into compromising his political beliefs under
a patronage system, regardless of whether he or she is applying for a position or seeking
to retain one.56 Furthermore, the elected official has no greater legitimate interest in
hiring a political associate for a position than the official may have in firing an employee
who does not share the same political views. Therefore, instead of devising a new test
for patronage hiring, in which an informal system drawing on family and allies is
distinguished from an official system that regards party affiliation as the sole factor, the
Avery court should have adopted the Branti Court's test of whether political affiliation is
necessary for performing the job." Under such a test, political affiliation is an appro-
priate requirement in both hiring and firing decisions only where such affiliation is
necessary for job performance. The court in Avery should have required the defendants
to consider all applications for office positions, rather than hire only those who have
some political connection.
Due to numerous factors that employers consider when deciding upon applicants,
it may be more difficult in cases of hiring, rather than firing, for an individual to prove
57 Instead, the court held that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional deprivation, and that
the only harm caused by the patronage system was institutional — members of a particular party
are dominant in different offices. Avery II, 786 F.2d at 236, 237.
56 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
59 Avery II, 786 F.2d at 237.
69 Id.
61 Id,
62 Id.
63 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-65.
I" See Avery II, 786 F.2d at 235, 237.
65 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-65.
66 See supra note 28.
67 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Branti test.
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that he or she was denied employment because of political affiliation." As the Avery court
observed, the judiciary would be forced to oversee a civil service system to guarantee
that workers are hired because of ability rather than political connection." The specu-
lative difficulty of adjudication, however, should not be sufficient reason for allowing
infringements of constitutional guarantees.
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit in Avery v. Jennings held that political patronage
hirings are permissible as long as party affiliation is not the sole criterion used. The
court maintained that inability to receive public employment in the absence of political
connections is not an infringement of first amendment associational rights. In addition,
the court stated that public officials have legitimate interests in hiring relatives and
political allies. Thus, following Avery, publicly elected officials remain free to hire only
people with political or personal connections, regardless of the nature of the position.
ue See Columbia Comment, supra note 8, at 479-80,
" Avery II, 786 F.2d at 237,
